首选通道三。请不要修改几个字重复大量发送,珍惜与维护平台环境是大家共同的责任。

2019年6月

JUNE 2019

在自己的游戏中击败美国 有中国特色的补偿战略

Beating the Americans at their Own GameAn Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

罗伯特·o·沃克和格雷格·格兰特

Robert O. Work and Greg Grant

罗伯特·沃克是新美国安全中心国防和国家安全方面的杰出高级研究员,也是团队合作有限责任公司的所有者,该公司专门从事国家安全事务和战争的未来。沃克先生曾担任国防部副部长,负责监督五角大楼的日常事务,并发展国防部6000亿美元的国防计划。他因为在"第三次抵消战略"上与国防部和情报部门领导人的合作而广受赞誉,该战略旨在恢复美国在传统战略上战胜其战略对手和对手的局面。他曾两次获得国防部杰出公共服务奖、国家情报杰出公共服务奖和参谋长联席会议主席联合杰出文职服务奖。除了在伊拉克和阿富汗战争中担任过几年新闻记者之外,他还有在国防部工作的八年经验。在他目前的职位上,他是 MITRE 国家安全部门的高级主管,专注于新兴技术的作战影响及其对战争性质变化的影响。此前,他是国防创新实验部门(DIUx)的战略高级主管。他还担任国防部副部长罗伯特·沃克的特别助理,帮助他制定国防部的"第三次抵消战略" 致谢作者要特别感谢苏珊娜·布鲁姆,感谢她不知疲倦的工作帮助我们完成了这份报告。作者还要感谢 Elbridge Colby,Loren DeJonge Schulman,Christopher Dougherty,Frank Hoffman 博士和匿名评论家对本报告部分内容的有益反馈。他们还要感谢 Adam Routh,Molly Parrish 和 Yashar Parsie 编辑和设计了这份报告。所作的陈述和所表达的观点仅代表提交人本人。任何事实、遗漏或解释上的错误都是作者自己的错误。Cnas 不担任机构职务。封面艺术 / 盖蒂图片社(CNAS 改编)。

About the AuthorsROBERT O. WORK is the Distinguished Senior Fellow for Defense and National Security at the Center for a New American Security and the owner of TeamWork, LLC, which specializes in national security affairs and the future of warfare. Mr. Work previously served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, where he was responsible for overseeing the day-to-day business of the Pentagon and developing the department’s $600 billion defense program. He is widely credited for his work with leaders in the department and the intelligence community on the “Third Offset Strategy,” which aimed to restore U.S. conventional overmatch over its strategic rivals and adversaries. He was awarded DoD’s Distinguished Public Service Award (twice), the National Intelligence Distinguished Public Service Award, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award.GREG GRANT is an Adjunct Senior Fellow for the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He brings eight years of experience working in the Department of Defense in addition to several years working as a journalist covering the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In his current role, he is a Senior Principal at MITRE’s National Security Sector focused on the operational implications of emerging technologies and their impact on the changing character of warfare. Previously, he was Senior Director of Strategy at Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx). He also served as Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work helping him develop the department’s “Third Offset Strategy.”Acknowledgments The authors would like to extend a special thanks to Susanna Blume for her tireless work in helping to get this report over the finish line. The authors would also like to thank Elbridge Colby, Loren DeJonge Schulman, Christopher Dougherty, Dr. Frank Hoffman, and anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on portions of this report. They would also like to thank Adam Routh, Molly Parrish, and Yashar Parsie for editing and designing the report. The statements made and views expressed are solely those of the authors. Any errors of fact, omission, or interpretation are the author’s alone. CNAS does not take institutional positions.Cover ArtGetty Images (adapted by CNAS).

关于国防推进计划过去10年来,CNAS 已经确定了美国国防战略的未来。在这一遗产的基础上,CNAS 国防团队继续发展高层概念和具体建议,以确保美国军事优势走向未来,并扭转美国相对于中国(在较小程度上相对于俄罗斯)的军事优势受到侵蚀的局面。具体的研究领域包括集中研究大国竞争,发展适应这一更具挑战性的时代的力量结构和创新的作战理念,以及作出艰难的选择以实现必要的变革。

About the Defense ProgramOver the past 10 years, CNAS has defined the future of U.S. defense strategy. Building on this legacy, the CNAS Defense team continues to develop high-level concepts and concrete recommendations to ensure U.S. military preeminence into the future and to reverse the erosion of U.S. military advantages vis-à-vis China, and to a lesser extent Russia. Specific areas of study include concentrating on great-power competition, developing a force structure and innovative operational concepts adapted for this more challenging era, and making hard choices to effect necessary change.

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

1

1

介绍在冷战期间,美国军队依靠技术优势来"抵消"苏联在时间、空间和兵力规模上的优势。我们的军事技术优势使得美国联合部队能够采取力量姿态和作战概念,这在很大程度上弥补了苏联军队在数量上的常规优势,而不需要人对人或坦克对坦克的战斗。冷战结束后,同样的军事技术优势为美国军队提供了一个决定性的常规战胜区域对手超过20年。然而,长期以来一直吸引美国注意力的"流氓"地区大国,如今已被两个拥有更大权力的大国所取代。一个复兴和复仇的俄罗斯和一个崛起,日益强大的中国正在采取侵略性的行动,威胁地区安全和稳定,并挑战现有的国际秩序。毫无疑问,在这两个大国竞争对手中,中国构成了更大的长期挑战。自1885年以来,美国从来没有遇到过国内生产总值(GDP)总和大于自身的竞争对手,甚至是竞争对手集团。中国在2014年第一购买力平价超过了美国,并有望在2030年成为世界上 GDP 绝对值最高的国家。相比之下,我们在冷战时期的对手苏联却因为难以持续的经济矛盾而举步维艰,最终在压力下崩溃。如果这对美国的战略规划者来说还不够重要的话,那么中国的技术能力正在和它的经济实力一样快速增长。苏联从未能够与美国的技术优势相匹敌,更不用说超越美国了。中国的情况可能并非如此ーー当然不是因为缺乏尝试。事实上,中国正在敏锐地关注削弱美国军队的技术优势,尽管它正在努力实现技术平衡,并最终获得技术优势。中国的战略家们并没有用这种方式明确地描述他们的目标。然而,考虑到中国军队在短短20多年里在技术上取得的成就,以及他们在未来几十年的计划,任何客观的评估都必须至少考虑到这样一种可能性,即美国联合部队正接近成为一种蓄意的、耐心的、有充足资源的军事技术对抗战略的受害者。本文的目的是描述这一战略并概述其主要努力方向。

Introduction During the Cold War, the U.S. military relied on tech-nological superiority to “offset” the Soviet Union’s advantages in time, space, and force size. Our mili-tary-technical edge allowed the U.S. Joint Force to adopt force postures and operational concepts that largely compensated for the Soviet military’s numerical conventional advantage without needing to match it man-for-man or tank-for-tank. After the Cold War ended, this same military-technical advantage provided the U.S. military a decisive conventional overmatch against regional adversaries for over two decades. Now, however, the “rogue” regional powers that have preoccupied U.S. attention for so long have been replaced by two great powers with substantially greater capa-bilities. A resurgent and revanchist Russia and a rising, increasingly more powerful China are taking aggressive actions that threaten regional security and stability and challenge the existing international order. Without question, of these two great-power competitors, China poses the greater challenge over the long term. Since about 1885, the United States never has faced a compet-itor or even group of competitors with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) larger than its own. China surpassed the United States in purchasing power parity in 2014 and is on track to have the world’s largest GDP in absolute terms by 2030. In comparison, our Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, was hobbled by unsustain-able economic contradictions that ultimately crumbled under pressure. At the height of its power, its GDP was roughly 40 percent the size of the United States’.1 If that is not concerning enough for U.S. strategic planners, Chinese technological capabilities are growing as rapidly as its economic power. The Soviets were never able to match, much less overcome, America’s technological superiority. The same may not be true for China—certainly not for lack of trying. Indeed, China is keenly focused on blunting the U.S. military’s technolog-ical superiority, even as it strives to achieve technological parity, and eventually technological dominance. Chinese strategists do not explicitly describe their aims in this manner. Nevertheless, after considering what the Chinese military has accomplished technologically in little more than two decades and what they plan to do in the decades to come, any objective assessment must at least consider the possibility that the U.S. Joint Force is close to becoming the victim of a deliberate, patient, and robustly resourced military-technical offset strategy. The purpose of this paper is to describe this strategy and outline its key lines of effort.

自1885年以来,美国还没有遇到过一个 GDP 超过其自身 GDP 40% 的竞争对手。2. 根据2017年的数据,比较 GDP,中国经济占美国经济的大约63%

The United States has not faced a competitor with a GDP greater than 40 percent of its own since 1885.2 According to 2017 figures, China’s economy measured roughly 63 percent of the U.S. economy when comparing GDP.3

中国的技术能力与其经济实力一样快速增长。苏联从未能够与美国的技术优势相匹敌,更不用说超越美国了。中国的情况可能并非如此。

Chinese technological capabilities are growing as rapidly as its economic power. The Soviets were never able to match, much less overcome, America’s technological superiority. The same may not be true for China.

$05 / 1015 $20

$051015$20

美国国内生产总值(以万亿美元计)

ChinaUnitedStatesGDP (current US$ in trillions)

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

国防部长哈罗德·布朗和他的国防研究和工程主任威廉·佩里因此得出结论,北约的威慑态势正在削弱,需要采取重大行动来恢复。其中一个想法是,在华沙条约组织集结的坦克部队抵达北约前线防御之前进行攻击并减少他们的数量,使得这些防御更有可能坚持下去。因此,布朗和佩里着眼于当时正在开发的几项新兴技术,以使美国联合部队及其北约盟国有能力"深入观察和射击" 这些努力的结果现在被称为第二次抵消战略。第二次抵消战略是五角大楼长期研究和发展规划计划(LRRDPP)的产物。在考虑和拒绝一个新的核武器系列,并研究在越南和中东使用常规制导弹药之后,反对派民进党成员主张美国应该寻求能够"接近零失误"的常规武器 他们的报告得到了1976年国防科学委员会一项研究的补充,该研究提议发展一种"深度打击系统",能够瞄准和攻击远离北约前线的华沙条约组织部队,使用常规制导弹药分配坦克杀伤子弹药

2Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and William Perry, his Director for Defense Research and Engineering, there-fore concluded NATO’s deterrent posture was eroding, and drastic action was needed to restore it. One idea was to attack and reduce the massed Warsaw Pact tank armies before they reached NATO’s front-line defenses, making it more likely those defenses could hold. Brown and Perry thus looked to several emerging technologies then under development to give the U.S. Joint Force and its NATO allies the ability to “look deep and shoot deep.” The result of these efforts is now referred to as the Second Offset Strategy.6 The Second Offset Strategy was the offspring of the Pentagon’s Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program (LRRDPP). After considering and rejecting a new family of nuclear weapons and studying the use of conventional guided munitions in Vietnam and the Middle East, the members of the LRRDPP con-cluded that the United States should pursue conventional weapons capable of “near zero miss.” Their report was complemented by a 1976 Defense Science Board study that proposed developing a “deep strike system” able to target and attack Warsaw Pact forces still far from NATO front lines with conventional guided munitions dispensing tank killing sub-munitions.7

美国冷战战略自二战以来,美国一直依靠军事技术平衡方面的决定性优势,来抵消其对手和竞争对手常常享有的常规力量的数量优势。这种偏好源于其与轴心国作战的经验。第二次世界大战结束后不久,德怀特·艾森豪威尔说得很好,"虽然我们的一些盟国被迫建起一堵血肉之墙,作为他们抵御侵略者攻击的主要防御,但我们能够使用机器和技术来拯救生命。" 4. 关于国与国之间的战争,军事技术优势有助于在战争的战术和作战水平上形成一种舒适的常规军事优势。感知到的常规战力越强,其常规威慑态势就越强。在面对拥有核武器的大国时,进行决定性的超级对抗尤为重要,在这种情况下,常规威慑力量的削弱可能会促使更加激进的战略探索,从而可能导致公开对抗,并伴随着核升级的风险。在冷战期间,苏联采取了一种威慑方式,依赖于常规力量的压倒性数量,这体现在古老的军事格言中,即"数量有它自己的质量" 但是从冷战一开始,艾森豪威尔总统就拒绝支付与苏联人对人或坦克对坦克相关的经济惩罚。相反,艾森豪威尔依靠自己的二战经验(以及美国早期的核垄断经验) ,以一支配备导弹、火箭和装有低当量原子弹头的炮弹的小规模军队,对抗苏联在数量上的强大优势。换句话说,艾森豪威尔转而在战场上使用核武器来威慑华沙条约组织的常规攻击。5这是美国的第一个冷战抵消战略。

U.S. Cold War Offset StrategiesSince World War II, the United States has relied on a decisive edge in the military-technical balance to offset the numerical advantage in conventional forces often enjoyed by its adversaries and competitors. This prefer-ence grew out if its experience fighting the Axis powers. Dwight Eisenhower put it well, saying shortly after World War II, “While some of our Allies were compelled to throw up a wall of flesh and blood as their chief defense against the aggressors’ onslaught, we were able to use machines and technology to save lives.”4 With respect to state-on-state warfare, a military-tech-nical advantage contributes to a comfortable conventional military overmatch at the tactical and operational levels of war. And the stronger the perceived conventional overmatch, the stronger one’s conventional deterrence posture. Having a decisive overmatch is especially important when confronting nuclear-armed great powers, where a weakened conventional deterrence could prompt more aggressive strategic probing that might lead to an overt confrontation, with the attendant risks of nuclear escalation. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union pursued a deterrent approach reliant on overwhelming numbers in conventional forces, embodied in the old military adage that “quantity has a quality all of its own.” But from the outset of the Cold War, President Eisenhower refused to pay the economic penalty associated with trying to match the Soviet Union man-for-man or tank-for-tank. Instead, Ike leaned on his World War II experience—as well as the early U.S. nuclear monopoly—to confront Soviet conven-tional numerical superiority with a smaller military armed with missiles, rockets, and artillery shells tipped with low-yield atomic warheads. In other words, Eisenhower turned to battlefield atomic weapons to deter a Warsaw Pact conventional attack.5 This was America’s first Cold War Offset Strategy.

