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Chinese Influence & American Interests

中国影响力与美国利益

Promoting Constructive Vigilance

提高建设性警惕

A publication of the Hoover Institution

胡佛研究所发行

Report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States

中国在美国的影响活动工作小组报告

 

Co-Chairs

联合主席

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University

拉里·戴蒙德,胡佛研究所,斯坦福大学,高级研究员

Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director, Center on US-China Relations, Asia Society

奥维尔·谢尔,亚洲协会美中关系研究中心,阿瑟-罗斯主任

HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS

胡佛研究所出版社

STANFORD UNIVERSITY | STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

斯坦福大学 | 斯坦福,加利福尼亚

 

Working Group Participants

工作小组参加者

This report grew out of a series of discussions over the past year and a half at the Hoover Institution, Sunnylands, and George Washington University in which the following scholars participated:

这份报告来自于过去一年半在胡佛研究所,阳光之乡和乔治华盛顿大学的一系列讨论,参与讨论的学者如下:

Robert Daly, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

罗伯特·戴利,伍德罗·威尔逊国际学者中心

Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

拉里·戴蒙德,胡佛研究所,斯坦福大学

Elizabeth Economy, Council on Foreign Relations

易明,对外关系委员会

Gen. Karl Eikenberry (Ret.), Stanford University

卡尔·艾肯伯里将军(ReT.),斯坦福大学

Donald Emmerson, Stanford University

唐纳德·埃默森,斯坦福大学

Francis Fukuyama, Stanford University

弗朗西斯·福山,斯坦福大学

Bonnie Glaser, Center for Strategic & International Studies

邦妮·格拉泽,战略和国际问题研究中心

Kyle Hutzler, Stanford University

凯尔·胡茨勒,斯坦福大学

Markos Kounalakis, Hoover Institution

马科斯·库纳拉基斯,胡佛研究所

WiNston Lord, Former US Ambassador to China

温斯顿·洛德,前美国驻华大使

Evan Medeiros, Georgetown University

埃文·梅代罗斯,乔治城大学

James Mulvenon, SOS International

詹姆斯·马尔维农,国际 SOS

Andrew J. Nathan, Columbia University

黎安友,哥伦比亚大学

Minxin Pei, Claremont McKenna College

裴敏欣,克莱尔蒙特麦克纳学院

Jeffrey Phillips, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands

杰弗里·菲利普斯,位于阳光之乡的安纳伯格基金会

John Pomfret, The Washington Post

约翰·庞弗雷特,华盛顿邮报

Orville Schell, Center on US-China Relations, Asia Society

奥维尔·谢尔,亚洲协会美中关系研究中心

David Shambaugh, George Washington University

沈大伟,乔治华盛顿大学

Susan Shirk, University of California – San Diego

谢淑丽,加州大学圣地亚哥分校

Robert Sutter, George Washington University

罗伯特·萨特,乔治华盛顿大学

Glenn Tiffert, Hoover Institution

格伦·蒂芙特,胡佛研究所

Ezra VoGel, Harvard University

以斯拉·沃格尔,哈佛大学

Christopher Walker, National Endowment for Democracy

克里斯托弗·沃克,美国国家民主基金会

International Associates

国际合伙人

Anne-Marie Brady, University of Canterbury, New Zealand

安玛丽·布雷迪,坎特伯雷大学,新西兰

Timothy Cheek, University of British, Columbia, Canada

蒂莫西·奇克,英属哥伦比亚大学,加拿大

John Fitzgerald, Swinburne University, Australia

约翰·菲茨杰拉德,澳大利亚斯温伯恩大学

John Garnaut, Former Senior Adviser to Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Australia

约翰·加诺特,前澳大利总理亚麦肯·腾博高级顾问

Timothy Garton Ash, Oxford University, United Kingdom

提莫西·贾顿·艾什,英国牛津大学

Francois Godement, European Council on Foreign Relations

弗朗索瓦·戈德门特,欧洲对外关系委员会

Bilahari KausiKan, Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore

比拉哈里·考斯坎,新加坡外交部前常务秘书

Richard Mcgregor, Lowy Institute, Australia

理查德·麦格雷戈,澳大利亚罗伊研究所

Eva Pils, King’s College London, United Kingdom

伊娃·皮尔斯,英国伦敦国王学院

Volker Stanzel, German Council on Foreign Relations

沃尔克·斯坦泽,德国对外关系委员会

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the participants in the workshop and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution or the participant’s affiliated institutions. The convening organizations of this project have no affiliation with the US government.

本文仅代表研讨会参与者个人观点,并不代表胡佛研究所或参与者所属机构的工作人员、官员或监察委员会的观点。该项目的召集机构与美国政府没有附属关系。

 

Acknowledgments

鸣谢

This Working Group was jointly convened by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the Center on US-China Relations at Asia Society in New York. These co-conveners have also been assisted, financially and logistically, by The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands. We are grateful to each of these institutions for their support of our work, and to Thomas Gilligan, Director of the Hoover Institution, and Ambassador David Lane, President of The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, for their personal support of this project. We also thank the latter two institutions, as well as the China Policy Program of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, for supporting and hosting meetings of the Working Group.

