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Chinese Influence & American Interests


Promoting Constructive Vigilance


A publication of the Hoover Institution


Report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States





Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University


Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director, Center on US-China Relations, Asia Society





斯坦福大学 | 斯坦福,加利福尼亚


Working Group Participants


This report grew out of a series of discussions over the past year and a half at the Hoover Institution, Sunnylands, and George Washington University in which the following scholars participated:


Robert Daly, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars


Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University


Elizabeth Economy, Council on Foreign Relations


Gen. Karl Eikenberry (Ret.), Stanford University


Donald Emmerson, Stanford University


Francis Fukuyama, Stanford University


Bonnie Glaser, Center for Strategic & International Studies


Kyle Hutzler, Stanford University


Markos Kounalakis, Hoover Institution


WiNston Lord, Former US Ambassador to China


Evan Medeiros, Georgetown University


James Mulvenon, SOS International

詹姆斯·马尔维农,国际 SOS

Andrew J. Nathan, Columbia University


Minxin Pei, Claremont McKenna College


Jeffrey Phillips, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands


John Pomfret, The Washington Post


Orville Schell, Center on US-China Relations, Asia Society


David Shambaugh, George Washington University


Susan Shirk, University of California – San Diego


Robert Sutter, George Washington University


Glenn Tiffert, Hoover Institution


Ezra VoGel, Harvard University


Christopher Walker, National Endowment for Democracy


International Associates


Anne-Marie Brady, University of Canterbury, New Zealand


Timothy Cheek, University of British, Columbia, Canada


John Fitzgerald, Swinburne University, Australia


John Garnaut, Former Senior Adviser to Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Australia


Timothy Garton Ash, Oxford University, United Kingdom


Francois Godement, European Council on Foreign Relations


Bilahari KausiKan, Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore


Richard Mcgregor, Lowy Institute, Australia


Eva Pils, King’s College London, United Kingdom


Volker Stanzel, German Council on Foreign Relations


The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the participants in the workshop and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution or the participant’s affiliated institutions. The convening organizations of this project have no affiliation with the US government.





This Working Group was jointly convened by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the Center on US-China Relations at Asia Society in New York. These co-conveners have also been assisted, financially and logistically, by The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands. We are grateful to each of these institutions for their support of our work, and to Thomas Gilligan, Director of the Hoover Institution, and Ambassador David Lane, President of The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, for their personal support of this project. We also thank the latter two institutions, as well as the China Policy Program of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, for supporting and hosting meetings of the Working Group.

这个工作组是由斯坦福大学的胡佛研究所和纽约亚洲协会的中美关系中心联合召集的。这些共同召集人还得到了设在阳光之乡的安纳伯格基金会信托基金的资金和后勤支持。我们感谢这些机构对我们工作的支持,感谢胡佛研究所基金会主任 Thomas Gilligan 和阳光之乡安纳伯格基金会主席 David Lane 大使对这个项目的个人支持。我们还要感谢这两个机构,以及乔治华盛顿大学伊利亚德国际事务学院中国政策项目,感谢它们对工作组会议的支持和主办。

This report has been a collaborative effort among a group of American scholars and policy practitioners who have spent long careers studying and engaging China, Asia more broadly, and a wide variety of political systems around the world. Each participant also has an abiding interest in protecting and strengthening democratic institutions in the United States and elsewhere in the world. While different participants took the lead in drafting particular sections of the report, each section was reviewed and contributed to by a number of participants in what became a truly collective and collaborative research effort. Our general findings and policy principles represent a broad—though not necessarily complete— consensus of the Working Group Participants.


This Working Group grew out of the Task Force on US-China Relations (chaired by Susan Shirk and Orville Schell), and we thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation for their support of the Task Force. Although the two efforts share many members in common, they are separate and distinct endeavors.