20世纪70年代,已故国防部长哈罗德·布朗(Harold Brown)和国防研究与工程主任威廉·佩里(William Perry)认识到,有必要采取第二次补偿战略(Second Offset Strategy) ,该战略的核心是精确制导常规弹药的革命。(国防部)

The late Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (pictured here), together with Director for Defense Research and Engineering William Perry, recognized in the 1970s the need for a Second Offset Strategy, which centered around the revolution in precision-guided conventional munitions. (Department of Defense)

到20世纪70年代初,第一次抵消战略的威慑力被两次发展削弱。首先,苏联的核武库和美国的一样强大。在这种情况下,过早使用战术核武器不再是一种可信的威胁;核升级的危险简直太大了。其次,在20世纪60年代和70年代,苏联在德国边境地区部署了数量上已经超过其他国家的常规突击部队,增加了数千辆新坦克、装甲运兵车、防空导弹、飞机和大炮,这些部队在质量上与北约相当。

By the early 1970s, the deterrent power of the First Offset Strategy was being undermined by two devel-opments. The first was that the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was every bit as powerful as that of the United States. Under these circumstances, early use of tactical nuclear weapons was no longer a credible threat; the danger of nuclear escalation was simply too great. Second, during the 1960s and 1970s the Soviets modernized their already numerically superior conventional assault forces arrayed along the inter-German border, adding thousands of new tanks, armored personnel carriers, air-defense missiles, aircraft, and artillery that were qualitatively equal to their NATO counterparts.

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

1978年,佩里指示国防高级研究计划局(DARPA)整合各种深空打击技术,并展示其战场潜力。由此产生的"突击破碎机"计划将 Pave Mover 空中瞄准雷达、导弹和空投炸弹与制导反装甲子弹药结合起来,并建立了一个地面数据处理站,将两者联系起来。数据处理或"攻击协调中心"来源于联合部队的发展战场开发和目标获取(BETA)项目,是早期的一次尝试,目的是提高处理战术战场信息的可行性,将其融合为可执行的情报,并向陆军导弹攻击单位传递近实时的精确目标信息。8所有这些组成部分在1982年汇集在一起,突击破碎机在小规模上进行了演示,美国部队设计者现在称之为使用常规制导弹药的作战网络。而且,正如历史学家诺曼·弗里德曼(Norman Friedman)所指出的那样,突击破坏者对苏联战略家来说无异于一场灾难,他们现在"相信他们的美国对手是科学魔术师;他们说他们能做什么,他们就能做什么。" 苏联总参谋部总结了使用制导弹药的作战网络的出现——他们称之为侦察打击综合体——引发了一场新的军事技术革命。在这种新的作战制度中,精确定向的常规制导弹药可以达到与战术核武器相当的蝙蝠特拉菲尔德效应。因此,它的出现有助于加强北约的战略威慑力,结束冷战,而无需北约大规模增兵。正如布朗所说:"(美国)在技术方面比我们在质量方面做得好。" 值得庆幸的是,在欧洲与苏联军队的全面战斗中,美国军方从来没有考验过这一主张。但它确实展示了制导弹药作战网络对抗装备有俄罗斯和中国武器并受过苏联作战理论训练的有能力的伊拉克军队的潜在力量。在1991年的沙漠风暴行动中,伊拉克的重型编队实际上减少为一系列目标和瞄准点,等待服务。在五周的空中轰炸之后,以制导和非制导弹药进行的100小时地面战争是一场溃败。尽管美国在战斗中使用的所有常规武器中只有8% 是由导弹指挥的,但全世界的军队立刻意识到,一种新的军事模式已经出现ーー美国联合部队拥有强大的传统战争优势,这种优势很难复制,在范围和规模上更不可能匹敌。苏联解体后,第二次抵消战略为美国军队提供了很好的服务;它使联合部队在20多年的时间里战胜了任何潜在的地区对手,成为一支占主导地位的常规力量。但战略竞争的本质在于,实力雄厚的竞争对手不会简单地将军事优势拱手让给对手。新兴大国尤其如此,它们明白,如果要与美国的作战网络竞争,它们必须首先制定一个对抗方案,然后发展自己的侦察打击综合体。这正是中国决心摆脱其二流军事强国地位的初衷。

3In 1978, Perry directed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to integrate the various deep strike technologies and demonstrate their battlefield potential. The resulting “Assault Breaker” program combined the Pave Mover airborne targeting radar, missiles, and air-delivered bombs with guided anti-armor submunitions, and a ground-based data processing station that linked the two. The data processing or “attack coordination center” was derived from the joint services’ developmental Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition (BETA) project—an early attempt to demon-strate the feasibility of processing tactical battlefield information, fusing it into actionable intelligence, and passing accurate targeting information in near-real time to Army missile attack units.8All these components came together in 1982, when Assault Breaker demonstrated on a small scale what U.S. force designers now refer to as an operational battle network employing conventional guided munitions. And, as historian Norman Friedman noted, Assault Breaker was nothing less than a disaster for Soviet strategists who now “believed that their American rivals were scien-tific magicians; what they said they could do, they could do.”9 The Soviet General Staff concluded the appearance of operational battle networks that employed guided munitions— what they called reconnaissance-strike complexes—had triggered a new military-technical revolution. In this new warfighting regime, accurately directed conventional guided munitions could achieve bat-tlefield effects comparable with tactical nuclear weapons. Its emergence thus helped strengthen NATO’s conven-tional deterrence and end the Cold War without the need for a major NATO force buildup. As Brown put it: “[the U.S.] is better at technology than we are at mass.”10Thankfully, the U.S. military never had to test this proposition in an all-out battle against Soviet forces in Europe. But it did demonstrate the potential power of a guided munitions battle network against a capable Iraqi Army equipped with Russian and Chinese weapons and trained in Soviet doctrine. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Iraqi heavy formations were virtually reduced to an array of targets and aim-points waiting to be serviced. The 100-hour ground war that followed five weeks of aerial bombardment with both guided and unguided munitions was a rout. And even though only 8 percent of all conventional weapons employed in battle by the United States were guided, armies the world over immediately grasped that a new military paradigm had emerged—and the U.S. Joint Force had a powerful con-ventional warfighting advantage that would be hard to duplicate, much less match in scope and scale.After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Second Offset Strategy served the U.S. military well; it afforded the Joint Force a dominant conventional overmatch over any potential regional opponent for more than two decades. But the nature of strategic competitions is that serious competitors do not simply cede military advantage to their rivals. This is especially true of emerging and great powers, which understood if they were to compete against U.S. operational battle networks they would have to develop a counter to them first, and then develop reconnaissance-strike complexes of their own. That is exactly what China, determined to break from its status as a second-rate military power, set out to accomplish.

机载目标雷达,例如 E-8联合监视目标攻击雷达系统提供的雷达,承担了第二抵消战略的深打击杀伤链。(美国国防部高级研究计划局)

Airborne targeting radar, such as that provided by the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, underwrote the Second Offset Strategy’s deep strike kill chain. (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)

在沙漠风暴行动中,一架美国 F-14A 雄猫战斗机飞过撤退的伊拉克军队点燃的油井。这场短暂的地面战争向美国联合部队及其对手展示了美国作战网络的威力。(史蒂夫·戈佐中尉,国防部)

A U.S. F-14A Tomcat aircraft flies over an oil well fire set by retreating Iraqi troops during Operation Desert Storm. The brief ground war demonstrated the might of U.S. operational battle networks to both the U.S. Joint Force and its adversaries. (Lt. Steve Gozzo, Department of Defense)

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

图4

4

具有中国特色的抵消战略虽然中国在冷战后二十年是美国事实上的战略伙伴,但苏联的解体自动使美国成为中国军事规划者的紧迫战略威胁。此后不久,在1993年,江泽民主席对美国在沙漠风暴中令人印象深刻的军事力量展示记忆犹新,指示人民解放军准备打"高科技条件下的局部战争" 11. 他不必说出哪个国家是最可能的潜在对手;沙漠风暴最近令人震惊的结果清楚地表明了这一点。在高科技条件下局部战争的规划将受到两个关键假设的影响:第一,战争的地理范围、持续时间和目标将受到限制。其次,战争将被高科技武器所主导,特别是像沙漠风暴那样的制导武器攻击。这两个假设的含义集中在随后发展的解放军战略和学说的短期,激烈,高度破坏性的战争。中国从1991年的"沙漠风暴"战役中学到的一个重要教训是,在战争的最初阶段进行快速而猛烈的打击,因为一旦失去主动权,就几乎不可能再从一个能够24小时全天候制导轰炸的对手手中夺回主动权。它不会寻求抵消来抵消美国在数量上的优势,而是会以某种方式抵消美国的技术优势。由于美国在后冷战时代早期的行动,这些计划被赋予了新的紧迫性。1996年,为了回应中国在台湾周围海域进行的导弹试验,美国在西太平洋地区举行了自越南以来最大规模的海军军事演习。它派出两个航空母舰战斗群穿过台湾海峡,生动地表明中国人甚至无法跟踪美国海军水面舰队,更不用说拥有阻止美国干预保卫台湾的手段。13然后,1999年5月7日,在北约轰炸美国塞尔维亚期间。部队向中国驻贝尔格莱德大使馆投掷5枚制导炸弹,造成3名中国公民死亡,另有20人受伤。美国对这一事件表示道歉,称其提供的炸弹坐标不正确。这个

An Offset Strategy with Chinese CharacteristicsAlthough China was a de facto strategic partner of the United States during the latter two decades of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union automatically made the United States the pacing strategic threat for Chinese military planners. Soon thereafter, in 1993, with America’s impressive demonstration of military might in Desert Storm fresh in mind, President Jiang Zemin directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to prepare to fight “local wars under high technology conditions.”11 He did not have to name the country that represented the most likely potential adversary; the recent stunning results of Desert Storm made that plain.Planning for local wars under high technology con-ditions would be shaped by two key assumptions, First, the wars would be limited in geographic scope, duration, and objectives. Second, the wars would be dominated by high-technology weaponry, particularly by guided weapon attacks like those demonstrated during Desert Storm. The implications of these two assumptions focused the subsequent development of PLA strategy and doctrine on short, intense, highly destructive wars. And a key lesson China took from the 1991 Desert Storm campaign was to strike hard and fast during war’s earliest stages, as initiative once lost would be all but impossible to regain against an opponent capable of 24-hour, all-weather guided munitions bombardment.12From the very beginning, then, although not referred to in such a way, the Chinese decided to develop an offset strategy with Chinese characteristics. Instead of pursuing an offset to counter U.S. numerical advantages, it would instead aim to offset the American technolog-ical advantage in some way. These plans were given new urgency due to American actions early in the post—Cold War era. In 1996, in response to Chinese missile tests over and into the waters surrounding Taiwan, the United States assembled the biggest naval show of force in the Western Pacific since Vietnam. It sent two carrier battle groups steaming through the Taiwan Strait, demonstrating in vivid fashion that the Chinese were incapable of even tracking U.S. naval surface groups, let alone possessing the means to stop a U.S. intervention to defend Taiwan.13 Then, on 7 May 1999, during the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, the US. forces dropped five guided bombs on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese citizens and wounding another 20. The United States apologized for the incident, saying it had provided the bombs with incorrect coordinates. The

2017年9月,中国人民解放军举行阅兵,纪念该部队建军90周年。中国人民解放军的大规模现代化计划试图对抗美国的技术优势。(国防情报局)

A PLA parade commemorates the force’s 90th anniversary in September 2017. The PLA’s massive modernization programs seek to counter U.S. technological advantages. (Defense Intelligence Agency)

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

中国拒绝道歉,认为美国的联合作战网络不可能犯这样的错误。14国耻和愤怒导致中国领导人加快了抵消美国军事技术优势的计划。但是在台湾海峡和南斯拉夫发生的事件让中国的军事规划者们意识到,要想在平等的基础上面对美国的联合部队,他们还有很长的路要走。他们的传感器网格无法进行远程定位;他们的指挥、控制、通信和情报(C3I)网格无法进行基于传感器融合和定向效果的操作;他们的效果网格几乎完全依赖于无制导或无制导的制导武器。第二阶段将发生在中国在制导武器和作战网络战方面取得大致相当的技术地位时,这使得中国更有可能阻止美国对东亚沿岸地区的军事干预。第三阶段将代表理想的最终状态,中国军队将建立一个完全技术优势超过美国军队的地位,使解放军能够自信地走出其第一个岛链堡垒,把美国军队推到第二个岛链甚至更远。中国军事技术补偿战略的时间阶段性将得到中国军费开支持续、强劲增长的支持。1996年至2015年间,中国的年度国防开支按实际价值计算至少增长了620% ,平均每年增长11% 。18军费开支如此大幅度的增长,势必会转化为军事实力和能力的真正提高。但事实证明,这些改进非常有效,因为中国人民解放军的方法、系统和部队的优先次序是由纪律严明、连贯一致的军事技术抵消战略制定和指导的。这一战略的重点是大幅提高美国干预中国在西太平洋的军事行动的成本,这样华盛顿就会认为这种行动是禁止的。在这方面,对中国人民解放军自1996年以来所作的精确投资的分析表明,中国的补偿战略有五条加强努力的路线。它们是:工业和技术间谍活动以及民间军事融合,以便迅速获得与美国几十年来发展的军事能力相当的军事能力,从而使中国人民解放军能够在某种接近公平的基础上进行竞争。发展进行"系统破坏战"的能力和概念ーー美国战斗网络的指挥、控制、通信和情报系统的瘫痪。首先,通过积累远程精确导弹和先进瞄准系统的兵工厂来有效地进行攻击,这些系统在冲突的开始阶段提供了摧毁美国作战网络防御系统的高度概率。发展"杀手锏"能力ーー美国国防部称之为"黑色能力"ーー目前正在进行

5Chinese rejected the apology, believing U.S. joint battle networks incapable of making such a mistake.14Both national humiliation and anger caused Chinese leaders to accelerate their plans to offset the U.S. mili-tary-technical advantage. But the events in the Taiwan Strait and over Yugoslavia underscored to Chinese military planners just how far they had to go before they could hope to face the U.S. Joint Force on equal footing. Their sensor grids were incapable of long-range tar-geting; their command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) grids were incapable of sensor fusion and directing effects-based operations; and their effects grids relied almost entirely on unguided or unsophis-ticated guided weapons.15 Fixing all these problems would take time. it lacked “deep and multidirectional strike capabili-ties” comparable to those of the U.S. military.17 ¡Phase Two would occur when the Chinese achieved a position of rough technological parity in guided munitions and battle network warfare, making it far more likely China might be able to deter a U.S. military intervention in the East Asian littoral. ¡And Phase Three would represent the desired end state, when the Chinese military would establish a position of outright technological superiority over U.S. military forces, enabling the PLA to confidently move out of its first island chain bastion and push U.S. forces out to the second island chain and even beyond.The temporal phasing of China’s military-technical offset strategy would be supported by a sustained, robust increase in Chinese military spending. Annual Chinese defense spending jumped by at least 620 percent in real terms between 1996 and 2015—an average annual increase of 11 percent.18 Such a massive increase in military spending was bound to translate into real improvements in military capability and capacity. But these improvements proved strikingly more effective because the PLA’s prioritization of approaches, systems and forces were shaped and guided by a disciplined and coherent military-technical offset strategy. The focus of that strategy was to dramatically raise the costs to the United States of intervening in Chinese military opera-tions in the Western Pacific so that Washington would deem such action prohibitive. In this regard, an analysis of the precise investments made by the PLA since 1996 suggests China’s offset strategy has five reinforcing lines of effort. These are: ¡Industrial and technical espionage and civil-mili-tary fusion to rapidly acquire comparable military capabilities to those developed over decades by the United States so that the PLA could compete opera-tionally on something approaching an even footing. ¡Developing the capabilities and concepts to conduct “systems destruction warfare,” —the crippling of the U.S. battle network’s command, control, communica-tion, and intelligence systems. ¡Attacking effectively first by amassing an arsenal of long-range precision missiles and advanced targeting systems that provide a high probability of pene-trating U.S. battle network defenses in the opening stages of a conflict. ¡Developing “Assassin’s Mace” capabilities—what DoD terms “black capabilities”—that are held in

