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Fincen ADVISORY

FinCEN ADVISORY

就与贩运芬太尼和其他合成类阿片有关的非法金融计划和方法向金融机构提供咨询

Advisory to Financial Institutions on Illicit Financial Schemes and Methods Related to the Trafficking of Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids

Fin-2019-a006

FIN-2019-A006

2019年8月21日

August 21, 2019

设在美国的跨国犯罪组织、外国芬太尼供应商和互联网购买者从事芬太尼、芬太尼类似物和其他合成阿片类药物的贩运以及随后对这种非法销售所得的洗钱活动。

Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), foreign fentanyl suppliers, and Internet purchasers located in the United States engage in the trafficking of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and other synthetic opioids and the subsequent laundering of the proceeds from such illegal sales.

引言

Introduction

这一咨询意见应与下列机构分享:

This Advisory should be shared with:

  • 行政总裁
  • Chief Executive Officers
  • 总行动主任
  • Chief Operations Officers
  • 总风险主任
  • Chief Risk Officers
  • 法律部门
  • Legal Departments
  • 总督察 / 业务支援主任
  • Chief Compliance/BSA Officers
  • Aml Officials
  • AML Officials
  • 遵守制裁的官员
  • Sanctions Compliance Officials
  • 网络安全部队
  • Cybersecurity Units

金融犯罪执法网络正在发布这一建议,以提醒金融机构注意与芬太尼、芬太尼类似物和其他合成类阿片贩运有关的非法金融计划和机制,并协助它们侦查和报告相关活动。

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is issuing this advisory1 to alert financial institutions to illicit financial schemes and mechanisms related to the trafficking of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and other synthetic opioids,2 and to assist them in detecting and reporting related activity.

由于芬太尼和其他合成阿片类药物的非法贩运、销售、分销和滥用,美国正处于一场空前的成瘾和死亡的流行之中。统计数据发人深省:从2013年到2017年,美国除美沙酮以外的合成阿片类药物导致的死亡人数增加了800% 以上。在美国,每天都有超过130人死于阿片类药物过量。这些数字本身不能充分反映这一流行病造成的破坏,其后果是深远和持久的,从悲痛的父母和孤儿,到巨大的经济和公共政策代价,以及对当代和后代的破坏。

The United States is in the midst of an unparalleled epidemic of addiction and death, fueled by the illicit trafficking, sale, distribution, and misuse of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. The statistics are sobering; between 2013 and 2017, deaths in the United States from synthetic opioids, other than methadone, increased over 800 percent.3 Every day in the United States, more than 130 people die from an opioid-related overdose.4 These numbers alone cannot fully capture the devastation wrought by this epidemic, the consequences of which are far reaching and everlasting, from grieving parents and orphaned children, to the enormous economic and public policy costs,5 and the destruction of current and future generations.

这一流行病正在撕裂我们社区的社会和经济结构,而总警监、国际贩毒者、洗钱者和其他犯罪分子则从受害者的痛苦中获利。犯罪网络和其他组织获得了数十亿美元的非法毒品收益,并利用美国的金融系统和经济来推动他们的犯罪事业,继续这种流行病来产生更多的犯罪利润,导致更多的死亡和成瘾。金融犯罪执法网络和其他美国政府机构正在与包括墨西哥在内的外国合作伙伴合作,以结束芬太尼的流行。这项咨询意见将协助金融机构侦查和报告可疑活动,使犯罪分子更难和更昂贵地(一)犯下这些罪行;(二)藏匿和使用其非法资金;和(三)继续助长这一流行病。金融机构利用这份谘询文件所载的资料,保障我们的金融体系,将有助拯救生命、保护无辜家庭,以及确保我们社区的安全和未来。事实上,这就是金融机构根据《银行保密法》生成、维护和报告的信息背后的真正价值和效用。这一咨询意见强调了敏感财务报告的主要类型和危险信号,这些报告涉及:(一)中国、墨西哥或其他外国供应商销售这些药物;(二)墨西哥和其他技术转让公司用于清洗芬太尼贩运收益的方法;(三)与位于美国的买家通过互联网销售和采购芬太尼有关的财务方法。芬太尼在美国以多种形式出售,所有这些都可能是致命的。芬太尼可以单独购买;与海洛因,可卡因,或甲基苯丙胺混合;或压缩成药丸形式,错误地作为处方阿片类药物出售,许多次被毫无戒心的受害者摄入。

The epidemic is tearing away at the social and economic fabric of our communities, while TCOs, international drug traffickers, money launderers, and other criminal actors profit off the misery of victims. Criminal networks and others generate billions of dollars in illicit drug proceeds, and use the U.S. financial system and economy to advance their criminal enterprises and continue this epidemic to generate more criminal profits, resulting in more deaths and addictions. FinCEN and other U.S. government agencies are collaboratively working with foreign partners, including Mexico, to end the fentanyl epidemic. This advisory will assist financial institutions in detecting and reporting suspicious activity, making it harder and more costly for criminals to (i) commit these crimes; (ii) hide and use their illicit money; and (iii) continue fueling this epidemic. By using the information in this advisory and safeguarding our financial system, financial institutions will help save lives, protect innocent families, and ensure the safety and future of our communities. Indeed, this is the real value and utility behind information generated, maintained, and reported under the Bank Secrecy Act by financial institutions. This advisory highlights the primary typologies and red flags derived from sensitive financial reporting which are associated with (i) the sale of these drugs by Chinese, Mexican, or other foreign suppliers; (ii) methods used by Mexican and other TCOs to launder the proceeds of fentanyl trafficking; and (iii) financial methodologies associated with the sale and procurement of fentanyl over the Internet by purchasers located in the United States.6 Fentanyl is sold in the United States in many forms, all of which can be deadly. Fentanyl can be purchased alone; mixed with heroin, cocaine, or methamphetamine; or pressed into pill form and falsely sold as prescription opioids, many times being ingested by unsuspecting victims.

类型学

Typologies

美国的芬太尼贩运通常遵循两种途径之一:美国个人从中国直接购买芬太尼供个人消费或在国内分销;或由多国警卫队和较小的犯罪网络从墨西哥跨境贩运芬太尼。在这两类中,与芬太尼贩运模式相关的主要融资机制包括:(i)利用货币服务企业、银行转账或在线支付处理器从外国供应源购买货物;(ii)利用可兑换虚拟货币(CVC)从外国供应源购买货物(如比特币、比特币、虚拟货币、虚拟货币或货币) ;(iii)利用货币服务处理器、在线支付处理器、虚拟货币或个人对个人销售从美国供应源购买货物;以及(iv)与 TCO 采购和分销相关的其他更一般的洗钱机制。

Fentanyl trafficking in the United States generally follows one of two pathways: direct purchase of fentanyl from China by U.S. individuals for personal consumption or domestic distribution; or cross-border trafficking of fentanyl from Mexico by TCOs and smaller criminal networks. Within these two categories, the predominant funding mechanisms associated with fentanyl trafficking patterns include: (i) purchases from a foreign source of supply made using money services businesses (MSBs), bank transfers, or online payment processors; (ii) purchases from a foreign source of supply made using convertible virtual currency7 (CVC) (such as bitcoin, bitcoin cash, ethereum, or monero); (iii) purchases from a U.S. source of supply made using an MSB, online payment processor, CVC, or person-to-person sales8; and (iv) other, more general money laundering mechanisms associated with TCO procurement and distribution.

美国个人从中国直接购买芬太尼用于个人消费或国内分销

Direct Purchase of Fentanyl from China by U.S. Individuals for Personal Consumption or Domestic Distribution

使用货币发射机或在线支付系统等现金流服务商从外国供应商购买货物

Purchases from a Foreign Source of Supply Using MSBs Such as Money Transmitters or Online Payment Systems

与芬太尼销售或购买有关的交易往往涉及通过现金服务商、在线支付处理器或银行转账向中国和其他国家的个人转账。一项对敏感金融数据的分析表明,当美国个人直接从中国和其他国家购买芬太尼时,他们往往安排资金转移,以逃避《银行保密法》(BSA)的报告和记录要求。个人经常使用多个 MSB 代理位置转移资金。此外,尽管付款接受者看起来彼此无关,但在许多情况下,他们通常共享同一个电话号码。

Transactions related to the sale or purchase of fentanyl often involve money transfers to individuals in China and other foreign countries through MSBs, online payment processors, or bank transfers to individuals located in foreign countries. An analysis of sensitive financial data illustrates that when U.S. individuals purchase fentanyl directly from China and other foreign countries, they often structure the money transfers to evade Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reporting and recordkeeping requirements.9 Individuals frequently transfer the funds using multiple MSB agent locations. Additionally, although payment recipients may seem to be unrelated to one another, in many cases, they often share the same phone numbers.

