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自由与媒体:

Freedom and the Media:

螺旋式下降

A Downward Spiral

作者:研究与分析高级主管莎拉·瑞普奇

By Sarah Repucci, Senior Director for Research and Analysis

主要发现

Key Findings

在过去的十年中,世界各地的媒体自由一直在恶化。

Freedom of the media has been deteriorating around the world over the past decade.

在世界上一些最有影响力的民主国家,民粹主义领导人一直在监督旨在扼杀媒体行业独立性的共同努力。

In some of the most influential democracies in the world, populist leaders have overseen concerted attempts to throttle the independence of the media sector.

尽管对全球媒体自由的威胁是真实存在的,也是令人担忧的,但它们对民主国家的影响才是真正危险的。

While the threats to global media freedom are real and concerning in their own right, their impact on the state of democracy is what makes them truly dangerous.

然而,经验表明,只要有机会,新闻自由甚至可以从长期的镇压中恢复过来。对民主自由的基本渴望,包括获得诚实和基于事实的新闻报道,永远不会熄灭。

Experience has shown, however, that press freedom can rebound from even lengthy stints of repression when given the opportunity. The basic desire for democratic liberties, including access to honest and fact-based journalism, can never be extinguished.

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通过独立媒体寻求和传播信息的基本权利受到攻击,部分攻击来自一个意想不到的来源。许多民主国家的民选领导人应该是新闻自由最坚定的捍卫者,他们已经明确地试图压制批评性的媒体声音,并加强那些提供有利报道的渠道。这一趋势与全球民主本身的衰落有关:新闻自由的侵蚀既是其他民主体制和原则崩溃的症状,也是促成这种崩溃的因素,这一事实尤其令人震惊。

The fundamental right to seek and disseminate information through an independent press is under attack, and part of the assault has come from an unexpected source. Elected leaders in many democracies, who should be press freedom’s staunchest defenders, have made explicit attempts to silence critical media voices and strengthen outlets that serve up favorable coverage. The trend is linked to a global decline in democracy itself: The erosion of press freedom is both a symptom of and a contributor to the breakdown of other democratic institutions and principles, a fact that makes it especially alarming.

根据自由之家的世界自由数据显示,在过去的十年中,随着新形式的压制在开放社会和独裁国家中扎根,世界各地的媒体自由正在恶化。这一趋势在欧洲、欧亚大陆和中东最为明显,这些地方集中了世界上许多最糟糕的独裁政权。如果民主政权不再支持国内的媒体独立,也不对国外的媒体独立施加任何限制,自由的新闻团体可能面临几乎灭亡的危险。

According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World data, media freedom has been deteriorating around the world over the past decade, with new forms of repression taking hold in open societies and authoritarian states alike. The trend is most acute in Europe, previously a bastion of well-established freedoms, and in Eurasia and the Middle East, where many of the world’s worst dictatorships are concentrated. If democratic powers cease to support media independence at home and impose no consequences for its restriction abroad, the free press corps could be in danger of virtual extinction.

然而,经验表明,只要有机会,新闻自由甚至可以从长期的镇压中恢复过来。对民主自由的基本渴望,包括获得诚实和基于事实的新闻报道,永远不会消失,重申充分赋予这些权利的要求永远不会太晚。

Experience has shown, however, that press freedom can rebound from even lengthy stints of repression when given the opportunity. The basic desire for democratic liberties, including access to honest and fact-based journalism, can never be extinguished, and it is never too late to renew the demand that these rights be granted in full.

对民主国家新闻自由的攻击

Attacks on press freedom in democracies

在世界上一些最有影响力的民主国家,大部分人口不再接收无偏见的新闻和信息。这并不是因为新闻工作者被投入监狱,这种情况在专制环境下可能会发生。相反,媒体已经成为了扼杀其独立性的更微妙努力的牺牲品。常见的方法包括政府支持的所有权改变,监管和财政压力,以及公开谴责诚实的记者。各国政府还通过诸如有利可图的国家合同、有利的监管决定和优先获取国家信息等措施,为友好的渠道提供积极的支持。我们的目标是让新闻服务于当权者而不是公众。

In some of the most influential democracies in the world, large segments of the population are no longer receiving unbiased news and information. This is not because journalists are being thrown in jail, as might occur in authoritarian settings. Instead, the media have fallen prey to more nuanced efforts to throttle their independence. Common methods include government-backed ownership changes, regulatory and financial pressure, and public denunciations of honest journalists. Governments have also offered proactive support to friendly outlets through measures such as lucrative state contracts, favorable regulatory decisions, and preferential access to state information. The goal is to make the press serve those in power rather than the public.

这个问题与右派民粹主义同时出现,它破坏了许多民主国家的基本自由。民粹主义领导人把自己描绘成受到侵害的多数派的捍卫者,反对他们质疑的自由派精英和少数民族的忠诚,并辩称,国家利益——按照他们的定义——应该凌驾于新闻自由、透明度和公开辩论等民主原则之上。

The problem has arisen in tandem with right-wing populism, which has undermined basic freedoms in many democratic countries. Populist leaders present themselves as the defenders of an aggrieved majority against liberal elites and ethnic minorities whose loyalties they question, and argue that the interests of the nation—as they define it—should override democratic principles like press freedom, transparency, and open debate.

在自由之家的世界自由报告中的自由国家中,19%(16个国家)的新闻自由得分在过去五年中有所下降。这与《世界自由》(Freedom in the world)的一个重要发现是一致的,即民主国家的政治权利和公民自由总体上正在下降。令人痛苦的是,即使民主统治已经存在了几十年,新闻自由也绝不能被视为理所当然。

Among Free countries in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report, 19 percent (16 countries) have endured a reduction in their press freedom scores over the past five years. This is consistent with a key finding of Freedom in the World—that democracies in general are undergoing a decline in political rights and civil liberties. It has become painfully apparent that a free press can never be taken for granted, even when democratic rule has been in place for decades.

匈牙利的 Viktor orb n 政府和塞尔维亚的亚历山大·武契奇政府在扼杀批评性新闻方面取得了巨大成功,为其他地方的民粹主义势力开辟了道路。两位领导人都把媒体的所有权牢牢掌握在他们的亲信手中,确保影响力最大的媒体机构支持政府,并诽谤他们眼中的反对者。在匈牙利,这一进程已经向前推进了很多,近80% 的媒体为政府盟友所有。*

Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary and Aleksandar Vučić’s administration in Serbia have had great success in snuffing out critical journalism, blazing a trail for populist forces elsewhere. Both leaders have consolidated media ownership in the hands of their cronies, ensuring that the outlets with the widest reach support the government and smear its perceived opponents. In Hungary, where the process has advanced much further, nearly 80 percent of the media are owned by government allies. *

亲政府媒体的培育正在向周边国家蔓延。奥地利极右翼自由党(Freedom Party of Austria)的领导人,直到最近还是该国执政联盟的一部分,被拍到试图与俄罗斯人勾结,购买最大的全国性报纸,并在报道中注入党派偏见。过去五年,欧洲媒体得分下降与媒体的经济操纵有关(包括政府将广告投放到友好的媒体,或鼓励商业盟友购买关键媒体)的情况比世界其他地区更为普遍。这种影响和干涉策略在非洲大陆是一种相对较新的现象,自30年前柏林墙倒塌以来,非洲大陆普遍表现出对新闻自由的有力支持。

Cultivation of progovernment media is spreading to neighboring states. The leader of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria, until recently part of that country’s ruling coalition, was caught on video attempting to collude with Russians to purchase the largest national newspaper and infuse its coverage with partisan bias. Score declines linked to economic manipulation of media—including cases in which the government directs advertising to friendly outlets or encourages business allies to buy those that are critical—were more common across Europe over the past five years than in other parts of the world. Such tactics of influence and interference are a relatively recent phenomenon on the continent, which has generally displayed strong support for press freedom since the fall of the Berlin Wall 30 years ago.

以色列是中东为数不多的民主本雅明·内塔尼亚胡之一,以色列总理多次严厉批评调查记者,现在又因涉嫌向两家主要媒体公司提供监管优惠以换取正面报道而面临腐败指控。尽管内塔尼亚胡拒绝就这些指控正式起诉和审判他,但有证据表明,为了维持政治权力,内塔尼亚胡愿意牺牲新闻自由。许多选民显然在2019年4月的选举中接受了这种权衡,使内塔尼亚胡的政党及其盟友有机会组成新的执政联盟。

In Israel, one of the few democracies in the Middle East, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly excoriated investigative reporters and now faces corruption charges for allegedly offering regulatory favors to two major media firms in exchange for positive coverage. Although Netanyahu has resisted efforts to formally indict and try him on these charges, the evidence suggests that the prime minister was willing to sacrifice press freedom in order to maintain political power. Many voters apparently accepted this tradeoff in the April 2019 elections, putting Netanyahu’s party and its allies in a position to form a new ruling coalition.

作为世界上人口最多的民主国家,印度也发出信号,要求政府承担责任不是新闻界的责任。执政的印度人民党支持反对"矛盾言论"的运动,与政府结盟的暴徒袭击了关键记者的家和办公室。媒体对上个月赢得连任的印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪(Narendra Modi)进行了广泛的吹捧。有指控称,政府就媒体应该如何报道他的活动发布指令,并威胁反击的记者。政府在电视许可证的分配上也是有选择性的,有效地将不友好的媒体排除在电视广播之外。

India, the world’s most populous democracy, is also sending signals that holding the government accountable is not part of the press’s responsibility. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has supported campaigns to discourage speech that is “antinational,” and government-aligned thugs have raided critical journalists’ homes and offices. The media have become widely flattering of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who won reelection last month, amid allegations that the government issues directives on how the press should cover his activities and intimidates journalists who push back. The government has also been selective in the allocation of television licenses, effectively excluding unfriendly outlets from the airwaves.

在近年来最令人担忧的事态发展中,新闻自由在世界领先的民主国家美国受到了不同寻常的压力。尽管主要新闻机构依然强大,并继续对执政者进行有力的报道,但唐纳德·特朗普总统对新闻界的不断诽谤,严重加剧了公众对主流媒体信心的持续削弱。在其他措施中,总统多次威胁要加强诽谤法,吊销某些广播公司的执照,并损害媒体所有者的其他商业利益。美国宪法对此类行动提供了强有力的保护,但特朗普总统对新闻自由的公开立场对全球格局产生了切实的影响。世界各地的记者现在没有什么理由相信,如果他们的基本权利受到侵犯,华盛顿会伸出援助之手。

In perhaps the most concerning development of recent years, press freedom has come under unusual pressure in the United States, the world’s leading democratic power. Although key news organizations remain strong and continue to produce vigorous reporting on those in office, President Donald Trump’s continual vilification of the press has seriously exacerbated an ongoing erosion of public confidence in the mainstream media. Among other steps, the president has repeatedly threatened to strengthen libel laws, revoke the licenses of certain broadcasters, and damage media owners’ other business interests. The US constitution provides robust protections against such actions, but President Trump’s public stance on press freedom has had a tangible impact on the global landscape. Journalists around the world now have less reason to believe that Washington will come to their aid if their basic rights are violated.

助长全球衰退

Fueling a global decline

全球新闻自由的崩溃与自由之家在过去13年追踪的更广泛的民主衰落密切相关。尽管当一个国家的领导人转向反民主时,新闻媒体并不总是第一个受到攻击的机构,但对自由媒体的镇压有力地表明,其他政治权利和公民自由正处于危险之中。对媒体独立性的攻击往往与新任或现任领导人的权力攫取有关,或者与根深蒂固的政权试图粉碎对其控制的威胁有关。

The breakdown of global press freedom is closely related to the broader decline of democracy that Freedom House has tracked for the past 13 years. Although the press is not always the first institution to be attacked when a country’s leadership takes an antidemocratic turn, repression of free media is a strong indication that other political rights and civil liberties are in danger. Assaults on media independence are frequently associated with power grabs by new or incumbent leaders, or with entrenched regimes’ attempts to crush perceived threats to their control.

在过去的五年里,那些已经被指定为非自由之家世界自由报告中的非自由国家也是最有可能遭受新闻自由分数下降的国家,28% 的非自由国家经历了这样的下降。部分自由的国家几乎同样可能经历新闻自由下降的好处,这反映了这些中等表现者的不稳定性和影响其轨迹的复杂力量。非自由国家不断恶化的记录,加上自由国家的消极趋势,导致了全球新闻自由的整体下降。

Over the past five years, countries that were already designated as Not Free in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report were also those most likely to suffer a decline in their press freedom scores, with 28 percent of Not Free countries experiencing such a drop. Partly Free countries were almost equally likely to experience a gain as a decline in press freedom, reflecting the volatility of these middle performers and the complex forces influencing their trajectory. The worsening records of Not Free states, combined with the negative trend among Free countries, have driven the overall decline in global press freedom.

当民主国家的民粹主义领导人试图通过驯服媒体来巩固和扩大自己的成果时,老牌的专制政府却在继续收紧对不同声音的压制,因为任何对他们媒体统治地位的破坏都可能暴露官方的不当行为或揭穿官方的叙述。2018年,俄罗斯当局采取行动,屏蔽了广受欢迎的通讯应用 Telegram,因为该公司拒绝将其加密密钥交给安全官员。喀麦隆政府去年大部分时间都关闭了动荡的英语地区的互联网服务,这是对抗议活动和新生的叛乱活动的强硬反应,叛乱源于对大量英语少数民族的长期歧视。在缅甸,两名路透社(Reuters)记者被判处七年有期徒刑,此前的审判存在缺陷,法院忽视了一些明显的证据,这些证据表明,他们是被陷害的,目的是阻止他们调查针对罗辛亚少数民族的军事暴行。尽管他们最近得到了赦免,但他们并没有被免罪。

While populist leaders in democracies seek to secure and build on their gains by taming the press, established autocratic governments continue to tighten the screws on dissenting voices, as any breach in their media dominance threatens to expose official wrongdoing or debunk official narratives. In Russia in 2018, authorities moved to block the popular messaging application Telegram after the company refused to hand over its encryption keys to security officials. The government in Cameroon shut down internet service in the restive Anglophone region for most of last year, a heavy-handed reaction to protests and a nascent insurgency stemming from long-standing discrimination against the large Anglophone minority. In Myanmar, two Reuters journalists were sentenced to seven years in prison after a flawed trial in which the court ignored plain evidence that they had been entrapped to halt their investigation of military atrocities against the Rohingya minority; although they were recently pardoned, they were not exonerated.

不同国家的评级下调可以归因于一系列法律、政治和经济因素,但其中一些因素更令人担忧,也更普遍。针对特定记者和媒体机构的暴力和骚扰在过去五年中新闻自由得分下降的63% 的国家中发挥了一定作用。2018年的贾马尔·哈绍吉谋杀案是最近发生的最臭名昭著的案件,但并非独一无二。2015年,萨尔瓦多记者在揭露警察虐待和法外处决的事件后,收到了死亡威胁。2017年,一名马里记者对猖獗的政治腐败直言不讳,胸部中弹。同年,一名调查当地官员谋杀案的坦桑尼亚记者失踪,他的命运至今仍是个谜。

The downgrades in various countries can be attributed to a range of legal, political, and economic factors, but some stand out as more concerning and pervasive. Violence and harassment aimed at particular journalists and media outlets have played some role in 63 percent of the countries with a press freedom score reduction over the past five years. The 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi was the most infamous recent case, but it was hardly unique. Journalists in El Salvador received death threats in 2015 after they uncovered stories of police abuse and extrajudicial killings. A Malian journalist who was outspoken about rampant political corruption was shot in the chest in 2017. Also that year, a Tanzanian journalist investigating the murders of local officials disappeared, and his fate remains a mystery.

新闻自由的趋势因地区而异。自2014年以来,美洲和亚太地区的平均新闻自由得分没有净变化,2014年撒哈拉以南非洲的平均新闻自由得分略有增长,增幅为3% 。但是,世界上最不自由的两个地区——欧亚大陆、中东和北非(MENA)的平均得分分别下降了9% 和11% ,而欧洲的新闻自由(每五个国家中有四个是自由的)则下降了8% 。

Trends in press freedom differ by region. Since 2014, there has been no net change in the average press freedom score for the Americas or Asia-Pacific, and sub-Saharan Africa has seen a slight increase of 3 percent. But the average scores in the two least free regions of the world, Eurasia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), declined by 9 percent and 11 percent, respectively, while press freedom in Europe—where four out of every five countries are Free—dropped by 8 percent.

在欧亚大陆和中东和北非地区,媒体在过去一年中面临着传统挑战的加剧。这方面的例子包括白俄罗斯的新立法限制,黎巴嫩的进一步逮捕和定罪,以及饱受战争蹂躏的也门更加不安全和死亡。这些事态发展表明,在缺乏对媒体独立性和其他基本权利的有意义的国际支持的情况下,本已困难的环境可能会不断恶化。

In Eurasia and MENA, the media in the past year have faced an intensification of traditional challenges. Examples include new legislative restrictions in Belarus, further arrests and convictions in Lebanon, and heightened insecurity and fatalities in war-torn Yemen. These developments illustrate the ways in which already difficult environments can grow steadily worse in the absence of meaningful international support for media independence and other fundamental rights.

即使在平均分数比较稳定的地区,个别国家的新闻自由也受到了威胁。尼泊尔的一项新隐私法禁止收集任何个人的个人信息,包括公职人员的个人信息,利用对隐私的正当关切,压制媒体对政治领导人的利益冲突或腐败行为的监督。据称,在巴基斯坦,安全人员警告记者不要报道禁忌话题,例如军队滥用职权,或者指示记者如何报道具体的政治问题。中国政府一直致力于切断获取未经审查信息的最后渠道,对私营科技公司施加越来越大的压力,要求它们更加严格地监管自己平台上的内容。

Even in the regions where average scores were more stable, press freedom has come under threat in individual countries. A new privacy law in Nepal restricts collection of the personal information of any individual, including public officials, exploiting legitimate concerns about privacy to suppress media scrutiny of political leaders’ conflicts of interest or corruption. In Pakistan, security agents have allegedly warned journalists against coverage of taboo subjects, such as abuses by the military, or given reporters instructions on how to cover specific political issues. The regime in China has worked to close off the last remaining avenues for accessing uncensored information by increasing pressure on private technology companies to police the content on their platforms more assiduously.

在黑暗中指引光明

Guiding lights in the darkness

全球新闻自由的前景并非完全黯淡。过去两年来,埃塞俄比亚、马来西亚、亚美尼亚、厄瓜多尔和冈比亚等最令人鼓舞的民主进步实例,几乎所有国家的媒体环境都取得了类似的进展。在这五个国家中,只有亚美尼亚在《世界自由》首次政治开放的同一年,其新闻自由得分没有提高。这种相关性再次强调了媒体自由和政治变革之间的密切关系:正如反民主的权力攫取往往涉及对独立媒体的攻击,改革派领导层的定义部分取决于他们是否愿意接受来自自由媒体的批评。正如对媒体自由的限制往往先于对其他权利的侵蚀一样,取消这种限制有利于并促进进一步的民主进步。

The picture of global press freedom is not entirely bleak. The most encouraging examples of democratic progress over the past two years—Ethiopia, Malaysia, Armenia, Ecuador, and The Gambia—have nearly all featured parallel gains in their media environments. Among these five countries, only Armenia failed to register an improvement in its press freedom score in the same year as its initial political opening in Freedom in the World. This correlation underscores once again the close relationship between media freedom and political change: Just as antidemocratic power grabs often involve attacks on independent media, a reformist leadership is defined in part by its willingness to accept criticism from a free press. And just as restrictions on media freedom frequently precede the erosion of other rights, the removal of such restrictions facilitates and catalyzes further democratic advancements.

这些国家的进步也表明,即使经历了多年的压制,独立新闻业依然具有弹性。在马来西亚和厄瓜多尔,对媒体施加的政治压力的解除使得独立媒体能够摆脱审查制度,以前支持政府的媒体能够进行不那么谄媚的报道。在埃塞俄比亚,一直在国外经营的网点得以返回该国。在冈比亚,遭受迫害的记者从流亡中归来,更多的当地人决定从事这一职业。

The improvements in these countries also point to the resilience of independent journalism, even after years of repression. In Malaysia and Ecuador, the lifting of political pressure on the media allowed independent outlets to rebound from censorship and previously progovernment outlets to produce less obsequious coverage. In Ethiopia, outlets that had been operating from abroad were able to return to the country. In The Gambia, persecuted journalists returned from exile, and more locals have decided to enter the profession.