这个工作组是由斯坦福大学的胡佛研究所和纽约亚洲协会的中美关系中心联合召集的。这些共同召集人还得到了设在阳光之乡的安纳伯格基金会信托基金的资金和后勤支持。我们感谢这些机构对我们工作的支持,感谢胡佛研究所基金会主任 Thomas Gilligan 和阳光之乡安纳伯格基金会主席 David Lane 大使对这个项目的个人支持。我们还要感谢这两个机构,以及乔治华盛顿大学伊利亚德国际事务学院中国政策项目,感谢它们对工作组会议的支持和主办。

This report has been a collaborative effort among a group of American scholars and policy practitioners who have spent long careers studying and engaging China, Asia more broadly, and a wide variety of political systems around the world. Each participant also has an abiding interest in protecting and strengthening democratic institutions in the United States and elsewhere in the world. While different participants took the lead in drafting particular sections of the report, each section was reviewed and contributed to by a number of participants in what became a truly collective and collaborative research effort. Our general findings and policy principles represent a broad—though not necessarily complete— consensus of the Working Group Participants.

这份报告是一群美国学者和政策制定者的共同努力,他们花了很长时间研究和参与中国、亚洲以及世界各地各种各样的政治制度。保护和加强美国和世界其他地方的民主体制也符合每个参与者的持久利益。虽然不同的参与者牵头起草了报告的特定章节,但每一章节都得到了一些参与者的审查和贡献,从而成为一项真正的集体和协作性的研究工作。我们的一般调查结果和政策原则代表了工作小组与会者的广泛共识,虽然不一定完整。

This Working Group grew out of the Task Force on US-China Relations (chaired by Susan Shirk and Orville Schell), and we thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation for their support of the Task Force. Although the two efforts share many members in common, they are separate and distinct endeavors.

这个工作组由美中关系工作组发展而来(由 Susan Shirk 和 Orville Schell 担任主席),我们感谢纽约卡内基公司和 Henry Luce 基金会对工作组的支持。虽然这两种努力有许多共同点,但它们是分开的、不同的努力。

We present this report as the collective product of discussions and research among a group of distinguished American specialists on China and US foreign affairs. It analyzes the growing challenge posed by China’s influence-seeking activities in the United States across a number of important sectors of American public life. However, as we note throughout the report, these influence activities are not confined to the US. Indeed, they appear in different forms and to different degrees in a large number of other democratic societies around the world (in some cases more deeply than in the US). We therefore have opted to include in an Appendix short summary reports on China’s influence activities (and the resulting national responses) in eight other countries.

我们提出这份报告,作为一组杰出的美国专家在中国和美国外交事务的讨论和研究的集体成果。它分析了中国在美国公共生活的一些重要领域的寻求影响力活动所带来的日益严重的挑战。然而,正如我们在报告中指出的那样,这些影响力活动并不局限于美国。事实上,它们以不同的形式和不同的程度出现在世界各地的许多其他民主社会(在某些情况下比美国更为严重)。因此,我们决定在附录中列入关于中国在其他八个国家的影响活动(以及由此产生的国家反应)的简短摘要报告。

We owe a particular debt of thanks to Kyle Hutzler, an MBA student at Stanford University with significant experience in China. His superior organizational skills and uncomplaining capacity for prodigious work contributed enormously to the coordination of our work throughout the project. We could not have produced this report without him.

我们尤其要感谢凯尔·胡茨勒(Kyle Hutzler),他是斯坦福大学的 MBA 学生,在中国有丰富的经验。他卓越的组织能力和无怨无悔的工作能力极大地促进了我们整个项目工作的协调。没有他,我们不可能写出这份报告。

We would also like to thank Barbara Arellano and Alison Petersen at the Hoover Institution Press for their dedicated assistance in producing, editing, and publishing this report, as well as Laura Chang at the Center on US-China Relations at Asia Society for her assistance in helping to coordinate the project.

我们还要感谢胡佛研究所出版社的 Barbara Arellano 和 Alison Petersen,感谢他们在制作、编辑和出版这份报告方面的全力协助,以及亚洲协会美中关系中心的 Laura Chang,感谢她协助协调这个项目。

Finally, we would like to thank all of the Working Group participants for their generous contributions of time and effort. None were remunerated for their contributions, and everyone participated and contributed out of their professional and national sense of responsibility.

最后,我们要感谢工作组所有与会者花费时间和精力作出的慷慨贡献。没有人因其贡献而获得报酬,每个人都是出于其专业和国家责任感参与和贡献的。

Larry Diamond, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University

拉里·戴蒙德,胡佛研究院,斯坦福大学

Orville Schell, Center on US-China Relations, Asia Society

奥维尔·谢尔,亚洲协会美中关系研究中心

October 24, 2018

2018年10月24日

 

Contents

目录

Policy Principles for Constructive Vigilance

建设性警惕的政策原则

Introduction

引言

section 1 Congress

第一节 国会

section 2 State and Local Governments

第二节 国家和地方政府

section 3 The Chinese American Community

第三节 美籍华人社区

section 4 Universities

第四节 大学

section 5 Think Tanks

第五节 智囊团

section 6 Media

第六节 媒体

section 7 Corporations

第七节 法团

section 8 Technology and Research

第八节 技术与研究

appendix I Chinese Influence Operations Bureaucracy

附录一 中国影响力运营官僚机构

appendix II Chinese Influence Activities in Select Countries

附录二 中国在选定国家的影响活动

Australia

澳大利亚

Canada

加拿大

France

法国

Germany

德国

Japan

日本

New Zealand

新西兰

Singapore and Asean

新加坡和东盟

United Kingdom

英国

appendix III Chinese-Language Media Landscape

附录三 中文媒体景观

Dissenting Opinion

不同意见书

Afterword

后记

About the Participants

参加者简介

 

Policy Principles for Constructive Vigilance

建设性警惕的政策原则

The members of this Working Group seek a productive relationship between China and the United States. To this end, and in light of growing evidence of China’s interference in various sectors of American government and society, we propose three broad principles that should serve as the basis for protecting the integrity of American institutions inside the United States while also protecting basic core American values, norms, and laws.