这些交易一般从位于美国的个人开始,联系出售芬太尼或其他处方药或非法药物的外国网站。这些网站通常由中国境内的个人注册或运营,用户可直接通过电话、短信(如视频短信、短信或短信应用程序的使用)或电子邮件与公司或个人的代表联系。

These transactions generally begin with individuals located in the United States contacting foreign websites selling fentanyl or other prescription or illicit drugs10 regulated under the Controlled Substances Act. The websites, which are typically registered to or operated by individuals located in China, direct users to contact a representative of the company or individual by telephone, message (e.g., video messaging, text messages, or the use of messaging applications), or email.

一旦买方和销售代表达成协议,销售代表通常指示买方通过位于美国的 MSB、在线支付处理器或银行转账将付款发送给特定的人(见图1)。联系信息通常包括一个电话号码,这个号码可能与外国网站有关,也可能被许多其他外国付款接收人或可能的信使使用。向这些外国来源的付款通常是低美元价值的交易(不到1000美元),有时通过多次交易或在一次交易中进行。在其他情况下,外国供应商可指示个人直接向在化学品制造领域开展业务的幌子公司或与化学品或化学品生产活动无关的空壳公司发送银行转账。这些付款通常是美元价值较高的交易(超过10000美元),可能与大宗毒品或前体化学品采购有关。这些公司,或者他们的代表,然后通常直接邮寄或运送非法麻醉品到美国的买家,供个人消费或再分配。

Once the buyer and the sales representative come to an agreement, the sales representative typically directs the buyer to send the payment to a particular person through an MSB located in the United States, online payment processor, or bank transfer (see Figure 1). The contact information often includes a telephone number, which may be associated with the foreign-based website and may also be used by many other foreign payment recipients or likely couriers. The payments to these foreign sources are typically low-dollar-value transactions (less than $1,000), sometimes conducted through multiple transactions or in a single transaction. In other cases, the foreign supplier may direct the individual to send a bank transfer directly to a front company operating in the chemical manufacturing field or to a shell company that is unrelated to chemicals or chemical production activity. These payments are typically higher-dollar-value transactions (over $10,000) and may be associated with bulk drug or precursor chemical purchases.11 These companies, or their representatives, then typically mail or ship the illicit narcotics directly to the buyers in the United States for personal consumption or redistribution.12

图1:MSB,在线支付处理器,或银行转账到国外的联系人

Figure 1: MSB, Online Payment Processor, or Bank Transfer to Foreign-based Contact

使用 CVC 从外国供应商采购

Purchases from a Foreign-located Supplier Using CVC

贩毒者和消费者越来越多地使用 Clearnet 和 Darknet 电子商务市场,配合在线支付系统和虚拟货币,进一步匿名化芬太尼的购买和分销。对敏感财务数据的分析表明,国内非法药物制造商、经销商和消费者使用在线支付平台或 CVC 购买主要来自中国的前体化学品或完全合成的麻醉品。

Drug traffickers and consumers increasingly use Clearnet and Darknet13 e-commerce markets, paired with online payment systems and virtual currencies, to further anonymize fentanyl purchase and distribution.14 An analysis of sensitive financial data indicates that domestic illicit drug manufacturers, dealers, and consumers use online payment platforms or CVC to purchase precursor chemicals or completely synthesized narcotics primarily sourced from China.

申报机构根据网站上提及使用合资公司交易商进行非法毒品交易的内嵌信息或参考资料,确定了潜在的毒品贩运者。这些信息和网站提供有关资金和产品来源或目的地的宝贵财务情报。

Filing institutions have identified potential drug traffickers based on embedded messages or references on websites that mention illegal drug transactions using CVC exchangers.15 Such messages and websites provide valuable financial intelligence on the source or destination of money and products.

国外联系人付款方式

CVC Payment to Foreign Contact Method

与使用现金支付服务或在线支付处理器从外国供应来源购买相似,位于美国的个人搜索芬太尼,并查明可能提供在线购买非法药物机会的潜在网站。外国代表将指示美国的个人通过 CVC 支付,比如比特币、比特币现金、 etherium 或 monero(见图2)。

Similar to purchases from a foreign source of supply using MSBs or online payment processors, individuals located in the United States search for fentanyl and identify potential websites that may provide the opportunity to purchase illicit drugs online. Foreign representatives will instruct the U.S.-based individual to send payments through CVC, such as bitcoin, bitcoin cash, ethereum, or monero16(see Figure 2).

此外,美国的个人可以在暗网市场上找到芬太尼经销商,并与包括美国在内的世界各地的暗网供应商联系。个人购买芬太尼在暗网也将支付供应商使用 CVC。然后,Darknet 供应商和化学公司将非法麻醉品直接邮寄给美国的个人。Darknet 的供应商最终可能会寻求使用美国和外国的 CVC 交换机将 CVC 兑换成传统的法定货币,例如美元,或者将虚拟货币本身作为未经许可的货币传递机构出售给公众。与个人消费者的活动相比,金额较高的交易加上其他可疑指标,更有可能与供应商、再分销商或街头经销商有关。

Additionally, U.S.-based individuals may find fentanyl dealers on Darknet markets and contact Darknet vendors located worldwide, including in the United States. Individuals purchasing fentanyl on the Darknet will also pay vendors using CVC. Darknet vendors and chemical companies then mail the illicit narcotics directly to the U.S.-based individuals. The Darknet vendors may eventually seek to exchange CVC for traditional fiat currency such as U.S. dollars (USD) using both U.S.- and foreign-based CVC exchangers, or sell the virtual currency themselves to the public as unlicensed money transmitters.17 Higher-amount transactions, coupled with other suspicious indicators, are more likely to be related to a vendor, redistributor, or street dealer compared with the activity of a personal consumer.

图2:CVC 付款给国外的联系方法

Figure 2: CVC Payment to Foreign-based Contact Method

使用 MSB、在线支付处理器、 CVC 或人对人交易从位于美国的供应商购买商品

Purchases from a U.S.-located Supplier Using an MSB, Online Payment Processor, CVC, or Person-to-Person Transaction

位于美国的个人利用互联网或当地联系从同样位于美国的供应商那里购买芬太尼。在这种类型的交易中,个人通常以两种方式之一进行支付。首先,可以使用现金服务支付平台和在线支付平台进行支付,类似于向外国供应商进行支付的方式。在收到付款后,供应商通常船舶或邮寄芬太尼给消费者。其次,在更为传统的非法毒品贸易交易中,个人通过现金(个人对个人的交易)亲自进行支付。在这种情况下,芬太尼是手提交换取现金,然后毒品贩子存款或洗钱。现金交易的美元价值可能根据变量而有所不同,例如地理位置和所购买的非法麻醉品的数量(或重量)。

Individuals located in the United States use the Internet or local connections to buy fentanyl from suppliers who are also located in the United States. In this type of transaction, individuals typically make payments in one of two ways. First, payments can be made using both MSBs and online payment platforms, similar to the way payments are made to foreign suppliers. After the payment is received, the supplier typically ships or mails the fentanyl to the consumer.18 Second, in more traditional drug trafficking transactions, individuals make payments in person with cash (person-to-person transactions). In this scenario, fentanyl is hand-delivered in exchange for cash, and then the drug traffickers deposit or launder the cash. The cash transaction dollar values may vary depending on variables, such as geographic location and the amount (or weight) of the illicit narcotics that are purchased.

Tcos 和小型犯罪网络跨境贩运芬太尼

Cross-border Trafficking of Fentanyl by TCOs and Smaller Criminal Networks

控股公司采购及分销

TCO Procurement and Distribution

墨西哥是许多非法毒品的过境和生产地,墨西哥的多氯联苯公司是这些非法毒品的主要供应商,其中也包括芬太尼。墨西哥多氯联苯公司控制着跨越西南边境的走私路线,并安排芬太尼在美国各地的运输和分销。

Mexico is a transit and production point for the trafficking of many illicit drugs and Mexican TCOs operate as the dominant purveyors of these illicit drugs, which also include fentanyl.19 Mexican TCOs control the smuggling routes across the Southwest Border (SWB) and arrange the transport and distribution of fentanyl throughout the United States.20

随后,墨西哥 TCOs 安排合并,安置和转移非法收益来自芬太尼在美国的销售。金融犯罪执法网络对机密财务信息的审查揭示了涉及结构性现金存款、资金转移和电汇的交易,这些交易涉及美国主权财富基金地区和墨西哥账户的最终信用。金融犯罪执法网络认为,这一机密财务信息常常描述了使用自动取款机进行过度现金交易的个人、无来源的现金以及没有可核实或合法的交易目的。非法毒品贸易网络经常利用空壳公司将非法毒品收益伪装成合法的商业交易。Bsa 的数据还显示,在美国的个人使用他们的账户在国内和国际地点之间汇集资金。墨西哥技术转让办公室使用的一些更常见的洗钱 / 技术方法如下:

Subsequently, Mexican TCOs arrange the consolidation, placement, and movement of illicit proceeds derived from fentanyl sales in the United States. FinCEN’s review of confidential financial information reveals transactions that involve structured cash deposits, money transfers, and wire transfers for the ultimate credit of accounts in the U.S. SWB region and Mexico. FinCEN finds that this confidential financial information frequently describes individuals who conduct excessive cash transactions using ATMs, unsourced cash, and no verifiable or legitimate purpose for the transactions. Drug trafficking networks often use shell companies to disguise the illicit drug proceeds as legitimate business transactions. BSA data also shows that individuals located in the United States use their accounts to funnel funds between domestic and international locations. Some of the more common money laundering methodologies used by Mexican TCOs are described below:

1. 大量现金走私:将大量现金从美国偷运到墨西哥、控股公司或其保留的第三方,将超过10000美元的货币或其他货币工具藏在个人、行李或任何运输工具上,以便从美国境内某地运往墨西哥某地。

1. Bulk Cash Smuggling21: To smuggle bulk cash across the border from the United States to Mexico, a TCO, or a third party it retains, conceals more than $10,000 in currency or other monetary instruments on a person, luggage, or in any conveyance for transportation from a place within the United States to a place in Mexico.