这个工作组由美中关系工作组发展而来(由 Susan Shirk 和 Orville Schell 担任主席),我们感谢纽约卡内基公司和 Henry Luce 基金会对工作组的支持。虽然这两种努力有许多共同点,但它们是分开的、不同的努力。

We present this report as the collective product of discussions and research among a group of distinguished American specialists on China and US foreign affairs. It analyzes the growing challenge posed by China’s influence-seeking activities in the United States across a number of important sectors of American public life. However, as we note throughout the report, these influence activities are not confined to the US. Indeed, they appear in different forms and to different degrees in a large number of other democratic societies around the world (in some cases more deeply than in the US). We therefore have opted to include in an Appendix short summary reports on China’s influence activities (and the resulting national responses) in eight other countries.


We owe a particular debt of thanks to Kyle Hutzler, an MBA student at Stanford University with significant experience in China. His superior organizational skills and uncomplaining capacity for prodigious work contributed enormously to the coordination of our work throughout the project. We could not have produced this report without him.

我们尤其要感谢凯尔·胡茨勒(Kyle Hutzler),他是斯坦福大学的 MBA 学生,在中国有丰富的经验。他卓越的组织能力和无怨无悔的工作能力极大地促进了我们整个项目工作的协调。没有他,我们不可能写出这份报告。

We would also like to thank Barbara Arellano and Alison Petersen at the Hoover Institution Press for their dedicated assistance in producing, editing, and publishing this report, as well as Laura Chang at the Center on US-China Relations at Asia Society for her assistance in helping to coordinate the project.

我们还要感谢胡佛研究所出版社的 Barbara Arellano 和 Alison Petersen,感谢他们在制作、编辑和出版这份报告方面的全力协助,以及亚洲协会美中关系中心的 Laura Chang,感谢她协助协调这个项目。

Finally, we would like to thank all of the Working Group participants for their generous contributions of time and effort. None were remunerated for their contributions, and everyone participated and contributed out of their professional and national sense of responsibility.


Larry Diamond, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University


Orville Schell, Center on US-China Relations, Asia Society


October 24, 2018





Policy Principles for Constructive Vigilance




section 1 Congress

第一节 国会

section 2 State and Local Governments

第二节 国家和地方政府

section 3 The Chinese American Community

第三节 美籍华人社区

section 4 Universities

第四节 大学

section 5 Think Tanks

第五节 智囊团

section 6 Media

第六节 媒体

section 7 Corporations

第七节 法团

section 8 Technology and Research

第八节 技术与研究

appendix I Chinese Influence Operations Bureaucracy

附录一 中国影响力运营官僚机构

appendix II Chinese Influence Activities in Select Countries

附录二 中国在选定国家的影响活动











New Zealand


Singapore and Asean


United Kingdom


appendix III Chinese-Language Media Landscape

附录三 中文媒体景观

Dissenting Opinion




About the Participants



Policy Principles for Constructive Vigilance


The members of this Working Group seek a productive relationship between China and the United States. To this end, and in light of growing evidence of China’s interference in various sectors of American government and society, we propose three broad principles that should serve as the basis for protecting the integrity of American institutions inside the United States while also protecting basic core American values, norms, and laws.





Transparency is a fundamental tenet and asset of democracy, and the best protection against the manipulation of American entities by outside actors.


  • American NGOs should play an important role in investigating and monitoring illicit activities by China and other foreign actors. They should as well seek to inform themselves about the full range of Chinese influence activities and the distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate influence efforts.
  • 美国非政府组织应该在调查和监测中国和其他外国行为者的非法活动方面发挥重要作用。他们也应该努力让自己了解中国影响力活动的全部内容,以及合法与非法影响力活动之间的区别。
  • Congress should perform its constitutional role by continuing to investigate, report on, and recommend appropriate action concerning Chinese influence activities in the United States. It should update relevant laws and regulations regarding foreign influence, and adopt new ones, to strengthen transparency in foreign efforts to exert influence.
  • 国会应该通过继续调查、报告和建议有关中国在美影响活动的适当行动来履行其宪法职责。更新有关外国影响力的法律法规,采用新的法律法规,加强对外影响力的透明度。
  • Executive branch agencies should similarly investigate and publicize, when appropriate, findings concerning these activities, with a view to promoting healthy and responsible vigilance among American governmental and nongovernmental actors.
  • 行政部门机构也应酌情调查和公布有关这些活动的调查结果,以促进美国政府和非政府行为者保持健康和负责任的警惕。
  • The US media should undertake careful, fact-based investigative reporting of Chinese influence activities, and it should enhance its knowledge base for undertaking responsible reporting.
  • 美国媒体应对中国的影响力活动进行认真、基于事实的调查性报道,并增强其进行负责任报道的知识基础。
  • Faculty governance is the key to preserving academic freedom in American universities. All gifts, grants, endowments, and cooperative programs, including Confucius Institutes, should be subjected to the usual procedures of faculty oversight.
  • 教职工管理是美国大学维护学术自由的关键。所有的捐赠、拨款、资助和合作项目,包括孔子学院,应该按照一般的程序接受教师的监督。
  • US governmental and nongovernmental sectors should disclose financial and other relationships that may be subject to foreign influence.
  • 美国政府和非政府部门应披露可能受到外国影响的金融和其它关系。