这个工作组的成员寻求在中国和美国之间建立富有成效的关系。为此,鉴于越来越多的证据表明中国干涉了美国政府和社会的各个部门,我们提出了三个广泛的原则,作为保护美国境内美国机构完整性的基础,同时也保护美国的基本核心价值观、规范和法律。

 

Transparency

透明度

Transparency is a fundamental tenet and asset of democracy, and the best protection against the manipulation of American entities by outside actors.

透明度是民主的基本原则和财富,也是防止外部势力操纵美国实体的最佳保障。

  • American NGOs should play an important role in investigating and monitoring illicit activities by China and other foreign actors. They should as well seek to inform themselves about the full range of Chinese influence activities and the distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate influence efforts.
  • 美国非政府组织应该在调查和监测中国和其他外国行为者的非法活动方面发挥重要作用。他们也应该努力让自己了解中国影响力活动的全部内容,以及合法与非法影响力活动之间的区别。
  • Congress should perform its constitutional role by continuing to investigate, report on, and recommend appropriate action concerning Chinese influence activities in the United States. It should update relevant laws and regulations regarding foreign influence, and adopt new ones, to strengthen transparency in foreign efforts to exert influence.
  • 国会应该通过继续调查、报告和建议有关中国在美影响活动的适当行动来履行其宪法职责。更新有关外国影响力的法律法规,采用新的法律法规,加强对外影响力的透明度。
  • Executive branch agencies should similarly investigate and publicize, when appropriate, findings concerning these activities, with a view to promoting healthy and responsible vigilance among American governmental and nongovernmental actors.
  • 行政部门机构也应酌情调查和公布有关这些活动的调查结果,以促进美国政府和非政府行为者保持健康和负责任的警惕。
  • The US media should undertake careful, fact-based investigative reporting of Chinese influence activities, and it should enhance its knowledge base for undertaking responsible reporting.
  • 美国媒体应对中国的影响力活动进行认真、基于事实的调查性报道,并增强其进行负责任报道的知识基础。
  • Faculty governance is the key to preserving academic freedom in American universities. All gifts, grants, endowments, and cooperative programs, including Confucius Institutes, should be subjected to the usual procedures of faculty oversight.
  • 教职工管理是美国大学维护学术自由的关键。所有的捐赠、拨款、资助和合作项目,包括孔子学院,应该按照一般的程序接受教师的监督。
  • US governmental and nongovernmental sectors should disclose financial and other relationships that may be subject to foreign influence.
  • 美国政府和非政府部门应披露可能受到外国影响的金融和其它关系。

 

Integrity

诚信

Foreign funding can undermine the independence of American institutions, and various types of coercive and covert activities by China (and other countries) directly contradict core democratic values and freedoms, which must be protected by institutional vigilance and effective governance.

外国资金可能破坏美国机构的独立性,中国(和其他国家)的各种胁迫和秘密活动直接违背核心民主价值观和自由,必须通过机构警惕和有效治理来保护这些价值观和自由。

  • Openness and freedom are fundamental elements of American democracy and intrinsic strengths of the United States and its way of life. These values must be protected against corrosive actions by China and other countries.
  • 开放和自由是美国民主的基本要素,也是美国及其生活方式的内在力量。这些价值观必须得到保护,以免受到中国和其他国家的侵蚀。
  • Various institutions—but notably universities and think tanks—need to enhance sharing and pooling of information concerning Chinese activities, and they should promote more closely coordinated collective action to counter China’s inappropriate activities and pressures. This report recommends that American institutions within each of the above two sectors (and possibly others) formulate and agree to a “Code of Conduct” to guide their exchanges with Chinese counterparts.
  • 各种机构——特别是大学和智囊团——需要加强分享和汇集有关中国活动的信息,它们应该促进更密切协调的集体行动,以应对中国的不当活动和压力。本报告建议上述两个部门(可能还有其他部门)的美国机构制定并同意一项“行为准则”,以指导它们与中国同行的交流。
  • When they believe that efforts to exert influence have violated US laws or the rights of American citizens and foreign residents in the United States, US institutions should refer such activities to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
  • 当他们认为施加影响的行为违反了美国法律或者美国公民和在美国的外国居民的权利时,美国机构应该将这种行为移交给相应的执法部门。
  • Rigorous efforts should be undertaken to inform the Chinese American community about potentially inappropriate activities carried out by China. At the same time, utmost efforts must be taken to protect the rights of the Chinese American community, as well as protecting the rights of Chinese citizens living or studying in the United States.
  • 应当作出严格的努力,向美籍华人社区通报中国开展的可能不当的活动。同时,必须尽最大努力保护美国华人社区的权利,保护在美国生活或学习的中国公民的权利。
  • Consideration should be given to establishing a federal government office that American state and local governments and nongovernmental institutions could approach—on a strictly voluntary basis—for advice on how best to manage Chinese requests for engagement and partnership. This office could also provide confidential background on the affiliations of Chinese individuals and organizations to party and state institutions.
  • 应该考虑建立一个联邦政府办公室美国州政府、地方政府和非政府机构可以在严格自愿的基础上,就如何最好地处理中国的参与和伙伴关系请求寻求建议。该办公室还可以提供中国个人和组织与党和国家机构关系的机密背景资料。
  • All American institutions—governmental and nongovernmental—that deal with Chinese actors (and other potential sources of inappropriate foreign influence) should review their oversight and governance practices and codify and exemplify best standards of practice and due diligence.
  • 所有与中国行为者(以及其他不适当外国影响力的潜在来源)打交道的美国机构——包括政府和非政府机构——都应当审查自己的监督和治理实践,并编纂和示范最佳实践和尽职调查标准。

 

Reciprocity

互惠

American institutions are deflected from their purpose of increasing US-China understanding, and become distorted as one-way channels of Chinese influence, when they are denied access to China on a basis that is reciprocal with the access Chinese institutions are granted here.