美国执法部门怀疑,大部分从美国其他州走私到加利福尼亚的大量货币都是用来支付毒品运输费用的。然后,这些非法大宗货币的大部分通过私人拥有的车辆或商用牵引式拖车越过边界运入墨西哥。

U.S. law enforcement suspects that most bulk currency smuggled into California from other U.S. states is payment for drug shipments.22 The majority of this illicit bulk currency is then transported across the border into Mexico through privately owned vehicles or commercial tractor-trailers.23

2. 以贸易为基础的洗钱:包括芬太尼在内的非法毒品销售所产生的大量现金很难在不被发现的情况下跨越美国边境运输,促使毒品贩子寻找不那么引人注目的替代方案,如以贸易为基础的洗钱计划。Tbml 往往涉及使用非法收益购买货物出口,因为随后出售的货物有效地洗钱的收益。反洗钱金融行动特别工作组将反洗钱定义为」通过利用贸易交易掩盖犯罪收益和转移价值,企图使其非法来源合法化的过程。实际上,这可以通过进出口价格、数量或质量的不正当手法引诱来实现。此外,TBML 技术的复杂性各不相同,经常与其他洗钱技术结合使用,以进一步掩盖资金来源 在这种情况下,TBML 通常涉及到将实物美元纸币转换成商品,然后出口或进口该商品,而无需实物跨境流动的基础货币。例如,贩毒者会将散装货币(即纸币)的货币价值转换为具有等值货币价值的商品,如智能手机、汽车或珠宝。

2. Trade-Based Money Laundering: Large amounts of bulk cash resulting from illegal drug sales, including fentanyl, can be difficult to transport across U.S. borders undetected, prompting drug traffickers to look to less conspicuous alternatives, such as trade-based money laundering (TBML) schemes. TBML often involves using illicit proceeds to buy goods for export, as the subsequent sale of the goods effectively launders the proceeds.24 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines TBML as, “the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illicit origins. In practice, this can be achieved through the misrepresentation of the price, quantity or quality of imports or exports. Moreover, TBML techniques vary in complexity and are frequently used in combination with other money laundering techniques to further obscure the money trail.”25 In this context, TBML often involves converting physical U.S. banknotes into a commodity and then exporting or importing the commodity, without physical cross-border movement of the underlying currency.26 For example, drug traffickers will convert the monetary value of bulk currency (i.e., banknotes) into a good with an equivalent monetary value, such as a smartphone, automobile, or jewelry.

为了促进 TBML,TCO 使用内部会计师或独立会计师(也称为」货币经纪人」)从美国向国际司法管辖区转移资金 下面的 TBML 示例在墨西哥使用了一个外部代理(请参见图3)。在 TBML 运作之前,TCO 和经纪人协商取钱和转移佣金的事宜。Tco 然后通知经纪人在哪里使用加密代码获取美元毒品收益,作为收益确认或验证手段。经纪人可能会雇佣一个助手或者雇佣洗钱者(通常被称为「蓝精灵」)来代表经纪人收取收益。一旦收益回升,洗钱者可能:

To facilitate TBML, a TCO transfers funds from the United States back to international jurisdictions using either internal accountants or an independent accountant, also referred to as a “money broker.” The following TBML example uses an external broker in Mexico (see Figure 3).27 The TCO and broker negotiate a money pick-up and transfer a commission fee prior to the TBML operation. The TCO then informs the broker where to pick up the USD drug proceeds using an encrypted code, as a proceeds confirmation or validation means. The broker may use an assistant or hire launderers (often called “smurfs”) to pick up the proceeds on the broker’s behalf. Upon proceeds pick-up, the launderers may:

i. 将收益存入美国金融机构(通常避免记录和报告要求),然后将资金作为货物或债务付款转移给美国供应商和出口商;或

i. deposit proceeds into U.S. financial institutions (often structured to avoid recordkeeping and reporting requirements) and then transfer the funds as goods or debt payments to U.S. vendors and exporters; or

ii. 运输(也称为「下降」或「交出」)大量现金给第三方,包括美国出口商,以便随后存入美国金融体系。

ii. transport (also called “drop” or “hand off”) the bulk cash to third parties, including U.S. exporters, for subsequent deposit and integration into the U.S. financial system.

在货币提取之前,货币经纪商与墨西哥进口商谈判一个合同和汇率,以进口商的名义支付以美元计价的出口商品(例如,第三方支付)。一旦经纪人从进口商那里收到墨西哥比索计价的存款,经纪人的账户就」载入」了,然后他就可以为洗钱者或蓝精灵提款提供便利,并同时向控股公司付款以核对账户。在这种类型的抵消交易中,通常被称为「镜子转账」,洗钱者拿起钱,确认经纪人收到了适当的金额(通常是通过短信或电话),然后经纪人转账或「转手」相当于美元的比索给 TCO。有时,当墨西哥进口商在美国最初的资金下降之前向经纪人付款(从而」装入」他的帐户),这种交易就开始了。

Prior to the money pick-up, the money broker negotiates a contract and exchange rate with a Mexican importer to pay for exported USD-denominated goods on the importer’s behalf (i.e., a third-party payment). Once the broker receives the Mexican peso-denominated deposits from the importer, the broker’s account is “loaded,” and he can then facilitate the money pick-up by the launderer(s) or smurf(s) and make a simultaneous payment to the TCO to reconcile accounts. In this type of offsetting transaction, often called a “mirror transfer,”28 the launderer picks up the money, and confirms that the broker received the proper amount (normally via text or a phone call), and the broker then transfers or “hands off” a peso-equivalent amount of USD to the TCO. Sometimes this type of transaction commences when the Mexican importer pays the broker (thereby “loading” his account) prior to the initial money drop in the United States.

从洗钱者那里收到美元的供应商将根据货币经纪人的运输指示将货物出口到墨西哥进口商。收到货物后,进口商在墨西哥公开市场上加价销售,进口商的账户就可以调节或平衡。

The vendor who receives USD from the launderer will then export the goods to the Mexican importer according to the money broker’s shipping directions. After receiving the goods, the importer sells them on the Mexican open market at a markup, and the importer’s account is reconciled or balanced.

图3:以贸易为基础的洗钱

Figure 3: Trade-based Money Laundering

3. 结构化的 MSB 资金转移:专业的洗钱组织雇佣散伙人(包括「洗钱者」)通过美国的 MSB 向墨西哥转移资金,主要是资金转移机构,结构化的目的是逃避报告要求。在这方面,结构安排(即将资金转移数额保持在3000美元的适用门槛以下,以避免查明和报告要求)是通过下列方式之一或组合完成的:

3. Structured MSB Money Transfers: Professional money laundering organizations hire looselyassociated parties (including “money mules”29) to send money transfers to Mexico via U.S. MSBs,primarily money transmitters, structured to evade reporting requirements. In this context, structuring (i.e., keeping the amount of the money transfer below the applicable threshold of $3,000 in order to avoid identification and reporting requirements) is accomplished through one of, or a combination of, the following:

4. 漏斗账户活动:多个个人代表控股公司将非法毒品销售的现金收益存入个人或企业账户。这些存款往往存在多个国家,这些国家地理位置远离开立账户的分支机构或定居点,而且地理位置与提款活动地点不同。存款是有组织的(即低于适用的门槛10000美元,在这种情况下,是为了避免识别和保存记录的要求)。由于某些大型国家银行决定限制私人客户账户的第三方现金存款,可能部分中断了控股公司使用漏斗账户活动的情况。

4. Funnel Account Activity: Multiple individuals acting on behalf of the TCO deposit cash proceeds of illicit drug sales into a personal or business account. The deposits are often made in multiple states geographically distant from the branch in which the account was opened or domiciled and geographically different from the location of the withdrawal activity.30 The deposits are structured (i.e., kept below the applicable threshold of $10,000, in this instance, to avoid identification and recordkeeping requirements).31 The use of funnel account activity by TCOs may have been partially disrupted by the decisions of certain large national banks to restrict third-party cash deposits for private customer accounts.