Foreign funding can undermine the independence of American institutions, and various types of coercive and covert activities by China (and other countries) directly contradict core democratic values and freedoms, which must be protected by institutional vigilance and effective governance.


  • Openness and freedom are fundamental elements of American democracy and intrinsic strengths of the United States and its way of life. These values must be protected against corrosive actions by China and other countries.
  • 开放和自由是美国民主的基本要素,也是美国及其生活方式的内在力量。这些价值观必须得到保护,以免受到中国和其他国家的侵蚀。
  • Various institutions—but notably universities and think tanks—need to enhance sharing and pooling of information concerning Chinese activities, and they should promote more closely coordinated collective action to counter China’s inappropriate activities and pressures. This report recommends that American institutions within each of the above two sectors (and possibly others) formulate and agree to a “Code of Conduct” to guide their exchanges with Chinese counterparts.
  • 各种机构——特别是大学和智囊团——需要加强分享和汇集有关中国活动的信息,它们应该促进更密切协调的集体行动,以应对中国的不当活动和压力。本报告建议上述两个部门(可能还有其他部门)的美国机构制定并同意一项“行为准则”,以指导它们与中国同行的交流。
  • When they believe that efforts to exert influence have violated US laws or the rights of American citizens and foreign residents in the United States, US institutions should refer such activities to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
  • 当他们认为施加影响的行为违反了美国法律或者美国公民和在美国的外国居民的权利时,美国机构应该将这种行为移交给相应的执法部门。
  • Rigorous efforts should be undertaken to inform the Chinese American community about potentially inappropriate activities carried out by China. At the same time, utmost efforts must be taken to protect the rights of the Chinese American community, as well as protecting the rights of Chinese citizens living or studying in the United States.
  • 应当作出严格的努力,向美籍华人社区通报中国开展的可能不当的活动。同时,必须尽最大努力保护美国华人社区的权利,保护在美国生活或学习的中国公民的权利。
  • Consideration should be given to establishing a federal government office that American state and local governments and nongovernmental institutions could approach—on a strictly voluntary basis—for advice on how best to manage Chinese requests for engagement and partnership. This office could also provide confidential background on the affiliations of Chinese individuals and organizations to party and state institutions.
  • 应该考虑建立一个联邦政府办公室美国州政府、地方政府和非政府机构可以在严格自愿的基础上,就如何最好地处理中国的参与和伙伴关系请求寻求建议。该办公室还可以提供中国个人和组织与党和国家机构关系的机密背景资料。
  • All American institutions—governmental and nongovernmental—that deal with Chinese actors (and other potential sources of inappropriate foreign influence) should review their oversight and governance practices and codify and exemplify best standards of practice and due diligence.
  • 所有与中国行为者(以及其他不适当外国影响力的潜在来源)打交道的美国机构——包括政府和非政府机构——都应当审查自己的监督和治理实践,并编纂和示范最佳实践和尽职调查标准。




American institutions are deflected from their purpose of increasing US-China understanding, and become distorted as one-way channels of Chinese influence, when they are denied access to China on a basis that is reciprocal with the access Chinese institutions are granted here.