当美国机构在与中国机构互惠的基础上被拒绝进入中国时,它们就偏离了增进美中了解的目的,并被扭曲为中国影响力的单向渠道。

  • The asymmetry of scholarly research access is the most glaring example of the lack of reciprocity. A whole variety of normal scholarly activities—including access to archives and certain libraries, fieldwork, conducting surveys, and interviewing officials or average citizens—have been cut off for American researchers in China while Chinese enjoy all of these academic opportunities in the United States. Individually and collectively, universities and other sectors of American democratic life should insist on greater reciprocity of access.
  • 学术研究渠道的不对称是缺乏互惠的最突出的例子。一系列正常的学术活动——包括查阅档案和某些图书馆、实地考察、进行调查、采访官员或普通公民——都被中断,而中国人在美国享有所有这些学术机会。无论是个人还是集体,大学和美国民主生活的其他部门应该坚持更大程度的互惠准入。
  • US government public diplomacy activities are heavily circumscribed in China, while nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have encountered an increasingly difficult environment to carry out their work. More reasonable reciprocity for US public diplomacy efforts in China, relative to China’s activities in the United States, should be addressed in negotiations between the two countries. In addition, this report recommends enhanced American efforts to promote independent news and information, and democratic ideas, through US global broadcasting and efforts to counter disinformation.
  • 美国政府的公共外交活动在中国受到严重限制,而非政府组织在中国的工作环境也日益艰难。相对于中国在美国的活动,美国在中国的公共外交努力更合理的互惠应该在两国之间的谈判中解决。此外,这份报告还建议美国加强努力,通过美国的全球广播和打击虚假信息,促进独立的新闻和信息,以及民主思想。
  • The US government should actively promote and protect opportunities for American actors to operate in China.
  • 美国政府应积极促进和保护美国演员在中国活动的机会。

 

Introduction

引言

For three and a half decades following the end of the Maoist era, China adhered to Deng Xiaoping’s policies of “reform and opening to the outside world” and “peaceful development.” After Deng retired as paramount leader, these principles continued to guide China’s international behavior in the leadership eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Admonishing Chinese to “keep your heads down and bide your time,” these Party leaders sought to emphasize that China’s rapid economic development and its accession to “great power” status need not be threatening to either the existing global order or the interests of its Asian neighbors. However, since Party general secretary Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the situation has changed. Under his leadership, China has significantly expanded the more assertive set of policies initiated by his predecessor Hu Jintao. These policies not only seek to redefine China’s place in the world as a global player, but they also have put forward the notion of a “China option” (中国方案) that is claimed to be a more efficient developmental model than liberal democracy.

在毛泽东时代结束后的35年里,中国一直坚持邓小平“改革开放”与“和平发展”的政策 在邓作为中华人民共和国最高领导人退休后,这些原则继续指导着中国在江泽民和胡锦涛领导时代的国际行为。这些党的领导人告诫中国人要“韬光养晦”,他们试图强调,中国经济的快速发展及其成为“大国”的地位,不应该对现有的国际秩序或其亚洲邻国的利益构成威胁。然而,自从中共中央总书记习近平2012年上台以来,情况发生了变化。在他的领导下,中国显著扩大了其前任胡锦涛发起的一系列更为自信的政策。这些政策不仅试图重新定义中国作为全球参与者在世界上的地位,而且还提出了“中国方案”的概念,据称这是一种比自由民主更有效的发展模式。

While Americans are well acquainted with China’s quest for influence through the projection of diplomatic, economic, and military power, we are less aware of the myriad ways Beijing has more recently been seeking cultural and informational influence, some of which could undermine our democratic processes. These include efforts to penetrate and sway—through various methods that former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull summarized as “covert, coercive or corrupting”—a range of groups and institutions, including the Chinese American community, Chinese students in the United States, and American civil society organizations, academic institutions, think tanks, and media.1

尽管美国人非常了解中国通过外交、经济和军事力量寻求影响力的过程,但我们不太了解北京最近在寻求文化和信息影响力的无数方式,其中一些可能会破坏我们的民主进程。其中包括通过各种各样的方式渗透和影响——澳大利亚前总理麦肯·腾博·奥巴马总结为“秘密、胁迫或腐败”——一系列的团体和机构,包括美籍华人社区、在美国的中国学生、美国公民社会组织、学术机构、智囊团和媒体。1

Some of these efforts fall into the category of normal public diplomacy as pursued by many other countries. But others involve the use of coercive or corrupting methods to pressure individuals and groups and thereby interfere in the functioning of American civil and political life.

其中一些努力属于许多其他国家所追求的正常公共外交范畴。但另一些则涉及使用胁迫或腐败的方法对个人和团体施加压力,从而干涉美国公民和政治生活的运作。

It is important not to exaggerate the threat of these new Chinese initiatives. China has not sought to interfere in a national election in the United States or to sow confusion or inflame polarization in our democratic discourse the way Russia has done. For all the tensions in the relationship, there are deep historical bonds of friendship, cultural exchange, and mutual inspiration between the two societies, which we celebrate and wish to nurture. And it is imperative that Chinese Americans—who feel the same pride in American citizenship as do other American ethnic communities—not be subjected to the kind of generalized suspicion or stigmatization that could lead to racial profiling or a new era of McCarthyism. However, with increased challenges in the diplomatic, economic, and security domains, China’s influence activities have collectively helped throw the crucial relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the United States into a worrisome state of imbalance and antagonism. (Throughout the report, “China” refers to the Chinese Communist Party and the government apparatus of the People’s Republic of China, and not to Chinese society at large or the Chinese people as a whole.) Not only are the values of China’s authoritarian system anathema to those held by most Americans, but there is also a growing body of evidence that the Chinese Communist Party views the American ideals of freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and association as direct challenges to its defense of its own form of one-party rule.2