中国国防开支16从1996年到2015年,中国每年的国防开支按实际价值计算至少增长了620% ,平均每年增长11% 。从事后来看,中国抵消战略的一个重要方面似乎很明显,就是解放军高级领导人在1990年代中期认识到,他们与美国进行了长期的军事技术合作,他们的战略目标必然要通过一系列不同的时间阶段来实现:第一阶段将看到中国军队以技术劣势与美国竞争。20世纪90年代末和21世纪初,中国的军事著作探索并强调如何打败技术上更先进的对手,直到他们的现代化努力能够缩小美国军队所享有的优势。特别是,中国人民解放军将不得不适应一段时间

PRC Defense Expenditures16 Annual Chinese defense spending jumped by at least 620 percent in real terms between 1996 and 2015—an average annual increase of 11 percent.With the benefit of hindsight, then, it seems evident a critical aspect of China’s offset strategy was the recogni-tion in the mid-1990s by PLA senior leadership that they were engaged in a long-term military-technical compe-tition with the United States, and their strategic aims would necessarily be achieved through a series of distinct temporal phases: ¡Phase One would see the Chinese military compete with the United States from a position of technolog-ical inferiority. Chinese military writings in the late 1990s and early 2000s explored and emphasized ways to defeat a more technologically advanced adversary, until such time that their modernization efforts were able to narrow the advantages enjoyed by the U.S. military. In particular, the PLA would have to accommodate some period of time in which

军事开支(当前数十亿美元) $050100150200 $250

Military expenditure (current USD in billions)$050100150200$250

2017201520102005200019951990

2017201520102005200019951990

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

图6

6

直到战争发生时才公之于众,用意想不到的力量给敌人一个惊喜。成为人工智能领域的世界领导者,然后利用人工智能技术获得军事优势。下面的部分依次讨论这些工作的每一行。工业技术间谍活动与军民融合中国抵消战略的核心目标是在技术竞争中尽快赶上美国。这个目标为所有中国的抵消努力奠定了基础:工业和技术间谍活动。正如最近一份关于中国经济间谍的报告所说,中国抵消战略的这一部分将是一种"有意的、国家支持的[努力] ,以规避研究成本,克服文化劣势,并通过利用其他国家的创造力实现跳跃式发展" 美国政府高级官员最近报告说,中国侵入了美国国防合约商的网络,恢复了一批关于美国海军水下战能力的敏感数据。间谍活动受到了中国著作中所称的"民事和军事融合"过程的支持和利用。中国官员通过与美国和其他技术先进的西方国家进行学术和商业交涉,将合法和非法的军事技术转让常规化。正如美国国务院(u.s. State Department)报告的那样,自2009年以来,这种努力已经加速,现在已经成为"全国性的、国家级的战略,从上到下'融合'中国的军事和民用工业综合体" 21、中国领导人对这些努力的目标直言不讳。在谈到中国的军民融合时,美国国务院(State Department)一名官员最近表示:推动这一巨大努力的是一种敏锐的中国观念,即中国在19世纪的衰落,是因为在定义"军事革命"的技术和理论曲线上落后了。这些革命主导并塑造了20世纪的战争

reserve until unveiled in the event of war, to surprise the adversary with attacks from unexpected vectors. ¡Becoming the world leader in artificial intelligence and then deploying that technology for military superiority. The following sections address each of these lines of effort in turn.Industrial and Technical Espionage and Civil-Military FusionThe central aim of the Chinese offset strategy was to catch up with the United States in the technological com-petition as quickly as possible. This goal established the foundation for all Chinese offset efforts: industrial and technical espionage. As a recent report on Chinese industrial espionage stated, this leg of the Chinese offset strategy would be a “deliberate, state-sponsored [effort] to circumvent the costs of research, overcome cultural disadvantages and ‘leapfrog’ to the forefront by leveraging the creativity of other nations.”19 Senior U.S. government officials recently reported that the Chinese penetrated the network of a U.S. defense contractor and recovered a trove of sensitive data on U.S. Navy undersea warfare capabilities.20 This is just the latest instance of one of the most widespread, relentless, and successful industrial and technological espionage programs in history. Espionage efforts are both supported and exploited by a process identified in Chinese writings as “civil-mili-tary fusion,” whereby Chinese officials work to routinize licit and illicit transfers of technology for military applications through academic and commercial interac-tions with the United States and other technologically advanced Western states. As the U.S. State Department reported, since 2009, this effort has accelerated and is now a “whole-of-nation, national-level strategy to ‘fuse’ the Chinese military and civilian industrial complexes, from top to bottom.”21 Chinese leaders are forthright about the aims of these efforts. Speaking to China’s civil-military fusion, a State Department official recently said:Driving this enormous effort is an acute Chinese perception that their country’s 19th century downfall resulted from falling behind along the technology and doctrinal curves that defined the “revolutions in military affairs” (RMA) that domi-nated and shaped warfare across the 20th century

2018年,解放军部队参加装甲车训练演习。(vcg / getty Images)

PLA troops participate in an armored vehicle training exercise, 2018. (VCG/Getty Images)

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

7. 中国决心在下一次军事革命中不落后,中国官员认为这已经在进行中。换句话说,中国领导人认为工业和技术间谍活动以及军民融合是启动中国技术进步的关键手段,而不必投资昂贵的新技术研发。在这方面,研究得出的结论是,在中国和美国,从原型系统到部署系统的时间大致相同。然而,对于类似的系统,工业和技术应用帮助中国军方减少了从概念到研发和原型开发的时间和金钱。因此,非法使用尖端技术、逆向工程和军民融合技术,使中国能够以比美国情报机构最初预期快得多的速度发挥先进的技术能力。人民解放军最新的一线战斗机模仿美国制造的 F-22猛禽或 F-35闪电II战斗机的设计特点,或者他们的一些无人驾驶飞行器简直就是"捕食者"和"收割者"无人机的翻版,这并非巧合。实际上,通过窃取和利用美国和西方的技术机密,他们在不到20年的时间里,在一些关键的军事能力方面,已经能够与美国联合部队(u.s. Joint Force)在技术领域平起平坐——在和平时期的长期战略竞争中,这只是相对眨眼的功夫。24

7. . . China is determined not to be left behind in the next RMA, which Chinese officials believe to be already under way.22 In other words, Chinese leaders see industrial and tech-nical espionage and civil-military fusion as the key means to jump-start Chinese technical advancements, without having to invest in costly R&D of new technologies. In this regard, studies have concluded that the time to move from a prototype to a fielded system takes about the same time in both China and the United States. For equivalent systems, however, industrial and technical espio-nage has helped the Chinese military reduce the time and money spent going from concept to research and development and prototyping. As a result, illicit trans-fers of cutting-edge technology, reverse engineering, and civil-military fusion have enabled the Chinese to field advanced technical capabilities much faster than U.S. intelligence agencies originally expected.23 It’s no coincidence that the PLA’s newest front-line fighters mimic design features of the U.S. built F-22 Raptor or F-35 Lightning II, or that some of their unmanned aerial vehicles are the spitting image of the Predator and Reaper drones. In effect, by stealing and exploiting U.S. and Western technical secrets, they have been able to level the technological playing field with the U.S. Joint Force, in some key military capabilities, in little less than two decades—a relative blink of an eye in a peacetime, long-term strategic competition.24

系统破坏战争中国补偿战略的第二个方向是把行动重点放在中国的间谍活动上,并帮助优先考虑解放军的投资。中国人民解放军对高技术战争的理解告诉我们这一点。中国人民解放军将"传统的"现代军事行动描述为以线性方式发生,前线清晰。正如苏联计划对抗北约一样,进攻部队力图渗透并打击敌人脆弱的后方地区。但在高科技战争中,攻击不受地理边界的限制;战斗行动同时发生在空间、空中、海洋、陆地、网络空间和电磁领域。在这个多领域的战斗空间中,战争与其说是敌对军事力量之间的歼灭战,不如说是敌对"作战系统"之间的战斗,中国战略家称之为"系统对抗" "系统破坏战"反映了解放军打败像美国这样的高科技对手的胜利理论。26个美国作战系统,或者说作战网络,有四个连锁的网格。多现象、多主传感器网格观测从海底到外层空间的作战空间,C3I 网格根据来自传感器网格的观测和数据,确定进一步实现作战目标所需要的效果,开发和选择行动方向,并向效果网格传播命令,根据 C3I 网格的方向利用和指导动力效应和非动力效应的应用。第四个栅格ーー维持和再生栅格ーー支持上述所有三个栅格,并使它们在战斗行动中继续运作。正如解放军规划者在沙漠风暴行动期间以及在塞尔维亚和科索沃上空看到的那样,美军在行动区组装了各种远征作战网络网格和效应器,并通过广泛的高带宽通信和数据传输将它们连接起来,打击部队和后勤支援部队则在附近的基地集结。为了使这个概念尽可能有效和经济,美国武装部队集中了他们作战网络的要素。虽然有效,但这种中央集权的结构呈现出多个易受攻击的单一故障点,每个故障点都是中国用先进的能力攻击的目标

Systems Destruction WarfareThe Chinese offset strategy’s second line of effort gives operational focus to Chinese espionage efforts and helps prioritize PLA investments. It is informed by the PLA’s conception of high technology warfare. The PLA describes “traditional” modern military operations as occurring in linear fashion with clear front lines. Just as the Soviets had planned to do against NATO, attacking forces strive to penetrate and strike into the enemy’s vulnerable rear areas. But in high technology warfare, attacks are not restricted by geographical boundaries; combat operations occur simultaneously across space, air, sea, land, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains.25 In this multi-domain battle space, war is less of a battle of annihilation between opposing military forces and more of a battle between opposing “operational systems,” what Chinese strategists refer to as “systems confrontation.” And “system destruction warfare” reflects the PLA’s theory of victory against a high technology opponent like the United States.26 U.S. operational systems, or battle networks, have four interlocking grids. A multi-phenomenology, multi-do-main sensor grid observes the battle space from under the sea to outer space; a C3I grid makes sense of the observa-tions and data coming from the sensor grid, determines the effects needed to further campaign objectives, develops and selects courses of action, and disseminates orders to the effects grid, which employs and directs the application of both kinetic and nonkinetic effects in accordance with the direction from the C3I grid. A fourth grid—a sustainment and regeneration grid—supports all three of the aforementioned grids and keeps them functioning during combat operations. Working together, the sensor, C3I, and effects grids form theater “kill chains” to find, fix, and finish intended targets.27 And, as PLA planners saw during Operation Desert Storm and again over Serbia and Kosovo, the U.S. military assembles its various expeditionary battle network grids and effectors in the theater of operations and connects them via an extensive and high-bandwidth communications and data architec-ture, with the strike elements and supporting logistics assembled at nearby bases. To make this concept as effi-cient and economical as possible, the U.S. armed forces centralize the elements of their battle networks. While effective, this centralized construct presented multiple vulnerable single points of failure, each of which China has targeted with advanced capabilities.28 The Chinese understood that to have any hope of defeating a U.S. intervention, especially during the period when the PLA was clearly outclassed technologically,

非法技术转让和军民融合使中国的技术进步迅速,包括成都歼 -20等第五代飞机。(中国国防)

Illicit technology transfers and civil-military fusion have enabled China’s rapid technological advances, including in fifth generation aircraft such as the Chengdu J-20. (Sino Defence)

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

他们需要瘫痪美国作战网络的功能。这是系统毁灭战争的主要目的ーー破坏敌人的作战系统、指挥系统、武器系统、支援系统等,以及每个系统内部的联系。破坏这些联系使敌人进行孤立而不是协同作战,从而降低了敌人的整体作战能力。如果这种破坏性战役对美国作战网络产生预期效果,中国人将期望取得信息优势,他们认为这是"现代战争最重要的作战方法",也是"在空中、海上和地面取得优势地位的核心先决条件"。与系统摧毁战的总体理论相一致,它的目的是…… 在信息战场上取得并保持作战系统的信息优势,同时寻求削弱或破坏敌方的作战系统…… 信息论战系统包括两个主要组成部分:信息攻击系统和信息防御系统

8they would need to paralyze the functions of the American battle network. This is the key aim of system destruction warfare—to cripple the . . . enemy’s operational system, command system, weapon system, support system, etc., and the internal links within each system. Destroying these links results in the enemy carrying out isolated instead of concerted campaign opera-tions, [thus] degrading the enemy’s overall combat capabilities.29 Should this crippling campaign have its intended effects against the U.S. battle network, the Chinese would expect to achieve information superiority, which they consider to be the “most important operational method of modern wars,” and the “core precondition for achieving supremacy dominance” in the air, at sea, and on the ground”.30 So important is this core precondition that Chinese military theorists add a fifth, information contesta-tion grid to their design of operational systems. Consistent with the overall theory of system destruction warfare, its purpose is to . . . achieve and maintain information superiority for the operational system while simultaneously seeking to degrade or undermine an adversary’s operational system in the information battlefield. . . . The information contestation system comprises two major component systems: the information attack system and the information defense system.31

鉴于其在解放军战略思想中的核心地位,系统破坏战已成为解放军部队结构决策和现代化优先事项背后的主要驱动力。它解释了中国在反作战网络能力和进行"信息化战争"手段方面的重大投资ーー利用电子战、网络战、计算机网络攻击、信息作战和欺骗手段破坏任何美国作战网络的完整性。例如,中国已经发展出某种类型的电子战能力,足以威胁到美国的每一个系统和数据链;人们必须假定他们也已经发展出网络攻击工具。而且,考虑到美国对其远征作战网络的依赖,中国人民解放军专心致志地致力于太空行动,以"使敌人盲目和震耳欲聋"作为系统销毁战的核心部分。32这有助于解释中国在一系列反太空武器上的大量投资,包括直升导弹、定向能武器和共轨武器。33. 对系统破坏战的强调也有助于理解解放军新的战略支援部队背后的理由,这是一个系统组织,旨在更好地将空间、网络和电子战能力整合到解放军的行动中。34先有效地进攻中国人认为,在系统对抗中占主导地位的作战方法包括远程、多维的精确制导武器打击,这种制导武器会粉碎敌人进行连贯防御的能力。因此,中国抵消战略的第三条努力线包括发展军事学说、系统、平台和武器,以使中国人民解放军能够首先有效地攻击任何对手。"有效攻击(通过高度集中的方式)和先发制人(使用远程武器、机动优势或基于良好侦察的精明时机)"是中国军事思想和制导弹药战争的基石。36它是解放军部队结构决策和现代化优先事项背后的第二个主要驱动力。

Given its centrality to PLA strategic thought, system destruction warfare has become a dominant driver behind PLA force structure decisions and moderniza-tion priorities. It explains heavy Chinese investments in counter-battle network capabilities and the means to conduct “informationalized warfare”—the use of electronic warfare, cyber, computer network attack, information operations, and deception to destroy the integrity of any U.S. battle network. For example, the Chinese have developed some type of electronic warfare capability to threaten every U.S. system and data link; one must presume they also have developed cyber-attack tools. And, given U.S. reliance on space-based support for its expeditionary battle networks, the PLA is intently focused on a space campaign to “blind and deafen the enemy” as a central part of systems destruction warfare.32 This helps explain China’s heavy investment in a range of counter-space weapons, including direct ascent missiles, directed energy weapons, and co-orbital weapons.33 The emphasis on systems destruction warfare also helps to understand the reasoning behind the PLA’s new Strategic Support Force, a system-of-systems organization designed to better integrate space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities into PLA operations.34 Attack Effectively FirstThe Chinese believe the dominant operational approach in systems confrontation involves long-range, multidi-mensional precision strikes by guided munitions that shatter an enemy’s ability to mount a coherent defense.35 The Chinese offset strategy’s third line of effort thus involves devel-oping the doctrine, systems, platforms, and weapons to allow the PLA to attack any opponent effectively first. “To attack effectively (by means of superior concentration) and to do so first (with longer-range weapons, an advantage in maneuver, or shrewd timing based on good scouting)” is a corner-stone of both Chinese military thought and guided munitions warfare.36 And it is the second dominant driver behind PLA force structure decisions and modernization priorities.