  • The asymmetry of scholarly research access is the most glaring example of the lack of reciprocity. A whole variety of normal scholarly activities—including access to archives and certain libraries, fieldwork, conducting surveys, and interviewing officials or average citizens—have been cut off for American researchers in China while Chinese enjoy all of these academic opportunities in the United States. Individually and collectively, universities and other sectors of American democratic life should insist on greater reciprocity of access.
  • 学术研究渠道的不对称是缺乏互惠的最突出的例子。一系列正常的学术活动——包括查阅档案和某些图书馆、实地考察、进行调查、采访官员或普通公民——都被中断,而中国人在美国享有所有这些学术机会。无论是个人还是集体,大学和美国民主生活的其他部门应该坚持更大程度的互惠准入。
  • US government public diplomacy activities are heavily circumscribed in China, while nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have encountered an increasingly difficult environment to carry out their work. More reasonable reciprocity for US public diplomacy efforts in China, relative to China’s activities in the United States, should be addressed in negotiations between the two countries. In addition, this report recommends enhanced American efforts to promote independent news and information, and democratic ideas, through US global broadcasting and efforts to counter disinformation.
  • 美国政府的公共外交活动在中国受到严重限制,而非政府组织在中国的工作环境也日益艰难。相对于中国在美国的活动,美国在中国的公共外交努力更合理的互惠应该在两国之间的谈判中解决。此外,这份报告还建议美国加强努力,通过美国的全球广播和打击虚假信息,促进独立的新闻和信息,以及民主思想。
  • The US government should actively promote and protect opportunities for American actors to operate in China.
  • 美国政府应积极促进和保护美国演员在中国活动的机会。




For three and a half decades following the end of the Maoist era, China adhered to Deng Xiaoping’s policies of “reform and opening to the outside world” and “peaceful development.” After Deng retired as paramount leader, these principles continued to guide China’s international behavior in the leadership eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Admonishing Chinese to “keep your heads down and bide your time,” these Party leaders sought to emphasize that China’s rapid economic development and its accession to “great power” status need not be threatening to either the existing global order or the interests of its Asian neighbors. However, since Party general secretary Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the situation has changed. Under his leadership, China has significantly expanded the more assertive set of policies initiated by his predecessor Hu Jintao. These policies not only seek to redefine China’s place in the world as a global player, but they also have put forward the notion of a “China option” (中国方案) that is claimed to be a more efficient developmental model than liberal democracy.

在毛泽东时代结束后的35年里,中国一直坚持邓小平“改革开放”与“和平发展”的政策 在邓作为中华人民共和国最高领导人退休后,这些原则继续指导着中国在江泽民和胡锦涛领导时代的国际行为。这些党的领导人告诫中国人要“韬光养晦”,他们试图强调,中国经济的快速发展及其成为“大国”的地位,不应该对现有的国际秩序或其亚洲邻国的利益构成威胁。然而,自从中共中央总书记习近平2012年上台以来,情况发生了变化。在他的领导下,中国显著扩大了其前任胡锦涛发起的一系列更为自信的政策。这些政策不仅试图重新定义中国作为全球参与者在世界上的地位,而且还提出了“中国方案”的概念,据称这是一种比自由民主更有效的发展模式。

While Americans are well acquainted with China’s quest for influence through the projection of diplomatic, economic, and military power, we are less aware of the myriad ways Beijing has more recently been seeking cultural and informational influence, some of which could undermine our democratic processes. These include efforts to penetrate and sway—through various methods that former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull summarized as “covert, coercive or corrupting”—a range of groups and institutions, including the Chinese American community, Chinese students in the United States, and American civil society organizations, academic institutions, think tanks, and media.1


Some of these efforts fall into the category of normal public diplomacy as pursued by many other countries. But others involve the use of coercive or corrupting methods to pressure individuals and groups and thereby interfere in the functioning of American civil and political life.