重要的是,不要夸大中国这些新举措的威胁。中国没有试图干涉美国的全国大选,也没有像俄罗斯那样在我们的民主话语中制造混乱或煽动两极分化。尽管两国关系紧张,但两国之间有着深厚的友谊、文化交流和相互鼓舞的历史纽带,这是我们所庆祝和希望培育的。当务之急是,华裔美国人——他们对美国公民身份和其他美国少数民族社区一样感到自豪——不要受到可能导致种族归纳或麦卡锡主义新时代的普遍怀疑或污名化。然而,随着外交、经济和安全领域的挑战不断增加,中国的影响力活动共同促使中华人民共和国和美国之间的关键关系陷入令人担忧的不平衡和对抗状态。(在整个报告中,“中国”指的是中国共产党和中华人民共和国政府机构,而不是整个中国社会或整个中国人民。)不仅大多数美国人对中国威权体制的价值观深恶痛绝,而且越来越多的证据表明,中国共产党将美国的言论、出版、集会、宗教和结社自由视为对其捍卫自己的一党制形式的直接挑战。2

Both the US and China have derived substantial benefit as the two nations have become more economically and socially intertwined. The value of combined US-China trade ($635.4 billion, with a $335.4 US deficit) far surpasses that between any other pair of countries.3 More than 350,000 Chinese students currently study in US universities (plus 80,000 more in secondary schools). Moreover, millions of Chinese have immigrated to the United States seeking to build their lives with more economic, religious, and political freedom, and their presence has been an enormous asset to American life.

随着美中两国在经济和社会方面更加紧密地联系在一起,美国和中国都获得了巨大的利益。美中贸易总额(6,354亿美元,美国有335.4亿美元的贸易逆差)远远超过其他任何一对国家。3目前有超过35万中国学生在美国大学学习(另外还有8万中学生)。此外,数以百万计的中国人移民到美国,寻求更多的经济、宗教和政治自由,他们的存在是美国人生活的巨大财富。

However, these virtues cannot eclipse the reality that in certain key ways China is exploiting America’s openness in order to advance its aims on a competitive playing field that is hardly level. For at the same time that China’s authoritarian system takes advantage of the openness of American society to seek influence, it impedes legitimate efforts by American counterpart institutions to engage Chinese society on a reciprocal basis. This disparity lies at the heart of this project’s concerns.

然而,这些美德并不能掩盖这样一个事实:在某些关键方面,中国正在利用美国的开放性,以便在一个几乎不平等的竞争环境中推进其目标。与此同时,中国的专制体系利用美国社会的开放性来寻求影响力,这阻碍了美国对应机构在互惠基础上与中国社会接触的合法努力。这种差异是这个项目关注的核心。

China’s influence activities have moved beyond their traditional United Front focus on diaspora communities to target a far broader range of sectors in Western societies, ranging from think tanks, universities, and media to state, local, and national government institutions. China seeks to promote views sympathetic to the Chinese Government, policies, society, and culture; suppress alternative views; and co-opt key American players to support China’s foreign policy goals and economic interests.

中国的影响力活动已经超越了传统的统一战线对海外侨民社区的关注,而是针对西方社会更广泛的部门,从智囊团、大学、媒体到国家、地方和国家政府机构。中国寻求促进同情中国政府、政策、社会和文化的观点;压制不同的观点;拉拢美国的关键角色支持中国的外交政策目标和经济利益。

Normal public diplomacy, such as visitor programs, cultural and educational exchanges, paid media inserts, and government lobbying are accepted methods used by many governments to project soft power. They are legitimate in large measure because they are transparent. But this report details a range of more assertive and opaque “sharp power” activities that China has stepped up within the United States in an increasingly active manner.4 These exploit the openness of our democratic society to challenge, and sometimes even undermine, core American freedoms, norms, and laws.

正常的公共外交,如访问者计划、文化和教育交流、付费媒体插入和政府游说,是许多政府用来展示软实力的公认方法。它们在很大程度上是合法的,因为它们是透明的。但是这份报告详细描述了一系列更加自信和不透明的“强权”活动,中国以一种越来越积极的方式在美国加强了这些活动。4这些活动利用了我们民主社会的开放性来挑战,有时甚至破坏美国的核心自由、规范和法律。

Except for Russia, no other country’s efforts to influence American politics and society is as extensive and well-funded as China’s. The ambition of Chinese activity in terms of the breadth, depth of investment of financial resources, and intensity requires far greater scrutiny than it has been getting, because China is intervening more resourcefully and forcefully across a wider range of sectors than Russia. By undertaking activities that have become more organically embedded in the pluralistic fabric of American life, it has gained a far wider and potentially longer-term impact.

除了俄罗斯,没有哪个国家能像中国那样,在影响美国政治和社会方面做出如此广泛和充足的努力。中国在金融资源投资的广度、深度和强度方面的雄心,需要比现在更严格的审查,因为中国在比俄罗斯更广泛的领域进行了更机智和更有力的干预。通过开展更加有机地嵌入美国生活多元结构的活动,它获得了更广泛和可能更长期的影响。

 

Summary of Findings

调查结果摘要

This report, written and endorsed by a group of this country’s leading China specialists and students of one-party systems is the result of more than a year of research and represents an attempt to document the extent of China’s expanding influence operations inside the United States. While there have been many excellent reports documenting specific examples of Chinese influence seeking,5 this effort attempts to come to grips with the issue as a whole and features an overview of the Chinese party-state United Front apparatus responsible for guiding overseas influence activities. It also includes individual sections on different sectors of American society that have been targeted by China. The appendices survey China’s quite diverse influence activities in other democratic countries around the world.