芬太尼非法融资案例研究

Case Studies of Fentanyl-related Illicit Finance

漏斗帐户资金电汇到墨西哥伪装成合法商业的例子

Example of Funnel Accounts Funding Wires to Mexico Disguised as Legitimate Business

金融机构类型:存款机构

Financial Institution Type: Depository Institutions

2018年12月,联邦陪审团宣判赫尔曼·e·阿吉雷和特洛伊·r·吉伦犯有毒品阴谋罪。同时,Aguirre 还被判犯有继续经营犯罪事业和洗钱组织阴谋罪。2016年,这两个人与15名共谋者一起被起诉,罪名是他们参与了一个由个人和食品以及生产公司组成的犯罪网络,这些公司与锡那罗亚卡特尔有关联,通过伪装被称为装有」海参」的托盘,从墨西哥向美国贩运数千公斤海洛因、芬太尼和可卡因 Tco 的业务覆盖墨西哥、亚利桑那州、加利福尼亚州和其他地区,以 joaqu n「El Chapo」 guzm n 和 Ismael「El Mayo」 Zambada 为首的锡那罗亚卡特尔(Sinaloa Cartel)是其供应源。Tco 在南加州的银行开设了账户,用于在东北部城市的药品销售点接受现金存款。

In December 2018, a federal jury convicted Herman E. Aguirre and Troy R. Gillon of narcotics conspiracy. Aguirre was also convicted of operating a continuing criminal enterprise and money laundering conspiracy.32 In 2016, these two individuals were indicted along with 15 co-conspirators for their role in a criminal network of individuals and food and produce companies affiliated with the Sinaloa Cartel trafficking in thousands of kilograms of heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine from Mexico into the United States by disguising the shipments in pallets described as containing “sea cucumbers.”33 The TCO’s operation spanned Mexico, Arizona, California, and elsewhere, with the Sinaloa Cartel, led by Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán and Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, as its source of supply.34 The TCO opened accounts in banks in southern California, which were used to receive cash deposits at drug sale locations in Northeastern cities.35

和 Clearnet Marketplace Fentanyl Transactions

Darknet and Clearnet Marketplace Fentanyl Transactions

金融机构类型:现金支付证券和存款机构

Financial Institution Type: MSBs and Depository Institutions

马修·罗伯茨和霍莉·罗伯茨分别被判入联邦监狱服刑135个月和96个月,罪名是通过多个黑网市场账户分发芬太尼和其他麻醉剂。2018年他们被捕时,这对夫妇是世界上产量最高的 Darknet 芬太尼供应商。他们使用」私人信息、加密软件、虚拟专用网络和通过 Tor 网络的代理」以及预付款的签证和礼品卡,并邮寄发光手镯等物品,以掩盖他们邮寄麻醉品的事实。

Matthew and Holly Roberts were sentenced to 135 and 96 months in federal prison, respectively, for their roles in distributing fentanyl and other narcotics through multiple Darknet marketplace36accounts.37 At the time of their arrest in 2018, the couple were the most prolific Darknet fentanyl vendors in the world. They used “private messaging, encryption software, Virtual Private Networks and proxies through the Tor network” as well as pre-paid Visa and gift cards, and mailed decoy items, such as glow bracelets, to hide the fact they were mailing narcotics.38

他们的客户用虚拟货币进行购买,然后夫妇俩把这些货币送到虚拟货币交易所,将这些货币兑换成美国法定货币。

Their customers made purchases with virtual currency, which the couple then sent to virtual currency exchangers to convert the funds into U.S. fiat currency.39

注:根据对敏感金融数据的分析,Holly Roberts 在储值卡中加入了资金,并立即通过 ATM 取款和网上购物取走了资金。马修·罗伯茨和他的同事们从账户地理区域以外的地方收到了过多的现金存款,然后立即提取现金。

Note: Based on analysis of sensitive financial data, Holly Roberts added funds to stored value cards and immediately removed funds via ATM withdrawals and online purchases. Matthew Roberts and associates received excessive cash deposits into their accounts from sources outside of the account’s geographic area followed immediately by cash withdrawals.

中国合成阿片类毒品贩运者

Kingpin Act Sanctions – Chinese Synthetic Opioid Traffickers

美国财政部外国资产管制办公室(OFAC)通过对参与合成阿片贩运的中国国民进行制裁调查,将中国国民张指定为重要的外国麻醉品走私商,这是根据《外国麻醉品大亨指定法》(《大亨指定法》)第一个与芬太尼有关的指定。张向美国贩运芬太尼和其他受管制物质与美国公民的过量死亡有关。除了张,外国资产管制处还指认了一家名为扎龙生物科技(亚洲)有限公司的化学公司。扎龙生物科技(亚洲)有限公司是一家在中国上海经营的香港实体,由张所有和控制。张利用扎伦生物技术公司为非法向美国输入芬太尼和其他受控物质提供便利。外国资产管制处还指认了四个人,其中包括张的父母,他们协助张的贩毒活动,利用全球无国界医生组织从美国境内的个人那里获得购买芬太尼的资金。

Through sanctions investigations into Chinese nationals involved in synthetic opioid trafficking, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Chinese national Jian Zhang as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker, the first fentanyl-related designation pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act).40 Zhang’s trafficking of fentanyl and other controlled substances to the United States was tied to the overdose deaths of U.S. citizens. In addition to Zhang, OFAC designated a chemical company named Zaron Bio-Tech (Asia) Limited, a Hong Kong entity operating in Shanghai, China, that was owned and controlled by Zhang. Zhang used Zaron Bio-Tech to facilitate the unlawful importation of fentanyl and other controlled substances into the United States. OFAC also designated four individuals, including Zhang’s mother and father, who assisted his narcotics trafficking activities by using global MSBs to receive funds for fentanyl purchases from individuals located in the United States.41

2014年,外国资产管理处处罚了2名中国公民,Bo Peng 和 Zhang Lei,根据京宾法案被特别指定为毒品贩子,以及2家中国公司,CEC 有限公司和凯凯科技有限公司,因为他们在合成阿片类药物、大麻素和卡西酮的国际非法毒品贸易中扮演的角色。外国资产管制处还指定另外三名中国公民代表张磊履行职责。

In 2014, OFAC sanctioned two Chinese nationals, Bo Peng and Zhang Lei, as specially designated narcotics traffickers pursuant to the Kingpin Act,42 as well as two Chinese companies, CEC Limited and Kaikai Technology Co., Ltd., for their role in international drug trafficking relating to synthetic opioids, cannabinoids, and cathinones. OFAC also designated three additional Chinese nationals for their role on behalf of Zhang Lei.43

购买黑网芬太尼

Darknet Fentanyl Purchases

暗网通常用于一些非法活动,包括芬太尼贩运。2017年7月,美国司法部查封了 AlphaBay 的服务器和资产;AlphaBay 是当时互联网上最大的黑网犯罪市场。要求其用户在 CVC(包括比特币、 monero 和 ethereum)进行交易,以混淆交易和关联方。Darknet 网站是芬太尼和海洛因交易的主要平台,这些交易与过量死亡有关。在 Darknet 上运行了两年多,全世界有成千上万的人使用该网站购买和销售致命的和非法的毒品,盗窃和伪造的身份文件和访问设备,假冒商品,恶意软件和其他电脑黑客工具,枪支和有毒化学品。根据执法部门的调查,美国官员估计,阿尔法湾被用来清洗与其非法交易有关的数亿美元。

The Darknet is commonly used for a number of illicit activities, including fentanyl trafficking. In July 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice seized AlphaBay servers and assets; AlphaBay was the largest criminal Darknet market on the Internet at the time.44 AlphaBay required its users to transact in CVC (including bitcoin, monero, and ethereum) to obfuscate transactions and related parties. The Darknet site was a major platform for transactions involving fentanyl and heroin, which were linked to overdose deaths. AlphaBay operated for over two years on the Darknet, and hundreds of thousands of people around the world used the site to buy and sell deadly and illegal drugs, stolen and fraudulent identification documents and access devices, counterfeit goods, malware and other computer hacking tools, firearms, and toxic chemicals. U.S. officials estimate, based on the law enforcement investigation, that AlphaBay was used to launder hundreds of millions of dollars linked to its illegal transactions.45

芬太尼相关活动的红旗指标

Red Flag Indicators for Fentanyl-related Activity

下面提到的危险信号可能有助于金融机构查明涉嫌与非法贩运芬太尼有关的阴谋。列出的一些危险信号也可能更普遍地适用于非法毒品贸易,或适用于其他贩运毒品,或适用于其他洗钱或非法活动,但是为了提供与芬太尼有关的金融活动的背景而详细列出。在应用红旗时,金融机构被告知,没有任何一个交易红旗必然最终表明可疑活动。金融机构在确定某项交易是否可疑之前,可以考虑额外的背景信息以及周围的事实和情况,例如客户的历史金融活动,以及客户是否表现出多种指标。金融机构也可酌情进行额外的查询和调查。

The red flags noted below may help financial institutions in identifying suspected schemes related to illicit fentanyl trafficking. Some red flags listed may also be applicable more generally to drug trafficking, or apply to other trafficked drugs, or to other money laundering or illicit activity, but are detailed in order to provide context for financial activity related to fentanyl. In applying the red flags, financial institutions are advised that no single transactional red flag necessarily indicates suspicious activity conclusively. Financial institutions may consider additional contextual information and the surrounding facts and circumstances, such as a customer’s historical financial activity and whether the customer exhibits multiple indicators, before determining that a transaction is suspicious. Financial institutions may also perform additional inquiries and investigations where appropriate.