媒体自由在经过一段时间的独裁统治之后,比其他一些民主要素,如法治,可以恢复得更快。但它也容易发生迅速的逆转。阿拉伯之春提供了一个警示故事。2011年起义后不久,突尼斯、埃及和利比亚都在世界自由中记录了新闻自由的改善。从那以后,这些国家都面临着挫折。与民主本身一样,新闻自由不是一旦实现就能保持安全的最终状态,必须培育和捍卫新闻自由,抵御反对新闻自由的势力。

Media freedom can recover much more quickly after a period of authoritarian governance than some other elements of democracy, such as the rule of law. But it is also subject to rapid reversals. The Arab Spring provides a cautionary tale. Soon after the 2011 uprisings, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya all recorded improvements in press freedom in Freedom in the World. All have since faced setbacks. Like democracy itself, press freedom is not an end state that remains secure once it is achieved—it must be nurtured and defended against the forces that oppose it.

在一次竞选集会上,印度印度人民党党的支持者在等待印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪的演讲时欢呼。

Supporters Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) cheer as they wait for the speech of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a campaign rally.

印度印度人民党的支持者在等待印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪在竞选集会上发表演讲时欢呼雀跃。图片来源:DIBYANGSHU sarkar / afp / getty Images。

Supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) cheer as they wait for a speech by Indian prime minister Narendra Modi during a campaign rally. Photo Credit: DIBYANGSHU SARKAR/AFP/Getty Images.

媒体和民主

The media and democracy

尽管对全球媒体自由的威胁是真实存在的,也是令人担忧的,但它们对民主国家的影响才是真正危险的。建立一个自由和独立的媒体部门,使民众了解情况,并追究领导人的责任,对于一个强大和可持续的民主制度来说,与举行自由和公正的选举同样重要。没有它,公民就不能对他们如何被统治做出明智的决定,滥用权力,这在任何社会中几乎都是不可避免的,也不能被揭露和纠正。

While the threats to global media freedom are real and concerning in their own right, their impact on the state of democracy is what makes them truly dangerous. A free and independent media sector that can keep the population informed and hold leaders to account is as crucial for a strong and sustainable democracy as free and fair elections. Without it, citizens cannot make informed decisions about how they are ruled, and abuse of power, which is all but inevitable in any society, cannot be exposed and corrected.

对去年面临潜在转折点的一些国家的审查表明,媒体支持民主的能力如何取决于它们独立运作的自由。

A review of some of the countries that have faced potential turning points in the last year illustrates how the media’s ability to support democracy depends on their freedom to operate independently.

在2019年4月阿尔及利亚推翻独裁总统阿卜杜勒-阿齐兹·布特弗利卡的事件中,记者发挥了关键作用,他们不仅报道了反政府抗议活动,而且在主要新闻媒体未能对民众运动给予应有的关注时,也举行了自己的示威游行。然而,在布特弗利卡辞职后,持批评态度的记者被频繁逮捕,这表明正在进行的领导层换届可能没有许多人所希望的那样具有革命性。

Journalists played a key role in the April 2019 ouster of authoritarian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algeria, not only by reporting on antigovernment protests but also by staging their own demonstrations when major news outlets failed to give due attention to the popular movement. However, the frequent arrests of critical journalists that took place under Bouteflika have continued since his resignation, an indication that the unfolding leadership transition may be less revolutionary than many have hoped.

在苏丹总统奥马尔·巴希尔(Omar al-Bashir)也于今年4月被免职之前,民众已经习惯了国内新闻媒体未能提供不带偏见的实质性信息。公民记者和流亡媒体填补了这一空白,他们主要通过互联网传播新闻和图片。整个冬天,人们对巴希尔暴政的失望情绪日益高涨,巴希尔也意识到了自己权力面临的威胁程度,于是他的政权开始镇压,逮捕了报道大规模抗议活动的记者,并撤销了一些外国记者的资格证书。就像在阿尔及利亚一样,记者们也举行了自己的抗议活动。巴希尔被捕后,军方指挥官试图安抚公众,宣布媒体审查制度结束,并默认增加新闻自由的看法将有助于巩固他们的控制。但记者们对军政府的这种声明持怀疑态度,他们与其他抗议者一道,要求将权力移交给能够监督真正民主开放的文职领导人。

Before Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir was removed from office, also in April, the population was accustomed to domestic news outlets that failed to provide unbiased and substantive information. Citizen journalists and exile-based outlets filled the gap, disseminating news and images largely via the internet. As frustration with al-Bashir’s misrule grew throughout the winter and he perceived the extent of the threat to his power, his regime cracked down, arresting journalists who covered mass protests and revoking the credentials of some foreign reporters. As in Algeria, journalists staged their own protests. Military commanders attempted to placate the public after al-Bashir’s arrest, announcing the end of media censorship and tacitly acknowledging that a perception of increased press freedom would help consolidate their control. But journalists are skeptical of such declarations by the junta, and they have joined other protesters in pressing for a transfer of power to civilian leaders who can oversee a genuine democratic opening.

在委内瑞拉,自从反对派控制的国民议会在一月指定胡安·盖伊德为代理总统以来,媒体压制有所增加。再加上反复停电,来自尼科尔马杜罗独裁政权的压力严重阻碍了该国媒体机构向公众通报政治事件和持续的人道主义危机的努力。但少数坚韧不拔的记者继续通过社交媒体、互联网和国际合作伙伴传播新闻。一个报告小组开发了在移动设备上录制低带宽视频,然后在转移到安全服务器后自动删除视频的技术,减少了被拘留和搜查的记者遭到报复的风险。记者记录反对派活动的能力以及政权的残暴反应有助于激发国际社会对民主运动的支持。

In Venezuela, media repression has increased since the opposition-controlled National Assembly designated Juan Guaidó as acting president in January. Combined with repeated electricity blackouts, this pressure from the authoritarian regime of Nicolás Maduro has severely hampered efforts by media outlets in the country to inform the public about political events and the ongoing humanitarian crisis. But a handful of resilient journalists have continued to disseminate news through social media, the internet, and international partners. One reporting group has developed technology to record video with low bandwidth on mobile devices and then automatically delete it after transfer to a secure server, reducing the risk of reprisals against journalists who are detained and searched. Journalists’ ability to document opposition activities as well as the brutality of the regime response has helped to galvanize international support for the democracy movement.

为了弥补委内瑞拉当地的信息差距,一些媒体机构还与人口中的小部分建立了直接关系。记者进入马杜罗领导下获得客观新闻机会有限的社区,报道当地新闻。这增强了公众的信任,使居民更容易接受其他不偏不倚的新闻。然而,尽管作出了这些勇敢的努力,编制委内瑞拉人民可以获得的可靠、客观的新闻仍然是一项艰巨的挑战。

In order to address the information gap on the ground in Venezuela, some media outlets have also forged direct relationships with subsets of the population. Journalists enter communities that have had limited access to objective news under Maduro and report on local stories. This fosters public trust and makes residents more receptive to other impartial news. Despite these valiant efforts, however, the production of reliable, objective news that is accessible to Venezuelans remains a daunting challenge.

在过去的一年中,亚美尼亚在民主过渡方面取得了更大的进步,抗议活动导致了新的选举和一个改革派的新政府。与苏丹一样,大多数电视频道最初都避免报道大规模示威活动。但包括 Civilnet 和 Azatutyun 在内的一小部分独立媒体能够提供稳定的深度报道,包括直播和熟练使用社交媒体。信息流动有助于人民运动获得动力,增加压力的建立力量和合法化的崛起的新领导人。这些渠道也有助于阻止前政权散布的虚假信息。

Armenia has made far more progress in its democratic transition in the past year, with protests leading to fresh elections and a new, reformist government. As in Sudan, most television channels initially avoided covering the mass demonstrations. But a small contingent of independent outlets, including Civilnet and Azatutyun, was able to provide steady in-depth reporting, including live streams and skillful use of social media. The information flow helped the popular movement to gain momentum, increasing pressure on establishment forces and legitimizing the rising new leadership. These outlets also helped stem disinformation spread by the former regime.

在试图履行其适当民主职能的记者和决心保留权力的反民主政权之间存在着明显的紧张关系。独立记者的创新和勇敢的工作提供了希望,即使在最绝望的情况下,那些致力于传播信息的公众利益可以找到一种方式。但是,仅凭这些记者无法满足数十亿人的需求,这些人除了了解政府的叙述之外,几乎没有其他途径,他们必须依靠自己的直觉和观察来评估腐败和滥用权力的领导人的指控。

There is an obvious tension between journalists who are attempting to perform their proper democratic function and antidemocratic regimes that are determined to retain power. The innovative and courageous work of independent reporters offers hope that even in the most desperate circumstances, those who are committed to distributing information in the public interest can find a way. But these journalists alone cannot address the needs of billions of people who still have access to little more than their government’s narrative and must rely on their own instincts and observations to assess the claims of corrupt and abusive leaders.

进一步分析

Further analysis

本文是关于媒介自由与民主之间关系的四篇系列论文中的第一篇。

This essay is the first in a series of four on the links between media freedom and democracy.

在《中国媒体影响力全球化对民主的影响》(The Implications for Democracy of China's Globalizing Media Influence)一书中,莎拉·库克(Sarah Cook)探讨了中国共产党通过参与新闻报道、内容传播、公开辩论,以及在某些情况下参与海外选举政治,来扩大其海外影响。即使在北京尚未试图破坏言论自由和信息获取自由的情况下,也在为未来的干预奠定基础,这种干预对民主有着潜在的影响。

In “The Implications for Democracy of China’s Globalizing Media Influence,” Sarah Cook looks at the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party is expanding its overseas influence operations through involvement in news reporting, content dissemination, public debate, and in some cases electoral politics outside China. Even in settings where Beijing has not yet attempted to undermine free expression and access to information, the groundwork is being laid for future interference, with insidious implications for democracy.

在《拉拢媒体的非自由派工具箱》一书中,Zselyke Csaky 分析了民主选举但非自由派领导人用来拉拢媒体的工具箱。她研究了塞尔维亚和匈牙利的法律、法外和经济策略,这两个国家今年都拒绝了《部分自由在世界》。文章还描述了媒介环境容易受到非自由合作的条件。

In “The Illiberal Toolbox for Co-opting the Media,” Zselyke Csaky analyzes the toolbox that democratically elected but illiberal leaders use to co-opt the media. She examines the legal, extralegal, and economic tactics deployed in Serbia and Hungary, both of which declined to Partly Free in Freedom in the World this year. The essay also describes the conditions that make media environments vulnerable to illiberal co-optation.

在《为什么社交媒体仍然值得拯救》一书中,阿德里安·沙赫巴兹(Adrian Shahbaz)写道,谷歌(Google)和 Facebook 等主要科技平台对全球在线媒体生态系统的破坏程度,无论是好是坏。本文分析了专制主义者和宣传者如何操纵数字媒体破坏民主,并提出了科技公司和新闻媒体之间的新伙伴关系,以支持高质量的新闻报道。

In “Why Social Media Are Still Worth Saving,” Adrian Shahbaz writes about the extent to which major technology platforms such as Google and Facebook have disrupted the online media ecosystem, for better and worse, around the globe. The essay analyzes how authoritarians and propagandists manipulate digital media to undermine democracy, and proposes a new partnership between tech companies and news media to support high-quality journalism.

建议

Recommendations

以下对民主国家决策者的建议将有助于确保全世界独立媒体的可持续性:

The following recommendations for policymakers in democratic nations will help ensure the sustainability of independent media worldwide:

确保他们的行动不会成为侵犯新闻自由的借口或鼓动。民主国家在维护媒体自由方面可以发挥特别重要的作用。语言很重要,当美国官员口头攻击新闻界,或未能迅速有力地谴责卡绍吉谋杀案等镇压行为时,它向世界各地不民主的领导人发出了一个信号,即攻击新闻界和针对记者的犯罪是允许的。

Ensure that their actions do not excuse or inspire violations of press freedom. Democratic nations have a particularly important role to play in maintaining media freedom. Words matter, and when US officials verbally attack the press or fail to swiftly and vigorously condemn acts of repression such as Khashoggi’s murder, it sends a signal to undemocratic leaders around the world that assaults on the press and crimes against journalists are permissible.

立即采取强有力的行动,通过新闻声明、电话、会议、信件以及对肇事者实施有针对性的制裁,在全球范围内打击任何侵犯媒体自由的行为。这包括公开反对针对记者的暴力行为,以及当局未能识别和起诉攻击者,限制媒体访问,封锁网站,以及对特定主题的审查。

Take strong and immediate action against any violations of media freedom globally through press statements, phone calls, meetings, letters, and the imposition of targeted sanctions on perpetrators. This includes speaking out against violence against journalists and authorities’ failure to identify and prosecute attackers, restrictions on media access, blocking of websites, and censorship on particular topics.

公开支持新闻自由的价值,支持为下一代提供信息的公民教育。新闻自由是美国民主最基本的支柱之一,美国的宪法保护比世界上任何其他国家都要强大。在媒体的诽谤和煽动性的评论中,民众很容易忘记这一点。政治领导人和教师应该重申,我们所有人都能在多大程度上从追究当权者责任的专业记者那里获益。

Stand up publicly for the value of a free press, and support civic education that will inform the next generation. Press freedom is one of the most fundamental pillars of American democracy, and constitutional protections in the United States are stronger than in any other country in the world. Citizens could easily forget this amid media mudslinging and incendiary commentary. Political leaders and teachers should reiterate the extent to which we all benefit from professional journalists who hold those in power to account.

确保外交政策和援助优先支持包括媒体自由在内的民主原则,将其作为国家安全和经济繁荣的基础。外国援助的目标是使受援国达到不再需要援助的程度。在这个意义上,捐助国政府投资海外资金而不支持新闻自由是短视的。在民主权利受到保护的国家,国家安全和经济繁荣最为强大,新闻自由是民主的重要监督者。鉴于记者目前面临的威胁,特别需要外国援助,重点是通过提供技术培训和紧急援助来支持独立媒体。最近经历了新闻自由扩张的国家,如安哥拉、埃塞俄比亚、马来西亚和厄瓜多尔,特别容易倒退,需要特别关注。

Ensure that foreign policy and assistance prioritizes support for democratic principles, including media freedom, as the foundation of national security and economic prosperity. The goal of foreign assistance is to bring recipient countries to the point that they no longer need it. In that sense, it is shortsighted for donor governments to invest funding overseas without shoring up press freedom. National security and economic prosperity are strongest in nations where democratic rights are protected, and a free press is a key watchdog of democracy. Foreign aid specifically focused on bolstering independent media by providing technical training and emergency assistance is especially needed given the threats journalists currently face. Countries that have experienced recent expansions in press freedom, such as Angola, Ethiopia, Malaysia, and Ecuador, are particularly vulnerable to backsliding and require special focus.

支持社交媒体作为在压抑环境中自由表达意见的另一种出路。除了国家控制的媒体之外,社交媒体上经常出现创新的替代品,包括最近在委内瑞拉、亚美尼亚和苏丹出现的媒体。相关技术可以用来规避审查,并在需要时保持记者匿名。捐助机构应该为增加新闻自由的技术提供资金。

Support social media as an alternative outlet for free expression in repressive environments. Innovative alternatives to state-controlled media regularly spring up on social media, including recently in Venezuela, Armenia, and Sudan. Related technology can be used to circumvent censorship and keep reporters anonymous where needed. Donor agencies should provide funding for technology that increases journalistic freedom.

脚注

Footnotes

*"Mindent bebor t a fidesz-k zeli media",m rt k,2019年4月25日, https://mertek.atlatszo.hu/Mindent-beborit-a-fidesz-kozeli-media/ 。

* “Mindent beborít a Fidesz-közeli media,” Mérték, April 25, 2019, https://mertek.atlatszo.hu/mindent-beborit-a-fidesz-kozeli-media/.

中国媒体影响力全球化对民主的启示

The Implications for Democracy of China’s Globalizing Media Influence

东亚高级研究分析师 Sarah Cook

By Sarah Cook, Senior Research Analyst for East Asia

在肯尼亚首都内罗毕的一个报摊前,一位报纸消费者正在阅读中国日报的非洲版。

A newspaper consumer reads a copy of China's Africa edition of its daily newspaper infront of a news stand in Nairobi, Kenya.

肯尼亚首都内罗毕,一名报纸消费者在报摊前阅读北京官方报纸《中国日报》的非洲版。图片来源:TONY karumba / 法新社 / 盖蒂图片社。

A newspaper consumer reads a copy of the Africa edition of Beijing’s state-run China Daily newspaper in front of a newsstand in Nairobi, Kenya. Photo Credit: TONY KARUMBA/AFP/Getty Images.

主要发现

Key Findings

中国政府、中国共产党和各种代理人迅速扩大了他们对国外媒体生产和传播渠道的影响力。因此,如果中共选择干涉其他国家,它已经提高了侵略性干涉其他国家的能力。

The Chinese government, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and various proxies have rapidly expanded their influence over media production and dissemination channels abroad. As a result, the CCP has enhanced its ability to interfere aggressively in other countries, should it choose to do so.

中国当局通过三个主要策略影响世界各地的新闻媒体内容:促进党的叙事,压制批评观点,管理内容传递系统。

Chinese authorities influence news media content around the world through three primary strategies: promoting the CCP’s narratives, suppressing critical viewpoints, and managing content delivery systems.

这些努力已经破坏了民主治理的关键特征和媒体自由的最佳实践,破坏了公平竞争,干扰了华人社区,削弱了法治,并为政治干预建立了渠道。

These efforts have already undercut key features of democratic governance and best practices for media freedom by undermining fair competition, interfering with Chinese diaspora communities, weakening the rule of law, and establishing channels for political meddling.

民主国家的政策制定者和媒体发展捐助者的行动将在未来几年中发挥关键作用,消除北京的外国媒体影响运动的潜在负面影响。

Actions by policymakers and media development donors in democracies will play a critical role in coming years in countering the potential negative impact of Beijing’s foreign media influence campaigns.

下载高分辨率 JPG | 下载 PDF

Download High-Rez JPG | Download PDF

媒体对中国日益增长的全球影响力的报道,往往聚焦于中国迅速增长的经济影响,以及对外国的潜在负面影响。这些担忧虽然值得冷静考虑和政策回应,但可能会掩盖威权主义的中共不断扩大的全球影响力给民主带来的风险,包括它努力利用境外媒体推进党的议程。中共在国内发展了世界上最多层次、最有活力、最复杂的媒体控制机构,同时极大地扩展了其影响媒体报道、内容传播、公共辩论的能力,在某些情况下,影响中国以外的选举政治。此外,在尚未激发破坏新闻自由的潜在可能性的地方,正在为未来的影响力奠定基础,如果(或者更有可能是在)北京决定部署这种影响力的话。

Media coverage of China’s increasing global presence has often focused on the country’s rapidly growing economic impact, and potentially negative implications for foreign countries. These anxieties, while deserving of sober consideration and policy responses, threaten to overshadow the risks to democracy posed by the expanding global influence of the authoritarian CCP—including through its efforts to harness media outside China to advance the party’s agenda. The CCP has developed the world’s most multilayered, dynamic, and sophisticated apparatus of media control at home, while vastly expanding its ability to influence media reporting, content dissemination, public debate, and in some cases, electoral politics, outside China. And where the potential for undermining press freedom has not been activated yet, the groundwork is being laid for future influence, if—or more likely when—Beijing decides to deploy it.

扩大中共的外国媒体影响力是一个全球性的运动,美国是其目标之一。这些结果已经影响了数百万美国人的新闻消费。此外,中共试图影响海外媒体报道的各种咄咄逼人的方式破坏了其他国家的民主治理和选举竞争,包括美国的盟友台湾。这些努力的累积效应,如果不加以控制,可能会对民主治理、新闻自由和美国在全球的影响产生深远的影响。

The expansion of the CCP’s foreign media influence is a global campaign, and the United States is among its targets. The results have already affected the news consumption of millions of Americans. Moreover, the varied and aggressive ways in which the CCP seeks to influence media narratives abroad undermine democratic governance and electoral competition in other countries, including US allies like Taiwan. The cumulative effects of these efforts, if unchecked, could have far-reaching implications for democratic governance, press freedom, and US influence worldwide.

共产党海外媒体影响的多方面因素

The many facets of Communist Party overseas media influence

中共的全球媒体影响运动是多方面的。传统上,他们寻求促进对中国的积极看法和对中共威权政权的良性看法;鼓励在中国的投资和对中国投资和对外战略接触的开放性;抑制或限制对中国政治制度的负面报道。近年来,一种新的说法将中国的威权主义治理风格作为发展中国家的典范,并在某些情况下同时挑战了民主和美国国际领导地位的吸引力。

The CCP’s global media influence campaigns are multifaceted. Traditionally, they have sought to promote positive views of China and a benign perspective of the CCP’s authoritarian regime; encourage investment in China and openness to Chinese investment and strategic engagement abroad; and suppress or curtail negative coverage of China’s political system. In recent years, a new narrative has presented China’s authoritarian governance style as a model for developing countries, and in some cases simultaneously challenged the attractiveness of both democracy and US international leadership.