2015年中国人民解放军阅兵纪念日本在二战中战败。(Kevin frayer / 盖蒂图片社)

PLA troops parade in 2015 to commemorate Japan’s defeat in World War II. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

9A 中国人民解放军对进攻的普遍关注首先解释了他们为什么痴迷于拥有比对手更有效的武器,也就是说拥有更大的有效射程。假设两支敌对部队在侦察方面能力相当,定义为"采取行动在射程范围内获得武器并[瞄准]它们"ーー拥有远程武器的一方应该能够更经常地将火力集中在敌方部队的某一部分,从而产生很大的效果。而且,如果一方在侦察中占有优势,那么这些效果将更加有力。因此,中国的补偿战略强调的武器通常比他们的美国对手有更大的有效射程就不足为奇了。比如美国标准的反舰导弹鱼叉,

9A general focus on attacking effectively first explains the PLA’s obsession with having weapons that “out-stick” their opponent’s—that is, that have a greater effective range. Assuming two opposing forces are equally capable in scouting, defined as “actions taken to get weapons within range and [aim] them”—the side with longer range weapons should be able to more often concentrate its fires on portions of the enemy force to great effect. And, if one side enjoys an advantage in scouting in a guided munitions duel, these effects will be even more powerful.It therefore comes as no surprise that the Chinese offset strategy emphasizes weapons that generally have a greater effective range than their American counterparts. For example, the Harpoon, the standard U.S. antiship missile,

韩国、日本、菲律宾、越南、马来西亚、波兰、马来西亚、中国、南海

SingaporeChinaS.KoreaJapanPhilippinesVietnamMalaysiaCambodiaBurmaLaosEast ChinaSeaSouth ChinaSea

泰国

ThailandN.Korea

第三层防御水面,空中,潜艇,海岸防御巡航导弹海岸 -270毫米 / 秒防御层潜艇,空中270-540毫米 / 秒防御层反舰弹道导弹,潜艇540-1000毫米 / 秒防御层陆军战区陆军战区空军部队人民解放军火箭部队海军战区总部

THIRD DEFENSIVE LAYERSurface, Air, Submarines, Coastal Defense Cruise Missilescoast – 270 nmSECOND DEFENSIVE LAYERSubmarines, Air270 – 540 nmFIRST DEFENSIVE LAYERAnti-Ship Ballistic Missiles, Submarines540 – 1,000 nmPLA ARMYTheater Army HQPLA AIR FORCETheater Air Force HQPLA ROCKET FORCEPLA NAVYTheater Navy HQ

能够竞争区域接入的中国资产

CHINESE ASSETS CAPABLE OF CONTESTING REGIONAL ACCESS

中国的防御层中国的多层反介入导弹利用范围和精确定位挑战美国海空力量投射。(CNAS)

China’s Defensive Layers China’s multiple layers of anti-access missiles exploit range and precision targeting to challenge U.S. naval and air power projection. (CNAS)

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

10的最大航程约为75海里(海里)。相比之下,中国的 YJ-18可以打击290纳米的目标,几乎是美国的四倍。然后,它应该有一个战斗的机会,在制导武器决斗中达到接近一对一的交换率,这是美国人不习惯接受的。这种动态现在正在上演。长期以来,美国战术空军一直享有100纳米 AIM-120先进中程空对空飞弹的空对空作战范围优势。然而现在,中国的新型空对空导弹 PL-15与它的系列相匹配。即便如此,也足以让美国战斗机飞行员感到不安,他们已经习惯了向远远超出自己武器射程的对手开火。他们现在大声疾呼需要一种能够"超越 pl-15"的导弹。38中国人注重先发制人的有效攻击,这也解释了为什么中国人民解放军采取了所谓的"炮弹中心战略",以远程弹道导弹和巡航导弹为基础,而不是以空中平台为基础的美国远程打击手段。39中国人广泛研究了美国在沙漠风暴和波斯尼亚及科索沃上空使用空中力量的情况。中国没有试图建立一支对称的、高质量的空军,而是选择了追求一支高质量的导弹部队,重点是从运输竖起发射器发射的道路机动弹道导弹。从中国的角度来看,这种部队结构的方法非常有意义:美国弹道导弹部队的建设、训练和维护成本低于高质量的空军,而空军是美国远程打击的主要交付机制。追求弹道导弹利用了一种竞争性对抗:直到最近,美国还受到《中间核力量条约》的约束,将陆基导弹的射程限制在500公里以内。中国从未加入过这项条约,因此能够开发和部署大量的陆基导弹,而不受任何自我限制的射程。在射程竞争中,通过建造一个能够携带更多推进剂的更大的导弹弹体来扩大导弹的射程通常比扩大载人飞机不加燃料的射程更容易。发动大规模导弹袭击比发动飞机袭击更容易、更迅速,而且预警要少得多,这是中国有效率先发制人原则的关键。而且,由于美国在狩猎和破坏方面的困难

10has a maximum range of about 75 nautical miles (nm). In contrast, the Chinese YJ-18 can hit targets out to 290 nm, nearly four times as far.37 And if it cannot outrange an American weapon, the PLA strives to achieve at least range parity. It should then have a fighting chance to achieve something close to a one-to-one exchange ratio in a guided munitions duel, something the Americans are not used to accepting. This very dynamic is playing out now. U.S. tactical air forces have long enjoyed a range advantage in air-to-air combat with the 100 nm-range Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, or AMRAAM. Now, however, China’s new PL-15 air-to-air missile matches its range. Even that is enough to unnerve U.S. combat pilots, who have grown accustomed to being able to fire at opponents far beyond the range of their own weapons. They are now clamoring for a missile that “out-sticks the PL-15.38 The Chinese focus on attacking effectively first also explains why the PLA has embraced what has been termed a “projectile-centric strategy” based around long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as opposed to the airborne platform-based means of U.S. long-range strike.39 The Chinese extensively studied the U.S. use of air power in Desert Storm and over Bosnia and Kosovo. Rather than try to build a symmetrical, high-quality air force, the Chinese opted to pursue a high-quality missile force, with a focus on road-mobile ballistic missiles fired from transporter-erector-launchers. From the Chinese perspective, such a force structure approach makes great sense: ¡A ballistic missile force is less expensive to build, train, and maintain than a high-quality air force, the primary U.S. delivery mechanism for long-range strikes. ¡Pursuing ballistic missiles exploits a competitive asym-metry: Until recently, the United States was bound by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, limiting land-based missiles to a range less than 500 kilometers. Having never been a party to this treaty, the Chinese were able to develop and field large numbers of land-based missiles without any self-imposed constraints on range. ¡In a range competition, it is generally easier to extend the range of missiles, by building a larger missile body able to carry more propellant, than it is to extend the unrefueled range of manned aircraft. ¡It is easier and quicker to generate massed missile strikes than aircraft strikes—and with far less warning—which is key to Chinese doctrine of firing effectively first. ¡And, as the U.S. difficulties in hunting and destroying

2015年,中国人民解放军火箭部队在东风26号远程弹道导弹通过天安门。公路机动,双能力导弹是几个打击平台之一,构成 PLA 的弹丸中心力量结构。(Andy wong / pool / Getty Images)

The PLA Rocket Force parades the Dong-Feng 26 intermediate-range ballistic missile through Tiananmen in 2015. The road-mobile, dual-capable missile is one of several strike platforms that comprise the PLA’s projectile-centric force structure. (Andy Wong/Pool /Getty Images)

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

11、沙漠风暴中的伊拉克飞毛腿导弹表明,如果战争爆发,部署的机动卫星导弹部队将比支持持续空中行动所需的大型固定基地更难捕杀。40、中国致力于以射弹为中心的战略,这也反映在2015年底成立的解放军火箭部队(PLARF)上,使其成为与解放军陆军、海军和空军同等地位的第四支武装部队。中国人民解放军火箭部队起源于中国人民解放军火箭军,自1985年以来,该部队一直负责中国陆基洲际核威慑。然而,重要的是,PLARF 获得了对中国周边地区的陆地和海洋目标进行中程核打击和常规打击的责任。Plarf 的导弹项目是世界上最活跃的,现在正在开发一些最先进的巡航和弹道导弹。根据一位前美国太平洋司令部指挥官的说法,中国每年发射100多枚用于训练、研究和开发的导弹。当使用非制导武器,其中大多数都打不中目标时,人们不得不依靠大规模齐射来确保哪怕只有一个目标命中。相比之下,当使用制导弹药时,只需发射足够的武器就可以使防御系统饱和;任何单一的"泄密者"都有可能击中目标。因此,防御任何制导弹药攻击都会给防御带来非常沉重的负担,而在防御专门设计用于抑制防御的武器或天生难以击落的武器时,这种负担就更加沉重。一般来说,空中防御者发现弹道导弹比飞机和巡航导弹更难打败。43. 中国对具有突破美国作战网络防御能力的武器的重视,不仅限于弹道导弹,还包括各种类型的超音速导弹。这解释了中国早期对俄罗斯武器的追求,比如超音速 SS-N-22"晒伤"和更先进的 SS-N-27B"Sizzler"反舰巡航导弹,这两种导弹都是专门设计用来击败美国海军顶级神盾战斗系统的。44. 这些超音速导弹,以及其他类似的导弹,从本质上来说更难被击落。随着其他特性的增加,他们击败终端防御系统的可能性更大,比如编织攻击和先进的毫米波探测器,而美国的电子战系统是无法欺骗的。超音速反舰导弹与世界上第一枚反舰全球导弹——中国的"航母杀手"df-21d ——结合使用,df-21d 的射程接近1000英里,弹头机动灵活。不久,甚至可以到达关岛美国机场的弹道导弹 DF-26也将加入这一行列,并威胁到在第一岛链和第二岛链之间运营的美国航空母舰。现在,正如负责研究和工程的国防部副部长迈克·格里芬在2018年初告诉国会的那样,中国正在将高超音速和高超音速滑翔飞行器添加到他们已经强大的弹道导弹和巡航导弹组合中。高超音速武器飞越"近空间",这是一个目前美国传感器或效应器尚未很好覆盖的操作领域。45. 此外,它们可以以超过音速五倍的速度进行机动飞行,并且从高度上进行非常陡峭的"锥形"终端俯冲。所有这些特点使得高超音速武器成为美国作战网络面临的一个非常有压力的目标。拥有既能超越对手又有很好机会突破防御系统的武器,为高科技战争提供了一个潜在的拥有属性优势

11Iraqi Scud missiles during Desert Storm suggested, should a shooting war start, a deployed mobile bal-listic missile force would be much harder to hunt and kill than the large fixed bases necessary to support sustained air operations.40China’s commitment to its projectile-centric strategy is also reflected in the late 2015 creation of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), making it a fourth armed service equal in status with the PLA Army, Navy, and Air Force. The PLA Rocket Force grew out of the Second Artillery Corps, which since 1985 had been responsible for the country’s land-based intercontinental nuclear deterrent. Importantly, however, the PLARF gained the responsi-bility for intermediate range nuclear and conventional strikes against land and sea targets around China’s periphery. The PLARF’s missile program is the most active in the world and now is developing some of the most advanced cruise and ballistic missiles of any force.41 Moreover, it trains relentlessly. According to a former U.S. Pacific Command commander, China launches more than 100 missiles a year for training and research and development.42When seeking to fire effectively first, an emphasis on ballistic missiles also makes sense in another way. When employing unguided weapons, most of which miss their targets, one has to rely on massive salvos to ensure even a single target hit. In contrast, when employing guided munitions, one has to fire only enough weapons to saturate the defense; any single “leaker” is likely to hit the target. Defending against any guided munitions attack thus puts a very high burden on defenses, and that burden is made even more stressful when defending against weapons that are specifically designed to pene-trate defenses or are inherently difficult to shoot down. Generally speaking, air defenders find ballistic missiles tougher to defeat than aircraft and cruise missiles. This is particularly true of advanced versions with multiple maneuvering warheads, decoys, and jammers.43The Chinese emphasis on weapons that have a high probability of penetrating U.S. battle network defenses extends beyond just ballistic missiles to include super-sonic missiles of all types. This explains China’s early pursuit of Russian weapons like the supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn and the more advanced SS-N-27B Sizzler anti-ship cruise missiles, both of which are specifically designed to defeat the U.S. Navy’s top-of-the-line Aegis combat system. These Soviet designs have been followed by the indigenously produced long-range YJ-12 supersonic antiship cruise missile, in both air and ship-launched versions.44 These supersonic missiles, and others like them, are inherently more difficult to shoot down. They are made more so with the addition of other features that improve their chances of defeating terminal defenses, like weaving attacks and advanced millimeter wave seekers that U.S. electronic warfare systems cannot spoof. Supersonic antiship missiles are used in conjunction with the world’s first antiship bal-listic missile, China’s DF-21D—the “carrier killer” —with a nearly 1,000-mile range and a maneuverable warhead. This ballistic missile soon will be joined by the even lon-ger-range DF-26, able to reach U.S. airfields on Guam and to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers operating between the first and second island chains. And now, as Mike Griffin, the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, told Congress in early 2018, the Chinese are adding hypersonic and hypersonic glide vehicles to their already formidable mix of ballistic and cruise missiles. Hypersonic weapons fly through “near space,” an operational domain not well covered by current U.S. sensors or effectors. 45 Moreover, they can maneuver at speeds greater than five times the speed of sound and make very steep, “coning” terminal dives from altitudes. All of these characteristics make hypersonic weapons a very stressing target for U.S. battle networks to contend with.46 Having weapons that both outrange an opponent and have a good chance of penetrating their defenses provides a potentially war-winning advantage in high technology warfare characterized by intense guided