资金转移红旗

MSBs: Money Transfer Red Flags

1. 汇款受益人列出了与制药公司或化学品销售网站相关的电话号码或电子邮件地址。

1. The money transfer beneficiary lists a phone number or email address associated with a pharmaceutical company or chemical sales website.

2. 美国汇款人向中国境内的个人发送低美元的汇款,没有明显的合法目的。个人转账金额从10美元到100美元不等,多次转账的总金额约为600美元。相反,一个美国汇款人会向明显不相关的个人发送大量的汇款。

2. U.S. remitter sends low-dollar money transfers to an individual in China for no apparent legitimate purpose. Individual transfers may range from $10 to $100, with an aggregated amount of multiple transfers totaling approximately $600. Conversely, a U.S. remitter sends a high volume of money transfers to apparently unrelated individuals.

3. 美国的多个汇款机构向中国的同一个受益人汇款(也就是说,多对一)。

3. Multiple U.S. remitters send money transfers to the same individual beneficiary in China (i.e., many to one).

4. 似乎不相关的受益人共享相同的电话号码或电子邮件地址来接收交易。

4. Seemingly unrelated beneficiaries share the same phone number or email address to receive transactions.

5. 汇出资金的数量与美国汇款人的预期活动不一致。

5. The volume of outgoing money transfers is not consistent with the expected activity of a U.S. remitter.

6. 美国汇款人调整汇款金额,以避免 BSA 报告和记录保存要求(即结构化)。当一个美国汇款人发送多个结构化的汇款时,可能会有其他的危险信号:

6. A U.S. remitter adjusts the money transfer amount to avoid BSA reporting and recordkeeping requirements (i.e., structuring). When a U.S. remitter sends multiple structured money transfers, additional red flags may be involved:

存款机构:结构和漏斗帐户活动红旗

Depository Institutions: Structuring and Funnel Account Activity Red Flags

7. 账户所有者或第三方将全国各银行分支机构的现金存入同一个账户,为社工局的外出交易提供资金,包括提取现金或电汇到墨西哥(即漏斗账户活动和资金快速流动)。

7. Account owners or third parties structure cash deposits at bank branches nationwide into the same account, which funds outgoing transactions on the SWB, including cash withdrawals or wire transfers to Mexico (i.e., funnel account activity and rapid movement of funds).

8. 存款机构对存放钞票的物理状况有所怀疑(例如,钞票有毒品、洗涤剂的味道或过度磨损)。

8. The depository institutions have a suspicion concerning the physical condition of deposited banknotes (e.g., the bills smell of drugs, detergent, or are excessively worn).

9. 资金来源无法证实。

9. The source of funds cannot be corroborated.

10. 多宗低于适用的货币交易报告门槛(即结构性)的交易,可能涉及额外指标:

10. Multiple transactions below the applicable Currency Transaction Report (CTR) threshold (i.e., structuring), which may involve additional indicators:

11. 客户或业务类型的交易超出模式。

11. Transaction out of pattern for customers or business type.

12. 没有明显业务目的的交易。

12. Transaction with no apparent business purpose.

存款机构:壳牌公司的危险信号

Depository Institutions: Shell Company Red Flags

13. 不清晰的商业模式:

13. Unclear business model:

14. 公司地址或地点差异:

14. Company address or location discrepancy:

15. 公司名称不符:

15. Company name discrepancy:

16. 雇主身份证号码(EIN)差异:

16. Employer Identification Number (EIN) discrepancy:

存款机构和 MSBs:Clearnet 和 Darknet Marketplace 芬太尼收购危险信号

Depository Institutions and MSBs: Clearnet and Darknet Marketplace Fentanyl Purchase Red Flags

17. 与 Darknet 市场或 CVC 混合服务的直接或间接交易。当前流行的几个 Darknet 市场的名称包括:

17. Direct or indirect transactions with Darknet marketplaces or CVC mixing services.46 The names of several current popular Darknet marketplaces include:47

18. 有毒品犯罪前科的顾客。

18. Customers with past criminal histories for drug-related offenses.

19. 消费者在交易记录栏中讨论药品购买,包括引用药物或者像克这样的重量测量(例如「1克食物」)。顾客可以参考非正式的俚语名称(例如「Fenty」)或实际的化学名称(例如「乙酰芬太尼」)。

19. Customers discussing drug purchases in the transaction notes field available on the exchange, including referencing drugs or weight measurements like grams (e.g., “1 gram fent”). Customers may reference the informal slang names48 (e.g., “Fenty”) or the actual chemical names (e.g., “Acetylfentanyl”).

20. 使用虚拟专用网(VPN)服务或 Tor 访问 CVC 交换帐户。

20. Use of virtual private network (VPN) services or Tor to access CVC exchange accounts.

举报可疑活动的宝贵资料

Valuable Information in Reporting Suspicious Activity

涉及网站及内嵌讯息的可疑活动

Suspicious Activity Involving Websites and Embedded Messages

网上支付系统或合资公司的交易商可能会获得网上购买非法药物的信息或其他信息。这些信息对于金融机构确定可疑活动与潜在的非法毒品贸易安全局和执法部门进行调查极为有用。

Online payment systems or CVC exchangers may have access to embedded messages or other information that reference Internet purchases of illegal drugs. This information can be extremely useful for financial institutions in determining suspicious activity linked to potential drug trafficking and to law enforcement for investigative purposes.

涉及合资公司的可疑活动

Suspicious Activity Involving CVC

合营公司的交易产生了各种各样的信息要素,这些要素可能对执法部门调查涉及合营公司交易的潜在非法行为极为有用。具体而言,以下资料对执法工作特别有帮助:

CVC transactions generate a significant variety of information elements that may be extremely useful to law enforcement in investigating potential illicit conduct involving CVC transactions. Specifically, the following information is particularly helpful to law enforcement:

在提交可疑活动报告时,金融机构应在报告表格和说明中提供所有相关的现有资料。

When filing a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR), financial institutions should provide all pertinent available information in the SAR form and narrative.

提醒美国金融机构的监管责任

Reminder of Regulatory Obligations for U.S. Financial Institutions

根据现有的监管义务,美国金融机构应采取合理的、基于风险的步骤,查明并限制它们可能接触与参与金融便利或贩运芬太尼或其他合成类阿片的个人和实体有关的资金和其他资产。

Consistent with existing regulatory obligations, U.S. financial institutions should take reasonable, risk-based steps to identify and limit any exposure they may have to funds and other assets associated with individuals and entities engaged in the financial facilitation or trafficking in fentanyl or other synthetic opioids.

提醒美国金融机构在尽职调查、客户识别和可疑活动报告方面的反洗钱和监管义务

Reminder of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Regulatory Obligations for U.S. Financial Institutions Regarding Due Diligence, Customer Identification, and Suspicious Activity Reporting

金融犯罪执法网络正在提供咨询意见中的信息,以协助美国金融机构履行其基于风险的尽职调查和其他 BSA 义务,帮助查明可能参与金融便利或贩运芬太尼或其他合成类阿片的个人。

FinCEN is providing the information in this advisory to assist U.S. financial institutions in meeting their risk-based due diligence and other BSA obligations to help identify individuals who may be engaged in the financial facilitation or trafficking in fentanyl or other synthetic opioids.