这份报告由中国一些领先的中国问题专家和一党制学生撰写并认可,是一年多研究的成果,也是试图记录中国在美国境内不断扩大影响力的一次尝试。5虽然有许多优秀的报道记录了中国寻求影响力的具体例子,但这一努力试图从整体上处理这个问题,并概述了负责指导海外影响力活动的中国党国统一战线机构。它还包括中国针对的美国社会不同部门的个别章节。附录概述了中国在世界其他民主国家的各种影响活动。

 

Among the report’s findings:

该报告的调查结果包括:

  • The Chinese Communist party-state leverages a broad range of party, state, and non-state actors to advance its influence-seeking objectives, and in recent years it has significantly accelerated both its investment and the intensity of these efforts. While many of the activities described in this report are state-directed, there is no single institution in China’s party-state that is wholly responsible, even though the “United Front Work Department” has become a synecdoche for China’s influence activities, and the State Council Information Office and CCP6 Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission have oversight responsibilities (see Appendix: “China’s Influence Operations Bureaucracy”). Because of the pervasiveness of the party-state, many nominally independent actors— including Chinese civil society, academia, corporations, and even religious institutions— are also ultimately beholden to the government and are frequently pressured into service to advance state interests. The main agencies responsible for foreign influence operations include the Party’s United Front Work Department, the Central Propaganda Department, the International Liaison Department, the State Council Information Office, the All-China Federation of Overseas Chinese, and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. These organizations and others are bolstered by various state agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, which in March 2018 was merged into the United Front Work Department, reflecting that department’s increasing power.
  • 中国共产党国家利用广泛的党、国家和非国家行为体来推进其寻求影响力的目标,近年来,它大大加快了投资步伐,并加大了这些努力的力度。尽管本报告中描述的许多活动都是国家指导的,但在中国的党国体系中,没有一个单一的机构负有全部责任,尽管"统战部"已成为中国影响力活动的象征,国务院新闻办公室和中共中央外交委员会6负有监督职责(见附件:“中国的影响力运作机构”)。由于党国政府的普遍存在,许多名义上的独立行为者——包括中国的公民社会、学术界、企业,甚至宗教机构——也最终受制于政府,经常被迫为国家利益服务。负责对外影响行动的主要机构包括党的统战部、中宣部、对外联络部、国务院新闻办公室、全国华侨联合会和中国人民对外友好协会。这些组织和其他组织得到了各种国家机构的支持,比如外交部和国务院侨务办公室,2018年3月,侨务办公室并入了统战部,反映了该部门权力的增加。
  • In American federal and state politics, China seeks to identify and cultivate rising politicians. Like many other countries, Chinese entities employ prominent lobbying and public relations firms and cooperate with influential civil society groups. These activities complement China’s long-standing support of visits to China by members of Congress and their staffs. In some rare instances China has used private citizens and/or companies to exploit loopholes in US regulations that prohibit direct foreign contributions to elections.
  • 在美国的联邦政治和州政治中,中国寻求识别和培养崛起的政治家。像许多其他国家一样,中国实体雇佣著名的游说和公关公司,并与有影响力的公民社会团体合作。这些活动补充了中国长期以来对美国国会议员及其工作人员访华的支持。在一些罕见的情况下,中国利用美国法规中的漏洞,禁止外国直接向选举捐款。
  • On university campuses, Confucius Institutes (CIs) provide the Chinese government access to US student bodies. Because CIs have had positive value in exposing students and communities to Chinese language and culture, the report does not generally oppose them. But it does recommend that more rigorous university oversight and standards of academic freedom and transparency be exercised over CIs. With the direct support of the Chinese embassy and consulates, Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) sometimes report on and compromise the academic freedom of other Chinese students and American faculty on American campuses. American universities that host events deemed politically offensive by the Chinese Communist Party and government have been subject to increasing pressure, and sometimes even to retaliation, by diplomats in the Chinese embassy and its six consulates as well as by CSSA branches. Although the United States is open to Chinese scholars studying American politics or history, China restricts access to American scholars and researchers seeking to study politically sensitive areas of China’s political system, society, and history in country.
  • 在大学校园里,孔子学院(CI)为中国政府接触美国学生提供了便利。由于中国留学生联谊会在使学生和社区了解中国语言和文化方面具有积极的价值,报告一般不反对他们。但它确实建议对独立学院实行更严格的大学监督和学术自由和透明度标准。在中国大使馆和领事馆的直接支持下,中国学生学者协会(CSSA)有时会报道和危害美国校园中其他中国学生和美国教师的学术自由。举办被中国共产党和政府视为具有政治攻击性的活动的美国大学受到了来自中国大使馆及其六个领事馆以及综援机构的外交官越来越大的压力,有时甚至是报复。尽管美国对研究美国政治或历史的中国学者持开放态度,但中国限制了那些试图研究中国政治制度、社会和历史中政治敏感领域的美国学者和研究人员进入中国。