美国猎鹰高超音速测试飞行器的插图。2018年12月,负责研究的国防部副部长兼工程师迈克·格里芬表示:"去年,中国测试的高超音速武器比我们十年测试的还要多。" 美国国防部高级研究计划局 / 国防部

An illustration of the U.S. Falcon Hypersonic Test Vehicle. In December 2018, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineer Mike Griffin stated that “In the last year, China has tested more hypersonic weapons than we have in a decade.” (DARPA/DOD)

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

12次弹药决斗。除了在齐射战中占据优势,拥有这些优势的一方将更容易发动先发制人的突袭。这样的攻击在对抗技术上更优越的敌人如美国时尤其具有吸引力。因此,突然袭击在解放军信条中扮演着核心角色。而且,无论是先发制人的先发制人还是随后的打击,中国军事准则总是鼓吹大规模集中打击。解放军军官在沙漠风暴行动后严厉批评伊拉克发射"像喷胡椒一样的飞毛腿导弹" 47相比之下,他们强调需要"集中使用先进技术武器,在有限的时间和空间内,对指挥中心、通信枢纽和信息处理中心等"关键目标"发动集中的、超级密集的突然袭击。"退役海军上校小韦恩·p·休斯(Wayne p. Hughes jr.)撰写了大量有关海上制导弹药战争的文章,他认为这些类型的目标是敌方"反侦察"行动的一部分——这些行动是为了对抗敌方侦察、跟踪或瞄准友军的努力。事实上,系统破坏战和先有效攻击被恰当地看作是中国抵消战略中同一作战硬币的两面。鉴于20世纪90年代末美国在制导武器作战网络战中的领先地位,从中国的角度来看,早期强调系统销毁战具有重大意义。如果成功,这些努力将阻止美国作战网络有效地利用其在远程精确打击中的优势。然而,中国人一直致力于在导弹齐射比赛中击败美国人。因此,即使强调解构美国的作战网络以获得决定性的信息优势,解放军也希望通过惩罚性制导武器打击来削弱美军作战部队。事实上,这两种方法是相辅相成的,因为在美国战斗网格中对关键点目标的精确动能打击只会加速它们的毁灭。中国以炮弹为中心的战略在和平时期对美国军队产生了另外两个有害的影响。这是一个有效的"成本强加"战略,迫使美国发展和部署大规模的扩张型导弹防御系统,以保护其陆地和海洋基地网络。此外,它还迫使美国军方陷入一种过于"防御性"的思维模式,专注于保护前沿部署的资产免受中国制导武器的攻击,而不是专注于利用对手的歌剧弱点的"进攻性"思维模式。

12munition duels. In addition to having the upper hand in salvo battles, the side with these advantages will have an easier time launching surprise preemptive first strikes. Such attacks are especially attractive when fighting a technologically superior foe such as the United States. Surprise strikes therefore play a central role in PLA doctrine. And, whether part of a preemptive first strike or subsequent strikes, Chinese military doctrine always preaches heavy, concentrated strikes. PLA officers severely criticized Iraq after Operation Desert Storm for firing “Scud missiles like spraying pepper.”47 In contrast, they emphasize the need to make “con-centrated use of advanced technology arms to launch focused, super-intensive surprise attacks within limited time and space” against “key-point targets” such as command centers, communication hubs, and informa-tion processing centers.48Retired Navy Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., who writes extensively about guided munitions warfare at sea, would consider these latter types of targets to be part of an adversary’s “anti-scouting” operations—those actions taken to counter an enemy’s efforts to detect, track, or target friendly forces.49 The Chinese would see them as natural targets of their information contestation grids and system destruction warfare writ large. Indeed, system destruction warfare and attacking effectively first are properly seen as two sides of the same operational coin in the Chinese offset strategy. Given the U.S. lead in guided munitions-battle network warfare in the late 1990s, an early emphasis on system destruction warfare made great sense from the Chinese perspective. If successful, these efforts would prevent an American battle network from effectively exploiting its advantage in long-range precision strike. However, the Chinese always have been intent on beating the Americans in a guided munitions salvo competition. Accordingly, even as it emphasizes deconstructing U.S. battle networks to gain a decisive information advantage, the PLA hopes to cripple U.S. operating forces through punishing guided munitions strikes. In fact, these two approaches are mutually reinforcing, as precision kinetic strikes against key-point targets in U.S. battle network grids only hasten their destruction. China’s projectile-centric strategy has two additional deleterious peacetime impacts on the U.S. military. It’s an effective “cost imposition” strategy that has forced the United States to develop and deploy enormously expen-sive missile defense systems to protect its network of land and sea bases. And, it forces U.S. military thinking into an overly “defensive” mindset focused on protecting forward deployed assets from Chinese guided munitions, instead of what should be more of an “offensive” mindset that focuses intently on exploiting an adversary’s opera-tional vulnerabilities.

2016年7月,南中国海的罗纳德·里根号航空母舰。Plarf 导弹计划使美国水面舰艇暴露在外,易受攻击,对潜在作战区构成挑战。(Nathan burke / u. 美国海军)

The USS Ronald Reagan in the South China Sea in July 2016. The PLARF missile program makes U.S. surface ships exposed and vulnerable, challenging access to a potential theater of operations. (Nathan Burke/U.S. Navy)

2013年,来自中太平洋伊利湖号航空母舰的标准3座1B 导弹拦截器。中国以炮弹为中心的竞争战略给美国的导弹防御系统造成了不成比例的损失。(美国海军 / flickr)

A Standard Missile-3 Block 1B interceptor from the USS Lake Erie in the Central Pacific in 2013. China’s projectile-centric competitive strategy imposes disproportionate costs on U.S. missile defense systems. (U.S. Navy/Flickr)

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

图13

13

"杀手锏"能力中国技术能力抵消战略的前三条战线是清晰可见的,它们反映在中国的军事信条、中国人民解放军军事能力的部署以及军队的组织和训练上。这与所有的抵消策略是一致的,这些策略揭示或暗示了一些能力,希望能够阻止潜在的对手。事实上,任何抵消战略的根本目的都是为了避免战争。然而,重要的是,抵消战略的最终目的是在威慑失败的情况下提供战争双赢的优势。因此,除了显示出的威慑能力之外,抵消战略通常还隐藏了其他可能令对手感到惊讶的能力,并在发生敌对行动时提供了潜在的战争胜利优势。美国军方称之为"黑色"能力或特殊访问程序,受到最高安全协议的保护。美国第二次抵消战略的一个关键方面是"揭露(能力)以威慑、隐藏(能力)以取得作战优势"的思想。美国表明了其意图,并展示了选定的能力,以使苏联相信,美国拥有使用远程制导弹药实施作战网络的必要技术手段。然而,它隐藏了隐形战机的发展,这是联合部队版本的系统摧毁战的核心,披着秘密的外衣。事实上,尽管媒体上对隐形战机组织的发展有着广泛的猜测,但直到1989年,也就是突击破坏者示威活动发生七年后,美国才正式承认它们的存在。中国似乎也在遵循同样的剧本。正如习主席自己所说:"先进的技术是现代国家的利器…… 恰如其分地说,'一个国家的利器不应该暴露。'50中国作家有时会把这些可能会赢得战争的秘密武器称为"杀手锏"或"995工程"——后者工程始于1999年5月中国驻塞尔维亚大使馆遭到轰炸后不久。在中国的工业和技术间谍活动的支持和引导下,中国的"黑色"能力可能包括定向能武器、先进空间武器、电磁轨道炮、高功率微波武器,甚至更奇特的武器。正如一位研究中国武器发展的分析人士所指出的,中国人民解放军正在追求"跨越式发展",以便在美国尚未意识到的"战略前线"技术方面获得决定性的作战优势

“Assassin’s Mace” CapabilitiesThe first three lines of effort of China’s technologically enabled offset strategy are clear to see; they are reflected in Chinese doctrine, the fielding of PLA military capabili-ties, and the organization and training of its armed forces. This is consistent with all offset strategies, which reveal or hint at capabilities in hopes of deterring a would-be adversary. Indeed, the fundamental aim of any offset strategy is to avoid a war. Importantly, however, offset strategies ultimately are designed to provide a war-win-ning advantage if deterrence fails. So, in addition to the capabilities revealed for deterrence, offset strategies typically conceal other capabilities that might surprise an opponent and provide a potential war-winning edge in the event of hostilities. The U.S. military refers to these as “black” capabilities or special access programs, protected by the highest security protocols. The thinking behind “reveal (capabilities) for deter-rence, conceal (capabilities) for warfighting advantage” was a key aspect of the United States’ Second Offset Strategy. The United States revealed its intent and demonstrated selected capabilities to convince the Soviet Union it had the technological wherewithal to field an operational battle network employing long-range guided munitions. However, it concealed the development of stealth aircraft, central to the Joint Force’s version of system destruction warfare, under a cloak of secrecy. In fact, although there was widespread speculation about the development of stealth aircraft in the press, the United States did not officially acknowl-edge their existence until 1989—seven years after the Assault Breaker demonstration.The Chinese appear to be following this very same playbook. As President Xi himself has said: “advanced technology is the sharp weapon of the modern state . . . it’s been aptly put that ‘The sharpest weapon of a state should not be revealed.’”50 Chinese writers sometimes refer to these potentially war-winning secret weapons as “Assassin’s Mace” or Project 995 weapons—the latter project having started in May 1999 soon after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia. Enabled and guided by China’s industrial and technical espionage, Chinese “black” capabilities might include such things as directed energy weapons, advanced space weapons, electromagnetic railguns, high-powered microwave weapons, or even more exotic arms. As one analyst of Chinese weapons development noted, the PLA is pursuing “leapfrog development” to gain a decisive war-fighting edge in “strategic front-line” technologies that the United States has not yet realized.51

美国军事规划者必须假定,中国的武器开发商正在像他们的美国同行一样积极地追求这种跳跃式的能力。"杀手锏"和"995计划"已经酝酿了近20年,看起来他们已经取得了一些成功。因此,尽管具体的秘密能力是行动上的百搭牌,但联合部队必须做好准备,一旦与中国发生武装冲突,就会出现一些令人不快的技术性意外。事实上,鉴于中国所处的军事技术竞争激烈,让联合部队做好准备,摆脱困境,通过技术突袭作战,可能与首先发展新的"黑色"能力同样重要。为军事优势开发人工智能上述的每一项努力都可以追溯到20世纪90年代末。然而,最近中国又增加了第五项努力,旨在加速实现其最终目标,即获得相对于美国军队的主导技术优势。推动力来自中国国家主席习本人,他推动了解放军的大规模重组,并呼吁加快武器装备的创新。正如习主席所说:"一场新的技术和工业革命正在酝酿之中,全球军事革命正在加速,国际军事竞争格局正在经历历史性的变化。" 他和中国人民解放军决心不落后。在这方面,中国人相信人工智能(AI)、大数据、人机混合智能、群体智能、自动决策,以及具有人工智能的自主无人系统和智能机器人,将成为新兴经济和军事技术革命的中心特征。谷歌 DeepMind 在2016年春天击败了被认为是过去最伟大的围棋选手的 AlphaGo

U.S. military planners must assume Chinese weapons developers are pursuing such leapfrog capabilities as aggressively as their American counterparts. And the “Assassin’s Mace” and Project 995 programs are nearly two decades in the making; it seems likely they have produced some successes. As a result, while the specific secret capabilities are operational wild cards, the Joint Force must be prepared for some unpleasant technolog-ical surprises should it wind up in an armed conflict with China. Indeed, given the heated military-technological competition it finds itself in, preparing the Joint Force to shake off and fight through technological surprise may be as important as developing new “black” capabilities in the first place. Exploiting Artificial Intelligence for Military SuperiorityEach of the aforementioned lines of effort can be tracked back to the late 1990s. Recently, however, the Chinese have added a fifth line of effort, one designed to accel-erate the attainment of their ultimate goal—to gain a dominant technological advantage over the U.S. military. The impetus has come from Chinese President Xi himself, who has pushed a massive restructuring of the PLA and called for accelerated innovation in weaponry. As President Xi has said: “A new technological and indus-trial revolution is brewing, a global revolution in military affairs is accelerating, and the pattern of international military competition is experiencing historic changes.”52 He and the PLA are determined not to be left behind. In this regard, the Chinese believe artificial intelli-gence (AI), big data, human-machine hybrid intelligence, swarm intelligence, and automated decision-making, along with AI-enabled autonomous unmanned systems and intelligent robotics, will be the central feature of the emerging economic and military-technical revolutions. Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo defeat over Lee Sodol in Spring 2016, considered the greatest go player of the past

鉴于中国面临着激烈的军事技术竞争,让联合部队做好准备,摆脱困境,通过技术突袭作战,可能与首先发展新的"黑色"能力同样重要。

Given the heated military-technological competition it finds itself in, preparing the Joint Force to shake off and fight through technological surprise may be as important as developing new “black” capabilities in the first place.