加强尽职调查的责任

Enhanced Due Diligence Obligations

Fincen 提醒美国金融机构,它们必须遵守 BSA 及其实施条例规定的尽职调查义务。除了一般尽职调查要求之外,受监管的金融机构还必须对为 non-U.S. 人员持有的私人银行账户实施尽职调查方案,以侦查和报告任何已知或可疑的洗钱或通过这些账户进行的其他可疑活动。

FinCEN reminds U.S. financial institutions that they must comply with their due diligence obligations under the BSA and its implementing regulations.49 In addition to their general due diligence requirements, covered financial institutions are required to implement a due diligence program for private banking accounts held for non-U.S. persons designed to detect and report any known or suspected money laundering or other suspicious activity through those accounts.50

金融犯罪执法网络还提醒被覆盖的金融机构,它们有义务对其为外国金融机构维持的代理账户实施尽职调查方案,其中包括适当的、具体的、基于风险的、必要时加强的政策、程序和合理设计的监测和报告涉及此类账户的已知或疑似洗钱活动的控制措施。

FinCEN also reminds covered financial institutions of their obligation to implement due diligence programs for correspondent accounts they maintain for foreign financial institutions that include appropriate, specific, risk-based and, where necessary, enhanced policies, procedures, and controls reasonably designed to detect and report known or suspected money laundering activity involving such accounts.51

客户身份识别

Customer Identification

此外,某些金融机构还必须有一个书面的客户身份识别程序,以使该机构形成一个合理的信念,即它知道每个客户的真实身份。至少,这些金融机构必须在开户时获得并核实每位客户的姓名、账户上所列个人的出生日期、地址和身份号码。

In addition, certain financial institutions also must have a written customer identification program,52 to allow the institution to form a reasonable belief that it knows the true identitfy of each of its customers. At a minimum, these financial institutions must, at account opening, obtain and verify each customer’s name, date of birth for individuals listed on the account, address, and identification number.53

反洗钱委员会的反洗钱计划必须建立适当的程序和控制措施,以应对洗钱安全局和与其有业务往来的外国代理人或交易对手构成的恐怖主义融资风险。

An MSB’s AML program must establish adequate and appropriate procedures and controls commensurate with the money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by foreign agents or counterparties with which that MSB does business.54

报告可疑活动

Suspicious Activity Reporting

如果金融机构知道、怀疑或有理由怀疑该金融机构进行或企图通过该金融机构进行的交易涉及来自非法活动的资金,或企图掩盖来自非法活动的资金,旨在规避根据《银行业管理条例》颁布的条例,缺乏业务或明显的合法目的,或涉及利用该金融机构协助犯罪活动,则该金融机构必须提交特别行政区。

A financial institution is required to file a SAR if it knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect a transaction conducted or attempted by, at, or through the financial institution involves funds derived from illegal activity, or attempts to disguise funds derived from illegal activity; is designed to evade regulations promulgated under the BSA; lacks a business or apparent lawful purpose; or involves the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity.55

特区申报指示

SAR Filing Instructions

在提交特区申报表时,金融机构应以特区表格和说明书提供所有相关的现有资料。金融罪行执法网要求金融机构只使用经过更新的强制性特别申报表(截至2019年2月1日),并在特别申报表第2栏(给金融罪行执法网的备案机构说明)中使用以下关键词引用此建议:

When filing a SAR, financial institutions should provide all pertinent available information in the SAR form and narrative. FinCEN requests that financial institutions use only the updated mandatory SAR form (as of February 1, 2019) and reference this advisory using the following key term in SAR field 2 (Filing Institution Note to FinCEN):

「fentanyfin-2019-a006」

“FENTANYL FIN-2019-A006”

指出所举报的可疑活动与本通告所强调的活动之间可能存在的联系。

to indicate a possible connection between the suspicious activities being reported and activities highlighted in this advisory.

特别行政区报告与金融机构有效执行尽职调查要求和外国资产管制处义务一起,对于识别扩散融资以及洗钱组织和恐怖主义融资至关重要。对金融犯罪执法网络和美国执法分析和调查工作、外国资产管制处的指定工作以及美国金融体系的总体安全和稳定来说,搜救报告始终是有益的,也是至关重要的。

SAR reporting, in conjunction with effective implementation of due diligence requirements and OFAC obligations by financial institutions, has been crucial to identifying proliferation financing as well as money laundering and terrorist financing. SAR reporting is consistently beneficial and critical to FinCEN and U.S. law enforcement analytical and investigative efforts, OFAC designation efforts, and the overall security and stability of the U.S. financial system.56

有关进一步资料

For Further Information

关于本建议内容的其他问题或意见可以发送到 FinCEN 资源中心 frc@FinCEN. gov。

Additional questions or comments regarding the contents of this advisory should be addressed to the FinCEN Resource Center at frc@fincen.gov.

金融机构如欲举报可能与恐怖活动有关的可疑交易,应致电金融机构免费热线(866-rrb- 556-3974)(每周7天,每天24小时)。该热线的目的是加快向执法部门提供这一信息。金融机构应立即向当地执法官员报告任何迫在眉睫的威胁。

Financial institutions wanting to report suspicious transactions that may potentially relate to terrorist activity should call the Financial Institutions Toll-Free Hotline at (866) 556-3974 (7 days a week, 24 hours a day). The purpose of the hotline is to expedite the delivery of this information to law enforcement. Financial institutions should immediately report any imminent threat to local-area law enforcement officials.

金融犯罪执法网络的使命是保护金融系统免受非法使用,打击洗钱,并通过战略性使用金融当局以及收集、分析和传播金融情报来促进国家安全。

The mission of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is to safeguard the financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering, and promote national security through the strategic use of financial authorities and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence.

1. 这个建议也是一个更大的,美国政府芬太尼咨询的一部分,涵盖运动,制造,营销和货币方面的芬太尼和其他合成阿片类药物的贩运。21世纪非法毒品贸易的摘要:关于芬太尼和其他合成阿片类药物的建议,包括每个建议的链接,可以在这里找到: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/white-house-Fentanyl-Advisories-summary.pdf。

1. This advisory is also part of a larger, United States government Fentanyl advisory covering the movement, manufacturing, marketing, and monetary aspects of the trafficking of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. A summary of the 21st Century Drug Trafficking: Advisories on Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids, which includes links to each advisory, can be found here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/White-House-Fentanyl-Advisories-Summary.pdf.

2. 经常在网上出售的合成阿片类药物的化学名称包括:乙酰芬太尼、 Butyrfentanyl、 Carfentanil、 FUF fentanyhcl、 Furanylfentanyl、异丁芬太尼、 Lofentanil、4'-甲基乙酰芬太尼 lhcl、缬雷利芬太尼和 u 系列,包括 U-47700。根据美国药品管理局(DEA),这些变体的非正式俚语包括:30年代,蓝调,龙的呼吸,Fent,芬太尼,芬提,m-30等。其他用于芬太尼和其他合成阿片类药物的俚语词汇可以在:DEA 情报报告中的药物俚语代码中找到。

2. The chemical names of synthetic opioids often sold online include: Acetylfentanyl, Butyrfentanyl, Carfentanil, FUF Fentanyl HCL, Furanylfentanyl, Isobutyrfentanyl, Lofentanil, 4’-methyl Acetyl fentanylHCL, Valerylfentanyl, and the U series, including U-47700. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), informal slang terms for these variants include: 30s, Blues, Dragon’s Breath, Fent, Fentanyl, Fenty, M-30s, etc. Additional slang words for fentanyl and other synthetic opioids can be found in the: DEA Intelligence Report on Drug Slang CodeWords.

3. 疾病控制和预防中心(CDC),国家卫生统计中心,多种死因文件,1999-2017 CDC WONDER 在线数据库,2018年12月。2018年12月访问。

3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Health Statistics, Multiple Cause of Death Files, 1999-2017 CDC WONDER Online Database, December 2018. Accessed December 2018.

4. 疾病预防控制中心 / 国家卫生统计中心,国家生命统计系统,死亡率。美国疾病控制与预防中心,亚特兰大:美国健康与人类服务部,疾病控制与预防中心;2018。Https://wonder.cdc.gov.

4. CDC/National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics System, Mortality. CDC WONDER, Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, CDC; 2018. https://wonder.cdc.gov.

5. 国家药物滥用研究所,」阿片类药物过量危机」,2019年1月。

5. National Institute on Drug Abuse, “Opioid Overdose Crisis,” January 2019.

6. 请注意,根据美国联邦法律,芬太尼是一种附表二受控物质,由美国食品和药物管理局批准的处方药制造商在美国合法生产和分发,并广泛用于医药。这个建议集中在非法制造,进口,和 / 或分销非法芬太尼和其他合成阿片类药物。此外,虽然这一咨询意见侧重于涉及在国外生产和贩运到美国或在网上购买的芬太尼的类型,但金融犯罪执法网了解到在美国贩运和过度使用药用芬太尼,并监测和报告与这一活动有关的非法交易。

6. Note that under U.S. federal law, fentanyl is a Schedule II controlled substance, which is lawfully produced and distributed in the United States by manufacturers of prescription drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration and is widely used in medicine. This advisory focuses on the illicit manufacturing, importation, and/or distribution of illegal fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. Furthermore, while this advisory focuses on typologies involving fentanyl produced abroad and trafficked into the United States or purchased online, FinCEN is aware of trafficking in, and overprescribing of, pharmaceutical fentanyl in the United States and monitors and reports on illicit transactions associated with this activity.