It is important not to exaggerate the threat of these new Chinese initiatives. China has not sought to interfere in a national election in the United States or to sow confusion or inflame polarization in our democratic discourse the way Russia has done. For all the tensions in the relationship, there are deep historical bonds of friendship, cultural exchange, and mutual inspiration between the two societies, which we celebrate and wish to nurture. And it is imperative that Chinese Americans—who feel the same pride in American citizenship as do other American ethnic communities—not be subjected to the kind of generalized suspicion or stigmatization that could lead to racial profiling or a new era of McCarthyism. However, with increased challenges in the diplomatic, economic, and security domains, China’s influence activities have collectively helped throw the crucial relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the United States into a worrisome state of imbalance and antagonism. (Throughout the report, “China” refers to the Chinese Communist Party and the government apparatus of the People’s Republic of China, and not to Chinese society at large or the Chinese people as a whole.) Not only are the values of China’s authoritarian system anathema to those held by most Americans, but there is also a growing body of evidence that the Chinese Communist Party views the American ideals of freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and association as direct challenges to its defense of its own form of one-party rule.2


Both the US and China have derived substantial benefit as the two nations have become more economically and socially intertwined. The value of combined US-China trade ($635.4 billion, with a $335.4 US deficit) far surpasses that between any other pair of countries.3 More than 350,000 Chinese students currently study in US universities (plus 80,000 more in secondary schools). Moreover, millions of Chinese have immigrated to the United States seeking to build their lives with more economic, religious, and political freedom, and their presence has been an enormous asset to American life.


However, these virtues cannot eclipse the reality that in certain key ways China is exploiting America’s openness in order to advance its aims on a competitive playing field that is hardly level. For at the same time that China’s authoritarian system takes advantage of the openness of American society to seek influence, it impedes legitimate efforts by American counterpart institutions to engage Chinese society on a reciprocal basis. This disparity lies at the heart of this project’s concerns.


China’s influence activities have moved beyond their traditional United Front focus on diaspora communities to target a far broader range of sectors in Western societies, ranging from think tanks, universities, and media to state, local, and national government institutions. China seeks to promote views sympathetic to the Chinese Government, policies, society, and culture; suppress alternative views; and co-opt key American players to support China’s foreign policy goals and economic interests.


Normal public diplomacy, such as visitor programs, cultural and educational exchanges, paid media inserts, and government lobbying are accepted methods used by many governments to project soft power. They are legitimate in large measure because they are transparent. But this report details a range of more assertive and opaque “sharp power” activities that China has stepped up within the United States in an increasingly active manner.4 These exploit the openness of our democratic society to challenge, and sometimes even undermine, core American freedoms, norms, and laws.


Except for Russia, no other country’s efforts to influence American politics and society is as extensive and well-funded as China’s. The ambition of Chinese activity in terms of the breadth, depth of investment of financial resources, and intensity requires far greater scrutiny than it has been getting, because China is intervening more resourcefully and forcefully across a wider range of sectors than Russia. By undertaking activities that have become more organically embedded in the pluralistic fabric of American life, it has gained a far wider and potentially longer-term impact.



Summary of Findings


This report, written and endorsed by a group of this country’s leading China specialists and students of one-party systems is the result of more than a year of research and represents an attempt to document the extent of China’s expanding influence operations inside the United States. While there have been many excellent reports documenting specific examples of Chinese influence seeking,5 this effort attempts to come to grips with the issue as a whole and features an overview of the Chinese party-state United Front apparatus responsible for guiding overseas influence activities. It also includes individual sections on different sectors of American society that have been targeted by China. The appendices survey China’s quite diverse influence activities in other democratic countries around the world.



Among the report’s findings:


  • The Chinese Communist party-state leverages a broad range of party, state, and non-state actors to advance its influence-seeking objectives, and in recent years it has significantly accelerated both its investment and the intensity of these efforts. While many of the activities described in this report are state-directed, there is no single institution in China’s party-state that is wholly responsible, even though the “United Front Work Department” has become a synecdoche for China’s influence activities, and the State Council Information Office and CCP6 Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission have oversight responsibilities (see Appendix: “China’s Influence Operations Bureaucracy”). Because of the pervasiveness of the party-state, many nominally independent actors— including Chinese civil society, academia, corporations, and even religious institutions— are also ultimately beholden to the government and are frequently pressured into service to advance state interests. The main agencies responsible for foreign influence operations include the Party’s United Front Work Department, the Central Propaganda Department, the International Liaison Department, the State Council Information Office, the All-China Federation of Overseas Chinese, and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. These organizations and others are bolstered by various state agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, which in March 2018 was merged into the United Front Work Department, reflecting that department’s increasing power.
  • 中国共产党国家利用广泛的党、国家和非国家行为体来推进其寻求影响力的目标,近年来,它大大加快了投资步伐,并加大了这些努力的力度。尽管本报告中描述的许多活动都是国家指导的,但在中国的党国体系中,没有一个单一的机构负有全部责任,尽管"统战部"已成为中国影响力活动的象征,国务院新闻办公室和中共中央外交委员会6负有监督职责(见附件:“中国的影响力运作机构”)。由于党国政府的普遍存在,许多名义上的独立行为者——包括中国的公民社会、学术界、企业,甚至宗教机构——也最终受制于政府,经常被迫为国家利益服务。负责对外影响行动的主要机构包括党的统战部、中宣部、对外联络部、国务院新闻办公室、全国华侨联合会和中国人民对外友好协会。这些组织和其他组织得到了各种国家机构的支持,比如外交部和国务院侨务办公室,2018年3月,侨务办公室并入了统战部,反映了该部门权力的增加。
  • In American federal and state politics, China seeks to identify and cultivate rising politicians. Like many other countries, Chinese entities employ prominent lobbying and public relations firms and cooperate with influential civil society groups. These activities complement China’s long-standing support of visits to China by members of Congress and their staffs. In some rare instances China has used private citizens and/or companies to exploit loopholes in US regulations that prohibit direct foreign contributions to elections.
  • 在美国的联邦政治和州政治中,中国寻求识别和培养崛起的政治家。像许多其他国家一样,中国实体雇佣著名的游说和公关公司,并与有影响力的公民社会团体合作。这些活动补充了中国长期以来对美国国会议员及其工作人员访华的支持。在一些罕见的情况下,中国利用美国法规中的漏洞,禁止外国直接向选举捐款。
  • On university campuses, Confucius Institutes (CIs) provide the Chinese government access to US student bodies. Because CIs have had positive value in exposing students and communities to Chinese language and culture, the report does not generally oppose them. But it does recommend that more rigorous university oversight and standards of academic freedom and transparency be exercised over CIs. With the direct support of the Chinese embassy and consulates, Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) sometimes report on and compromise the academic freedom of other Chinese students and American faculty on American campuses. American universities that host events deemed politically offensive by the Chinese Communist Party and government have been subject to increasing pressure, and sometimes even to retaliation, by diplomats in the Chinese embassy and its six consulates as well as by CSSA branches. Although the United States is open to Chinese scholars studying American politics or history, China restricts access to American scholars and researchers seeking to study politically sensitive areas of China’s political system, society, and history in country.
  • 在大学校园里,孔子学院(CI)为中国政府接触美国学生提供了便利。由于中国留学生联谊会在使学生和社区了解中国语言和文化方面具有积极的价值,报告一般不反对他们。但它确实建议对独立学院实行更严格的大学监督和学术自由和透明度标准。在中国大使馆和领事馆的直接支持下,中国学生学者协会(CSSA)有时会报道和危害美国校园中其他中国学生和美国教师的学术自由。举办被中国共产党和政府视为具有政治攻击性的活动的美国大学受到了来自中国大使馆及其六个领事馆以及综援机构的外交官越来越大的压力,有时甚至是报复。尽管美国对研究美国政治或历史的中国学者持开放态度,但中国限制了那些试图研究中国政治制度、社会和历史中政治敏感领域的美国学者和研究人员进入中国。
  • At think tanks, researchers, scholars, and other staffers report regular attempts by Chinese diplomats and other intermediaries to influence their activities within the United States. At the same time that China has begun to establish its own network of think tanks in the United States, it has been constraining the number and scale of American think tanks operations in China. It also restricts the access to China and to Chinese officials of American think-tank researchers and delegations.