中国当局通过三个主要策略影响世界各地的新闻媒体内容:促进党的叙事,压制批评观点,管理内容传递系统。

Chinese authorities influence news media content around the world through three primary strategies: promoting the CCP’s narratives, suppressing critical viewpoints, and managing content delivery systems.

推进党的叙事

Promoting CCP narratives

在2016年的一次讲话中,中共领导人习近平告诉官方媒体,"无论读者在哪里,观众在哪里,宣传报道都必须伸出触角。" [1]早在习近平升任中共中央总书记之前,中国政府就已经开始投资数十亿美元,扩大国有媒体的全球影响力。通过各种新闻发布伙伴关系和社交媒体,中国官方媒体的内容现在已经覆盖了无数国家和语言的数亿人。努力更深入地渗透外国媒体市场和传播中共偏爱的叙事没有显示出任何衰退的迹象。2018年11月,英国《金融时报》的一项调查发现,中国官方电视台中央电视台(CCTV)向1700家外国新闻机构提供免费内容。[2]仅在2018年9月至11月,中国官方的新华社就与澳大利亚、白俄罗斯、老挝、印度和孟加拉国的通讯社签署了新闻交流协议。

In a 2016 speech, CCP leader Xi Jinping told state media, “Wherever the readers are, wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must extend their tentacles.”[1] Even prior to Xi’s ascension to the top of the Communist Party, the Chinese government had begun investing billions of dollars to expand the global reach of state media outlets. Through a variety of news distribution partnerships and through social media, Chinese state media content now reaches hundreds of millions of people in numerous countries and languages. Efforts to more deeply penetrate foreign media markets and spread preferred CCP narratives show no sign of ebbing. A November 2018 Financial Times investigation found that the Chinese state-run television broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) provides free content to 1,700 foreign news organizations.[2] Between September and November 2018 alone, China’s official Xinhua News Agency signed news exchange agreements with wire services in Australia, Belarus, Laos, India, and Bangladesh.

中共还通过代理人和盟友人物,包括中国外交官、友好的媒体所有者和记者,以及在中国有商业利益的外国政客,在外国媒体上嵌入自己的叙述。例如,新西兰议员 Todd McClay 在2017年参加了中国人民党组织的一次对话,他最近称新疆的劳改营为"职业培训中心",呼应了中国政府用来为拘留和政治灌输超过100万维吾尔人和其他穆斯林少数民族辩护的术语。同样,德国前总理格哈德·施罗德(Gerhard schr der)在2018年接受路透社(Reuters)采访时,将大规模拘留事件斥为"八卦"。施罗德离职后曾帮助德国企业与中国官员取得联系,从中获利。尤其是在发展中国家,中共的对外宣传努力似乎对提升或保持中国和习近平个人的正面形象产生了一定影响。[3]

The CCP also embeds its narratives in foreign media through proxies and allied figures, including Chinese diplomats, friendly media owners and journalists, and foreign politicians with business interests in China. For example, New Zealand member of Parliament Todd McClay, who attended a CCP-organized dialogue in 2017, recently referred to reeducation camps in Xinjiang as “vocational training centers,” echoing the terminology used by the Chinese government to justify the detention and political indoctrination of over one million Uighurs and other Muslim minorities. Similarly, former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder—who has profited after leaving office by aiding German companies in their contacts with Chinese officials—dismissed the mass detentions as “gossip” in a 2018 interview with Reuters. In the developing world in particular, the CCP’s foreign propaganda efforts appear to have had some effect in boosting or retaining a positive image of China, and Xi Jinping personally.[3]

压制批评性的观点

Suppressing critical viewpoints

中共及其代理人、盟友和代理人也在努力压制对中国在海外的批评性报道。中国外交官在专栏文章和媒体露面中淡化了对中国的负面报道,尤其是在新疆大规模拘留或中国经济面临的问题等话题上。为了遏制批评,外交官多次对记者进行公然骚扰。2019年初,中国驻瑞典和俄罗斯的外交官对那些批评中国经济或支持台湾民主的记者进行了恐吓。中国政府及其代理人还通过阻碍外国记者在中国的工作,以昂贵的诽谤诉讼威胁外国记者在其本国的法院,来阻止调查报导进入现代中国的黑暗腹地或中共的海外政治影响力的努力。

The CCP and its agents, allies, and proxies also work to suppress critical coverage of China abroad. Chinese diplomats downplay negative coverage of China in op-eds and media appearances, particularly on topics like mass detentions in Xinjiang or the troubles facing China’s economy. Diplomats have repeatedly engaged in outright harassment of journalists in order to curb criticism, as in early 2019, when Chinese diplomats in Sweden and Russia intimidated reporters who had written critically about the country’s economy, or in support of democracy in Taiwan.[4] The Chinese government and its proxies also discourage investigative journalism into the dark underbelly of modern China or the CCP’s overseas political influence efforts by obstructing the work of foreign correspondents in China, and threatening foreign journalists with costly defamation suits in courts based in their home countries.

中共还成功地拉拢了媒体所有者,这些媒体所有者随后将其自身渠道中的批评性报道边缘化,特别是在香港、台湾以及为海外华人服务的渠道。偶尔,这种情况也会延伸到英文媒体,例如2018年9月,南非一家部分由中国人拥有的报纸在其作者撰写有关新疆侵权行为的文章后,停止了一个周刊的专栏。[6]间接压力还通过代理机构(包括广告商、卫星公司、科技公司和外国政府)施加,这些代理机构采取行动,阻止或惩罚批评北京的内容的发表,同时削弱批评中共的新闻媒体的财务可行性。[7]另外,还发生了网络攻击和人身攻击,这些攻击和人身攻击不能完全追溯到中国中央政府,但是为党的目的服务。

The CCP has also successfully co-opted media owners, who then marginalize critical reporting in their own outlets, notably in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and outlets serving the Chinese diaspora. Occasionally, this extends to English-language media,[5] as occurred in September 2018 when a partially Chinese-owned newspaper in South Africa discontinued a weekly column after its author wrote about abuses in Xinjiang.[6] Indirect pressure is also applied via proxies—including advertisers, satellite firms, technology companies, and foreign governments—which take action to prevent or punish the publication of content critical of Beijing, while undermining the financial viability of news outlets critical of the CCP.[7] Separately, cyberattacks and physical assaults that are not conclusively traceable to central Chinese authorities but serve the party’s aims have taken place.

管理内容交付系统

Managing content delivery systems

最后,在过去的五年里,向新闻消费者提供内容的技术为中国政府在海外的影响力开辟了新的途径。在非洲,中国电视发行公司 startimes 拥有决定观众可以访问哪些电视台的权力。该公司已成为肯尼亚、尼日利亚、乌干达、赞比亚和其他地区从模拟电视向数字电视过渡的关键参与者。尽管是私有企业,但 StarTimes 得益于与中国政府的密切关系和偶尔的补贴。与此同时,中国科技巨头腾讯的微信即时通讯服务,在中国无处不在,现在估计有1亿到2亿人在国外。最近的证据表明,根据中国政府的标准,这些通信正受到越来越多的监控和审查。

Finally, over the past five years, technologies that deliver content to news consumers have opened new avenues for Chinese government influence abroad. In Africa, the Chinese television distribution firm StarTimes—which has become a key player in the transition from analog to digital television in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, and elsewhere—holds the power to determine which stations its viewers can access. Although privately owned, StarTimes has benefited from a close relationship with the Chinese government and occasional subsidies. Meanwhile, Chinese tech giant Tencent’s WeChat instant messaging service, which is ubiquitous in China, now reaches an estimated 100 to 200 million people outside the country. Recent evidence suggests these communications are increasingly monitored and censored according to Chinese government standards.

中国官方媒体的新闻发布交易数量不断增加,中国外交官员对媒体采取了咄咄逼人的压制行为,中国内容发布系统在海外的制度化表明,中国官员破坏海外独立新闻报道的能力和意愿不断升级,最终削弱了媒体在民主环境中发挥的监督作用。

Chinese state media’s increasing number of news distribution deals, Chinese diplomats’ aggressive acts of media suppression, and the institutionalization of Chinese content delivery systems abroad point to escalations in the ability—and willingness—of Chinese officials to undermine independent news coverage abroad, and ultimately weaken the watchdog role played by media in democratic settings.

对全球民主治理和媒体自由的影响

Implications for democratic governance and media freedom globally

中国官员、国家媒体和其他行为者为了对世界各地的媒体施加影响而采用的策略,有可能破坏民主治理的关键特征和媒体自由的最佳实践。在某些情况下,这种潜力已经得到实现。

The strategies Chinese officials, state media, and other actors employ to exercise influence over media around the world have the potential to undermine key features of democratic governance and best practices for media freedom. In some cases, this potential is already being realized.

蔑视透明度

Flouting transparency

在其它国家发行的中国官方媒体出版物通常不会提及任何与政府的联系,因为这会向不了解情况的新闻消费者表明它们的来源。事实上,正是因为许多国家的新闻消费者通常不会被中国政府的宣传所吸引或说服,他们才会使用层层的模糊处理来使内容与其专制的起源保持距离。

Chinese state media publications distributed in other countries routinely omit any mention of government links that would signal their origin to uninitiated news consumers. Indeed, it is precisely because news consumers in many countries are typically not attracted to or convinced by Chinese government propaganda that layers of obfuscation are employed to distance content from its authoritarian origins.

因此,中国官方媒体在广告中使用了欺骗性的标语。例如,《人民日报》在其 Facebook 页面上向潜在的外国追随者吹嘘自己是"中国最大的报纸",却没有提到它是中共的官方喉舌。这种虚伪的自我认同延伸到付费的平面广告软文。官方媒体《中国日报》(China Daily)的《中国观察》(China Watch)增刊已在30个国家的主流媒体上发表,包括《华盛顿邮报》(Washington Post)、《纽约时报》(New York Times)和《悉尼先驱晨报》(Sydney Morning herald)。该增刊很少明确提及这家中国媒体的官方。

Chinese state media thus employ deceptive taglines in their advertising. The People’s Daily, for example, touts itself to potential foreign followers of its Facebook page as “the biggest newspaper in China,” making no mention of the fact that it is the CCP’s official mouthpiece. Such disingenuous self-identification extends to paid print advertorials. The state-run China Daily’s “China Watch” supplement, which has been published in mainstream media outlets across 30 countries[8] —including in the Washington Post, New York Times, and the Sydney Morning Herald—rarely includes explicit mention of the Chinese outlet’s official ties.

在许多情况下,这种缺乏透明度的现象延伸到了围绕各种活动的经济安排上,不管是《中国日报》为每个广告支付了多少费用,有多少记者和哪些记者前往中国进行政府支付的旅行,还是新闻交流给各方带来的经济利益。

In many cases, this lack of transparency extends to the economic arrangements surrounding various activities, be it how much China Daily is paying for each advertorial, how many and which journalists travel to China on government-paid trips, or what financial benefits news exchanges provide to each party.

中共试图掩盖中国国家媒体参与海外事务的起源、规模和性质,这种做法损害了由此产生的公开辩论的完整性,并削弱了外部媒体运作的透明文化。

These CCP efforts to conceal the origin, scale, and nature of Chinese state media involvement abroad compromise the integrity of resulting public debate, and erode cultures of transparency at outside media operations.

破坏竞争

Undermining competition

中共实施了各种各样的策略,破坏了国有或友好新闻机构与批评性新闻机构之间的公平竞争,往往降低了后者的财务可行性。

The CCP executes a variety of strategies that undermine fair competition between state-owned or friendly news outlets and critical ones, often reducing the latter’s financial viability.

中国政府对那些被视为至关重要的网站进行阻挠或处罚,除了限制它们的受众,还可能导致股价下跌,并削减广告收入。例如,2012年《纽约时报》中文网络版被屏蔽,导致广告收入减少,该报股价一夜之间下跌了20% 。中国政府代表还向企业施压,要求它们不要在关键网点上刊登广告。由于这些努力,香港《苹果日报》(Apple Daily)失去了利润丰厚的房地产行业和两家伦敦投资银行的广告合同。2019年,香港前行政长官梁振英(CY Leung)对《南华早报》剩余的广告客户进行了尖锐的公开谴责。梁振英目前是内地一家政府咨询机构的副主席。[9]驻中国的行动者对海外华人或国际媒体发动破坏性的网络攻击——一些关键目标经常遭受这种攻击——也使资金短缺的媒体承担了财务成本,这些媒体必须为清理和预防工作买单。

Chinese government obstruction or imposition of penalties on outlets viewed as critical, in addition to limiting their audience, can prompt stock losses and dent income from advertising. The 2012 blocking of the Chinese-language web edition of the New York Times, for example, resulted in lost advertising revenue and a 20 percent overnight drop in the paper’s stock value. Chinese government representatives also pressure businesses not to place advertisements in critical outlets. As a result of such efforts, Hong Kong’s Apple Daily lost advertising contracts from players in the lucrative real estate industry and two London-based investment banks. In 2019, the paper’s remaining advertisers have faced strident public denunciations from former Hong Kong chief executive CY Leung, currently the vice chairman of a mainland government advisory body.[9] Damaging cyberattacks by China-based actors against overseas Chinese or international media—a regular occurrence for some key targets—also impose financial costs on cash-strapped outlets, which must pay for clean-up and prevention efforts.

与竞争对手相比,中国政府及其合作伙伴还找到了其它方式,为海外的中国官方媒体提供其它优势。例如,在监督了非洲许多国家从模拟电视向数字电视的过渡之后,StarTimes 以牺牲独立的国际新闻台为代价,优先考虑中国官方媒体频道的一揽子服务。在肯尼亚、乌干达和尼日利亚,包含 BBC 国际广播等频道的电视套餐比当地频道和中国官方媒体的基本版本花费更多。更广泛地说,随着中国政府扩大对外国媒体行业的援助和投资,它往往更青睐国有媒体,而不是独立的私营竞争对手,这反映了中国的媒体格局。[10]在其他情况下,中国官员明显的幕后压力导致了一些批评性的媒体渠道,如总部位于美国的新唐人电视台电视台,被剥夺了进入具有新闻价值的场所ーー如联合国大会ーー的记者证,而中国的官方媒体则保留了报道权。

The Chinese government and its partners have also found ways to provide other advantages to Chinese state media abroad relative to competitors. For example, after overseeing the transition from analog to digital television in a number of countries in Africa, StarTimes has prioritized Chinese state media channels in its package offerings at the expense of independent international news stations. In Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria, television packages that include channels like BBC World Service cost more than basic versions with local channels and Chinese state media. More generally, as Beijing has expanded its aid and investment in foreign media sectors, it has tended to favor state-owned outlets over independent, private competitors, mirroring the media landscape in China.[10] In other instances, apparent behind-the-scenes pressure by Chinese officials has resulted in critical media outlets like the US-based New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV) being deprived of press credentials to newsworthy venues—like the UN General Assembly[11] —while Chinese state-media have retained reporting access.

干预侨民社区

Interfering with diaspora communities

20年前,许多散居海外的中国人从相对独立的报纸或总部设在香港或台湾的广播公司获得新闻。如今,中国官方媒体或亲北京的私营媒体更具影响力,因此更有能力鼓励散居海外的选民持有与北京类似的观点,并支持本国对中共有利的政策。

Twenty years ago, many Chinese in the diaspora got their news from relatively independent papers or broadcasting operations based out of Hong Kong or Taiwan. Today, Chinese state media or pro-Beijing private outlets are more influential, and thus more able to encourage diaspora voters to hold perspectives similar to Beijing’s and to back policies in their home countries that are advantageous to the CCP.

在美国,中共影响华裔美国人消费的媒体的能力在有线电视市场尤其明显,相对于台湾电视台 ETTV 和美国的 NTDTV,中央电视台占据了主导地位。[12]有关中国对美国有线电视公司施加幕后压力的报道,以及新唐人电视台(NTDTV)相对于中央电视台(CCTV)的在线受欢迎程度表明,在形成这种等级制度中,除了市场力量之外,还有。[13]中国官员还与总部位于美国的私营中文媒体的利益相关者建立伙伴关系。[14]

In the United States, the CCP’s ability to influence media consumed by Chinese Americans is particularly evident in the cable television market, which CCTV dominates relative to the Taiwanese station ETTV and the US-based NTDTV.[12] Reports of behind-the-scenes Chinese pressure on US cable companies and the online popularity of stations like NTDTV relative to CCTV indicate that something other than market forces are at play in shaping this hierarchy.[13] Chinese officials also cultivate partnerships with stakeholders in privately owned, US-based Chinese-language media outfits.[14]

中共当局对澳大利亚的中文媒体施加了巨大的影响力,除了持不同政见的团体以外,澳大利亚的大多数此类出版物都是亲北京的。[15]去年,中国驻悉尼领事馆的外交官威胁当地一个委员会,禁止《中国时报》赞助中国新年活动,并说服至少10家企业撤下他们的广告。[16]中共对加拿大媒体市场的干涉,被环球华文出版社(Global Chinese Press)的两名记者分别解雇,原因是他们发表的内容被高管认为令北京不快。一位中国学者表示,在新西兰,中共长期以来一直在努力吸收海外人士(包括他们对当地政治的报道) ,这使得海外人士处于一种状态,"中国社会只能现实地希望通过得到北京批准的个人,让自己的成员获得政治代表权。" [17]

CCP authorities exert enormous influence over the Chinese-language Australian media, where most such publications, with notable exceptions run by dissident communities, are pro-Beijing.[15] The few independent diaspora publications face direct obstructions to their operations by Chinese officials, as occurred last year, when diplomats from the Chinese consulate in Sydney bullied a local council into banning the Vision China Times from sponsoring a Chinese New Year event and convinced at least ten businesses to pull their advertisements.[16] CCP interference in Canada’s media market was exposed by the separate firings of two journalists at the Global Chinese Press after they published content deemed by executives to be displeasing to Beijing. In New Zealand, the CCP’s long-term efforts to co-opt diaspora outlets—and with them coverage of local politics—has left the diaspora in a state, according to one Chinese scholar, where “the Chinese community can only realistically aspire to political representation by its own members through individuals approved by Beijing.”[17]

随着微信在侨民中的受欢迎程度不断扩大,以及政客们相应地使用微信服务与侨民进行沟通,中共对国外新闻传播的控制也在进一步加强。在加拿大,微信审查人员删除了一名国会议员发给赞扬香港2014年香港佔领运动抗议者的信息,操纵了有关华为高管 Wanzhou 被捕的新闻报道的传播,并阻止了媒体对中国政府腐败和领导官员的更广泛报道。在美国,华裔美国人看到微信上的帖子在有关当地亚裔美国人政治问题的群体对话中被封杀。在澳大利亚,最近一项针对散居海外的华人新闻来源的研究发现,中文新闻提供商的微信频道对中国的政治报道微不足道。令人难以置信的是,在2017年3月至8月期间,没有一个微信频道发表过一篇关于中国政治的文章,尽管去年秋天召开了重要的十九大。

CCP control of news distribution outside China is further increasing as WeChat’s popularity expands in the diaspora, and as politicians correspondingly use the service to communicate with Chinese diaspora constituents. In Canada, WeChat censors deleted a member of Parliament’s message to constituents praising Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement protesters, manipulated dissemination of news reports related to Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou’s arrest, and blocked broader media coverage of Chinese government corruption and leading officials. In the United States, Chinese Americans have seen WeChat posts silenced in group conversations about local Asian American political issues. In Australia, a recent study of news sources available to the Chinese diaspora found negligible political coverage of China on the WeChat channels of Chinese-language news providers. Incredibly, between March and August 2017, none of the WeChat channels published a single article on Chinese politics, despite the run-up to the important 19th Party Congress that fall.