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

53这对于解放军的规划者来说尤其如此,他们的目标是将人工智能注入到各级作战系统的每一个网格中,以利用这种"战略前线"技术,并逐步提高军事能力。例如,解放军的一个密集研究对象是"深绿",这是美国国防部高级研究计划局从2000年代中期开始的一个项目,旨在为指挥官提供人工智能增殖器预测能力。55中国正在探索人工智能作为一种力量,不仅是指挥决策,而且是武器系统的性能。事实上,中国的军事思想家认为,人工智能可能是超越美国军方成为世界上最强大的武装力量的关键,并且可以在一个比上世纪90年代末第一次登陆更快的时间表上取得进展。为了支持这些计划,2017年7月,中国国务院发布了"下一代人工智能发展计划",阐明了中国要在2030年前引领人工智能世界的雄心勃勃的议程。这个计划是军民融合的典范,因为它试图确保人工智能在商业领域的进步能够迅速用于国防——通过一个过程,中国称之为关键技术的"跨越式发展"。中国政府正在投资数十亿美元用于相关技术、企业(国内外)和人力资本,以实现这些雄心。而且,如果数据是人工智能的燃料,那么在人工智能竞赛中,中国可能比世界其他国家拥有结构性优势。正如人们对 Facebook 与第三方分享个人数据的强烈反对所看到的那样,西方民主国家对政府和公司收集个人数据都持谨慎态度。同样的疑虑在中国消费者中并不存在,中国政府当然也不存在,因为中国政府把人工智能作为执法和人口控制的工具。例如,2017年11月,中国面部识别初创企业依图科技(Yitu Tech)在美国情报高级项目局(Intelligence Advanced Projects Agency)主办的面部识别挑战赛(Facial Recognition Prize Challenge Challenge)中获得第一名。58中国人对人工智能的军事应用有多么认真,一个线索是他们最近决定将自己的理论和分析重点从系统正面化转向"算法竞争",他们相信,算法的"优越性"将产生"作战优越性" 59这也可能表明,中国现在相信自己已经在技术上与美国军队平起平坐,并准备进入第三阶段的活动——完全取得对美国联合部队的技术优势。很难预测这些活动在未来十年或二十年将如何发展。美国绝不会退出这场竞争,而且只要付出努力,很容易就能脱颖而出。然而,无论在何种情况下,人工智能和它们将实现的自主操作似乎都是一个可靠的赌注,它们将对传统传感器、 C3I、效果、维持和再生网格产生广泛的影响,并有可能引发一场新的军事技术革命。很明显,中国决心在这个新的战争政权中充当积极的先发者,并希望利用它来超越美国军队,成为世界上最强大的军事力量。

14decade, was a “Sputknik moment” for Beijing’s leader-ship, and sparked a marked acceleration of China’s efforts to dominate the AI competition.53This is especially true for PLA planners, who aim to inject AI into every grid in their operational systems at all levels in order to exploit this “strategic front line” technology and create a step increase in military capability.54 For example, an object of intense PLA study has been “Deep Green,” a DARPA program from the mid-2000s that aimed to provide commanders AI-enabled predictive capabilities.55 China is exploring AI as a force multiplier in not just command decision-making but in weapons systems performance. As one analyst highlights, there has been a marked increase in Chinese research into developing neural network-en-abled hypersonic missile systems.56 Indeed, Chinese military thinkers believe AI likely will be the key to surpassing the U.S. military as the world’s most capable armed force, and along a faster timeline than first envi-sioned in the late 1990s. In support of these plans, in July 2017, China’s State Council published the “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” which articulates an ambitious agenda for China to lead the world in AI by 2030. This plan is the poster child for civil-military fusion, as it seeks to ensure AI advances in the com-mercial sector can be rapidly leveraged for national defense—through a process China terms “leapfrog development” of critical technologies.57 The Chinese government is investing billions of dollars in the asso-ciated technologies, companies (both domestic and foreign), and human capital to enable those ambitions. And, if data is the fuel of AI, then China may have a structural advantage over the rest of the world in the AI race. As seen with the backlash against Facebook’s sharing personal data with third parties, Western democracies are both wary and cautious about govern-ments and companies massing personal data. Those same qualms don’t exist among Chinese consumers and cer-tainly not the Chinese government, which is embracing AI as a tool for law enforcement and population control. For example, in November 2017, Yitu Tech, a Chinese facial recognition start-up, took first place in the Facial Recognition Prize Challenge hosted by the Intelligence Advanced Projects Agency.58A clue on how serious the Chinese are in pursuing the military applications of AI is their recent decision to shift their doctrinal and analytical focus from systems con-frontation to “algorithms competition,” and their belief that “achieving superiority” in algorithms will produce ‘warfighting’ superiority.”59 It also may signal that the Chinese now are confident they have achieved techno-logical parity with the U.S. military and are ready to move to their third phase of activities—achieving outright tech-nological superiority over the U.S. Joint Force. How these activities play out over the next decade or two is difficult to foretell. The United States is by no means out of this competition, and, given the effort, easily can come out on top. Under any circumstances, however, it seems a sure bet that AI and the autonomous operations they will enable will have a wide-ranging impact on legacy sensor, C3I, effects, and sustainment and regeneration grids, and potentially spark a new military-technical revolution. It is clear the Chinese are intent on being an aggressive first mover in this new war-fighting regime and hope to exploit it in order to surpass the U.S. military as the most powerful on earth.

中国打算利用商业部门在人工智能技术方面的快速进步,为国防服务。(Kevin frayer / 盖蒂图片社)

China intends to leverage rapid commercial-sector advances in artificial intelligence technology for national defense. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

中国军事思想家认为,人工智能可能是超越美国军队成为世界上最有能力的武装力量的关键。

Chinese military thinkers believe AI likely will be the key to surpassing the U.S. military as the world’s most capable armed force.

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

图15

15

2014年11月,在中东持续13年的战斗和反恐行动之后,美国国防部宣布了一项新的国防创新计划。这一新举措的关键是呼吁实施第三次抵消战略,以遏制美国对复兴的俄罗斯和崛起的、日益强大的中国的传统威慑力的削弱。事后看来,这一声明可能低估了这两个大国,尤其是中国构成的挑战。宣布实行第三次世界大战后补偿战略,表明美国在自己的时间线上既具有技术领先优势,又具有发展新补偿战略的主动权。然而,在考虑了中国军队在短短20多年里在技术上取得的成就,以及未来几十年的计划之后,任何客观的评估都必须至少考虑到解放军可能掌握主动权并控制时间线,而美国联合部队本身也可能接近成为一种蓄意的、耐心的、有充足资源的军事技术抵消战略的受害者。而那些反对这个相当严肃的评估的人只需要检查一下国防部近年来进行的大规模军事演习的结果,模拟美国和中国之间的军事行动。这些军事演习的结果表明,如果美国国防部的计划能力和目前的作战理念没有根本性的改变,美国联合部队可能在合理的情况下面临中国军队的失败。中国领导层已经制定了在2035年前建立一支完全现代化的解放军的目标,并在2049年中华人民共和国成立100周年之前将解放军提升为世界首屈一指的军事力量,一支有能力赢得信息化战争的军队。习个人对超越美国军队这一目标的关注,以及中国的国防开支模式表明,中国很可能在2020年到2049年之间实现其军事现代化的雄心。62. 《下一代人工智能发展计划》认为,到2030年,中国将成为人工智能及相关技术领域的世界领导者,这是实现"智能化力量"的关键一步 中国致力于发展一支优化的军事力量,以战斗并赢得所谓的"智能化战争",这解释了中国上述的从系统对抗到算法竞争的理论转变,解放军领导人认为这是他们通向彻底的技术优势的道路。事后看来,前国防部长哈格尔2014年11月的声明如果说国防创新倡议的关键目标是"颠覆中国的补偿战略",可能会更加有效 这种说法本可以更好地传达这样一个信息:美国在军事技术方面的领先优势已经明显减弱;中国,而不是美国,可能享有技术主动权;如果美国想要重新获得占主导地位的技术优势,它就需要采取迅速和积极的行动。在采取这样的行动时,五角大楼可能也会警告说,美国再也不能通过其传统的方式来追求威慑了

Upsetting the Chinese OffsetIn November 2014, after 13 years of sustained combat and counterterrorism operations in the Middle East, the Department of Defense announced a new Defense Innovation Initiative. Key to this new initiative was a call to pursue a Third Offset Strategy to arrest the erosion of U.S. conventional deterrence against a resurgent Russia and a rising, and increasingly powerful, China.60 In hindsight, this announcement may have under-sold the challenge posed by these two great powers, particularly China. Announcing the pursuit of a third post—World War II offset strategy suggested that the United States had both the technological lead and the ini-tiative to develop the new offset strategy on its own time line. However, after considering what the Chinese military has accomplished technologically in little more than two decades, and what it plans to do in the decades to come, any objective assessment must at least consider that the PLA may hold the initiative and control the time line, and that the U.S. Joint Force itself may be close to becoming the victim of a deliberate, patient, and robustly resourced military-technical offset strategy. And those who reject this rather sobering assessment need only examine the results of extensive wargaming the Department of Defense has undertaken in recent years, modeling military action between the United States and China. The outcome of those wargames indicate that, absent fundamental changes to DoD’s planned capabilities and current warf-ighting concepts, the U.S. Joint Force could face defeat at the hands of the Chinese military in plausible scenarios.61China’s leadership has laid out its goals for a fully modernized PLA by 2035, and elevating the PLA to the world’s premier military force by the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China in 2049, one capable of winning informatized wars. Xi’s personal attention to achieving this goal of surpassing the U.S. military along with China’s defense spending patterns indicate that China is likely to realize its military modernization ambitions sometime between 2020 and 2049. 62 The Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan sees China being the world leader in AI and associated tech-nologies by 2030, a crucial step in the path to achieving an “intelligentized force.” China’s drive to develop a military optimized to fight and win what it calls “intelli-gentized warfare” explains its aforementioned doctrinal shift from systems confrontation to algorithmic competi-tion, which PLA leaders see as their pathway to outright technological superiority.63 In hindsight, then, former Secretary of Defense Hagel’s November 2014 announcement may have been more effective if it had said the key aim of the Defense Innovation Initiative was to “upset the Chinese Offset Strategy.” This formulation would have better conveyed that the U.S. military-technical lead had been signifi-cantly reduced; the Chinese, not the United States, likely enjoyed the technological initiative; and if the United States wanted to regain a dominant technological advan-tage, it would need to take prompt and aggressive action. When pursuing such action, the Pentagon also might warn that the United States no longer can afford to pursue deterrence through its traditional approach of

当时的国防部长查克·哈格尔宣布国防创新计划将追求第三次补偿战略(凯文·奥布莱恩 / 国防部)

Then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announces the Defense Innovation Initiative to pursue a Third Offset Strategy (Kevin O’Brien/DOD)

习主席亲自关注人民解放军的现代化建设,宣称"先进技术是现代国家的利器"(Mark schiefelbein / pool / getty Images)

President Xi has devoted personal attention to PLA modernization, declaring that “advanced technology is the sharp weapon of the modern state.” (Mark Schiefelbein/Pool/Getty Images)

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

16. 残酷的经济和军事优势。无论美国的反应如何,都必须考虑到中国经济实力的稳步增长以及中国技术变革的速度。正如前面讨论的,如果中国保持其引人注目的经济增长,国际货币基金组织估计中国经济将在2030年取代美国的名义 GDP。中国的研发支出"从1991年到2015年增长了近30倍,从130亿美元增长到3760亿美元,比日本、德国和韩国的研发支出总和还要多。" 65. 如前所述,这是一种非常不同于冷战时期的战略形势,当时美国与经济上步履蹒跚的苏联展开竞争。在冷战期间,美国也处于有利地位,因为它能够推动苏联知之甚少的技术领域的军事技术竞争—— 例如在21微电子学。在与中国的竞争中,这种优势不太可能存在。再加上军民融合的政策,中国不再仅仅是一个技术快速的追随者ーー真正的"中国制造"创新如今在一系列新技术领域处于领先地位,其中包括量子计算、机器人和基因编辑等等。因此,美国不太可能通过花钱来应对中国的技术挑战。相反,中国将需要在创新和抵消方面超过中国。这是2018年国防战略(NDS)的明确信息。这一战略得出的结论是,美国正在走出一个温和的萎缩时期,这在一定程度上意味着,联合部队在后冷战时期占据主导地位的对抗地区大国的行动,压制了任何有关这种超越可能会因为大国复兴和崛起的能力不断增强而受到侵蚀的考虑。因此,国防部宣布,国防部必须做出"艰难的选择,优先安排"资源,以避免美国与中国和俄罗斯的长期战略竞争中威慑力的下降,而这些竞争是"国防部的主要优先事项" 66. 与两个致力于在军事技术领域与美国平起平坐的大国展开竞争,意味着美国联合部队将面临自冷战结束以来从未有过的挑战——如果有的话。该战略几乎不加掩饰地提到俄罗斯和中国,宣称"一些竞争对手和对手试图优化他们对我们作战网络和作战概念的瞄准",安全环境正受到"迅速的技术进步和不断变化的战争性质"的影响 67. 在这种情况下,我们必须预料到竞争对手和军事行动者将如何运用新的作战理念和技术来击败我们,同时发展作战理念来增强我们的竞争优势和提高我们的杀伤力。美国国防部早就应该做出慎重的回应。它必须发展作战概念、系统和平台,使联合部队能够战胜中国企图解构和摧毁美国作战网络的一致企图。它必须发展作战概念、系统和平台,使美国联合部队能够先发制人,有效地抵御中国的制导武器。它必须应对中国人工智能的挑战,并确保在这一关键技术竞争中保持领先地位。更广泛地说,中国似乎正在推动量子科学、生物技术、超音速、弹道导弹和巡航导弹等关键领域的军事技术竞争。联合部队必须更积极地参与竞争ーー更好的是,创造具有竞争力的新技术。令人不快的现实是,美国并没有创造出许多新的竞争力

16brute economic and military superiority. Whatever the U.S. response, it must account for the steadily increasing size of China’s economic power and the velocity of the country’s technological pace of change. As discussed earlier, should China maintain its remarkable economic growth, the IMF estimates China’s economy will displace that of the United States by 2030, in nominal GDP terms.64 Moreover, Chinese spending on technology is increasing at the same heady pace as the Chinese economy. China’s R&D expenditure has seen “an almost 30-fold increase from 1991 to 2015—from $13 billion to $376 billion—spending more on R&D than Japan, Germany, and South Korea combined.”65 As mentioned earlier, this is a very different strategic situation than that which existed during the Cold War, when the United States competed against an economically hobbled Soviet Union. The United States also was advantaged during the Cold War in that it was able to drive the military-tech-nical competition in technology areas where the Soviet Union was known to be weak—in microelectronics, for example. That advantage is unlikely to exist in the competition with China. Coupled with its policy of civil-military fusion, China is no longer just a technology fast follower—true “Made in China” innovation now is leading across a range of new technologies, including quantum computing, robotics, and gene editing, to name just a few. As a result, the United States will be unlikely to be able to spend its way out of the Chinese technological challenge. Instead, it will need to out-innovate and out-offset the Chinese. This is the explicit message of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The strategy concludes the United States is emerging from a period of stra-tegic atrophy, meaning, in part, that the Joint Force’s post—Cold War dominant overmatch against regional powers suppressed any considered thought about how that overmatch might be eroding as a result of the steadily growing capabilities of resurgent and rising great powers. Therefore, the NDS declares that DoD must make “difficult choices and prioritize” resources in order to avert the decline of deterrence in the United States’ long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia that are “the principal priorities for the Department.”66 Competing against two great powers intent on leveling the military-technical playing field against the United States will mean the U.S. Joint Force will be challenged in ways it hasn’t been since the end of the Cold War—if ever. In a thinly veiled reference to Russia and China, the strategy declares, “Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks and operational concepts” and the security environment is being affected by “rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war.”67 Under these circumstances,We must anticipate how competitors and adver-saries will employ new operational concepts and technologies to attempt to defeat us, while developing operational concepts to sharpen our competitive advantages and enhance our lethality.68 This is a clear call for action, and a good diagnosis of the challenge the U.S. Joint Force now faces. It is long past time for the Department of Defense to craft a measured response. It must develop the operational concepts, systems, and platforms to allow the Joint Force to prevail against concerted Chinese attempts to deconstruct and destroy U.S. operational battle networks. It must develop the operational concepts, systems, and platforms to allow the U.S. Joint Force to fire first, effectively, and to ride out Chinese guided munitions salvos if it cannot. It must respond to the Chinese AI challenge and ensure it remains ahead in this critical technological compe-tition. More broadly, China appears to be driving the military-technical competition in critical areas such as quantum science, biotechnology, hypersonics, and ballistic and cruise missiles. The Joint Force must compete more aggressively—and better yet, create new competitive technologies. The unpleasant reality is that the United States has not created many new competitive