7. 一种虚拟货币,其价值要么与实际货币等值,要么作为实际货币的替代品。Fin-2013-g001,「FinCEN 条例对管理、兑换或使用虚拟货币者的适用」,2013年3月18日;另见 FIN-2019-G001,「FinCEN 条例对涉及可兑换虚拟货币的某些商业模式的适用」,2019年5月9日,以及 FIN-2019-A003,「涉及可兑换虚拟货币的非法活动咨询」,2019年5月9日。

7. A type of virtual currency that either has an equivalent value in real currency or acts as a substitute for real currency. FIN-2013-G001, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies,” March 18, 2013; see also FIN-2019-G001, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies,” May 9, 2019, and FIN-2019-A003, “Advisory on Illicit Activity Involving Convertible Virtual Currency,” May 9, 2019.

8. 在这种情况下,人与人之间,指的是亲自会面并将现金换成芬太尼的物理方法。

8. Person-to-person in this context, refers to the physical method of meeting in person and exchanging cash for fentanyl.

9. 「结构化」这个词在犯罪活动法规中使用(见《美国法典》第31编第5324节),不仅包括试图规避报告要求,还包括试图规避《旅行规则》和相关的记录保存要求。金融犯罪执法网关于结构化的规定(一般见于31 CFR 1010.100(xx-rrb- 和31 CFR 1010.314),重点在于规避现金交易报告(CTR)要求。

9. “Structuring,” as the term is used in statute for criminal activity (see 31 U.S.C. §5324), includes not only attempts to evade reporting requirements, but also attempts to evade the Travel Rule and related recordkeeping requirements. FinCEN’s regulations on structuring (see generally 31 CFR § 1010.100(xx) and 31 CFR § 1010.314) focus on evasion of cash transaction reporting (CTR) requirements.

10. 包括芬太尼类似物或其他合成没有合法的医疗用途。

10. To include fentanyl analogues or other synthetics with no legitimate medical use.

11. 芬太尼前体化学品是指形成芬太尼的基本化学品或母体化学品。参见受控物质法和受控物质清单。

11. Fentanyl precursor chemicals refer to the basic or parent chemicals that form fentanyl. See Controlled Substances Act and the List of Controlled Substances.

12. 参见 DEA,2018年国家毒品威胁评估,2018年10月。

12. See DEA, 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment, October 2018.

13. 互联网通常分为三个不同的部分:(i)开放的互联网,也称为 Clearnet,它包括通过知名的和公开的广告搜索引擎公开访问的网站;(ii)深层网络,它包括没有被索引的内容和不能被正常的搜索功能找到的网站,如付费墙保护的网页;(iii) Darknet,它包括许多部分,这是互联网的区域,只能通过专门的软件访问,如匿名 Tor 网络。(只能通过 Tor 网络访问的站点可以通过「。「onion」 URL 域后缀.) 虽然 Darknet 的内容多种多样,但它也是隐藏服务的发源地,比如允许个人买卖非法物品的犯罪市场,比如毒品、枪支和其他有害物质,这比传统的互联网更具匿名性。一般来说,这些黑网市场网站使用各种匿名和加密技术,试图保护通信和交易免遭拦截和监控。

13. The Internet is typically separated into three distinct parts: (i) the open Internet, also known as the Clearnet, which encompasses sites publicly accessible through well-known and publicly advertised search engines; (ii) the Deep Web, which consists of content not indexed and sites that cannot be found by normal search functions, such as paywall-protected pages; and (iii) the Darknet, which consists of many segments, which are areas of the Internet accessible only via specialized anonymizing software, such as the The Onion Router (Tor) network. (Sites only reachable through the Tor network are recognizable through their “.onion” URL domain suffix.) While Darknet content is varied, it is also home to hidden services such as criminal marketplaces that allow individuals to buy and sell illegal items, such as drugs, firearms, and other hazardous materials, with greater anonymity than is possible on the traditional Internet. Generally, these Darknet market websites use a variety of anonymizing and encryption technologies in an attempt to shield communications and transactions from interception and monitoring.

14. 参见 DEA,2018年国家毒品威胁评估,2018年10月。

14. See DEA, 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment, October 2018.

15. 「交换器」是一个从事虚拟货币交换业务的人,交换真实货币、基金或其他虚拟货币。见 FIN-2019-G001,「FinCEN 条例对涉及可兑换虚拟货币的某些商业模式的适用」,2019年5月9日;另见 FIN-2013-G001,「FinCEN 条例对管理、兑换或使用虚拟货币的人的适用」,2013年3月18日。

15. An “exchanger” is a person engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other virtual currency. See FIN-2019-G001, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies,” May 9, 2019; and see also FIN-2013-G001, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies,” March 18, 2013.

16. 金融犯罪执法网指出,这些只是心血管疾病的例子,其他类型的心血管疾病也可以使用。

16. FinCEN notes these are just examples of CVCs and that other types of CVCs may be also be used.

17. 金融犯罪执法网条例将」汇款人」定义为」提供汇款服务的人」或」从事汇款的任何其他人」 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(5).

17. FinCEN regulations define “money transmitter” to include a “person that provides money transmission services” or “any other person engaged in the transfer of funds.” 31 CFR § 1010.100(ff)(5).

18. 这些交易中的一个共同点是可能使用邮寄和运输系统传播芬太尼。毒贩经常通过邮件将芬太尼及其类似物运往美国的毒贩和吸毒者手中。托运人往往分层交易并掩盖其身份,使邮政检查局或海关和边境保护局难以查明每天到达的数十万包裹中哪些包裹含有非法药物。

18. One common thread among these transactions is the potential use of mailing and shipping systems to disseminate fentanyl. Traffickers regularly ship fentanyl and its analogues through the mail to drug dealers and users in the United States. The shippers often layer transactions and mask their identities, making it difficult for the Postal Inspection Service or Customs and Border Protection to identify which packages, among the hundreds of thousands arriving every day, contain illicit drugs.

19. 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment,p. 21,October 2018.

19. See DEA, 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment, p. 21, October 2018.

20. 参见 DEA,2018年国家毒品威胁评估,2018年10月33-34页。

20. See DEA, 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment, pp. 33-34, October 2018.

21. 2017年,加利福尼亚州、俄亥俄州和亚利桑那州报告的大宗现金缉获总额最高,达1.388亿美元。与前一年缉获量最高的三个州相比,这一数量显著下降,大约下降了49% 。参见2018年12月12日美国参议院全球执法行动办公室副主任,DEA,「在边境安全和移民小组委员会面前的声明」。

21. In 2017, California, Ohio, and Arizona reported the highest dollar amounts in bulk cash seizures for a combined total of $138.8 million. This amount decreased significantly, by approximately 49 percent, in comparison to the previous year’s top-three grossing states for seizures. See Deputy Chief of Operations Office of Global Enforcement, DEA, “Statement Before The Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration,” United States Senate, December 12, 2018.

22. 全球执法行动办公室副主任,美国药品管理局,「在边境安全和移民小组委员会面前的声明,」美国参议院,2018年12月12日。

22. Deputy Chief of Operations Office of Global Enforcement, DEA, “Statement Before The Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration,” United States Senate, December 12, 2018.

23. 同上。

23. Ibid.

24. 参见2018年国家洗钱风险评估(2018年美国疾病和预防控制局)。

24. See 2018 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (2018 NMLRA).

25. 参见 FATF,贸易洗钱,第一页,2006年6月23日。

25. See FATF, Trade Based Money Laundering, p. i, June 23, 2006.

26. 参见 FinCEN Advisory,「Update on u.s. Currency Restrictions in Mexico:Funnel Accounts and TBML,」 FIN-2014-A005,May 28,2014;and See 2018 NMLRA。

26. See FinCEN Advisory, “Update on U.S. Currency Restrictions in Mexico: Funnel Accounts and TBML,” FIN-2014-A005, May 28, 2014; and see 2018 NMLRA.

27. 有许多黑市比索兑换的变化,包括这种情况的细微差别。Tbml 元素和这些事务中的玩家类型通常是一致的。此外,虽然这个建议是专门针对来自墨西哥的芬太尼贩运,TBML 方法也可以用于许多国家,包括中 / 南美洲。

27. There are many Black Market Peso Exchange variations, including nuances to this scenario. TBML elements and the types of players in these transactions are normally consistent. Also, while this advisory is specific to fentanyl trafficking from Mexico, the TBML methodology can also be used with many countries, to include Central/South America.

28. 参见 DEA,2017年国家毒品威胁评估,2017年10月128页。

28. See DEA, 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment, p. 128, October 2017.

29. 美国联邦调查局(FBI)将「金钱骡子」定义为「代表他人或按照他人指示转移非法获得的金钱的人」 2,December,2018.

29. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines “money mule” as “someone who transfers illegally acquired moneyon behalf of or at the direction of another.” FBI, Money Mule Awareness Booklet, p. 2, December, 2018.

30. 参见 FinCEN Advisory,「关于美国在墨西哥的货币限制的更新:漏斗账户和 TBML」,FIN-2014-A005,(2014年5月)。

30. See FinCEN Advisory, “Update on U.S. Currency Restrictions in Mexico: Funnel Accounts and TBML”, FIN-2014-A005, (May 2014).

31. 同上。

31. Ibid.

32. 司法部,美国检察官办公室,纽约西区,「联邦陪审团判定两名被告与 El Chapo 墨西哥毒品卡特尔有关的毒品阴谋」,2018年12月20日。

32. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of New York, “Federal Jury Convicts Two Defendants of Narcotics Conspiracy Tied To The El Chapo Mexican Drug Cartel,” December 20, 2018.

33. 纽约西区,「17名被告在国际非法毒品贸易集团被起诉」,2016年8月9日。

33. Western District of New York, “17 Defendants Indicted in International Drug Trafficking Ring,” August 9, 2016.

34. 司法部,美国检察官办公室,纽约西区,「联邦陪审团判定两名被告与 El Chapo 墨西哥毒品卡特尔有关的毒品阴谋」,2018年12月20日。

34. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of New York, “Federal Jury Convicts Two Defendants of Narcotics Conspiracy Tied To The El Chapo Mexican Drug Cartel,” December 20, 2018.

35. 纽约西区,「17名被告在国际非法毒品贸易集团被起诉」,2016年8月9日。

35. Western District of New York, “17 Defendants Indicted in International Drug Trafficking Ring,” August 9, 2016.

36. 梦市场,丝绸之路,阿尔法湾,黑网英雄联盟,纽核力等等。

36. Dream Market, Silk Road, AlphaBay, Darknet Heroes League, Nucleus, and several others.

37. 美国司法部,美国检察官办公室,俄亥俄州北部地区,「德克萨斯州的一对夫妇被判入狱,他们是去年被捕时世界上最多产的暗网芬太尼供应商,」2019年2月7日。美国司法部,美国检察官办公室,俄亥俄州北部地区,「德克萨斯夫妇谁拥有数以千计的网上销售芬太尼和其他药物,毒品犯罪,」2018年10月23日。司法部,公共事务办公室,「黑暗降临行动的结果逮捕世界上最多产的暗网芬太尼销售商之一,」2018年8月22日。

37. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Ohio, “Texas couple sentenced to prison; they were the most prolific dark net fentanyl vendor in the world at the time of their arrest last year,” February 7, 2019. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Ohio, “Texas couple who had thousands of online sales of fentanyl and other drugs pleaded guilty to drug crimes,” October 23, 2018. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, “Operation Darkness Falls Results in Arrest of One of the Most Prolific Dark Net Fentanyl Vendors in the World,” August 22, 2018.

38. 美国司法部,美国检察官办公室,俄亥俄州北部地区,「德克萨斯州的一对夫妇被判入狱,他们是去年被捕时世界上最多产的暗网芬太尼供应商,」2019年2月7日。

38. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Ohio, “Texas couple sentenced to prison; they were the most prolific dark net fentanyl vendor in the world at the time of their arrest last year,” February 7, 2019.

39. 司法部,公共事务办公室,「黑暗降临行动的结果逮捕世界上最多产的暗网芬太尼销售商之一,」2018年8月22日。

39. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, “Operation Darkness Falls Results in Arrest of One of the Most Prolific Dark Net Fentanyl Vendors in the World,” August 22, 2018.

40. 详见财政部新闻稿:「财政部制裁中国芬太尼走私犯张,」2018年4月27日。

40. See Treasury Press Release: “Treasury Sanctions Chinese Fentanyl Trafficker Jian Zhang,” April 27, 2018.

41. 同上。

41. Ibid.

42. 参见财政部新闻稿:「财政部制裁多产的中国合成毒品贩子」,2018年4月27日。

42. See Treasury Press Release: “Treasury Sanctions Prolific Chinese Synthetic Drug Traffickers,” April 27, 2018.

43. 参见财政部新闻稿:「财政部制裁中国综合非法毒品贸易组织成员」,2014年7月29日。

43. See Treasury Press Release: “Treasury Sanctions Members of a Chinese Synthetic Drug Trafficking Organization,” July 29, 2014.

44. 美国司法部2017年7月20日「最大的网上黑市阿尔法湾被关闭」。

44. U.S. Department of Justice, “AlphaBay, Largest Online Dark Market, Shut Down,” July 20, 2017.

45. 同上。

45. Ibid.

46. 翻滚或混合涉及到使用机制来切断发送 CVC 的地址和接收 CVC 的地址之间的连接。

46. Tumbling or mixing involves the use of mechanisms to break the connection between an address sending CVC and the addresses receiving CVC.

47. 参见「市场咨询」的红旗部分,这是一个更大的美国政府芬太尼运动,制造,市场营销和货币方面的运输芬太尼和其他合成阿片类药物咨询的一部分。21世纪非法毒品贸易的摘要:关于芬太尼和其他合成阿片类药物的建议,包括每个建议的链接,可以在这里找到: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/white-house-Fentanyl-Advisories-summary.pdf。

47. See the Red Flag section of the “Marketing Advisory,” which is a part of a larger, United States government Fentanyl advisory covering the movement, manufacturing, marketing, and monetary aspects of the trafficking of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. A summary of the 21st Century Drug Trafficking: Advisories on Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids, which includes links to each advisory, can be found here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/White-House-Fentanyl-Advisories-Summary.pdf.

48. 参见 DEA 关于毒品俚语代码的情报报告。

48. See DEA Intelligence Report on Drug Slang Code Words.

49. 反洗钱计划要求见《美国法典》第31编第5318节(h)和第31编第1010.210节,并适用于特定金融机构,见《美国法典》第31编第1020.210节、1021.210节、1022.210节、1023.210节、1024.210节、1025.210节、1026.210节、1027.210节、1028.210节、1029.210节和1030.210节。

49. See 31 U.S.C § 5318(h) and 31 CFR § 1010.210 for AML program requirements, and as applied to specific financial institutions in 31 CFR §§ 1020.210, 1021.210, 1022.210, 1023.210, 1024.210, 1025.210, 1026.210, 1027.210, 1028.210, 1029.210, and 1030.210.

50. 见《美国爱国者法》第312条,编纂于《美国法典》第31编第5318节(i)和第31编第1010.620节(a)。「涵盖的金融机构」的定义载于31 CFR 1010.605(e)。「私人银行账户」的定义见于31 CFR 1010.605(m)。「非美国人」一词的定义见 CFR 1010.605(h)第31条。

50. See USA PATRIOT Act § 312, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i) and 31 CFR § 1010.620(a). The definition of “covered financial institution” is found in 31 CFR § 1010.605(e). The definition of “private banking account” is found in 31 CFR § 1010.605(m). The definition for the term “non-U.S. person” is found in 31 CFR § 1010.605(h).

51. 见《美国爱国者法》第312条(《美国法典》第31编第5318节第(i)项) ;《美国法典》第31条第1010.610节第(a)项。

51. See USA PATRIOT Act § 312 (31 U.S.C.§ 5318(i)); 31 CFR §1010.610(a).

52. 见31 CFR 1020.220,1023.220,1024.220和1026.220。

52. See 31 CFR §§ 1020.220, 1023.220, 1024.220, and 1026.220.

53. 见,例如,31 CFR 1020.220。

53. See, e.g., 31 CFR § 1020.220.

54. 见 FinCEN 2004-1,69 FR 239,December 14,2004。

54. See FinCEN Interpretive Release 2004-1, 69 FR 239, December 14, 2004.

55. 见31 CFR 1020.320,1021.320,1022.320,1023.320,1024.320,1025.320,1026.320,1029.320,和1030.320。

55. See 31 CFR §§ 1020.320, 1021.320, 1022.320, 1023.320, 1024.320, 1025.320, 1026.320, 1029.320, and 1030.320.

56. 有关执法案例,请参阅搜救活动评论,第19期,第19页开始。

56. For Law Enforcement Case Examples, see SAR Activity Review, Issue 19, beginning on p. 19.

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贩运芬太尼的非法金融计划和方法:机译中文  2019-10-12 04:41  分类:图书  搜索直达:c1083311 

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(2019-08-21,机译)对敏感金融数据的分析显示,美国国内非法药物制造商、经销商和消费者使用在线支付平台或「可兑换虚拟货币」,购买主要来自中国的前体化学品或完全合成的麻醉品。

https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2019-08-21/Fentanyl%20Advisory%20FINAL%20508.pdf

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匿名  2019-10-15 21:24  v70388

美国如果不能制止芬太尼,美国将会真正衰败!

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