  • At think tanks, researchers, scholars, and other staffers report regular attempts by Chinese diplomats and other intermediaries to influence their activities within the United States. At the same time that China has begun to establish its own network of think tanks in the United States, it has been constraining the number and scale of American think tanks operations in China. It also restricts the access to China and to Chinese officials of American think-tank researchers and delegations.
  • 在智囊团,研究人员、学者和其他工作人员报告说,中国外交官和其他中间人经常试图影响他们在美国的活动。与此同时,中国已经开始在美国建立自己的智囊团网络,它已经限制了美国智囊团在中国的数量和规模。它还限制了与中国以及美国智库研究人员和代表团的中国官员的接触。
  • In business, China often uses its companies to advance strategic objectives abroad, gaining political influence and access to critical infrastructure and technology. China has made foreign companies’ continued access to its domestic market conditional on their compliance with Beijing’s stance on Taiwan and Tibet. This report documents how China has supported the formation of dozens of local Chinese chambers of commerce in the United States that appear to have ties to the Chinese government.
  • 在商业领域,中国经常利用自己的公司在海外推进战略目标,获得政治影响力,并获得关键的基础设施和技术。中国政府规定,外国企业要继续进入中国国内市场,就必须遵守中国政府在台湾和西藏问题上的立场。这份报告记录了中国是如何支持在美国成立数十个似乎与中国政府有联系的中国当地商会的。
  • In the American media, China has all but eliminated the plethora of independent Chinese-language media outlets that once served Chinese American communities. It has co-opted existing Chinese-language outlets and established its own new outlets. State-owned Chinese media companies have also established a significant foothold in the English-language market, in print, radio, television, and online. At the same time, the Chinese government has severely limited the ability of US and other Western media outlets to conduct normal news gathering activities within China, much less to provide news feeds directly to Chinese listeners, viewers, and readers in China, by limiting and blocking their Chinese-language websites and forbidding distribution of their output within China itself.
  • 在美国媒体中,中国几乎已经淘汰了过多曾经为美国华人社区服务的独立中文媒体。它增加了现有的中文网点,并建立了自己的新网点。中国国有媒体公司也在英语市场建立了重要的立足点,包括印刷、广播、电视和网络。与此同时,中国政府通过限制和封锁美国和其他西方媒体的中文网站,禁止其在中国境内发布信息,严重限制了美国和其他西方媒体在中国境内进行正常的新闻采集活动的能力,更不用说直接向中国的听众、观众和读者提供新闻源了。
  • Among the Chinese American community, China has long sought to influence— even silence—voices critical of the PRC or supportive of Taiwan by dispatching personnel to the United States to pressure these individuals and while also pressuring their relatives in China. Beijing also views Chinese Americans as members of a worldwide Chinese diaspora that presumes them to retain not only an interest in the welfare of China but also a loosely defined cultural, and even political, allegiance to the so-called Motherland. Such activities not only interfere with freedom of speech within the United States but they also risk generating suspicion of Chinese Americans even though those who accept Beijing’s directives are a very small minority.
  • 在美籍华人社区,中国长期以来一直试图影响批评中华人民共和国或支持台湾的声音,甚至压制这些声音,方法是派遣人员前往美国向这些人施压,同时也向他们在中国的亲属施压。中国政府还把美籍华人视为世界各地华人的一员,认为他们不仅关心中国的福祉,而且还对所谓的祖国保持着松散的文化、甚至政治上的忠诚。这些活动不仅干涉了美国国内的言论自由,而且还有可能引起美籍华人的怀疑,尽管那些接受北京指示的人只是极少数。
  • In the technology sector, China is engaged in a multifaceted effort to misappropriate technologies it deems critical to its economic and military success. Beyond economic espionage, theft, and the forced technology transfers that are required of many joint venture partnerships, China also captures much valuable new technology through its investments in US high-tech companies and through its exploitation of the openness of American university labs. This goes well beyond influence-seeking to a deeper and more disabling form of penetration. The economic and strategic losses for the United States are increasingly unsustainable, threatening not only to help China gain global dominance of a number of the leading technologies of the future, but also to undermine America’s commercial and military advantages.
  • 在技术领域,中国正在进行多方面的努力,盗用它认为对其经济和军事成功至关重要的技术。除了经济间谍活动、盗窃和许多合资企业合作所需的被迫技术转让,中国还通过对美国高科技公司的投资,以及利用美国大学实验室的开放性,获取了许多有价值的新技术。这远远超出了影响力——寻求更深入和更残酷的渗透形式。美国的经济和战略损失越来越不可持续,不仅有可能帮助中国获得未来一些领先技术的全球主导地位,还有可能削弱美国的商业和军事优势。
  • Around the world, China’s influence-seeking activities in the United States are mirrored in different forms in many other countries. To give readers a sense of the variation in China’s influence-seeking efforts abroad, this report also includes summaries of the experiences of eight other countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK.
  • 在世界各地,中国在美国寻求影响力的活动在许多其他国家以不同的形式反映出来。为了让读者了解中国在海外寻求影响力的努力的变化,本报告还包括其他八个国家的经验总结,包括澳大利亚、加拿大、法国、德国、日本、新西兰、新加坡和英国。