时任国防部长的吉姆·马蒂斯推出了2018年国防战略,该战略将国家间的战略竞争确定为美国国家安全的优先事项。(dod / flickr)

Then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis rolls out the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which identifies inter-state strategic competition as the priority of U.S. national security. (DoD/Flickr)

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

自1980年代和1990年代利用这些技术建立作战网络和进行远程精确打击以来的军事优势。美国联合部队需要重现在漫长的冷战期间使其苏联竞争对手手足无措的技术"魔力"。为了做到这一点,五角大楼必须投入更多的智能能源,以识别中国补偿战略中的不对称性,并利用这些不对称性获得竞争优势。中国还应该制定一项战略,引导恶魔般的行动和新能力或行动理念的披露,以削弱中国对其实现军事目标的能力的信心。这样的军事示威需要基于我们对中国领导层决策演算的理解,我们自己期望的最终国家的确认,以及评估中国的胜利理论和如何反击它的严格的红队模拟。这种努力的关键在于详细了解中国如何看待自己的优势和劣势。值得记住的是,五角大楼和美国联合部队在对抗苏联的漫长冷战期间,理所当然地做了所有这些事情。它只需要开始锻炼并恢复这些战略肌肉。在重建战略实力时,联合部队必须从第一次和第二次抵消战略中认识到一个关键教训:在激烈的长期军事技术竞争中,拥有最好的技术是不够的。历史学家威廉姆森·默里和艾伦·米利特对二战前和二战期间的军事革新进行了研究,他们得出结论:"关键的问题是在硬件、概念、学说和组织之间实现比未来对手更好的'适应'。" 69. 这一重要思想在2018年国防战略中得到了体现,它说:现代化不仅仅是由硬件决定的,它需要改变我们组织和使用军队的方式。我们必须预测新技术在战场上的影响,严格界定未来冲突中可能出现的军事问题,并培养一种实验文化和计算风险承担能力。20年来,中国人民解放军一直在耐心地跟踪美国军队。它研究了美国偏爱的战争方式,并制定了一项战略,以利用其弱点,抵消其优势,特别是其军事技术优势。它似乎越来越接近实现与美国作战系统的技术平衡,并计划实现技术优势。在这种新兴的安全环境中,中国和美国都在寻求占主导地位的军事技术优势,在技术和作战概念之间找到更好"契合"的一方可能会占据上风。历史表明,美国联合部队已被证明擅长寻找最具竞争力的"适合" 它已经证明有能力质疑现状,承担风险和进行实验,并采用新的技术上可行的操作概念,这些概念与它的反对意见不符。如果它希望扰乱中国的抵消,它将需要再次这样做。

17military advantages since it exploited the technologies to create operational battle networks and conduct long-range precision strikes in the 1980s and 1990s. The U.S. Joint Force needs to recreate the technological “magic” that so flummoxed its Soviet competitors during the long Cold War.To do so, the Pentagon must devote far more intellec-tual energy identifying asymmetries in China’s Offset Strategy that can be exploited for competitive advantage. It also should develop a strategy for guiding the demon-strations and revelations of new capabilities or concepts of operation designed to weaken China’s confidence in their ability to achieve military outcomes. Such military demonstrations need be based on our understanding of Chinese leadership’s decisionmaking calculus, the iden-tification of our own desired end states, and rigorous Red Team emulations to assess China’s theory of victory and how to counter it. Critical to such an effort is a detailed understanding of how China views its own strengths and weaknesses. It bears remembering that the Pentagon and U.S. Joint Force did all these things as a matter of course during the long Cold War against the Soviet Union. It simply has to start exercising and restoring these strategic muscles. And as it rebuilds its strategic muscles, the Joint Force must recognize a key lesson from its First and Second Offset Strategies: In a hotly contested long-term mili-tary-technical competition, having the best technology is not enough. Examining military innovation before and during World War II, the historians Williamson Murray and Allan Millet concluded, “[T]he critical issue is achieving a better ‘fit’ between hardware, concepts, doctrine, and organizations than do one’s prospective adversaries.”69 This important thought is picked up in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, when it says:Modernization is not defined solely by hardware; it requires change in the ways we organize and employ forces. We must anticipate the impli-cations of new technologies on the battlefield, rigorously define the military problems antic-ipated in future conflict, and foster a culture of experimentation and calculated risk-taking.70The Joint Force needs to take this observation to heart. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has been patiently stalking the U.S. military for two decades. It has studied the preferred American way of war and devised a strategy to exploit its weaknesses and offset its strengths—particularly its military-technological strengths. It appears increasingly close to achieving technological parity with U.S. operational systems and has a plan to achieve technological superiority. In this emerging security environment, where both China and the United States seek a dominant military-technical advantage, the side that finds the better “fit” between technology and operational concepts likely will come out on top.History shows that the U.S. Joint Force has proven adept at finding the most competitive “fit.” It has a demonstrated ability to question the status quo, to take risks and experiment, and adopt new technologically enabled operational concepts that confound its oppo-nents. If it hopes to upset the Chinese offset, it will need to do so again.

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

图18

18

尾注1。安德鲁 f. Krepinevich,《保持平衡:美国的欧亚防御战略》(华盛顿:司法和预算评估中心,2017年) ,38-43;Mike Bird,《中国刚刚超过美国成为世界最大的经济体》 ,商业内幕,2014年10月28日,https://www.businessinsider.com/China-overtakes-US-as-worlds-Largest-Economy-2014-10;Nicholas Krapels,《中国经济何时会超过美国》 ,Quora,https://www.Quora.com/When-Will-chinas-Economy-over-take-americas。中国在成为世界最大经济体的道路上面临着重大挑战。关于他们经济轨迹的平衡评估,见国际货币基金组织,亚太部,国家报告,中华人民共和国,https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2018/07/25/peoples-repub-lic-of-China-2018-article-iv-consultation-press-release-staff-Report-staff-46121。图2。克里皮尼维奇,《保持平衡》 ,39。图3。"GDP(当前美元)",世界银行,2017年,https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.GDP.mktp.cd?end=2017&locations=eu-us-cn&start=2017&view=bar。图4。1947年,芝加哥,艾森豪威尔总统图书馆,德怀特·艾森豪威尔 https://www.Eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html.5。这种想法符合艾森豪威尔总统的新面貌战略,该战略依靠美国当时的核优势来阻止对苏联的全面战争。有关这一战略的详细讨论,请参阅国防部长办公室,战略,资金和新面貌,1953-1956(华盛顿:历史办公室,国防部长办公室,2001年)6。爱德华·基弗和哈罗德·布朗,《抵消苏联军事挑战,1977-1981》(华盛顿:国防部长历史系列,国防秘书历史办公室,2017年) ,576.7。先进技术小组的最终报告,arpa / dna 远程研究和发展规划项目,1975年4月30日,vii;DARPA 国防分析技术协作研究所,1991年4月,第二卷,4-5。图8。巴里·d·瓦茨(Barry d. Watts) ,《制导弹药和战斗网络的六十年:进步与前景》(Washington:Center for Strategic and budget assessment,2007) ,28-30;DARPA 技术成就,美国国防分析研究所,1991年4月,第一卷。Ii,4-5. 突击断路器小规模演示了任何战斗网络的三个联锁网格:Pave Mover 是替代品

Endnotes1. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Preserving the Balance: A U.S. Eurasia Defense Strategy (Washington: Center for Stra-tegic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017), 38-43; Mike Bird, “China Just Overtook the US as the World’s Largest Economy,” Business Insider, October 28, 2014, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-overtakes-us-as-worlds-largest-economy-2014-10; and Nicholas Krapels, “When Will China’s economy overtake America’s,” Quora, https://www.quora.com/When-will-Chinas-economy-over-take-Americas. China faces significant challenges on its way to the world’s largest economy. For a balanced appraisal of their economic trajectory, see International Monetary Fund, Asia and Pacific Department, Country Report, People’s Republic of China, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/07/25/Peoples-Repub-lic-of-China-2018-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-Staff-46121. 2. Krepinevich, “Preserving the Balance,” 39. 3. “GDP (current US$)” The World Bank, 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2017&locations=EU-US-CN&start=2017&view=bar. 4. Dwight Eisenhower, Notes for address to the Industrial As-sociations, Chicago, 1947, Eisenhower Presidential Library, https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html.5. This thinking was in line with President Eisenhower’s New Look Strategy, which relied on America’s then-nu-clear superiority to deter a general war with the Soviet Union. For a detailed discussion of this strategy, see Richard M. Leighton, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953–1956 (Washing-ton: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001).6. Edward Keefer and Harold Brown, Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge, 1977–1981 (Washington: Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, Historical Office of the Secre-tary of Defense, 2017), 576.7. Final Report of the Advanced Technology Panel, ARPA/DNA Long Range Research and Development Planning Program, 30 April 30, 1975, vii; DARPA Technical Accom-plishments Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1991, Volume II, 4-5. 8. Barry D. Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007), 28-30; DARPA Technical Accomplishments, Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1991, vol. II, 4-5. Assault Breaker demonstrated on a small scale the three interlocking grids of any battle network: Pave Mover was the surrogate for

一个多现象学传感器网格来观察战斗空间;BETA 地面处理节点是一个 C3I 网格的表面门,用来感知来自传感器网格的观察和数据,确定为进一步的战役目标所需的效果,发展和选择行动方向,发布命令;导弹代表效果网格,在 C3I 网格的方向上运用和指导动力和非动力效果的应用。第四个网格-一个维持和再生网格,支持所有上述三个网格,并保持其功能在战斗行动-没有显示在突击破碎机。图9。引自科林·格雷的《混乱的战略:军事事务中的革命和历史的证据》 ,218页(伦敦:Routledge 出版社,2004)。图10。瓦茨,60年,14.11。等人,《进入龙穴:中国的安泰访问策略及其对美国的启示》(Santa Monica,CA:兰德公司,2007) ,21。图12。同上,19-23.13。台湾海峡导弹危机:中美之间的摊牌,《国家利益》 ,2017年3月10日,https://nationalinterest.org/fea-ture/The-third-taiwan-strait-crisis-The-forgotten-show-down-19742.14。具有讽刺意味的是,在中央情报局组织和指挥的整个行动中,这是唯一的目标。中情局的目标是他们认为是联邦供应和采购理事会的 Yugo-slav。原子能机构在同一条街上,但在不同的地点。图15。克里夫,龙穴,23-25。图16。世界银行,2017,《中国的军事开支》 ,https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ms.mil.xpnd.cd?end=2017&loca-tions=cn&start=1989&view=chart。图17。见"战胜技术上优势对手的战略原则",克里夫,龙之巢穴,27-44.18。1996-2017,The U.S.-China Military Score-card:Forces Geography,and The Evolving Balance of Power,1996-2017,(Santa Monica,CA:兰德公司,2015) ,26。图19。中国经济间谍:技术获取与军事现代化》 ,伦敦:Routledge 出版社,2013年。图20。华盛顿邮报》2018年6月8日 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/China-hacked-a-Navy-con-tractor-and-secured-a-trove-of-highly-sensitive-data- 报道:"中国黑客入侵了一家海军承包商,获取了一批关于潜艇战的高度敏感数据。"

a multi-phenomenology sensor grid to observe the battle space; the BETA ground processing node was the surro-gate for a C3I grid to make sense of the observations and data coming from the sensor grid, determine the effects desired to further campaign objectives, develop and select courses of action, and disseminate orders; and the missiles represented effects grid, which employs and directs the application of both kinetic and nonkinetic effects in accor-dance with direction from the C3I grid. A fourth grid – a sustainment and regeneration grid that supports all three of the aforementioned grids and keeps them functioning during combat operations – was not demonstrated in Assault Breaker. 9. Quoted in Colin Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History, (London: Routledge, 2004), 218. 10. Watts, Six Decades, 14.11. Roger Cliff et al, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese An-ti-access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 21. 12. Ibid., 19-23.13. J. Michael Cole, “The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: the For-gotten Showdown between China and America,” National Interest, March 10, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/fea-ture/the-third-taiwan-strait-crisis-the-forgotten-show-down-19742.14. Ironically, this was the only target in the entire campaign organized and directed by the Central Intelligence Agen-cy. The CIA was aiming at what it thought was the Yugo-slav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement. The Agency was on the same street, but at a different location. 15. Cliff, Dragon’s Lair, 23-25. 16. “Military Expenditure (current USD), China,” The World Bank, 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=2017&loca-tions=CN&start=1989&view=chart. 17. See “Strategic Principles for Defeating a Technologically Superior Adversary” in Cliff, Dragon’s Lair, 27-44.18. Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Score-card: Forces Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 26. 19. William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization (London: Routledge, 2013). 20. “China hacked a Navy contractor and secured a trove of highly sensitive data on submarine warfare,” The Wash-ington Post, June 8, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-hacked-a-navy-con-tractor-and-secured-a-trove-of-highly-sensitive-data-