建立政治干预渠道

Establishing channels for political meddling

尽管中国政府利用媒体影响干预选举的努力有限,但最近出现了一些重大事件。在台湾,来自中国大陆的几则"假新闻"和篡改图片的例子在社交媒体上广泛传播,其中一些被台湾新闻台转载并报道为事实。[18]一些观察人士认为,这些活动以及其他因素对2018年11月的地方选举产生了影响,当时中国政府不喜欢的执政党遭受了多次意外的失败。[19]2019年4月,台湾媒体报道称,在明年大选之前,疑似大陆政府代理人暗中提议购买热门的亲台湾 Facebook 页面。[20]网上也出现了支持统一观点的直播流媒体招聘广告。

Although Chinese government efforts to use media influence for electoral meddling have been limited, important incidents have recently emerged. In Taiwan, several examples of “fake news” stories and doctored images originating in China tainting the reputation of the Taiwanese government have spread widely on social media, with some picked up and reported as fact by Taiwanese news stations.[18] Some observers believe such activities—alongside other factors—had an impact on local elections in November 2018 when the ruling party, which is disfavored by Beijing, suffered a number of surprising losses.[19] In April 2019, Taiwanese media reported that suspected Chinese government agents had made quiet offers to buy popular pro-Taiwan Facebook pages ahead of next year’s general elections.[20] Recruitment advertisements for live streamers with pro-unification views have also emerged online.

在2018年美国中期选举的准备阶段,中央人民党也努力争取美国选民的支持,特别是大豆种植户。今年7月,中国国有电视台旗下的面向外国的中国全球电视网(CGTN)发布了一段两分钟的动画视频,讲述了双边贸易紧张局势对美国大豆产业的影响,最后以这样一个问题作为结尾:"一旦特朗普和共和党的钱袋受到打击,那里的选民会支持他们吗?" 今年9月,纽约得梅因纪事报的印刷版增加了一篇中国观察的增刊,文章描述了贸易战将如何伤害美国大豆种植者—— 内容比中国观察的插页更具针对性和政治性。尽管这些努力的影响有限,但它们反映出中国官方媒体为了影响美国选民,愿意利用现有的内容传播渠道。

The run-up to the 2018 midterm elections in the United States also saw CCP-backed efforts to reach American voters—in particular, soybean farmers. In July, the China Global Television Network (CGTN), the foreign-facing arm of China’s state-owned broadcaster, released a two-minute animated video about the impact of bilateral trade tensions on the US soybean industry, concluding with the question, “Will voters there turn out to support Trump and the Republicans once they get hit in the pocketbooks?” In September, the print edition of the Des Moines Register included a China Watch supplement with articles describing how a trade war would harm American soybean farmers—content far more targeted and politicized than is typical for the China Watch insert. While the impact of these efforts was limited, they reflect willingness by Chinese state media to use established avenues of content dissemination in an effort to influence American voters.

这些例子主要涉及在 Facebook、 LINE 和 YouTube 等非中国人拥有的社交媒体平台上进行宣传和散布虚假信息。但是,在马来西亚、蒙古和澳大利亚等国,移民社群和非华语人士越来越多地使用中国的微信应用程序,为中共未来干预选举创造了肥沃的基础。正如澳大利亚教授约翰·菲茨杰拉德最近指出的,"我们正在进入一个未知的领域。微信不是用来在民主国家工作的。"

These examples primarily involved propaganda and disinformation spreading on non-Chinese owned social media platforms like Facebook, LINE, and YouTube. But the growing use of the China-based WeChat application by both diaspora communities and non-Chinese speakers in countries like Malaysia, Mongolia, and Australia, creates a fertile foundation for future CCP electoral meddling. As Australian professor John Fitzgerald recently noted, “We are entering uncharted territory. WeChat was not designed to work in a democracy.”

破坏法治

Undermining the rule of law

当中国官员试图限制独立侨民或离岸中国媒体的运营空间时,他们恶意利用法院系统,藐视旨在确保诚实商业行为的利益冲突和其他标准,从而破坏了其他国家的法治。

When attempting to restrict the operating space for independent diaspora or offshore Chinese media, Chinese officials have undermined the rule of law in other countries by maliciously harnessing court systems and flouting conflict-of-interest and other standards meant to ensure honest business practices.

中国官员通过这些国家自己的法院系统向外国媒体的批评人士施加压力,有时还向地方官员施压,要求他们提供援助。在东南亚,出现了几起与希望之声无线电网络有关的案例。该电视台总部设在美国,由在中国被禁的法轮功精神组织的学员创办。该电视台播放有关中国侵犯人权和腐败的未经审查的新闻,以及其他基于辩论和文化的节目。在泰国,据报道,在中国政府的敦促下,警方最近拘留了一名帮助电视台向中国广播的台湾人。截至2019年5月,此案仍在审理中,是该地区第三起此类案件;印度尼西亚和越南发生了两起类似案件,后者导致两名男子被监禁。

Chinese officials have applied pressure on critics in foreign media through those countries’ own court systems, and at times have pressured local officials to aid them. In Southeast Asia, several cases have emerged involving the Sound of Hope radio network. Based in the United States and founded by practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual group, which is banned in China, the station broadcasts uncensored news about rights abuses and corruption in China, among other debate-based and cultural programming. In Thailand, police, reportedly at the urging of the Chinese government, recently detained a Taiwanese national who had helped facilitate the station’s broadcasts into China. The case was ongoing as of May 2019 and marked the third of its kind in the region; two similar cases have taken place in Indonesia and Vietnam—the latter resulting in two men being imprisoned.

在中国大陆以外,批评中国政府行为或亲北京官员的记者和新闻机构也面临着诽谤诉讼的威胁或实际诉讼。一直谴责《苹果日报》广告客户的前香港高管梁振英,在香港对一名拥有独立媒体的记者提起诽谤诉讼,这名记者撰文称自己可能与有组织犯罪有关。在捷克共和国,代表中国强大的能源和金融集团华信(CEFC)的律师致函威胁称,将对有关该公司所有者与中国军方情报机构的文章提起诉讼。[21]2018年,与中国政府有联系的澳大利亚华人对两家媒体公司提起诽谤诉讼,起因是一部高调的调查性纪录片,内容是关于中共在澳大利亚的政治影响力。

Journalists and news outlets reporting critically about Chinese government actions or pro-Beijing officials outside mainland China also face threats of or actual defamation lawsuits. Leung, the former Hong Kong executive who has been denouncing Apple Daily advertisers, has brought a defamation suit in Hong Kong against a journalist with a separate outlet who wrote about his possible links to organized crime. In the Czech Republic, lawyers representing the powerful Chinese energy and financial conglomerate CEFC sent letters threatening lawsuits over articles linking the firm’s owner to Chinese military intelligence.[21] In 2018, Chinese Australians with ties to the Chinese government filed defamation suits against two media companies over a high-profile investigative documentary examining the CCP’s political influence in Australia.

在其它情况下,中国对外国通信行业的投资引发了人们对利益冲突、腐败和有问题的竞标行为的担忧。在台湾,一家亲大陆的传媒大亨所拥有的公司试图收购一家大型有线电视公司的股份,这引发了人们的担忧,即这种交叉持股将导致有线电视运营商利用亲北京的电视台,而牺牲独立或亲独立的电视台的利益。(经过激烈的公开辩论,该交易被监管机构否决。[22]在赞比亚,赞比亚国家广播公司(ZNBC)与中国服务提供商 StarTimes 合作创办了一家合资企业ーー topstar ーー据报道违反了国内法律,禁止任何单一媒体实体同时拥有内容传输和内容创作许可证。该交易也未经赞比亚国家广播公司董事会或赞比亚议会批准,导致人们怀疑其存在腐败问题。

In other instances, Chinese investments in foreign communications sectors have raised concerns about conflicts of interest, corruption, and questionable bidding practices. In Taiwan, attempts by a company owned by a China-friendly media tycoon to purchase stakes in a major cable company sparked fears that such cross-ownership would cause cable providers to advantage pro-Beijing stations at the expense of independent or pro-independence ones. (Following vigorous public debate, the deal was rejected by regulators.[22]) In Zambia, a partnership between the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) and Chinese service provider StarTimes to create a joint venture—TopStar—reportedly violated domestic laws against any single media entity having licenses for both content transmission and content creation. The deal was also made without approval from either ZNBC’s board or Zambia’s parliament, leading to suspicions of corruption.

未来轨迹

Future trajectory

一个经济强大的威权主义国家迅速扩大其对其他国家媒体生产和传播渠道的影响力,这是一个相对较新的现象。目前,中国媒体对民主体制和实践的影响仍然相对有限,尽管对侨民群体的影响不成比例。然而,其庞大的规模、经济影响力和不断扩大的关系网突出表明,如果中共选择这样做的话,它在国外进行攻击性干预的能力得到了增强。此外,北京已经表现出为了达到目的而无视或违反外交规范、人权保护和外国法律的意愿。

Having an economically powerful authoritarian-led state rapidly expand its influence over media production and dissemination channels in other countries is a relatively new phenomenon. The current impact of Chinese media influence operations on democratic institutions and practice remains relatively limited, although it disproportionately affects diaspora communities. Nevertheless, the sheer scale, economic clout, and expanding network of relationships involved highlights the CCP’s enhanced ability to interfere aggressively abroad, should it choose to do so. In addition, Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to ignore or violate outright diplomatic norms, human rights protections, and laws of foreign countries to achieve its ends.

然而,中共是否有能力通过外国媒体影响运动来实现其预期目标,这一点仍然存在争议。关于中国政府在国内外行动的批评性报道经常出现,受众众众多。在过去的几年里,香港、美国和其他地方的一些独立的中文媒体已经变得更加专业化和有影响力。在中国影响力不断扩大的国家,民间社会团体、媒体所有者和前官员已经开始大声疾呼,敦促他们的政府在考虑中国投资通信基础设施时坚持良好的治理标准。

However, the ability of the CCP to achieve its desired goals through its foreign media influence campaigns is still contested. Critical reporting about Chinese government actions within and outside of China appears with regularity, reaching large audiences. A number of independent Chinese-language media in Hong Kong, the United States, and elsewhere have become more professionalized and influential over the past several years. Civil society groups, media owners, and former officials in countries where Chinese influence is expanding have begun to speak out and urge their governments to uphold good governance standards when considering Chinese investment in communications infrastructure.

展望未来,希望探索对中国全球化媒体影响对全球自由和民主构成的威胁作出原则性回应的个人和组织,应该着眼于调查和揭露隐秘和欺骗活动,提高政策辩论的复杂性和规模,以及维护地方法律标准。

Looking ahead, individuals and organizations wishing to explore principled responses to the threat to global freedom and democracy posed by China’s globalizing media influence should focus on investigating and exposing stealthy and deceptive activities, increasing the sophistication and scale of policy debates, and upholding local legal standards.

建议

Recommendations

以下对民主国家政策制定者的建议,将有助于消除北京方面的外国媒体影响活动可能带来的负面影响:

The following recommendations for policymakers in democratic nations will help counter the potential negative impact of Beijing’s foreign media influence campaigns:

增加透明度。外国政府应采取或执行政策,加强有关中国媒体在本国影响活动的公开信息。这可能包括对付费广告、所有权结构以及与中国政府部门的其他经济联系的报道要求。在美国,司法部应该把最近的这种要求扩大到 CGTN 和新华社,扩大到其他官方媒体或相关媒体,特别是中文的中央电视台。

Increase transparency. Foreign governments should adopt or enforce policies that enhance publicly available information about Chinese media influence activities in their countries. This could include reporting requirements for spending on paid advertorials, ownership structures, and other economic ties to Chinese government actors. In the United States, the Department of Justice should expand recent such requests to CGTN and Xinhua to other state-media or linked outlets, especially the Chinese-language CCTV.

制裁外交官。当中国外交官和安全人员越界,试图干涉其他国家的媒体报道时,东道国政府应该强烈抗议,表示这种行为可能违反外交协议。如果这种行为重复发生或者特别恶劣,东道国政府应该考虑宣布违法者为不受欢迎人物。

Sanction diplomats. When Chinese diplomats and security agents overstep their bounds and attempt to interfere with media reporting in other countries, the host government should vigorously protest, conveying that such behavior may violate diplomatic protocols. If the act in question repeats or is particularly egregious, the host government should consider declaring offenders persona non grata.

审查国际微信审查和监控。外国议会应该举行听证会,以更好地了解政治审查和监控在腾讯微信平台上的范围、性质和影响,然后探索向该公司施压的途径,以维护生活在民主国家的用户的言论自由和隐私权。选择使用微信与选民交流的政治人物应密切监控信息传递,以发现任何操纵行为,尽可能用国际电话号码注册账号,并在平行的国际社交媒体平台上重新发布信息。

Scrutinize international WeChat censorship and surveillance. Foreign parliaments should hold hearings to better understand the scope, nature, and impact of politicized censorship and surveillance on Tencent’s WeChat platform, then explore avenues for pressuring the company to uphold the rights to free expression and privacy of users living in democratic countries. Politicians who choose to use WeChat to communicate with constituents should monitor messaging closely to detect any manipulations, register accounts with international phone numbers when possible, and republish messages on parallel international social media platforms.

支持独立的海外华文媒体。媒体发展基金应确保将流亡者和侨民媒体纳入中文媒体的资助、培训和其他援助机会。外国政府应积极主动地与这类媒体接触,提供采访,探索其他潜在的合作伙伴关系,同时抵制中国外交官要求边缘化他们的压力。资助者应为应对网络攻击提供技术和财政支持。

Support independent overseas Chinese media. Media development funders should make sure to include exile and diaspora media in funding, training, and other assistance opportunities for Chinese-language media. Foreign governments should proactively engage with such media, providing interviews and exploring other potential partnerships, while resisting pressure from Chinese diplomats to marginalize them. Funders should provide technical and financial support for responding to cyberattacks.

脚注

Footnotes

1. David Bandurski,《习近平如何看待新闻》 ,《中国媒体工程》 ,2016年3月3日, https://medium.com/China-Media-Project/How-the-president-Views-the-News-2bee482e1d48。

[1]David Bandurski, “How Xi Jinping Views the News,” China Media Project, March 3, 2016, https://medium.com/china-media-project/how-the-president-views-the-news-2bee482e1d48.

中国与世界:北京如何传播信息》 ,金融时报,2018年7月12日, https://www.ft.com/content/f5d00a86-3296-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498。

[2]Emily Feng, “China and the world: how Beijing spreads the message,” Financial Times, July 12, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/f5d00a86-3296-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498.

[3]凯蒂·斯诺·贝拉德,《中国在非洲:中国媒体扩张对非洲舆论的影响分析》 ,载《国际新闻政治杂志》2016年第21卷第446-471页。

[3]Catie Snow Bailard, “China in Africa: An Analysis of the Effect of Chinese Media Expansion on African Public Opinion,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 2016 Vol 21(4) 446-471.

[4]"中国媒体公告:腾讯串通,监控升级,Reddit 操纵(第134号)"自由之家,2019年3月24日, https://freedomhouse.org/China-Media/China-Media-Bulletin-tencent-complicity-surveillance-upgrades-Reddit-manipulation-no-134。

[4]“China Media Bulletin: Tencent complicity, surveillance upgrades, Reddit manipulation (No. 134)” Freedom House, March 24, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/china-media/china-media-bulletin-tencent-complicity-surveillance-upgrades-reddit-manipulation-no-134.

中国审查制度的长长阴影:共产党的媒体限制如何影响世界各地的新闻机构》 ,国际媒体援助中心,2013年10月22日, http://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/cima-china_sarah%20cook.pd

[5]Sarah Cook, “The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World,” Center for International Media Assistance, October 22, 2013, http://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CIMA-China_Sarah%20Cook.pdf.

[6] Azad Essa,"中国在收买非洲媒体的沉默",《外交政策》 ,2018年9月14日, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/China-Is-Buying-African-medias-Silence/ 。

[6]Azad Essa, “China Is Buying African Media’s Silence,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/china-is-buying-african-medias-silence/.

[7]库克,"中国审查制度的长期阴影:共产党的媒体限制如何影响世界各地的新闻机构。"

[7]Cook, “The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World.”

[8] Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin,"Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign,"《卫报》 ,2018年12月7日, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/China-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping。

[8]Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, “Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign,” Guardian, December 7, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping.

香港:前首席执行官必须停止攻击苹果日报》 ,《无国界记者,2019年4月15日, https://rsf.org/en/news/Hong-Kong-Former-Chief-Executive-Must-Stop-Attacking-Apple-Daily。

[9]“Hong Kong: Former Chief Executive Must Stop Attacking Apple Daily,” Reporters Without Borders, April 15, 2019, https://rsf.org/en/news/hong-kong-former-chief-executive-must-stop-attacking-apple-daily.

中国在非洲媒体和电信领域的合作、互联互通和控制》 ,挪威建设和平资源中心,2014年4月, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/179376/7880fd6b12b93bdd18eddcbd4f4e207f.pdf

[10]Iginio Gagliardone and Sam Geall, “China in Africa’s media and telecommunications: cooperation, connectivity and control,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, April 2014, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/179376/7880fd6b12b93bdd18eddcbd4f4e207f.pdf

[11]"美国大众电视台被拒绝采访2017年联合国大会,"新闻专线,2017年9月21日, https://nwu.org/Popular-US-Based-Chinese-TV-Station-Denied-Accreditation-to-Cover-the-2017-United-Nations-General-Assembly/ ;"王毅在联合国:中国在世界舞台上发挥更大的作用,"CGTN,2017年9月26日, https://news.CGTN.com/news/3341544f77597a6333566d54/share_p.html。

[11]“Popular US-Based Chinese TV Station Denied Accreditation to Cover the 2017 United Nations General Assembly,” Newswire, September 21, 2017, https://nwu.org/popular-us-based-chinese-tv-station-denied-accreditation-to-cover-the-2017-united-nations-general-assembly/; “Wang Yi at UN: China playing bigger role on world stage,” CGTN, September 26, 2017, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3341544f77597a6333566d54/share_p.html.

[12]截至2016年年中,美国有9070万家庭收看了《中央电视台新闻》。其次是亲北京的香港凤凰卫视(7950万户)和亲中国的台湾电视台 CTI(7160万户)。相比之下,支持台独的台湾电视台 ETTV 只能在1230万户家庭收看,而由法轮功学员创办的纽约新唐人电视台(New Tang Dynasty TV)只能在590万户家庭收看。这些金额是根据 SNL Kagan 在2016年8月提供的一份网络运输报告中的数据计算出来的。详细的数据文件与作者。

[12]As of mid-2016, CCTV News was available in 90.7 million cable-viewing households in the United States. The next most widely available station was the Hong Kong-based pro-Beijing Phoenix TV (79.5 million households) and then the pro-China Taiwanese station CTI (71.6 million households). By contrast, the pro-independence Taiwanese station ETTV was available in just 12.3 million households, and the New York-based New Tang Dynasty TV, founded by Falun Gong practitioners, was available in only 5.9 million households. These sums were calculated from data in a network carriage report provided by SNL Kagan, August 2016. Detailed data on file with the author.

2017年1月27日,美国联邦通信委员会发表于《法规命令制订通知:促进视频节目多样化和独立来源的可获得性》一 https://www.FCC.gov/ecfs/filing/1012763254871。

[13]“New Tang Dynasty (NTD) Television is responding to the following Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM): ‘Promoting the Availability of Diverse and Independent Sources of Video Programming’ [MB Docket No. 16–41; FCC 16–129],” Federal Communications Commission, January 27, 2017, https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/1012763254871.

[14] Sarah Cook,"在美中经济与安全审查委员会面前的书面证词:中国政府对美国媒体前景的影响",2017年5月4日, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Sarah%20cook%20may%204th%202017%20uscc%20te

[14]Sarah Cook, “Written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: Chinese Government Influence on the U.S. Media Landscape,” May 4, 2017, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Sarah%20Cook%20May%204th%202017%20USCC%20testimony.pdf.

[15] Bill Bertles,"中国共产党通过澳大利亚的媒体交易寻求新闻影响力,"ABC http://www.ABC.net.au/news/2017-06-11/China-Communist-Party-seeks-news-influence-australia-deals/8607754,2017年6月10日。

[15]Bill Bertles, “China's Communist Party seeks news influence through Australian media deals,” ABC, June 10, 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-11/china-communist-party-seeks-news-influence-australia-deals/8607754.

[16] Nick McKenzie,"中国领事馆如何欺负当地议会,媒体如何反对'反华关系',"雪梨晨锋报时报,2019年4月6日,《 https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/How-China-s-consulate-bullied-local-council-media-over-anti-China-ties-20190404-p51as2.html。

[16]Nick McKenzie, “How China's consulate bullied local council, media over ‘anti-China ties’,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 6, 2019, 'https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/how-china-s-consulate-bullied-local-council-media-over-anti-china-ties-20190404-p51as2.html.