  • 在智囊团,研究人员、学者和其他工作人员报告说,中国外交官和其他中间人经常试图影响他们在美国的活动。与此同时,中国已经开始在美国建立自己的智囊团网络,它已经限制了美国智囊团在中国的数量和规模。它还限制了与中国以及美国智库研究人员和代表团的中国官员的接触。
  • In business, China often uses its companies to advance strategic objectives abroad, gaining political influence and access to critical infrastructure and technology. China has made foreign companies’ continued access to its domestic market conditional on their compliance with Beijing’s stance on Taiwan and Tibet. This report documents how China has supported the formation of dozens of local Chinese chambers of commerce in the United States that appear to have ties to the Chinese government.
  • 在商业领域,中国经常利用自己的公司在海外推进战略目标,获得政治影响力,并获得关键的基础设施和技术。中国政府规定,外国企业要继续进入中国国内市场,就必须遵守中国政府在台湾和西藏问题上的立场。这份报告记录了中国是如何支持在美国成立数十个似乎与中国政府有联系的中国当地商会的。
  • In the American media, China has all but eliminated the plethora of independent Chinese-language media outlets that once served Chinese American communities. It has co-opted existing Chinese-language outlets and established its own new outlets. State-owned Chinese media companies have also established a significant foothold in the English-language market, in print, radio, television, and online. At the same time, the Chinese government has severely limited the ability of US and other Western media outlets to conduct normal news gathering activities within China, much less to provide news feeds directly to Chinese listeners, viewers, and readers in China, by limiting and blocking their Chinese-language websites and forbidding distribution of their output within China itself.
  • 在美国媒体中,中国几乎已经淘汰了过多曾经为美国华人社区服务的独立中文媒体。它增加了现有的中文网点,并建立了自己的新网点。中国国有媒体公司也在英语市场建立了重要的立足点,包括印刷、广播、电视和网络。与此同时,中国政府通过限制和封锁美国和其他西方媒体的中文网站,禁止其在中国境内发布信息,严重限制了美国和其他西方媒体在中国境内进行正常的新闻采集活动的能力,更不用说直接向中国的听众、观众和读者提供新闻源了。
  • Among the Chinese American community, China has long sought to influence— even silence—voices critical of the PRC or supportive of Taiwan by dispatching personnel to the United States to pressure these individuals and while also pressuring their relatives in China. Beijing also views Chinese Americans as members of a worldwide Chinese diaspora that presumes them to retain not only an interest in the welfare of China but also a loosely defined cultural, and even political, allegiance to the so-called Motherland. Such activities not only interfere with freedom of speech within the United States but they also risk generating suspicion of Chinese Americans even though those who accept Beijing’s directives are a very small minority.
  • 在美籍华人社区,中国长期以来一直试图影响批评中华人民共和国或支持台湾的声音,甚至压制这些声音,方法是派遣人员前往美国向这些人施压,同时也向他们在中国的亲属施压。中国政府还把美籍华人视为世界各地华人的一员,认为他们不仅关心中国的福祉,而且还对所谓的祖国保持着松散的文化、甚至政治上的忠诚。这些活动不仅干涉了美国国内的言论自由,而且还有可能引起美籍华人的怀疑,尽管那些接受北京指示的人只是极少数。
  • In the technology sector, China is engaged in a multifaceted effort to misappropriate technologies it deems critical to its economic and military success. Beyond economic espionage, theft, and the forced technology transfers that are required of many joint venture partnerships, China also captures much valuable new technology through its investments in US high-tech companies and through its exploitation of the openness of American university labs. This goes well beyond influence-seeking to a deeper and more disabling form of penetration. The economic and strategic losses for the United States are increasingly unsustainable, threatening not only to help China gain global dominance of a number of the leading technologies of the future, but also to undermine America’s commercial and military advantages.
  • 在技术领域,中国正在进行多方面的努力,盗用它认为对其经济和军事成功至关重要的技术。除了经济间谍活动、盗窃和许多合资企业合作所需的被迫技术转让,中国还通过对美国高科技公司的投资,以及利用美国大学实验室的开放性,获取了许多有价值的新技术。这远远超出了影响力——寻求更深入和更残酷的渗透形式。美国的经济和战略损失越来越不可持续,不仅有可能帮助中国获得未来一些领先技术的全球主导地位,还有可能削弱美国的商业和军事优势。
  • Around the world, China’s influence-seeking activities in the United States are mirrored in different forms in many other countries. To give readers a sense of the variation in China’s influence-seeking efforts abroad, this report also includes summaries of the experiences of eight other countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK.
  • 在世界各地,中国在美国寻求影响力的活动在许多其他国家以不同的形式反映出来。为了让读者了解中国在海外寻求影响力的努力的变化,本报告还包括其他八个国家的经验总结,包括澳大利亚、加拿大、法国、德国、日本、新西兰、新加坡和英国。