@ cnasdc

@CNASDC

图19

19

潜艇战 / 2018 / 06 / 08 / 6cc396fa-68e6-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1故事?宇宙学术语。F36b2c4133b2. 图21。2018年10月24日,美国国务院国际安全防护局助理秘书 Christopher Ashley Ford 博士发表 https://www.State.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/2018/286889.htm.22。同上。图23。这是奥巴马政府负责采购、技术和物流的国防部长弗兰克·肯德尔得出的一个关键结论。24。在最近的一篇学术论文中,两位研究人员质疑中国可以轻易地复制外国技术,从而在军事技术竞争中迅速赶上美国的说法。参见 Andrea Gilli 和 Mauro Gilli,"为什么中国还没有赶上:军事技术优势和模仿、逆向工程和网络间谍的局限性",《国际安全》 ,第3期(2018 / 19年冬季) ,141-189页。他们的理论是,先进武器开发的进入壁垒过于不可逾越,并指出了中国航空航天工业在开发第五代低可观测飞机和战斗机用高性能涡扇发动机方面所面临的挑战。然而,从一个非常低的基线开始,中国航空航天工业在短短20年里发展先进的战斗机所取得的令人印象深刻的进步将与这一理论相矛盾。此外,直到最近,解放军空军在资源和支持方面都没有得到优先考虑,中国致力于弹道导弹、空间和核计划。在中国国家主席习近平的领导下,这种情况发生了变化,中国军方现在正优先发展航空航天力量。参见斯科特·w·哈罗德,《失败不仅仅是竞争:中国对其军事航天目标和要求与美国的关系的看法》(圣塔莫尼卡,加州:兰德公司,2018年)。凭借其弹道导弹、超音速飞行器和远程空对空导弹,中国的军事工业已经证明,当它优先发展某些项目时,它能够在短时间内取得令人瞩目的进步。作者还指出,如果不能获得有关解放军武器性能的机密信息,任何对单个系统的评估都将是不完整的。图25。吉利和吉利,"为什么中国还没有赶上",141-189.26。系统对抗与系统摧毁战》(Santa Monica,CA:兰德公司,2018) ,10-15.27。中国人有时会添加第五个信息对抗网格。图28。威廉·罗珀博士,国防部战略能力办公室主任,在参议院国防小组委员会作证,2017年5月3日,2-3。

on-submarine-warfare/2018/06/08/6cc396fa-68e6-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.f36b2c4133b2. 21. Remarks by Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford, Assistant Sec-retary, Bureau of International Security and Nonprolifer-ation, U.S. Department of State, October 24, 2018, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/2018/286889.htm.22. Ibid. 23. This was a key conclusion made by Frank Kendall, Un-dersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in the Obama administration.24. In a recent academic paper, two researchers challenge the assertion that China can easily copy foreign technology and thus rapidly catch up to the United States in the mil-itary-technical competition. See Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Tech-nological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Securi-ty, 43 no. 3 (Winter 2018/19), 141-189. Their theory is that the entry barriers to advanced weapons development are too insurmountable and point to the challenges China’s aerospace industry has faced in developing fifth-genera-tion low observable aircraft as well as high-performance turbofan engines for its fighter planes. Yet, starting from what was a very low baseline, the impressive strides China’s aerospace industry has made in just two decades of developing advanced fighter aircraft would contradict that theory. Moreover, until recently, the PLA Air Force did not receive the prioritization in terms of resources and support that China dedicated to its ballistic missile, space, and nuclear programs. That has changed under Chinese President Xi Jinping, and China’s military is now prioritizing development of aerospace power. See Scott W. Harold, Defeat Not Merely Compete: China’s View of Its Military Aerospace Goals and Requirements in Relation to the United States, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corpo-ration, 2018). With its ballistic missiles, hypersonics, and long-range air-to-air missiles, China’s military industry has demonstrated that when it prioritizes development of certain programs, the advances it is able to make in a short period of time are remarkably impressive. The authors also would note that absent access to classified informa-tion on PLA weapons performance, any assessment of individual systems will be incomplete. 25. Gilli and Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet,” 141-189.26. Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System De-struction Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 10-15.27. The Chinese sometimes add a fifth information confronta-tion grid. 28. Dr. William Roper, Director, Strategic Capabilities Office, Department of Defense, Testimony Before the Senate Ap-propriations Subcommittee on Defense, May 3, 2017, 2-3.

图29。克里夫,龙穴,37.30。同上,12.31。系统毁灭战》 ,66.32。中国军事力量:战斗和胜利力量的现代化》 ,国防情报局,2019年,43,www.dia.mil/Military-Power-publications。图33。太空威胁2018:中国评估》 ,国际战略研究中心航天安全项目,https://Aerospace.CSIS.org/Space-Threat-2018-chi-na.34。和 Eric Hegin-botham,"Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations,"兰德公司,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr2058.html.35。苏联总参谋部早在1984年就得出了这个结论。网络评估办公室主任安德鲁·马歇尔也许是第一个理解这一发展的全部意义并假设其影响的美国战略思想家。参见瓦茨的《60年制导弹药》 ,xi。图36。小韦恩·p·休斯上尉(Ret) 《舰队战术:理论与实践》(安纳波利斯:海军学院出版社,1986) ,34.37。中国 YJ-18超音速反舰巡航导弹:美国的噩梦 国家利益》 ,2015年6月1日,《 https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-yj-18-supersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-amer-icas-13010志;《波音公司(波音麦克唐纳-道格拉斯公司) agm / rgm / ugm-84鱼叉》 ,http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-84.html.38。2015年9月25日,《每日野兽》 ,https://www.thedailybeast.com/The-New-Chinese-Missile-That-Has-The-us-Air-Force-Spooked.39。第一次打击:中国导弹对美国在亚洲基地的威胁》 ,CNAS,2017年6月,2.40。在"沙漠风暴"行动中,"美国投入了2493次任务,执行了后来被称为"大飞毛腿狩猎"的任务 但是它没有在伊拉克击落一枚移动导弹或其发射装置。马克·汤普森,《飞毛腿狩猎》 ,《时代周刊》 ,2002年12月15日,http://con-tent.Time.com/Time/magazine/article/0,9171,400021,00.html.41。2016年10月13日,安东尼·h·科德斯曼,《解放军火箭部队:超越中国人民解放军火箭军和核武器的进化》 ,国际战略研究中心,2016年10月13日,访问 https://www.CSIS.org/analysis/PLA-Rocket-Force-Evolving-Beyond-sec-ond-artillery-corps-SAC-and-Nuclear-dimension。

29. Cliff, Dragon’s Lair, 37.30. Ibid., 12.31. Engstrom, System Destruction Warfare, 66.32. China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019), 43, www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications. 33. Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, Thomas G. Roberts, “Space Threat 2018: China Assessment,” Center for Stra-tegic and International Studies (CSIS) Aerospace Security Project, https://aerospace.csis.org/space-threat-2018-chi-na.34. Kevin L. Pollpeter, Michael S. Chase, and Eric Hegin-botham, “Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations,” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2058.html.35. The Soviet General Staff came to this conclusion as early as 1984. Andrew Marshall, the Director of the Office of Net Assessment, was perhaps the first American strate-gic thinker to grasp the full import of this development and to hypothesize about its ramifications. See Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions, xi. 36. Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr. (USN, Ret.), Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 34.37. Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s YJ-18 Supersonic Anti-ship Cruise Missile: America’s Nightmare?” The National Interest, June 1, 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-yj-18-supersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-amer-icas-13010; “Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) AGM/RGM/UGM-84 Harpoon,” http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-84.html.38. David Axe, “The New Chinese Missile That Has the U.S. Air Force Spooked,” The Daily Beast, September 25, 2015, https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-new-chinese-missile-that-has-the-us-air-force-spooked.39. Thomas Shugart and Javier Gonzalez, First Strike: China’s Missile Threat to U.S. Bases in Asia, CNAS, June 2017, 2.40. During Desert Storm, “the U.S. dedicated 2,493 missions to conduct what came to be called the “Great Scud Hunt.” But it did not score one confirmable kill against a mobile missile or its launcher in Iraq. Mark Thompson, “The Great Scud Hunt,” Time, December 15, 2002, http://con-tent.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,400021,00.html.41. Anthony H. Cordesman, The PLA Rocket Force: Evolving Beyond the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) and Nuclear Di-mension, CSIS, October 13, 2016, accessed at https://www.csis.org/analysis/pla-rocket-force-evolving-beyond-sec-ond-artillery-corps-sac-and-nuclear-dimension.

国防 | 2019年6月在他们自己的游戏中击败美国:一种具有中国特色的抵消战略

DEFENSE | JUNE 2019Beating the Americans at their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

图20

20

42. 海军上将哈里·b·哈里斯,美国海军太平洋司令部司令,在众议院军事委员会就美国太平洋司令部姿态发表声明,2017年4月26日,7。43. 参见瓦茨的《60年制导弹药》 ,254-55。44. 国会年度报告:中华人民共和国军事和安全发展2018,国防部长办公室,2018,64。45. 临近空间是指飞机无法产生足够升力飞行的100,000英尺以上的区域,在320,000英尺以下是飞船无法保持轨道的区域。46。五角大楼警告说美国在高超音速导弹竞赛中落后于中国,商业内幕,2018年4月20日,https://www.businessinsider.com/US-falling-behind-to-China-hypersonic-mis-sile-race-2018-4。47. 克里夫,龙穴,37.48。同上,27-44.49。休斯,《舰队战术》 ,166-171.50。《是什么让习近平夜不能寐》 ,《纽约时报》2018年5月11日 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/asia/Xi-Jinping-china-national-se-curity.html。51. 同上,52。同上,53。杰弗里·丁(Jeffrey Ding) ,《破译中国的人工智能梦想:中国在人工智能领域引领世界的策略的背景、组成部分、能力和后果》 ,牛津大学,2018年3月7日。54. 艾尔莎·b·卡尼亚,《战场奇点:人工智能、军事革命与中国未来军事力量》 ,CNAS,2017年11月,4。55. 艾尔莎·卡尼亚,《未来中国指挥决策中的人工智能》 ,载于《人工智能,中国,俄罗斯,与全球秩序:多层次战略评估(SMA)定期出版物,2018年12月,145。56. 罗拉·萨尔曼,《中国神经网络与高超音速滑翔飞行器的集成》 ,载于《人工智能,中国,俄罗斯,与全球秩序:战略多层评估》 ,2018年12月,153页。57. 格雷戈里·c·艾伦,《了解中国的人工智能战略:中国人工智能和国家安全战略思维的线索》 ,CNAS,2019年2月,第8页。58. 同上,5。59. Bill Gertz,《华盛顿时报》2019年1月30日"中国为高科技战争开发战场人工智能"。

42. Admiral Harry B. Harris, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, April 26, 2017, 7. 43. See Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions, 254-55. 44. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-ments of the People’s Republic of China 2018, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018, 64. 45. Near space is the domain above about 100,000 feet where airplanes can’t generate enough lift to fly, and below about 320,000 feet where spacecraft cannot sustain an orbit.46. Ben Brimelow, “Pentagon warns that the US is falling behind to China in hypersonic missile race,” Business Insider, April 20, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-falling-behind-to-china-hypersonic-mis-sile-race-2018-4. 47. Cliff, Dragons’ Lair, 37.48. Ibid., 27-44.49. Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 166-171.50. “What Keeps Xi Jinping Awake at Night,” The New York Times, May 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-national-se-curity.html. 51. Ibid.52. Ibid.53. Jeffrey Ding, Deciphering China’s AI Dream: The context, components, capabilities, and consequences of China’s strat-egy to lead the world in AI, (University of Oxford, March 2018), 7. 54. Elsa B. Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power, CNAS, November 2017, 4. 55. Elsa B. Kania, Artificial Intelligence in Future Chinese Command Decision Making, in AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, December 2018, 145. 56. Lora Saalman, China’s Integration of Neural Networks into Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, in AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, December 2018, 153. 57. Gregory C. Allen, Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese Strategic Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security, CNAS, February 2019, 8. 58. Ibid., 5. 59. Bill Gertz, “China developing battlefield AI for high-tech-nology warfare,” The Washington Times, January 30, 2019.

60. 国防部长 Chuck Hagel,Reagan National De-fense 论坛主旨演讲,2014年11月15日,https://dod.De-fense.gov/news/speeches/speech-view/article/606635/ 。61. David Ochmanek,《恢复美国力量投射能力》(Santa Monica,CA:兰德公司,2018年7月) ,6。62. 库珀,《中国人民解放军军事现代化:驱动力、力量重组和影响》 ,在美中经济与安全评估委员会会议上作证,2018年2月15日,2.63。在美中经济与安全审查委员会面前的证词:中国在无人系统和人工智能军事应用方面的进展——解放军的无人战争轨迹,"智能化"战争,2017年2月23日。64。国际货币基金组织,亚洲及太平洋分部,国别报告:中华人民共和国。国际战略研究中心,中国电力项目,中国是研发领域的全球领导者吗?Https://chinapower.csis.org/china-research-and-development-rnd/ . 66. 2018年联合国国防战略综述:提升美军竞争优势。(华盛顿:国防部长办公室,2018年) ,4.67。同上,3.68。同上,6.69。《 Interwar Period 的军事创新》 ,剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,1998)410。70. 2018年国防战略,7。

60. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Reagan National De-fense Forum Keynote, November 15, 2014, https://dod.de-fense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606635/. 61. David Ochmanek, Restoring U.S. Power Projection Capabil-ities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 2018), 6. 62. Cortez A. Cooper, PLA Military Modernization: Drivers, Force Restructuring, and Implications, Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Com-mission, February 15, 2018, 2.63. Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Chinese Advances in Unmanned Systems and the Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence – the PLA’s Trajectory towards Unmanned, “Intelligentized” Warfare, February 23, 2017.64. International Monetary Fund, Asia and Pacific Depart-ment, Country Report: People’s Republic of China.65. CSIS, China Power Project, Is China a global leader in research and development? https://chinapower.csis.org/china-research-and-development-rnd/. 66. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the Unit-ed States: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 4.67. Ibid., 3.68. Ibid., 6.69. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Cambridge, UK: Cam-bridge University Press, 1998) 410. 70. 2018 National Defense Strategy, 7.

关于新美国安全中心新美国安全中心的任务是制定强有力、务实和有原则的国家安全和国防政策。全国安全理事会在其工作人员和顾问的专门知识和经验的基础上,让决策者、专家和公众参与基于事实的创新研究、想法和分析,以形成和推动国家安全辩论。我们使命的一个关键部分是通知和准备今天和明天的国家安全领导人。cnas 位于华盛顿,于2007年2月由共同创始人库尔特·M·坎贝尔和 mich le a. Flournoy 建立。Cnas 是一个501(c)3免税非营利组织。它的研究是独立和无党派的。Cnas 在政策问题上不采取机构立场。因此,所有的观点,立场和结论表达在这份出版物应理解为完全是那些作者。2019年新美国安全中心。115215th Street,NW Suite 950 Washington,DC 20005t 保留所有权利。202.457.9400 | f. 202.457.9401 | info@cnas.org | cnas.org

About the Center for a New American SecurityThe mission of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is to develop strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies. Building on the expertise and experience of its staff and advisors, CNAS engages policymakers, experts and the public with innovative, fact-based research, ideas and analysis to shape and elevate the national security debate. A key part of our mission is to inform and prepare the national security leaders of today and tomorrow.CNAS is located in Washington, and was established in February 2007 by co-founders Kurt M. Campbell and Michèle A. Flournoy. CNAS is a 501(c)3 tax-exempt nonprofit organization. Its research is independent and non-partisan. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the authors. © 2019 Center for a New American Security. All rights reserved.1152 15th Street, NW Suite 950 Washington, DC 20005t. 202.457.9400 | f. 202.457.9401 | info@cnas.org | cnas.org

大胆。创新。两党合作。

Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan.

在自己的游戏中击败美国:机译:机译中文  2019-06-08 14:19   加密线路   快速线路 

(2019年6月6日,新美国安全中心)由美国国防部前常务副部长沃尔克(Robert Work)和前特别助理格兰特(Greg Grant)撰写。报告指出,中国的技术能力与其经济实力一样快速增长。苏联从未能够与美国的技术优势相匹敌,更不用说超越美国了。中国的情况可能并非如此。

如无法浏览,请切换线路。音视频下载,请点击顶部。扫描二维码,直达本节目。点击二维码,分享到微信。下载安卓版,才不会失联。搜索直达:c1042437

🌕 机译中文  🌕 英文

浏览 2095
收藏 0
评论 0

网门大陆网址(自带翻墙) | https://x.co/ogate | https://git.io/ogate2 | https://bit.ly/ogate8

网门安卓版(自带翻墙) | 网门电脑版(自带翻墙) | https://x.co/ofile | https://gitlab.com/ogate2/up | https://github.com/opipe/up