[17]艾米丽·冯,《中国与世界》 2018年12月31日,《新西兰:联合锋线永远是赢家》 ,jchang Lulu https://jichanglulu.wordpress.com/2017/09/21/New-Zealand-United-Frontlings-always-win/ 。

[17]Emily Feng, “China and the world.” “New Zealand: United Frontlings always win,” Jichang Lulu, December 31, 2018, https://jichanglulu.wordpress.com/2017/09/21/new-zealand-united-frontlings-always-win/.

[18]"中国制造的假新闻压倒了台湾",《环球之声》 ,2018年11月20日,台湾 https://Advox.globalvoices.org/2018/11/30/Made-in-China-fake-News-overwhelms-Taiwan/ ;《数字新闻报道:台湾》 ,《数字新闻报道》 ,2018年,台湾 http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/Taiwan-2018/ 。

[18]“Made-in-China fake news overwhelms Taiwan,” Global Voices Advox, November 20, 2018, https://advox.globalvoices.org/2018/11/30/made-in-china-fake-news-overwhelms-taiwan/; Lihyun Lin, “Digital News Report: Taiwan,” Digital News Report, 2018, http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/taiwan-2018/.

2018年11月28日,《日经亚洲评论》 https://asia.Nikkei.com/politics/Beijing-likely-meddled-in-Taiwan-elections-US-cybersecurity-firm-says 报道:"美国网络安全公司称,北京可能干预了台湾的选举。"。我们从台湾戏剧性的2018年选举中学到的5个教训》 ,《新闻镜头》 ,2018年11月28日, https://international.thenewslens.com/feature/bluewave/109096。

[19]Andrew Sharp, “Beijing likely meddled in Taiwan elections, US cybersecurity firm says,” Nikkei Asian Review, November 28, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Beijing-likely-meddled-in-Taiwan-elections-US-cybersecurity-firm-says. David Evans, “5 Lessons We Learned From Taiwan's Dramatic 2018 Elections,” The News Lens, November 28, 2018, https://international.thenewslens.com/feature/bluewave/109096.

[20]"中国媒体公报:学生灌输,监督创新,GitHub 动员(第135号) ,"自由之家,2019年4月24日, https://freedomhouse.org/China-Media/China-Media-Bulletin-Student-indoctrination-surveillance-innovation-GitHub-mobilization-no-135。

[20]“China Media Bulletin: Student indoctrination, surveillance innovation, GitHub mobilization (No. 135),” Freedom House, April 24, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/china-media/china-media-bulletin-student-indoctrination-surveillance-innovation-github-mobilization-no-135.

[21]罗伯特·马莱克,"电视节目与电视节目有关。Https://HlidaciPes.org/tvrdikovi-pravnici-kvuli-cine-hrozi-zalobou-i-ceskemu-poslanci-zastrasuji-me-rika/ ,2016年3月29日。

[21]Robert Malecký, “Tvrdíkovi právníci kvůli Číně hrozí žalobou i českému poslanci. Zastrašují mě, říká,” HlidaciPes, March 29, 2016, https://hlidacipes.org/tvrdikovi-pravnici-kvuli-cine-hrozi-zalobou-i-ceskemu-poslanci-zastrasuji-me-rika/.

[22]"NCC 拒绝希望与 cns 的合并",今日台湾,2013年2月21日, https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=6,23,45,6,6&post=11479。

[22]“NCC rejects Want Want-CNS merger,” Taiwan Today, February 21, 2013, https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=6,23,45,6,6&post=11479.

拉拢媒体的新工具箱

A New Toolbox for Co-opting the Media

作者:Zselyke Csaky,欧洲和欧亚大陆研究主任

By Zselyke Csaky, Research Director, Europe & Eurasia

匈牙利最大的反对派报纸 em Nepszabadsag / em 的记者和他们的支持者在布达佩斯抗议。

Journalists of Hungary's biggest opposition newspaper Nepszabadsag and their supporters protest in Budapest.

匈牙利最大的反对派报纸 Nepszabadsag 的记者和他们的支持者在布达佩斯抗议。图片来源:ATTILA kisbenedek / afp / getty Images。

Journalists of Hungary's biggest opposition newspaper Nepszabadsag and their supporters protest in Budapest. Photo Credit: ATTILA KISBENEDEK/AFP/Getty Images.

主要发现

Key Findings

在他们最近试图控制媒体的行动中,脆弱民主国家的反民主领导人部署了一个新的工具箱,其中包括经济、法律和法外手段,以压制批评性的记者,支持友好的新闻媒体。

In their recent attempts to control the media, antidemocratic leaders in fragile democracies have deployed a new toolbox that includes economic, legal, and extralegal means to silence critical journalists and bolster friendly news outlets.

在匈牙利,执政的青民盟几乎巩固了对媒体的控制,并且建立了一个平行的现实:政府信息和虚假信息相互加强。

In Hungary, the governing Fidesz party has all but consolidated its control over the media, and has built a parallel reality where government messages and disinformation reinforce each other.

在塞尔维亚,合作进程尚未完全成功,但恐吓和骚扰环境阻碍了记者的日常工作。

In Serbia, the process of co-optation has not yet been fully successful, but an environment of intimidation and harassment inhibits journalists’ day-to-day work.

除了这两个国家之外,对媒体缺乏信任,假新闻大量涌现,政治两极分化加剧,以及缺乏有利可图的商业模式,所有这些都削弱了新闻自由,为不怀好意的政治行为者的合作选举奠定了基础。

Beyond these two countries, a lack of trust in the media, the onslaught of fake news, increasing political polarization, and the lack of a profitable business model all grind down press freedom, laying the groundwork for co-optation by ill-intentioned political actors.

2018年4月,匈牙利的维克托·奥布尔和他的青年民主联盟赢得了议会的第三次绝对多数,赢得了49% 的选票,打败了支离破碎的反对派。一年前,塞尔维亚总理亚历山大·武契奇在竞选总统的过程中赢得了彻底的胜利,在第一轮投票中获得了55% 的选票,在塞尔维亚历史上第一次抢在了总统决选的前面。

In April 2018, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party won their third parliamentary supermajority, securing 49 percent of the vote and trouncing the fragmented opposition. A year earlier, Serbian prime minister Aleksandar Vučić won an outright victory in his bid for that country’s presidency, taking 55 percent of the vote in the first round and preempting the need for a presidential runoff for the first time in Serbia’s history.

奥布恩和武一都已经取消了制度上的制衡,将权力集中在自己手中;他们还得益于欧洲的支持和国内无效的反对。但正是他们对媒体的控制支撑了他们的成功。

Orbán and Vučić have both moved to dismantle institutional checks and balances and centralize power in their own hands; they have also benefited from European support and ineffectual domestic opposition. But it is their domination of the media that has underwritten their success.

在过去几年里,出现了一个新的工具箱,脆弱民主国家的非自由派领导人利用这个工具箱来控制和拉拢媒体,目的是确保他们继续掌权。这个工具箱漏掉了诸如审查制度、武力或者直接恐吓记者之类的策略。相反,它包含一组用于利用结构条件的方法。一旦成功的合作发生,媒体作为支撑当权者的基石被纳入系统。

Over the past few years, a new toolbox has emerged that illiberal leaders in fragile democracies deploy to control and co-opt the press, with the aim of ensuring their stay in power. This toolbox leaves out tactics like censorship, force, or outright intimidation of journalists. Instead, it contains a collection of methods used to harness structural conditions. Once successful co-optation has taken place, media are incorporated into the system as building blocks that prop up those in power.

拉拢媒体的"非自由工具箱"包含了各种法律、法外和经济策略,用于对批评性媒体施加压力,以及支持友好媒体。

The illiberal toolbox for co-opting the media contains a variety of legal, extralegal, and economic strategies for applying pressure to critical outlets, and supporting friendly ones.

匈牙利是这种合作取得成功的主要例子。虽然武一世和他的盟友还没有巩固对塞尔维亚媒体的控制,但他们正在追随 Orbán 的脚步。在自由之家最新的《世界自由报告》中,这两个国家都从"免费"下降到"部分免费"。[1]

Hungary serves as the primary example where this co-optation has been successful. And while Vučić and his allies have yet to consolidate control over Serbia’s media, they are following in Orbán’s footsteps. Both countries declined from Free to Partly Free in Freedom House’s most recent Freedom in the World report.[1]

但是,不仅仅是匈牙利和塞尔维亚的媒体受到恶意政治领导人的支持,可能会威胁到民主。在全球范围内,独立媒体促进基于充分信息的意见的公众讨论和政治参与。这些做法对民主至关重要,而今天它们正处于紧张状态。虽然公共领域在新千年呈指数级增长,但这种扩张也带来了混乱、经济混乱、两极分化,以及对支撑民主的机构日益增长的不信任。在这些机构中,媒体尤其受到胁迫。

But it is not just Hungary and Serbia where media co-optation by ill-intentioned political leaders can threaten democracy. Globally, independent media foster public discussion and political participation that is grounded in well-informed opinions. These practices are essential to democracy, and today they are under strain. While the public sphere has expanded exponentially in the new millennium, this expansion has brought with it confusion, economic disruption, polarization, and an increasing level of distrust toward the institutions that underpin democracy. Of these institutions, the media are under particular duress.

狭隘的工具箱尤其有效,因为它利用了当今媒体环境的弱点,包括对媒体信任的下降和旧商业模式的危机。它是逐渐地、悄悄地发生的,过了一个阶段就难以逆转了。这使得许多国家的媒体变得脆弱,进而威胁到民主的根本基础,破坏了对不受约束的政府权力的必要制约。

The illiberal toolbox is particularly effective because it exploits the weaknesses of today’s media environment, including the decline of trust in the press, and the crisis of the old business model. It takes place gradually and stealthily, and after a point it is difficult to reverse. This makes the media in many countries vulnerable—and by extension, threatens the very basis of democracy by undermining an essential check on unbridled government power.

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工具箱

The toolbox

倾斜市场

Tilting the market

施加财政和经济压力是拉拢人才的有效手段。这种技术利用了不断变化的媒体业务模式的优势,这种模式已经使许多媒体网点陷入资金短缺。各国政府也可以貌似合理地否认对这种策略的效果负有责任,因为它依赖于市场参与者和据称不受政府控制的机构。

The application of financial and economic pressure is an effective means for co-opting outlets. This technique takes advantage of the changing media business model, which has left many outlets cash-strapped. Governments can also plausibly deny responsibility for this strategy’s effects, as it relies on players on the market and in institutions supposedly outside the government’s control.

匈牙利青年民主联盟完善了利用和滥用市场力量来接管媒体的做法,并因此扩大了其政治权力。从2016年开始,媒体在亲政府手中几乎完全整合的速度加快。那一年,领先的日报《 n pszabads g 》在一夜之间被恶意关闭,其出版商被卖给了 l rinc m sz ros ——一个从煤气装配工转行成为寡头的 Orbán 童年好友。[2]和匈牙利的大多数其他媒体一样,pszabads g 一直在财务上举步维艰,但作为该国阅读量最高的日报,它是少数几家真正有机会扭亏为盈的出版物之一。

Hungary’s Fidesz has perfected the use and abuse of market forces to take over media, and has extended its political power as a consequence. The near total consolidation of the media in progovernment hands accelerated starting in 2016. That year, the leading daily Népszabadság was shut down overnight in a hostile maneuver, and its publisher sold to Lőrinc Mészáros, a gasfitter-turned-oligarch and childhood friend of Orbán.[2] Népszabadság, like most other outlets in Hungary, had been struggling financially, but as the country’s most-read daily it was among the few publications that had a realistic chance of turning its fortunes around.

后来,m sz ros 通过直接或间接收购电视频道、日报、周刊、在线媒体以及匈牙利所有的地区性报纸,建立了一个媒体帝国。[3]此后,他成为了匈牙利第二大富豪,由于他的政治关系,他的财富在三年内增加了300倍。然而,在2018年底,m sz ros 和其他亲政府的商人突然决定是时候放弃他们的股份了,他们向亲政府的综合媒体 KESMA 免费提供所有的出口。Kesma 统一了400多种媒体产品,展示了匈牙利亲政府媒体令人惊讶的统治地位。[5]

Mészáros later built a media empire through the direct or indirect acquisition of television channels, dailies, weeklies, online media, and all of Hungary’s regional newspapers.[3] He has since become Hungary’s second-richest man, increasing his wealth 300 times in the span of three years thanks to his political connections.[4] At the end of 2018, however, Mészáros and other government-friendly businessmen suddenly decided it was time to give up their holdings, offering all outlets for free to KESMA, a progovernment media conglomerate. KESMA unifies more than 400 media products, and exhibits in plain sight the astonishing domination of government-friendly media in Hungary.[5]

匈牙利出现的所有权合并程度尚未在塞尔维亚形成。然而,最近的一次私有化运动把几个出口交给了与执政党塞尔维亚进步党联盟(SNS)关系友好的所有者。[6]与政府关系密切的人也会进行个人收购。2018年底,SNS 一位高级官员的兄弟购买了两个全国性的电视频道;他还拥有三个门户网站,一个广播电台和九个有线频道。[7]

The degree of ownership consolidation seen in Hungary has yet to take hold in Serbia. However, a recent privatization drive handed several outlets to owners friendly with the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).[6] Individual acquisitions by people close to the government occur as well. In late 2018, the brother of a top SNS official purchased two national television channels; he also owns three online portals, a radio station, and nine cable channels.[7]

在塞尔维亚,一种更令人担忧的财政压力形式是税务当局对媒体的骚扰。2017年,每周一次的 Vrjanske novine 接受每日访问,恰逢其发表了对前税务机关负责人的采访;其所有者最终宣布该报无法再承受压力,于是停止运营。2018年,以在塞尔维亚南部进行批评性报道而闻名的新闻网站 Juzne Vesti,遭到了五年来长达五个月的税务调查。[8]

An even more worrying form of financial pressure in Serbia is the harassment of media by the tax authorities. In 2017, the weekly Vrjanske novine received daily visits, which coincided with its publication of an interview with a former head of the tax authority; its owner ultimately announced that the paper could no longer withstand the pressure, and it ceased operations. In 2018, the news site Juzne Vesti, known for its critical reporting in the south of Serbia, was subjected to its fifth months-long tax investigation in five years.[8]

行使法律

Wielding the law

政府有时制定法律和规章来恐吓或干涉新闻工作者,或榨干他们的资源。但狭隘的"工具箱"中很少有像审查制度这样的直接强制性法律压制手段,这会立即招致邻国民主国家和媒体监督机构的谴责。相反,正是技术法律的政治化实施给独立媒体施加了压力。

Governments occasionally deploy laws and regulations to intimidate or interfere with journalists, or to drain them of their resources. But the illiberal toolbox rarely contains instruments for the sort of blunt-force legal repression, such as censorship, that would prompt immediate condemnation by neighboring democracies and media monitors. Instead, it is the politicized implementation of technical laws that puts pressure on independent outlets.

例如,匈牙利政府于2011年成立的媒体机构,拥有大量忠于青民盟(Fidesz)的成员,它利用自己的权力,有选择地拒绝向独立或倾向于反对派的媒体发放许可证。2012年,广电总局与左翼的克鲁布拉迪奥频道(Klubradio channel)展开了一场旷日持久的法律斗争,在两年多的时间里拒绝向该频道颁发许可证,并拒绝执行法院对该频道有利的判决。[9]2016年,监管机构再次发起罢工,当时该机构拒绝延长美国最受欢迎的广播电台——第一调频电台(Class FM)的广播执照。在一场旷日持久的官司之后,2018年,一家亲政府机构获得了第三频道的频率。[10]这一决定对匈牙利的电台市场是一个重大打击,使该国只剩下政府下属的国家电台。

For example, Hungary’s media authority, set up by the government in 2011 and stacked with Fidesz loyalists, has used its powers to selectively refuse licenses to independent or opposition-leaning outlets. In 2012, the authority initiated what became a lengthy legal battle with the left-wing Klubradio channel, denying it a license and refusing to implement court decisions in the station’s favor over a period of more than two years.[9] Regulators struck again in 2016, when the authority refused to renew the broadcasting license of the country’s most popular radio station, Class FM. After a protracted court case, Class FM’s frequency was awarded to a progovernment outlet in 2018.[10] The decision was a significant blow to Hungary’s radio market, leaving the country with only government-affiliated national stations.

同样,塞尔维亚也通过对法律的政治化操纵破坏了新闻自由。诽谤已经非刑罪化,该国的媒体法在其他方面符合国际义务。但是政客们继续提起昂贵的诽谤诉讼,要求高昂的民事赔偿。例如,在2018年初,没有任职档案的部长涅纳德·波波维(Nenad popov)在一个月内对调查门户网站 KRIK 提起了四起诉讼,每起诉讼要求赔偿100万第纳尔(合9500美元)。[11]

Similarly, Serbia has also undermined press freedom through politicized manipulation of the law. Defamation has been decriminalized, and the country’s media laws are otherwise in line with international obligations. But politicians have continued to file costly defamation suits seeking exorbitant civil damages. In early 2018, for example, minister without portfolio Nenad Popović sued the investigative portal KRIK in four separate lawsuits in the space of one month, for 1 million dinars ($9,500) each.[11]

虽然塞尔维亚的媒体监管机构没有像在匈牙利那样公开表现出对独立媒体的敌意,但他们缺乏能力来执行塞尔维亚在其他方面制定得很好的媒体法律。电子媒体监管局只有部分人员,业务运转不良,尤其是在竞选期间未能突出执政党在媒体领域的主导地位。2019年2月,两家电视台播放了一段嘲笑反对派领导人的华丽视频,尽管塞尔维亚法律禁止在选举之外做政治广告,但这段视频首次出现在执政党 SNS 的 YouTube 频道上,塞尔维亚未能采取行动。[12]

And while Serbia’s media regulators do not display overt hostility to independent media as in Hungary, they lack the capacity to implement Serbia’s otherwise well-formulated media laws. The Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media is only partially staffed and is operationally dysfunctional, having notably failed to call out governing party dominance of the media landscape during election campaigns. In February 2019, it failed to act when two television stations aired a slick video that mocked opposition leaders, and that had first appeared on the governing SNS’s YouTube channel, even though Serbia’s laws prohibit political advertising outside elections.[12]

让他们保持队形,保持警惕

Keeping them in line and on their toes

骚扰也可以采取更直接的形式,如人身攻击和威胁。但是反自由的工具箱里通常不会有凶残的攻击。相反,政治领导人发出信号,表明对记者的敌意是可以允许的,包括在记者受到攻击后退下来,而不是坚持及时、有效地采取后续行动,或者部署代理人,使他们的工作失去合法性。通过这种方式,他们营造了一种恐惧和有罪不罚的气氛,让记者知道对权力的审查充满了风险。

Harassment can also take more direct forms, such as physical attacks and threats. But thuggish attacks are generally absent from the illiberal toolbox. Instead, political leaders signal that hostility toward journalists is permissible, including by standing down in the wake of aggression against them rather than insisting on a timely and effective follow-up, or by deploying proxies to delegitimize their work. In this way, they cultivate an atmosphere of fear and impunity in which journalists know that scrutiny of power is fraught with risk.

与匈牙利相比,塞尔维亚的媒体环境对记者的日常工作要严苛得多。来自政客和网络账户的诽谤和言语骚扰无处不在,而且对政府友好的小报经常发起攻击。媒体工作者经常被称为"叛徒"和"外国雇佣兵" 2018年初,一个记者协会的大门上贴满了传单,上面写着"悲惨的塞尔维亚敌人协会";与此同时,一些记者声称他们处于国家安全部门的监视之下。[13]2018年末,一位70岁的调查记者的家被纵火焚烧。那次袭击极其恶劣,足以引发回应ーー一名执政党官员因涉嫌下令袭击而被拘留并被剥夺职务。然而,如此严重、显然是有预谋的袭击事件的发生突出表明,塞尔维亚普遍认为独立记者的行动是自担风险的。

Serbia’s media environment is much tougher on journalists doing their day-to-day work than is Hungary’s. Smears and verbal harassment from politicians and online accounts are omnipresent, and attacks by government-friendly tabloids are a regular occurrence. Media workers are frequently called “traitors” and “foreign mercenaries.” In early 2018, a journalist association’s front door was plastered with flyers that read, “Miserable Association of Enemies of Serbia;” meanwhile, some journalists claim they are under surveillance by state security.[13] In late 2018, the home of a 70-year-old investigative journalist was torched. That attack was egregious enough to prompt a response—a ruling party official was detained and stripped of his position for allegedly ordering it. However, that such a severe, apparently premeditated attack took place at all underscored the widespread perception in Serbia that independent journalists operate at their own risk.