Toward Constructive Vigilance


In weighing policy responses to influence seeking in a wide variety of American institutions, the Working Group has sought to strike a balance between passivity and overreaction, confidence in our foundations and alarm about their possible subversion, and the imperative to sustain openness while addressing the unfairness of contending on a series of uneven playing fields. Achieving this balance requires that we differentiate constructive from harmful forms of interaction and carefully gauge the challenge, lest we see threats everywhere and overreact in ways that both undermine our own principles and unnecessarily damage the US-China relationship.


The sections that follow lodge recommendations under three broad headings. The first two, promoting “transparency” and “integrity,” are hardly controversial in the face of the existing challenge, and they elicited little debate. Sunshine is the best disinfectant against any manipulation of American entities by outside actors and we should shine as much light as possible on Chinese influence seeking over organizations and individuals if it is covert, coercive, or corrupting. We should also shore up the vitality of our institutions and our own solidarity against Chinese divide-and-conquer tactics. Defending the integrity of American democratic institutions requires standing up for our principles of openness and freedom, more closely coordinating responses within institutional sectors, and also better informing both governmental and nongovernmental actors about the potentially harmful influence activities of China and other foreign actors.


It was in the third category, promoting “reciprocity,” where the Working Group confronted the most difficult choices. In a wide range of fields, the Chinese government severely restricts American platforms and access while Chinese counterparts are given free rein in our society. Can this playing field be leveled and greater reciprocity be attained without lowering our own standards of openness and fairness? Since complaints and demarches by the US government and private institutions have not produced adequate results, is it possible to get Chinese attention by imposing reciprocal restrictions that do not undermine our own principles of openness?


The Working Group, not always in unanimity, settled on a selective approach. We believe that in certain areas the only practical leverage resides in tit-for-tat retaliation. This would not be an end in itself, but a means to compel a greater reciprocity. The Chinese government respects firmness, fairness summons it, and American opinion compels it.


Each section of this report offers its own recommendations for responding to China’s influence seeking activities in ways that will enhance the transparency of relationships, defend the integrity of American democratic institutions, and grant American individuals and institutions greater access in China that equates with the degree of access afforded Chinese counterparts in the United States.


Our recommendations urge responses to China’s challenge that will promote greater transparency, integrity, and reciprocity. We believe that a new emphasis on such “constructive vigilance” is the best way to begin to protect our democratic traditions, institutions, and nation, and to create a fairer and more reciprocal relationship that will be the best guarantor of healthier ties between the United States and China.





1 Malcolm Turnbull, “Speech Introducing the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017,” December 7, 2017, https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/speech-introducing-the-national-security-legislation-amendment-espionage-an.

2 See CCP Central Committee Document No. 9: http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.

3 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china.

4 National Endowment for Democracy, Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence, Washington, DC, December 2017, https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.pdf.

5 Several other studies have recently been published concerning China’s influence activities and united front work abroad, including: Bowe, Alexander. “China’s Overseas United Front Work.” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. August 24, 2018. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20 Implications%20 for%20US_final_0.pdf; Jonas Parello-Plesner, The Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Interference Operations: How the US and Other Democracies Should Respond: Hudson Institute, June 2018, https:// www.hudson.org/research/14409-the-chinese-communist-party-s-foreign-interference-operations-how-the-u-s-and-other-democracies-should-respond; Anastasya Lloyd- Damnjanovic, A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and Interference Activities in American Higher Education, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, September 6, 2018, https:// www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/preliminary-study-prc-political-influence-and-interference-activities-american-higher.

6 Throughout this report, we use the term “CCP,” which stands for Chinese Communist Party. It is sometimes also referred to as the Communist Party of China (CPC).

中国影响力与美国利益:引言:引言  2018-12-26 10:29   线路1   线路2   线路3   收起 


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