 

Toward Constructive Vigilance

走向建设性的警惕

In weighing policy responses to influence seeking in a wide variety of American institutions, the Working Group has sought to strike a balance between passivity and overreaction, confidence in our foundations and alarm about their possible subversion, and the imperative to sustain openness while addressing the unfairness of contending on a series of uneven playing fields. Achieving this balance requires that we differentiate constructive from harmful forms of interaction and carefully gauge the challenge, lest we see threats everywhere and overreact in ways that both undermine our own principles and unnecessarily damage the US-China relationship.

在权衡对美国各种机构寻求影响力的政策反应时,工作组力求在消极和过度反应、对我们的基础的信心和对其可能的颠覆的警惕之间达成平衡,以及在解决一系列不公平竞争环境的不公平问题时保持开放的必要性。要实现这种平衡,我们必须区分建设性的和有害的互动形式,仔细衡量挑战,以免我们看到威胁无处不在,反应过度,既损害我们自己的原则,又不必要地损害美中关系。

The sections that follow lodge recommendations under three broad headings. The first two, promoting “transparency” and “integrity,” are hardly controversial in the face of the existing challenge, and they elicited little debate. Sunshine is the best disinfectant against any manipulation of American entities by outside actors and we should shine as much light as possible on Chinese influence seeking over organizations and individuals if it is covert, coercive, or corrupting. We should also shore up the vitality of our institutions and our own solidarity against Chinese divide-and-conquer tactics. Defending the integrity of American democratic institutions requires standing up for our principles of openness and freedom, more closely coordinating responses within institutional sectors, and also better informing both governmental and nongovernmental actors about the potentially harmful influence activities of China and other foreign actors.

以下各节按三大标题提出建议。前两项提倡“透明度”和“诚信”,面对现有的挑战,几乎没有什么争议,也没有引起什么争论。阳光是防止外部势力操纵美国实体的最好消毒剂,如果中国对组织和个人的影响是隐蔽的、强制的或腐败的,我们应该尽可能多地曝光。我们还应该加强我们机构的活力和团结,反对中国各个击破的策略。捍卫美国民主制度的完整性,需要坚持我们的开放和自由原则,更密切地协调机构内部的应对措施,还需要更好地向政府和非政府行为体通报中国和其他外国行为体的潜在有害影响活动。

It was in the third category, promoting “reciprocity,” where the Working Group confronted the most difficult choices. In a wide range of fields, the Chinese government severely restricts American platforms and access while Chinese counterparts are given free rein in our society. Can this playing field be leveled and greater reciprocity be attained without lowering our own standards of openness and fairness? Since complaints and demarches by the US government and private institutions have not produced adequate results, is it possible to get Chinese attention by imposing reciprocal restrictions that do not undermine our own principles of openness?

第三项促进“互惠”,工作组在这方面面临最困难的选择。在广泛的领域,中国政府严格限制美国的平台和接入,而中国同行在我们的社会中被放任自流。在不降低我们自己的开放和公平标准的情况下,能否实现公平的竞争环境和更大的互惠?既然美国政府和私人机构的抱怨和行动没有产生足够的效果,那么有没有可能通过施加不损害我们自身开放原则的对等限制来引起中国的注意呢?

The Working Group, not always in unanimity, settled on a selective approach. We believe that in certain areas the only practical leverage resides in tit-for-tat retaliation. This would not be an end in itself, but a means to compel a greater reciprocity. The Chinese government respects firmness, fairness summons it, and American opinion compels it.

工作组并不总是达成一致意见,最后决定采取选择性做法。我们认为,在某些领域,唯一的实际杠杆就是针锋相对的报复。这本身不是目的,而是迫使实现更大互惠的一种手段。中国政府尊重它的坚定性和公正性,美国的意见迫使它这样做。

Each section of this report offers its own recommendations for responding to China’s influence seeking activities in ways that will enhance the transparency of relationships, defend the integrity of American democratic institutions, and grant American individuals and institutions greater access in China that equates with the degree of access afforded Chinese counterparts in the United States.

这份报告的每一部分都提供了自己的建议,以应对中国寻求影响力的活动,这些活动将提高关系的透明度,捍卫美国民主制度的完整性,并给予美国个人和机构更多的机会进入中国,等同于给予中国在美国的同行的机会。

Our recommendations urge responses to China’s challenge that will promote greater transparency, integrity, and reciprocity. We believe that a new emphasis on such “constructive vigilance” is the best way to begin to protect our democratic traditions, institutions, and nation, and to create a fairer and more reciprocal relationship that will be the best guarantor of healthier ties between the United States and China.

我们的建议敦促回应中国的挑战,以促进更大的透明度、诚信和互惠。我们认为,重新强调这种“建设性的警惕”,是开始保护我们的民主传统、制度和国家的最佳途径,也是建立一种更公平、更互惠的关系的最佳途径,这种关系将是美国和中国之间更健康关系的最佳保障。

 

NOTES

注释

1 Malcolm Turnbull, “Speech Introducing the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017,” December 7, 2017, https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/speech-introducing-the-national-security-legislation-amendment-espionage-an.

2 See CCP Central Committee Document No. 9: http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.

3 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china.

4 National Endowment for Democracy, Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence, Washington, DC, December 2017, https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.pdf.

5 Several other studies have recently been published concerning China’s influence activities and united front work abroad, including: Bowe, Alexander. “China’s Overseas United Front Work.” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. August 24, 2018. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20 Implications%20 for%20US_final_0.pdf; Jonas Parello-Plesner, The Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Interference Operations: How the US and Other Democracies Should Respond: Hudson Institute, June 2018, https:// www.hudson.org/research/14409-the-chinese-communist-party-s-foreign-interference-operations-how-the-u-s-and-other-democracies-should-respond; Anastasya Lloyd- Damnjanovic, A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and Interference Activities in American Higher Education, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, September 6, 2018, https:// www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/preliminary-study-prc-political-influence-and-interference-activities-american-higher.

6 Throughout this report, we use the term “CCP,” which stands for Chinese Communist Party. It is sometimes also referred to as the Communist Party of China (CPC).

中国影响力与美国利益:引言:引言  2018-12-26 10:29   线路1   线路2   线路3   收起 

(2018年11月29日,斯坦福大学胡佛研究所)审视中国对美国的影响活动,区分合法的公共外交和不当干涉之间的区别,并警告美国社会和大众:中国共产党正在致力于全面渗透和影响美国政府、大学、媒体、智库、企业、民间组织和侨界等各方面,而且情况已相当普及,这些影响正在破坏美国的民主程序,而多数美国人却浑然不觉。这份报告历时1年半时间完成,由33位研究中国问题的知名美国学者和其它国家的学者联名发表。

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