尽管直接骚扰在匈牙利很少见,但政府确保记者知道自己的位置。2019年由 orb n 举办的新闻发布会因多年来首次邀请批评性记者参加而引人注目。此外,自2007年以来,orb n 就没有接受过匈牙利最受关注的在线新闻网站 Index.hu 的采访,并称其为"假新闻" 政府发言人还经常参与旨在损害记者信誉的攻击;2018年,他在 Twitter 上称一名为外国媒体工作的记者为"卑鄙的社会正义战士"。

Though outright harassment is rare in Hungary, the government makes sure journalists know their place. A 2019 press conference by Orbán was notable for its inclusion of critical journalists for the first time in years. In addition, Orbán has not given an interview to Hungary’s most-read online news site, Index.hu, since 2007, and has referred to it as “fake news.” The government spokesperson also regularly engages in attacks meant to damage journalists’ credibility; in 2018, he called a journalist working for a foreign outlet a “despicable SJW [social justice warrior]” on Twitter.

削减支票

Cutting checks

建立和支持一个亲政府的媒体帝国,是非自由主义工具箱中的一个重要策略,就像对批评性媒体施加压力一样。这种支持可以采取多种形式,包括国家广告合同的优惠授予、特殊融资计划和税务当局的优惠待遇。

Establishing and supporting a progovernment media empire is as important a tactic in the illiberal toolbox as pressuring critical media. Such support can take many forms, including the preferential awarding of state advertising contracts, special financing schemes, and privileged treatment by tax authorities.

在匈牙利,国家广告的使用和滥用已经重塑了媒体市场。尽管州广告仅占所有广告的六分之一左右,但在过去几年中,州广告呈指数增长。[14]2018年,州政府的广告支出是十年前前几届政府的五倍,其中85% 的合同授予了对政府友好的公司。自2014年以来,一些新的亲政府渠道已经建立起来,在几年的时间里,利润增长了三到四倍,而且没有任何迹象表明受众在增加。亲政府周刊 figyel 在2018年公布了一份被政府视为"索罗斯雇佣兵"(指亿万富翁、慈善家乔治·索罗斯[ George Soros ])的名单。自2016年被政府盟友接管以来,该周刊从政府广告中获得的收入增加了10倍;到2018年,其广告收入的四分之三来自政府合同。[15]

In Hungary, the use and abuse of state advertising has reshaped the media market. While state advertising takes up only about one-sixth of all advertising, it has grown exponentially in the past few years.[14] In 2018, state ad spending was five times more than under previous governments a decade earlier, with a whopping 85 percent of contracts awarded to government-friendly companies. Since 2014, several new progovernment outlets have been set up, with some tripling or quadrupling their profits in the span of a few years without any indication of an increased audience. The progovernment weekly Figyelő, which published a list of government critics in 2018 deemed “Soros mercenaries” (referring to the billionaire and philanthropist George Soros), has increased its income from government advertising tenfold since its takeover by a government ally in 2016; by 2018, three-fourths of its ad money came from state contracts.[15]

国家广告在支持塞尔维亚亲政府媒体方面也发挥着重要作用,政府还可以利用其他创新方法向友好媒体输送资金。通过联合融资项目,国家出资帮助为公众利益服务的媒体项目,已被用于向亲政府机构拨款。欧洲联盟委员会在其2018年关于塞尔维亚的报告中强调了这种滥用,该报告还批评了共同供资程序的不透明性。[16]友好的网点也受益于选择性的税收执法,而较小的关键网点则受到严厉的处罚。[17]

State advertising plays an important role in supporting progovernment media in Serbia as well, and there are additional innovative methods available for the government to channel money to friendly media. Project co-financing, through which the state chips in to help media projects that serve the public interest, has been used to allocate money to progovernment outlets. This abuse was highlighted by the European Commission in its 2018 report on Serbia, which also criticized the nontransparent nature of the co-financing processes.[16] Friendly outlets have also benefitted from selective tax enforcement, while smaller, critical outlets have suffered harsh penalties.[17]

建立一个平行的现实

Building a parallel reality

最后,建立一个忠诚的媒体帝国还不够ーー媒体必须以战略的方式加以利用,而匈牙利和塞尔维亚的狭隘领导人是构建宏大叙事和制造新现实的大师。用自己的政治信息淹没媒体版图,让当权者主宰政治议程,转移公众对敏感问题的讨论,最终控制和操纵公共领域。

Finally, creating a loyal media empire is not enough—the outlets have to be put to use in a strategic way, and the illiberal leaders of Hungary and Serbia are masters of constructing a grand narrative and crafting a new reality. Flooding the media landscape with their own political messages allows those in power to dominate the political agenda, divert public discussion away from sensitive issues, and ultimately control and manipulate the public sphere.

公共媒体是这个叙事建筑的重要组成部分。在塞尔维亚和匈牙利,国有或国家控制的新闻机构使私营竞争对手相形见绌。作为私有化运动的一部分,塞尔维亚的 Tanjug 通讯社被正式关闭,但它仍然通过公共资金的支持继续运作。[18]匈牙利国家新闻通讯社 MTI 的市场主导地位是通过补贴的低价格得到保证的。[19]尽管塞尔维亚和匈牙利的公共广播公司一直支持当权的政府,但近年来,这种支持的基调和性质发生了巨大变化。以前他们或多或少是带有轻微偏见的专业渠道,而现在他们是政府的喉舌。

The public media are an important part of this narrative building. State-owned or state-controlled news agencies dwarf their private competitors in both Serbia and Hungary. Serbia’s Tanjug news agency was formally closed as part of a privatization drive, yet it continues to operate through support from public coffers.[18] The market domination of Hungary’s state newswire, MTI, is guaranteed through its subsidized low price.[19] And while public broadcasters in Serbia and Hungary have always been supportive of governments in power, the tone and nature of that support has dramatically shifted in recent years. Whereas previously they were more or less professional outlets with a slight bias, now they are government mouthpieces.

在匈牙利,政府和亲政府的媒体已经成为平行的现实叙事的主要来源。2018年初,亲政府的日报《 Magyar id k 》称,有2000名"雇佣军"在匈牙利为索罗斯工作;这个数字似乎源自一个神秘组织实施的恶意设圈套行动,目的是诋毁索罗斯所属的非政府组织,后来奥布尔本人又重复了这个数字。[20]索罗斯还出现在许多其他虚假新闻中,包括与政府关系友好的 TV2在2017年刊登的一条标题:"索罗斯差点杀了自己的母亲。" 此外,这家公共广播公司的员工承认,他们收到了总理办公室关于如何报道移民等敏感问题的指示。[21]2019年,一段泄露的视频记录显示,国家广播公司的一名记者指导亲政府的专家说些什么。[22]

In Hungary, the government and progovernment media have turned into a major source of parallel reality narratives. In early 2018, the progovernment daily Magyar Idők claimed that 2,000 “mercenaries” were working for Soros in Hungary; the number—which appeared to originate with a malicious sting operation conducted by a shadowy group and aimed at discrediting Soros-affiliated NGOs—was later repeated by Orbán himself.[20] Soros has featured in numerous other false news items, including a headline the government-friendly TV2 ran in 2017 that read, “Soros would have killed his own mother.” Moreover, employees of the public broadcaster have admitted to receiving instructions from the prime minister’s offices on how to cover sensitive issues, such as migration.[21] In 2019, a leaked video recording showed a reporter from the state broadcaster instructing a progovernment expert on what to say.[22]

除了通过问题框架和议程设置来识别"敌人",狭隘的工具箱还包含积极叙事建设的元素。塞尔维亚总统武一世在与友好媒体交谈时是不知疲倦的。在2018年地方选举之前,关于总统、 SNS 和政府的报道的播出时间是其余23份选举名单加起来的四倍。[23]

Besides identifying the “enemy” through issue framing and agenda setting, the illiberal toolbox also contains elements of positive narrative building. Serbia’s President Vučić is indefatigable when it comes to talking to friendly media. Ahead of the 2018 local elections, reporting on the president, the SNS, and the government received four times more airtime than did the remaining 23 electoral lists combined.[23]

准备出口的模型

A model ready for export

在塞尔维亚,加入欧盟的前景——随之而来的是越来越严格的法治监督——仍然可以为变革提供动力。但是,一旦发生了成功的合作,就像在匈牙利那样,就很难扭转局面。在巩固了匈牙利的媒体之后,青民盟现在正在采取措施扩大其跨国影响力:2018年,该党的盟友在马其顿和斯洛文尼亚收购了媒体,2019年初,在伦敦创建了一家英文新闻通讯社,显然是为了传播奥布赖恩的狭隘议程。[25]也许不足为奇的是,第一家引用新电报的非匈牙利通讯社是塞尔维亚的 Tanjug。

In Serbia, the prospect of EU membership, which brings with it increasingly stringent rule-of-law monitoring, can still provide an incentive for change. But once successful co-optation has taken place, as in Hungary, it is very difficult to reverse. And after consolidating media in Hungary, Fidesz is now taking steps to expand its influence transnationally: party allies acquired media in Macedonia and Slovenia in 2018,[24] and early 2019 saw the creation of an English-language newswire based in London apparently established to spread Orbán’s illiberal agenda.[25] Perhaps not surprisingly, the first non-Hungarian news agency to quote the new wire was Serbia’s Tanjug.

虽然狭隘的合作并不能根除独立的新闻业,但它利用了制度上的弱点和市场条件,严重限制了它的影响范围和影响力。媒体消费者仍然可以接触到由小规模、具有公众意识的记者团队撰写的高质量新闻报道,但鉴于政府对媒体版图的控制日益加强,这些媒体正在进行一场艰苦的战斗。狭隘的工具箱之所以奏效,是因为它阻碍和模糊了独立报道,将无限的资源投入到一个忠诚的媒体巨头的创造和维护中,并确保记者知道他们在新体系中的位置。

While illiberal co-optation does not eradicate independent journalism, it harnesses institutional weaknesses and market conditions to severely limit its reach and impact. Media consumers can still access quality journalism produced by small, public-minded teams of reporters, but in light of increasing government control of the media landscape, these outlets are fighting an uphill battle. The illiberal toolbox works because it discourages and obscures independent reporting, funnels limitless resources into the creation and maintenance of a loyal media juggernaut, and makes sure journalists know their place in the new system.

无论是在中欧还是在欧洲之外,新闻界都在遭受信任危机和旧商业模式的危机。在美国和欧洲,随着网络新闻的传播和传统广告市场的崩溃而带来的深刻变化,已经使得媒体和业主争先恐后地通过优先发布引起愤怒的内容来获取利润。假新闻和虚假信息日益突出,进一步加剧了政治两极分化,造成了信任度下降的循环。在美国,不到一半的人口说他们信任媒体;这个数字在意大利和英国大约是三分之一,在土耳其和俄罗斯只有四分之一。[26]对媒体的信任度似乎与对政府的信任度同步变化ーー这是当前危机的部分原因。[27]

Both in Central Europe and outside it, the press is suffering from a crisis of trust and a crisis of the old business model. In the United States and in Europe, the profound change that came with the spread of online news and the collapse of the traditional advertising market has sent outlets and owners scrambling for profits by prioritizing content that spurs outrage. The growing prominence of fake news and disinformation has further fed into political polarization, contributing to a cycle of decreasing trust. In the United States, fewer than half the population say they trust the media; the figure is around one-third in Italy and the United Kingdom, and only one-fourth in Turkey or Russia.[26] Rates of trust in the media seem to move together with those of trust in government—explaining part of the current crisis.[27]

缺乏信任、大量虚假信息和小报散布的半真半假的消息,以及一个盈利商业模式的难以捉摸,所有这些都削弱了媒体自由,为潜在的非自由主义接管打下了基础。当狡猾而有才华的政治领导人带着合适的议程出现时,民主政体在压力下屈服可能只是个时间问题。

The lack of trust, the onslaught of disinformation and tabloidized half-truths, and the elusiveness of a profitable business model all grind down media freedom and prepare the ground for potential illiberal takeover. When crafty and talented political leaders emerge with an appropriate agenda, it could be simply a matter of time before democracies buckle under the pressure.

希望之光

Rays of hope

但并非一切都是黯淡的。正面的例子已经表明,需求方面已经开始发生变化,因为越来越多的人愿意为他们认为有价值的新闻付费,供应方面也是如此,记者们推出了专注于高质量新闻分析的创新模式。民主党政府也在迎头赶上,加入了这场辩论——尽管有时有些尴尬——提议监管机构介入,以解决围绕假新闻和虚假信息的棘手问题。

But not all is bleak. Positive examples already suggest that a change has started on the demand side, as more people are willing to pay for news that they find valuable, as well as on the supply side, with journalists launching innovative models that concentrate on quality news analysis. Democratic governments are also catching up and have moved into the debate—though sometimes somewhat awkwardly—proposing regulatory involvement to tackle thorny issues around fake news and disinformation.

民众和立法者正在抗议媒体滥用权力,尤其是公共广播公司的滥用权力。在塞尔维亚,抗议者在2019年3月袭击了公共广播公司 RTS 的总部,因为 RTS 没有报道早前的抗议活动,并且拒绝向反对派领导人提供广播时间。在匈牙利,反对派议员在2018年12月占领了国家广播公司的总部,并得到了外面示威者的支持。

Citizens and lawmakers are protesting media abuses, particularly those by public broadcasters. In Serbia, protesters in March 2019 stormed the headquarters of the public broadcaster RTS after it failed to report on earlier protests and denied airtime to opposition leaders. In Hungary, opposition lawmakers in December 2018 occupied the headquarters of the state broadcaster, with the support of demonstrators outside.

民主国家必须努力建立一个媒体环境,优先重视独立和准确的报道,并保证各阶层人民都能获得高质量的信息。这不仅可以防止非自由的合作,而且还可以支撑机构,加强和支持国内的民主。

Democratic countries must work to build a media environment that prioritizes independent and accurate reporting and guarantees access to quality information for all segments of the population. This will not only prevent illiberal co-optation, but will also shore up institutions and strengthen and support democracy at home.

建议

Recommendations

以下对民主国家决策者的建议将有助于反击恶意政治行为者试图利用媒体的行为:

The following recommendations for policymakers in democratic nations will help counter efforts by ill-intentioned political actors to co-opt media:

承认并大声反对狭隘的策略。旨在破坏合法新闻业的虚假断言,包括媒体存在偏见或是反对派的一部分,或是独立的新闻报道和揭露不当行为的文章构成了安全威胁的说法,往往只被表面接受。来自民主国家的官员应该对这种狭隘的策略保持警惕,仔细研究虚假声明,并利用他们的发现来驳斥它们。民主国家的政策制定者和高级官员应继续大声疾呼,反对那些对媒体自由产生负面影响的法律、做法和言论。

Recognize and speak out against illiberal tactics. False assertions aimed at damaging legitimate journalism—including claims that the media are biased or part of the opposition, or that independent journalism and articles uncovering wrongdoing present a security threat—are often accepted at face value. Officials from democratic countries should stay on alert for such illiberal tactics, carefully research false claims, and use their findings to refute them. Policymakers and high-level officials in democratic countries should continue to speak out against laws, practices, and rhetoric that negatively impact media freedom.

密切关注脆弱的媒体市场,防止不自由的合作。传统商业模式所面临的危机影响了全球几乎所有的媒体市场,但影响并不一致。最近的民粹主义热潮,再加上媒体市场存在系统性问题(例如罗马尼亚或意大利所见的政治和经济利益的深度交织) ,这些国家尤其容易受到非自由主义合作的影响。政策制定者应该识别并公布从非自由主义工具箱中取得的方法,并敦促民主政府打击在脆弱市场中使用这些方法的行为。在适用的情况下,外国援助应包括努力支持新闻自由。

Closely watch vulnerable media markets to prevent illiberal co-optation. The crisis facing the traditional business model has affected practically all media markets globally, but the impact has not been uniform. Countries where the recent populist upsurge is coupled with a media market that suffers from systemic problems—such as the deep intertwining of political and economic interests as seen in Romania or Italy—are particularly vulnerable to illiberal co-optation. Policymakers should identify and expose the methods taken from the illiberal toolbox and urge democratic governments to combat their use in vulnerable markets. Foreign assistance, where applicable, should include efforts to shore up press freedom.

在政治领导人控制媒体的国家向记者提供有针对性的援助。随着采访工作的进展,当地记者反对政府统治的难度越来越大。民主政府和媒体资助者需要积极重新参与,以制止这种恶化,并维护当地优秀新闻业的孵化器。在匈牙利和塞尔维亚,重新接触需要具有战略意义:财政支持和赠款方案应优先考虑长期复原力,而不是仅仅奖励最精简和最具创造性的解决方案。决定支持这些国家媒体的私人基金会应该咨询当地的消息来源,以免他们的资金落入国家控制的机构手中。

Provide tailored assistance to journalists in countries where the political leadership has co-opted the media. As co-optation progresses, it becomes increasingly difficult for local journalists to counter government domination. Democratic governments and media funders need to actively reengage to halt this deterioration and preserve local incubators of good journalism. Both in Hungary and Serbia, the reengagement needs to be strategic: financial support and grant programs should prioritize long-term resilience, rather than solely rewarding the leanest and most creative solutions. Private foundations deciding to support media in these countries should consult local sources to keep their money from ending up with state-controlled outfits.

反对战略性地使用法律诉讼和针对媒体的监管行动。政治领导人越来越多地滥用法律,依靠监管当局的敌对决定来压制和恐吓调查记者和其他批评者。但这不仅仅是一种狭隘的策略ーー针对公众参与的战略性诉讼正成为压制全球批评声音的一种普遍工具。虽然一些国家有反记者招待会的法律,但法官往往不熟悉这种做法及其越来越多地用于对付记者。决策者应进一步通过地方反 slapp 法律,并在新闻自由组织的帮助下,对司法机构和地方记者进行有关这些法律的教育。政策制定者还应监督媒体监管机构的决定,以确保媒体自由不会受到敌意技术手段的压制。

Counter the strategic use of lawsuits and regulatory action against media. Political leaders are increasingly abusing laws and relying on hostile decisions by regulatory authorities to silence and intimidate investigative journalists and other critics. But it is not just an illiberal tactic—Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are becoming a widespread tool to silence critical voices globally. While anti-SLAPP laws exist in several countries, judges are often unfamiliar with the practice and its increasing use against journalists. Policymakers should further the adoption of local anti-SLAPP laws and, with the help of press freedom organizations, educate both the judiciary and local journalists about them. Policymakers should also monitor decisions implemented by media regulators to ensure that media freedoms are not being squelched through hostile technical means.

脚注

Footnotes

自由之家,2019年2月5日, https://freedomhouse.org/report/Freedom-World/Freedom-World-2019。

[1]“Freedom in the World 2019,” Freedom House, February 5, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019.

[2]"一份匈牙利报纸使政府难堪。几天后,它被关闭了,华盛顿邮报,2016年10月20日, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/a-hungarian-newspaper-embarrasses-the-government-Days-later-it-is-shut-down/2016/10/20/3f9d6b24-9494-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html。

[2]“A Hungarian newspaper embarrasses the government. Days later, it is shut down,” Washington Post, October 20, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/a-hungarian-newspaper-embarrasses-the-government-days-later-it-is-shut-down/2016/10/20/3f9d6b24-9494-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html.

路透社,2017年3月3日,《 https://www.Reuters.com/article/us-hungary-media-oligarch/Orban-ally-buys-stakes-in-owner-of-Hungarian-media-group-iduskbn16a1pe 道:"奥尔班联盟购买匈牙利传媒集团所有者的股份。"。

[3]“Orban ally buys stakes in owner of Hungarian media group,” Reuters, March 3, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-media-oligarch/orban-ally-buys-stakes-in-owner-of-hungarian-media-group-idUSKBN16A1PE.

2018年5月7日,《 https://Index.hu/gazdasag/2018/05/07/meszaros_lorinc_zuckerberg_vagyongyarapodas_vilag_leggazdagabb_embere_reloaded/ 。

[4]Mészáros Tamás, “Mészáros Lőrinc vagyongyarapodása kisebb matematikai csoda,” Index.hu, May 7, 2018, https://index.hu/gazdasag/2018/05/07/meszaros_lorinc_zuckerberg_vagyongyarapodas_vilag_leggazdagabb_embere_reloaded/.

[5] m rton Bede,"一个匈牙利媒体怪兽统治着他们所有人,"国际新闻研究所,2018年12月12日, https://ipi.media/One-Hungarian-media-monster-to-rule-them-all/ 。

[5]Márton Bede, “One Hungarian media monster to rule them all,” International Press Institute, December 12, 2018, https://ipi.media/one-hungarian-media-monster-to-rule-them-all/.

[6]"谁拥有塞尔维亚的媒体?" 无国界记者,2017年6月17日, https://rsf.org/en/news/who-owns-media-serbia。

[6]“Who owns the Media in Serbia?” Reporters Without Borders, June 17, 2017, https://rsf.org/en/news/who-owns-media-serbia.

[7]"执政党高官的兄弟买下了两家国家电视公司,"Slavko uruvija 基金会,2018年12月16日, https://www.slavkocuruvijafondacija.rs/en/Brother-of-high-ranking-ruling-party-official-buys-two-national-television-companies/ 。

[7]“Brother of high-ranking ruling party official buys two national television companies,” Slavko Ćuruvija Foundation, December 16, 2018, https://www.slavkocuruvijafondacija.rs/en/brother-of-high-ranking-ruling-party-official-buys-two-national-television-companies/.

[8]拉扎拉·马林科维:"塞尔维亚的税务检查是否被用作限制媒体的工具?" 审查指数,2018年5月3日, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2018/05/serbia-tax-inspections-curb-press/ 。

[8]Lazara Marinković, “Are Serbia’s tax inspections being used as a tool to curb the press?” Index on Censorship, May 3, 2018, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2018/05/serbia-tax-inspections-curb-press/.

人权观察》 ,2012年8月22日,《 https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/22/Clubbing-Klubradio ,莉迪亚·加尔,Klubradio 俱乐部。

[9]Lydia Gall, The Clubbing of Klubradio, Human Rights Watch, August 22, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/22/clubbing-klubradio.

[10] Szalay d niel,p nteken indul j korm nyk zeli di a Class FM hely,24. 胡,2018年6月11日, https://24.hu/media/2018/06/11/penteken-indul-az-uj-kormanykozeli-radio-a-class-fm-helyen/ 。

[10]Szalay Dániel, Pénteken indul az új kormányközeli rádió a Class FM helyén, 24.hu, June 11, 2018, https://24.hu/media/2018/06/11/penteken-indul-az-uj-kormanykozeli-radio-a-class-fm-helyen/.

[11]"塞尔维亚政府部长对调查性新闻编辑室提起4项诉讼",Slavko uruvija 基金会,2018年1月31日, https://www.slavkocuruvijafondacija.rs/en/Serbian-Government-Minister-Files-Four-Lawsuits-against-Investigative-Newsroom/ 。

[11]“Serbian Government Minister Files Four Lawsuits against Investigative Newsroom,” Slavko Ćuruvija Foundation, January 31, 2018, https://www.slavkocuruvijafondacija.rs/en/serbian-government-minister-files-four-lawsuits-against-investigative-newsroom/.

欧安组织 / 民主人权办选举评估团报告,塞尔维亚,2017年4月2日,总统选举,"欧洲安全与合作组织民主制度和人权办公室,2017年6月8日, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/322166?download=true。

[12]“OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report, Republic of Serbia, Presidential Election, 2 April 2017,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, June 8, 2017, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/322166?download=true.

[13] Francesco Martino,"The Trouble Brewing in Serbia:KRIK's Editor Talks Media and Power,"全球调查报导网络,2019年3月22日, https://gijn.org/2019/03/22/The-Trouble-Brewing-in-Serbia-kriks-Editor-Talks-Media-and-Power/ 。

[13]Francesco Martino, “The Trouble Brewing in Serbia: KRIK’s Editor Talks Media and Power,” Global Investigative Journalism Network, March 22, 2019, https://gijn.org/2019/03/22/the-trouble-brewing-in-serbia-kriks-editor-talks-media-and-power/.

[14]"Allami hirdetesek,"Mertek, https://Mertek.atlatszo.hu/allamihirdetesek/ .

[14]“Allami hirdetesek,” Mertek, https://mertek.atlatszo.hu/allamihirdetesek/.

[15] jand zolt n,"Kellemeset a hasznossal:gy v lnak a k znz-milli rdok mag nvagyonn a korm nypropagand val,"g7. hu,2018年6月13日, https://G7.hu/vallalat/20180613/Kellemeset-a-hasznossal-maganvagyonna-valnak-a-kozpenz-milliardok-a-kormanypropagandaval/ ;"Allami hirdetesek,"Mertek, https://Mertek.atlatszo.hu/allamihirdetesek/ 。

[15]Jandó Zoltán, “Kellemeset a hasznossal: így válnak a közpénz-milliárdok magánvagyonná a kormánypropagandával,” G7.hu, June 13, 2018, https://g7.hu/vallalat/20180613/kellemeset-a-hasznossal-maganvagyonna-valnak-a-kozpenz-milliardok-a-kormanypropagandaval/; “Allami hirdetesek,” Mertek, https://mertek.atlatszo.hu/allamihirdetesek/.

塞尔维亚2018年报告》 ,欧盟委员会,2018年4月17日, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-Serbia-Report.pdf。

[16]“Serbia 2018 Report,” European Commission, April 17, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-serbia-report.pdf.

媒体诚信报告:塞尔维亚的国家媒体金融关系,《东南欧媒体观察》 ,2015年11月23日, https://mediaobservatory.net/radar/Media-integrity-report-state-Media-financial-relations-Serbia。

[17]Bojana Barlovac, “Media integrity report: State-media financial relations in Serbia,” South East European Media Observatory, November 23, 2015, https://mediaobservatory.net/radar/media-integrity-report-state-media-financial-relations-serbia.

[18] Dina or evi and an ela milivojevi,"塞尔维亚的 Tanjug 通讯社:法律上不存在,由国家支持运作,"东南欧媒体专业化网络,2018年6月14日, http://seenpm.org/serbias-Tanjug-News-Agency-special-treatment-but-unclear-status/ 。

[18]Dina Đorđević and Anđela Milivojević, “Serbia’s Tanjug News Agency: Legally Non-Existent, Operates Supported by State,” South East European Network for Professionalization of Media, June 14, 2018, http://seenpm.org/serbias-tanjug-news-agency-special-treatment-but-unclear-status/.

[19]"为匈牙利的公共服务媒体提供资金ーー一种非法的国家援助?" 2019年1月9日,纽约 https://mertek.eu/en/2019/01/09/funding-for-public-service-media-in-hungary-a-form-of-unlawful-state-aid/ 。

[19]“Funding for public service media in Hungary—a form of unlawful state aid?” Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, January 9, 2019, https://mertek.eu/en/2019/01/09/funding-for-public-service-media-in-hungary-a-form-of-unlawful-state-aid/.

[20] Alberto Nardelli 和 Craig Silverman,"索罗斯联系的非政府组织成为大规模复杂卧底行动的牺牲品。匈牙利总理受益最多,BuzzFeed 新闻,2018年4月6日, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertonardelli/george-soros-Hungary-election。

[20]Alberto Nardelli and Craig Silverman, “Soros-Linked NGOs Fell Victim to a Big, Sophisticated Undercover Operation. Hungary’s Prime Minister Has Benefited the Most,” BuzzFeed News, April 6, 2018, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertonardelli/george-soros-hungary-election.

《卫报》 ,2018年4月13日,《 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/13/hungary-journalists-state-tv-network-migrants-viktor-orban-government 道:"匈牙利记者承认在打造反移民的'恐惧气氛'中扮演了角色。"。

[21]David Noland and Shaun Walker, “Hungarian journalists admit role in forging anti-migrant ‘atmosphere of fear,’” Guardian, April 13, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/13/hungary-journalists-state-tv-network-migrants-viktor-orban-government.

[22]"kisziv rgott egy v gatlan felv tel arr l,hogy k sz l a propaganda a k zt v ben,"24. 胡,2019年1月14日, https://24.hu/belfold/2019/01/14/kozmedia-propaganda-mtva-ifj-lomnici-zoltan/ 。

[22]“Kiszivárgott egy vágatlan felvétel arról, hogy készül a propaganda a köztévében,” 24.hu, January 14, 2019, https://24.hu/belfold/2019/01/14/kozmedia-propaganda-mtva-ifj-lomnici-zoltan/.

[23] Marija vuksaovi,塞尔维亚:媒体自由和记者安全水平指标,2018年(贝尔格莱德:塞尔维亚独立记者协会,2018年9月) , https://safejournalists.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/full-report-Indicators-on-the-level-of-media-freedom-and-Journalists-safety-Serbia-2018.pdf。

[23]Marija Vuksaović, Serbia: Indicators on the level of media freedom and journalists’ safety, 2018 (Belgrade: Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia, September 2018), https://safejournalists.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Full-report-Indicators-on-the-level-of-media-freedom-and-journalists-safety-Serbia-2018.pdf.

[24] Patrick Kingsley,"匈牙利的安全,Viktor Orban 将他的信息传遍欧洲",《纽约时报》 ,2018年6月4日, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/world/Europe/Viktor-Orban-media-slovenia.html。

[24]Patrick Kingsley, “Safe in Hungary, Viktor Orban Pushes His Message Across Europe,” New York Times, June 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/world/europe/viktor-orban-media-slovenia.html.

[25] Andras Gergely,"Orban 宣传机器寻求与新闻机构更广泛的接触,"彭博社,2019年4月9日,纽约 https://www.Bloomberg.com/News/articles/2019-04-09/Orban-Propaganda-Machine-Seeks-european-Reach-with-News-Agency。

[25]Andras Gergely, “Orban Propaganda Machine Seeks Wider Reach with News Agency,” Bloomberg, April 9, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-09/orban-propaganda-machine-seeks-european-reach-with-news-agency.

2019 Edelman Trust Barometer(New York:Edelman,2019) , https://www.Edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-03/2019_edelman_trust_barometer_global_report.pdf.

[26]2019 Edelman Trust Barometer (New York: Edelman, 2019), https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-03/2019_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report.pdf.

全球公众希望看到政治平衡的新闻,但不认为他们的新闻媒体在这个领域做得很好,皮尤研究中心,2018年1月11日, https://www.pewglobal.org/2018/01/11/Global-publics-want-politically-balanced-news-but-do-not-think-their-news-media-are-doing-very-well-in-this-area/ 。

[27]Amy Mitchell, Katie Simmons, Katerina Eva Matsa, and Laura Silver, “Global publics want politically balanced news, but do not think their news media are doing very well in this area,” Pew Research Center, January 11, 2018, https://www.pewglobal.org/2018/01/11/global-publics-want-politically-balanced-news-but-do-not-think-their-news-media-are-doing-very-well-in-this-area/.

为什么社交媒体仍然值得拯救

Why Social Media Are Still Worth Saving

作者:Adrian Shahbaz,技术与民主研究总监

By Adrian Shahbaz, Research Director, Technology and Democracy

一名与会者在 Telangana Gadwal 参加一个提高假新闻意识的活动时,手持一部显示在 WhatsApp 上分享的虚假信息的手机。

An attendee holds a mobile phone displaying a fake message shared on WhatsApp while attending an event to raise awareness of fake news in Gadwal, Telangana, India.

在 Gadwal,Telangana,一名男子手持一部显示在 WhatsApp 上分享的虚假信息的手机,参加一个旨在提高人们对虚假新闻认识的活动。图片来源:Dhiraj singh / bloomberg via Getty Images。

A man holds a mobile phone displaying a fake message shared on WhatsApp while attending an event to raise awareness of fake news in Gadwal, Telangana, India. Photo Credit: Dhiraj Singh/Bloomberg via Getty Images.

主要发现

Key Findings

社交媒体极大地扩大了获取信息和言论自由的渠道,在专制和动乱的国家,社交媒体仍然是记者、活动家和试图行使其民主权利的普通公民的生命线。

Social media dramatically expand access to information and freedom of expression, and in repressive and troubled countries they remain a lifeline to journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens attempting to exercise their democratic rights.

把社交媒体视为谎言和刻薄话的污水池,直接落入那些企图在信息领域增加国家霸权的独裁者手中。

Dismissing social media as a cesspool of lies and vitriol plays directly into the hands of authoritarians looking to increase state hegemony over the information landscape.

那些最有罪的政府大量散布误导性的宣传,以及通过付费恶魔和自动账户秘密操纵社交媒体,往往也是那些提议通过限制公民自由来解决问题的政府。

The governments most guilty of pumping out misleading propaganda and surreptitiously manipulating social media through paid trolls and automated accounts are often the same ones that propose to solve the problem by restricting civil liberties.

为了在不限制言论自由的情况下处理虚假信息,政府监管应该集中在公司行为的某些方面,而不是用户的言论。

In order to tackle disinformation without curbing freedom of expression, government regulation should concentrate on certain aspects of companies’ conduct, not the speech of their users.

在最近反对独裁统治者奥马尔·巴希尔(Omar al-Bashir)的起义爆发之前,多年来,苏丹女孩一直在 Facebook 上一个专门挖掘当地男孩丑闻的小组里分享她们恋爱时的照片——这是一种众包背景调查。但在2018年9月,随着安全人员加大对新生的反政府抗议运动的镇压力度,该网络动员起来,以识别和制止国家安全人员的侵权行为。"你可以把国家情报和安全局(National Intelligence and Security Service)的任何人的任何照片发布出去,"苏丹侨民中的活动人士阿扎兹·埃尔沙米(Azaz Elshami)说,"他们会告诉你他是谁、住在哪里、手机号码、家人等等。" 这一过程非常有效,以至于令人非常担心的国家情报和安全局人员不得不在公共场合戴上面具,以避免被认出。

For years before the recent uprising against authoritarian ruler Omar al-Bashir, Sudanese girls had shared pictures of their romantic crushes in a Facebook group dedicated to digging up dirt on local boys—a sort of crowdsourced background check. But as security agents escalated their crackdown on the nascent antigovernment protest movement in September 2018, the network mobilized to identify and deter abuses by state security personnel. “You can post any photo for any person of the National Intelligence and Security Service,” said Azaz Elshami, an activist in the Sudanese diaspora, “and they will give you who he is, where he lives, his mobile number, family, all that.” The process was so effective that agents of the much-feared NISS had to wear masks in public to avoid identification.

然而,在抗议期间,很明显,同样的数字工具可能被政府操纵,以传播虚假信息。1月,当苏丹警察对示威者使用实弹时,苏丹侨民维护的一个新闻网站报道了三人死亡,其中包括16岁的 Mohamed al-Obeid。当地记者迅速在社交媒体上分享了他的照片,并很快传播到国际媒体上。随着活动人士试图查明男孩身份的更多细节,怀疑的声音越来越大,直到最终人们发现,这张照片描绘的是遥远的巴西警察暴力事件的后果。苏丹活动人士得出结论认为,这张假照片是国家情报和安全局的一个互联网恶棍团队制造的,该团队以散布诽谤和谎言而闻名。

However, it became clear during the protests that the same digital tools could be manipulated by the government to spread disinformation. In January, when Sudanese police used live ammunition against the demonstrators, a news site maintained by the Sudanese diaspora reported the death of three individuals, including 16-year-old Mohamed al-Obeid. Local journalists rapidly shared his image on social media, and it soon spread to international media outlets. As activists attempted to ascertain more details about the boy’s identity, suspicion grew, until ultimately it became clear that the image depicted the aftermath of police violence in far-off Brazil. Sudanese activists concluded that the fraudulent image was the work of a team of NISS internet trolls known for disseminating smears and falsehoods.

"这是一个陷阱,"一名公民记者在推特上写道,"精心策划,目的是败坏我们所有人的名声。"

“It was a trap,” one citizen journalist tweeted, “orchestrated to discredit us all.”

苏丹的革命,就像之前的阿拉伯之春一样,展示了社交媒体的正面和负面潜力。在世界各地揭露和辩论这些平台的有害方面之际,不应忘记这些平台也带来了至关重要的好处。它们促进了公民新闻和行动主义的兴起,使独立记者能够在传统媒体已经受到政府控制的环境中继续接触新闻消费者,而且它们的跨国性质提供了一定程度的保护,使其免受国家审查。如今,政策制定者、科技公司和公民社会面临的挑战是,防止恶意的国家和非国家行为者毒害数字领域,同时保护和提高允许互联网支持媒体自由和推进民主的条件和质量。

Sudan’s revolution, like the Arab Spring before it, has showcased both the positive and the negative potential of social media. At a time when the harmful aspects of these platforms are being exposed and debated around the world, the fact that they have also delivered vital benefits should not be forgotten. They have fostered a rise in citizen journalism and activism and allowed independent reporters to continue reaching news consumers in environments where traditional outlets have fallen under government control, and their transnational nature has provided a measure of protection against state censorship. The challenge for policymakers, technology companies, and civil society today is to prevent malicious state and nonstate actors from poisoning the digital sphere while protecting and enhancing the conditions and qualities that allow the internet to bolster media freedom and advance democracy.

在苏丹,民主运动和新闻自由将同时兴起或衰落

In Sudan, the democracy movement and press freedom will rise or fall together

特色档案:Reem Abbas

Featured Profile: Reem Abbas

记者,作家,获奖博客作者 Reem Abbas 在苏丹历史的关键时刻报道了苏丹的人权和政治。四月,经过四个月的大规模抗议活动,苏丹独裁总统奥马尔·巴希尔在一场宫廷政变中下台。这些事件结束了长达30年的统治,这种统治被包括记者在内的持不同政见者的暴力镇压所破坏。虽然苏丹的政治命运仍然不确定,但巴希尔的被免职让阿巴斯这样的记者得以暂时摆脱他所营造的高压环境。

Journalist, writer, and award-winning blogger Reem Abbas is covering human rights and politics in Sudan at a critical juncture in its history. In April, after four months of massive protests, Sudan’s authoritarian president Omar al-Bashir was removed from power in a palace coup. The events brought about the end of a 30-year reign marred by the violent repression of dissidents, including journalists. While Sudan’s political fate remains uncertain, al-Bashir’s removal has granted journalists like Abbas a reprieve from the repressive environment he cultivated.

虽然社交媒体的扩散给了阿巴斯一定的自由,让她可以在自己的博客和3.4万名推特粉丝中传播独立报道,但在巴希尔掌权期间,她始终面临着报复的威胁。"我总是害怕,因为我写的故事,"阿巴斯说。在抗议期间,社交媒体屏蔽了抗议活动,尽管这种屏蔽是例行公事,但它提醒人们,批评的声音在苏丹是不受欢迎的。

While the proliferation of social media allowed Abbas some freedom to disseminate independent reporting on her blog and among her 34,000 Twitter followers, she was never free from the threat of reprisals while al-Bashir was in power. “I was always fearful because of the stories I’d written,” Abbas says. Social media blocks during the protests, though routinely circumvented, served as another reminder that critical voices were not welcome in Sudan.

现在,阿巴斯感到更加安全,也更有能力在没有实际障碍的情况下工作。她可以自由自信地写作。也许在她看来最有价值的是,她可以说出她的消息来源,而不用担心他们会遭到报复。

Now, Abbas feels far safer, and is more able to work without facing practical impediments. She can write freely and confidently. Perhaps most valuably in her eyes, she can name her sources without fear that they will face retaliation.

然而,苏丹新近开放的媒体环境带来了重大责任。阿巴斯说:"我们需要大量的能力建设,才能真正为这场起义以及为这个国家而战的人们伸张正义。"。此外,媒体市场在巴希尔的统治下发育不良,并不是为支持独立的新闻业而设计的。出口资源不足,像她的许多同龄人一样,阿巴斯必须通过咨询职位来支持自己,同时还要抽出时间写作。她担心新闻媒体的两极分化会阻碍可持续的独立新闻业的发展。

Yet Sudan’s newly liberalized media environment brings with it significant responsibilities. “We need a lot of capacity building for us to actually be able to deliver and do justice to this uprising, and to the people who fought for this country,” Abbas says. Furthermore, the media market was stunted under al-Bashir, and is not designed to support independent journalism. Outlets are under resourced, and like many of her peers, Abbas must support herself through consulting positions while still making time to write. She worries that the polarization of news outlets poses an obstacle to the development of sustainable independent journalism.

尽管如此,苏丹的开放环境为阿巴斯和她的同事们提供了在更少的约束下追求他们的激情的承诺。"当我写一个话题的时候,"她说,"我正在经历这个话题,我在呼吸这个话题;我真的很想向我面试的人表达自己的想法。"

Nevertheless, Sudan’s opening environment offers Abbas and her colleagues the promise of pursuing their passion with fewer constraints. “When I’m writing about a topic,” she says, “I’m living it, and I’m breathing it; I really want to give voice to the people I’m interviewing.”

互联网是媒体多样性的避难所

The internet as a refuge for media diversity

几乎从一开始,互联网就为人们提供了未受政府干预的新媒体空间。博客、在线新闻媒体和社交媒体平台为亲政府的电视、广播和印刷媒体提供了替代品。即使在沙特阿拉伯这样一个专制的地方,自由派诗人也挑战宗教教条,年轻的博客作者们记录了在保持沙特习俗的同时接受外国流行文化的心理体操。这种对自由的膨胀最终被国家当局镇压批判性思维和"非伊斯兰"思想而破灭。虽然许多国家的个人在发表事实和意见方面仍然不受限制,但他们可能会因发表的内容而受到惩罚ーー言论自由并不总是延伸到言论之后的自由。

Almost from its inception, the internet offered new media spaces unspoiled by government intrusion. Blogs, online news outlets, and social media platforms provided alternatives to progovernment television, radio, and print outlets. Even in a place as repressive as Saudi Arabia, liberal poets challenged religious dogma, and young bloggers chronicled the mental gymnastics of embracing foreign pop culture while upholding Saudi customs. This ballooning of freedom was eventually deflated by state authorities who cracked down on critical thinking and “un-Islamic” ideas. While individuals in many countries remain uninhibited in their ability to publish facts and opinions, they may face punishment for what they publish—freedom of speech does not always extend to freedom after speech.

尽管如此,在面临新闻自由急剧下降的国家,互联网可以成为一个重要的堡垒。自2016年未遂政变以来,土耳其关闭了近150家新闻机构,数百名记者面临支持恐怖主义的虚假指控。因此,许多媒体专业人士转移到了网上。著名记者 nsal nl 在他的家庭办公室经营着一个播客,而像 Dokuz8这样的初创公司正在测试数字优先报道的新模式。那些被迫完全离开土耳其的人,比如 Yavuz Baydar 和 Can d ndar,已经在新的平台上播放了来自海外的独立新闻,比如 Ahval 和 zg r z。虽然官方屏蔽了他们的信息,但是他们的信息仍然可以通过大多数社交媒体服务和虚拟专用网络(vpn)获得,这使得用户可以绕过政府的审查。

Nonetheless, in countries facing drastic and sudden declines in press freedom, the internet can be an important redoubt. Almost 150 news outlets have been closed in Turkey since the 2016 coup attempt, with hundreds of journalists facing spurious charges of supporting terrorism. As a result, many media professionals have moved online. Prominent journalist Ünsal Ünlü runs a podcast from his home office, while start-ups like Dokuz8 are testing new models of digital-first reporting. Those who have been forced to leave Turkey altogether, such as Yavuz Baydar and Can Dündar, have broadcast independent news from overseas on new platforms like Ahval and Özgürüz. Though officially blocked, their coverage remains accessible on most social media services and via virtual private networks (VPNs) that enable users to skirt government censorship.

与此同时,世界各国政府继续将严格的新闻法和视听法规延伸到网络领域,试图让网络媒体俯首帖耳。巴基斯坦的新闻自由环境受到严格限制,目前正在审议的一项法案将对在线记者和新闻机构实行许可证制度。2018年3月,乌干达当局发布了新的要求,要求在线出版商、新闻平台和无线电运营商必须获得该国通信委员会的授权。2018年12月对白俄罗斯《媒体法》的修正案扩大了传统媒体的定义,将网络媒体和相关网站包括在内,导致一些享有相对编辑自由的独立新闻网站被屏蔽。在埃及,2018年8月通过的类似立法为封锁属于人权组织和新闻机构的数十个网站提供了法律依据。暴发户 Mada Masr 是一个进步的新闻网站,创建者是2013年被《埃及独立报》(Egypt Independent)赶出的年轻记者。

Meanwhile, governments around the world have continued to extend strict press laws and audiovisual codes to the online realm in an attempt to bring online media to heel. A bill now under consideration in Pakistan, whose press freedom environment is highly restricted, would impose a licensing regime on online journalists and news outlets. Authorities in Uganda in March 2018 issued new requirements obliging online publishers, news platforms, and radio operators to obtain authorization from the country’s Communications Commission. Amendments to Belarus’s Media Law in December 2018 expanded the definition of traditional media to include online outlets and related websites, resulting in the blocking of several independent news sites that had enjoyed relative editorial freedom. In Egypt, similar legislation adopted in August 2018 has provided a legal basis for blocking dozens of websites belonging to human rights organizations and news outlets. The upstart Mada Masr, a progressive news site created by young journalists who were pushed out of Egypt Independent in 2013, was among the targets.

国际平台作为抵制审查制度的缓冲

International platforms as a buffer against censorship

虽然许多地方政府显然不能容忍一个不受约束的在线新闻行业,但主要的国际技术平台是抵御这种审查趋势的重要缓冲器。例如,Mada Masr 继续将内容直接发布到其 Facebook 页面上,而土耳其的 Medyascope 运营着一个 YouTube 频道。

While many local governments are clearly intolerant of an unfettered online news sector, major international technology platforms serve as an important buffer against such censorial tendencies. Mada Masr, for example, continues to post content directly to its Facebook page, while Turkey’s Medyascope runs a YouTube channel.

由于大多数公司推出了强大的加密技术,政府不再能够命令互联网服务提供商禁止访问科技平台内的特定内容,如个人账户或群组页面。这导致了大型科技公司和许多政府之间日益增长的不平衡,这必须说服驻海外的高管或管理人员撤销某一职位。许多总部位于美国的公司有意避免在更为专制的国家开展业务。在这些国家,员工可能会因未能遵守政府的要求而面临惩罚,因为这会侵犯当地用户的人权。

Due the rollout of strong encryption technology by most companies, governments can no longer order internet service providers to bar access to specific content within a tech platform, such as an individual account or group page. This has resulted in a growing imbalance between large tech companies and many governments, which must persuade executives or administrators based overseas to remove a given post. Many US-based companies deliberately refrain from setting up operations in more repressive countries where their employees could face punishment for failing to adhere to a government request that would violate the human rights of their local users.

也许这些国际平台提供的最强大的媒体工具是直播。这项功能现在已经内置在许多移动应用程序和社交媒体服务中,使任何拥有智能手机和互联网连接的人都可以成为全球范围内的业余电视工作人员。特别是在一些国家,领导人或朋党对事实有争议,直播比任何其他媒体形式提供了更高的可信度。与新闻文章或照片不同的是,实时流的时间、地点和创作者是很难争辩的。这种形式也是高度透明和互动的。任何观看实时视频的人都可以输入问题或评论,这些问题或评论会自动叠加在视频中供所有人观看,包括流媒体本身,他们通常会实时回复评论。

Perhaps the most powerful media tool provided by such international platforms is live streaming. The feature is now built into many mobile applications and social media services, allowing anyone with a smartphone and an internet connection to double as an amateur television crew with global reach. Particularly in countries where leaders or political factions dispute facts on the ground, live streaming provides a higher degree of credibility than any other media form. Unlike with a news article or photograph, it is difficult to dispute the timing, location, and creator of a live stream. The format is also highly transparent and interactive. Anyone watching a live stream can type questions or comments that are automatically superimposed within the video for all to see, including the streamers themselves, who often respond to comments in real time.

白俄罗斯和亚美尼亚的博客作者和记者使用 Facebook Live 和其他直播服务,挑战政府关于反政府抗议规模或目标的说法,并记录安全部队常常采取的强硬措施。在委内瑞拉,像 Efecto Cocuyo("萤火虫效应")这样的激进媒体初创企业使用直播平台 Periscope 提供一个替代主导的亲政府新闻媒体的选择。他们的记者报道反对派人士的新闻发布会,地方立法机构的会议,以及官方媒体等同于武装暴乱或拒绝承认的大规模抗议活动。

Bloggers and journalists in Belarus and Armenia have used Facebook Live and other live-streaming services to challenge the government’s claims on the size or goal of antigovernment protests, and to document security forces’ often heavy-handed response. In Venezuela, activist media start-ups like Efecto Cocuyo (“Firefly Effect”) use the live-streaming platform Periscope to provide an alternative to the dominant progovernment news outlets. Their journalists cover press conferences by opposition figures, the proceedings of local legislatures, and large protests that state media equate with armed riots or refuse to acknowledge.

民主国家中更多的传统媒体参与者也在沿着这些路线进行自己的实验。来自法国、德国、联合王国和美国的公共广播公司联手开发了一个土耳其语新闻频道,该频道将在 YouTube 上独家播放。"+ 90"频道的既定目标是"提供独立、准确的信息,促进言论自由和对时事的多种观点。" 由于其总部位于海外,土耳其当局对其报道感到不满,因此需要说服这家总部位于硅谷的主机服务公司对一家美国政府资助的新闻服务机构进行审查。

More traditional media players in democracies have engaged in their own experiments along these lines. Public broadcasters from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States teamed up to develop a Turkish-language news channel that will air exclusively on YouTube. The stated goal of the channel, +90, is to “provide independent and accurate information that promotes free speech and a multitude of perspectives on current affairs.” Since it is based overseas, Turkish authorities upset over its coverage would need to convince the Silicon Valley–based hosting company to censor a US government–funded news service.

但国际社交媒体平台也不能完全免受政府压力的影响。在越南这个当局严格控制信息流动的一党制国家,国内外的一个民主活动人士网络运营着一个 Facebook 页面,向大约130万名追随者提供对这个专制政权的独立看法。尽管 Facebook 高管谢丽尔·桑德伯格(Sheryl Sandberg)在国会作证时提到,该公司避免在专制国家建立实体存在,以避免遵守政治审查,但在5月初,该平台确实从该活动团体 vi something t n 中删除了至少7篇文章,理由是"当地法律限制" 这些帖子报道了越南总统的健康状况,当时当局已经对这个话题发布了严格的媒体封锁。路透社在 vi something t t n 最初报道此事的10天后"爆出"了总统病情的新闻。

But international social media platforms are not exactly immune from government pressure. In Vietnam, a one-party state where the authorities maintain a tight grip on information flows, a network of democratic activists based inside and outside the country run a Facebook page that provides an independent take on the repressive regime to some 1.3 million followers. While Facebook executive Sheryl Sandberg mentioned in congressional testimony that the company refrains from establishing a physical presence in repressive countries in order avoid complying with political censorship, the platform did remove at least seven stories from the activist group in question, Việt Tân, in early May, citing “local legal restrictions.” The posts covered the health condition of Vietnam’s president at a time when the authorities had issued a strict media blackout on the subject. Reuters “broke” a story on the president’s illness over 10 days after Việt Tân had initially covered it.

专制国家的活动人士担心,像 Facebook 这样的公司可能会因为财政或法律原因而更加一致地服从政府的命令。越南最近通过了一项类似于中国的网络安全法,要求企业将越南用户的数据存储在位于该国境内的服务器上。如果主要的国际平台服从,当地用户的私人通信将在越南安全机构的能力范围之内,他们认为非暴力的政治活动是对国家安全的威胁。由于坚持和平民主改革,脱离一党专政,六同已经被打上恐怖组织的烙印。

Activists in autocratic countries are concerned that companies like Facebook could move toward complying more consistently with government orders for financial or legal reasons. Vietnam recently passed a cybersecurity law, closely modeled on China’s, that requires companies to store data about Vietnamese users on servers located within the country. If major international platforms were to obey, the private communications of local users would be within the reach of Vietnamese security agencies, who consider nonviolent political activism to be a threat to national security. Already, Việt Tân has been branded a terrorist organization for its insistence on peaceful democratic reform away from one-party rule.

如果你不能审查它们,那就利用它们

If you can’t censor them, exploit them

数字媒体带来的自由也有黑暗的一面。在某种程度上,各种在线平台和应用程序创造了一个任何人都无法控制的信息空间,恶意的国家和非国家行为者正在利用这一空间来推进他们各自的议程。

There is a dark side to the freedom that digital media offer. To the extent that various online platforms and applications have created an information space beyond anyone’s authoritative control, malicious state and nonstate actors are exploiting it to advance their respective agendas.

Facebook 旗下的即时通讯服务 WhatsApp 就是一个很好的例子。不像 Facebook 和 Twitter,用户的默认隐私设置是"公开的",WhatsApp 的信息是为更私密的交流而设计的。它们是端到端加密的,这意味着即使是公司本身也无法访问它们,只能访问目标接收者。群聊的管理员必须"邀请"新参与者,确保一定程度的审查。因此,在 WhatsApp 使用率很高的几十个国家,大片在线媒体领域实际上已经被隐藏起来了。

The messaging service WhatsApp, owned by Facebook, is a case in point. Unlike Facebook proper and Twitter, where the default privacy setting for users is “public,” WhatsApp messages are designed for more private communications. They are end-to-end encrypted, meaning not even the company itself has access to them, only the intended recipients. Administrators of group chats must “invite” new participants, ensuring a degree of vetting. Thus in the dozens of countries where WhatsApp usage is high, large swathes of the online media landscape have become, effectively, hidden from view.

这些品质——增加信任和降低透明度——被恶意的行为者用来加深社会分裂,甚至非法影响选举。在自由之家2018年网络自由报告涵盖的65个国家中,有32个国家发生了支付亲政府评论员干预社交媒体的事件,包括 WhatsApp,通常是为了诽谤政治反对派或批评性记者。

These qualities—increased trust and decreased transparency—have been used by malevolent actors to deepen social divisions and even illegally influence elections. In the 65 countries covered by Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2018 report, 32 had instances in which paid progovernment commentators intervened on social media, including WhatsApp, usually to smear the political opposition or critical journalists.

在巴西,《页页报》(Folha)的一项调查显示,一些商业团体非法资助了极右翼总统候选人杰尔·博尔索纳罗(Jair Bolsonaro)2018年的竞选活动,在 WhatsApp 上发布了大约300万美元的群众信息。这些团体还通过第三方服务收集电话号码,这是巴西选举法所禁止的。

In Brazil, an investigation by the newspaper Folha revealed that business groups had illegally contributed to the successful 2018 campaign of far-right presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro by funding some $3 million in mass messages on WhatsApp. The groups also collected phone numbers through a third-party service, which is prohibited under Brazilian electoral laws.

在印度,在4月至5月的大选期间,各种平台上充斥着经过修改的图片和假新闻。Facebook 宣布,它已经删除了逾1000个页面,理由是违反了垃圾邮件政策,以及"有组织的不真实行为" 各政党相互之间,相互之间,相互之间,相互之间,相互之间,相互之间,相互之间,相互之间,相互之间,。印度教民族主义者尤其擅长散布谣言,称反对党偏袒穆斯林而不是普通民众。执政的印度教民族主义印度人民党组织所谓的网络军队声称有120万志愿者。

In India, where doctored images and fake news abounded on various platforms during the April–May general elections, Facebook announced that it had removed over 1,000 pages for violating policies on spam and “coordinated inauthentic behavior.” Political parties circulate propaganda and misleading claims about one another, religious minorities, and critical journalists. Hindu nationalists in particular have grown adept at spreading false rumors that characterize opposition parties as favoring Muslims over the general population. The so-called cyber army of the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party claims to have 1.2 million volunteers.

宗教和族裔极端分子还可能将技术平台武器化,以煽动针对少数群体的暴力行为。今年斯里兰卡发生复活节恐怖袭击后,该国当局屏蔽了 Facebook、 WhatsApp、 Instagram 和 Viber,以防止进一步的暴力事件。关于攻击者身份的虚假信息以及潜在的额外攻击已经开始在社交媒体上传播。

Tech platforms may also be weaponized by religious and ethnic extremists to incite violence against minorities. In the aftermath of the Easter terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka this year, the country’s authorities blocked Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, and Viber as a precaution against further violence. False information about the attackers’ identities and potential additional attacks had already begun to spread on social media.

但是,封锁通信工具是一种迟钝且最终无效的手段,可以用来阻止虚假信息和其他虚假新闻,这些信息可以通过口口相传甚至主流媒体继续传播;与此同时,社交媒体也可以用来揭穿错误报道。例如,在斯里兰卡,当局在国家电视台上发布了一名妇女的照片,声称她参与了复活节袭击。后来,当互联网用户根据照片追踪到一名美国学生时,他们才意识到,这是一起认错人的案件。

But blocking access to communication tools is a blunt and ultimately ineffective instrument for stemming disinformation and other false news, which can continue to spread via word of mouth and even mainstream media; social media, meanwhile, can be useful in debunking erroneous reports. For example, in Sri Lanka the authorities disseminated a photo of a woman on national television, alleging that she was involved in the Easter attacks. They realized only later, after internet users traced the photo to a US-based student, that it was a case of mistaken identity.

如何以及如何不进行监管

How and how not to regulate

尽管网络媒体和大型科技公司在高压环境中具有巨大的实用性和积极潜力,但它们的管理——或未能管理——却遭到严厉批评,例如虚假信息、仇恨言论和煽动暴力等问题,所有这些都威胁到民主社会的结构。在美国,脸谱网、谷歌和推特被指勾结审查保守派,而欧洲的政策制定者和广大公众则反对科技平台扰乱媒体生态系统的方式。一项针对全球27个国家的调查发现,北美和欧洲对社交媒体的信任度最低。在这些地方,扭曲的网络内容被认为是右翼民粹主义煽动者崛起的助推器。

Despite their great utility and positive potential in repressive environments, online media and major technology companies in particular have come under harsh criticism for their management—or failure to manage—problems like disinformation, hate speech, and incitement to violence, all of which threaten the fabric of democratic societies. Facebook, Google, and Twitter have been accused in the United States of colluding to censor conservatives, while European policymakers and the public at large are pushing back against the perceived ways in which tech platforms have disrupted the media ecosystem. A survey of 27 countries around the globe found that trust in social media was lowest in North America and Europe, where distorted online content has been credited with aiding the rise of right-wing populist demagogues.

对于糟糕或错误的言论,最好的补救办法是更多更好的言论,而不是强制性的沉默。然而在今天的网络平台上,不民主和不自由的演员似乎有了更响亮的扩音器。研究表明,意在激起愤怒的可疑信息在社交媒体上比更清醒、更真实的内容获得更大的曝光度。这些平台自己的算法似乎是为了放大能够产生高度参与度的内容而设计的,即使其结果是急于达到更大的极端。这些动态意味着,由非常小但协调和激进的个人或账户网络传播的内容——包括由不民主的政党或政权策划的内容——很容易掩盖较为温和的多数派的观点。

The best remedy for bad or erroneous speech remains more and better speech, not enforced silence. Yet on today’s online platforms, undemocratic and illiberal actors seem to have a louder megaphone. Studies have shown that dubious information intended to spark outrage gains greater visibility on social media than more sober, truthful content. The platforms’ own algorithms appear designed to amplify content that generates high levels of engagement, even if the result is a rush to ever greater extremes. These dynamics mean that content disseminated by a very small but coordinated and radical network of individuals or accounts—including those orchestrated by undemocratic parties or regimes—can easily overshadow the views of the more moderate majority.

鉴于这些及其它问题,科技行业确实需要加强监管。但是,民主的捍卫者应该警惕任何旨在定义可接受和不可接受的言论并导致言论自由减少的国家规定的推动。通过付费恶意攻击和自动化"机器人"账户,最有罪的政府往往是那些提议通过限制公民自由来解决这一问题的政府,这一点颇具启发性。

In light of these and other problems, the technology sector does need greater regulation. But defenders of democracy should be wary of any push for state regulation that aims to define acceptable and unacceptable speech and entails a reduction in freedom of expression. It is instructive that the very governments most guilty of pumping out misleading propaganda and surreptitiously manipulating social media through paid trolls and automated “bot” accounts are often the ones that propose to solve the problem by restricting civil liberties.

相反,政府应该找到其他方法来改善公司的业绩。决策者可以建立独立的多方利益攸关方机构,评估公司内容审核做法的透明度、相称性和申诉程序的有效性。这些机构还可以为发现和消除协调一致的不真实活动,如付费钓鱼者和机器人账户设定最低标准,以及为竞选期间的政治广告制定指导方针。此外,公职人员应当从反托拉斯法和隐私保护的角度来管理该部门的其他方面,因为这些法律对民主国家的言论自由具有重要影响。这种监管的首要目标应该是保护和加强在线交流平台在所有社会中可以发挥的建设性作用。

Instead, governments should find other ways to improve companies’ performance. Policymakers could establish independent multistakeholder bodies to evaluate companies’ content moderation practices for transparency, proportionality, and the effectiveness of appeal processes. Such bodies can also set minimum standards for the detection and elimination of coordinated inauthentic activity, such as paid trolls and bot accounts, as well as guidelines for political advertising during election campaigns. In addition, public officials should regulate other aspects of the sector through the lens of antitrust laws and privacy protections, since they have important consequences for freedom of expression in a democracy. The overarching goal of such regulation should be to protect and augment the constructive role that online communication platforms can play in all societies.

社交媒体是现代媒体生态系统的重要组成部分。它们极大地扩大了获取信息和言论自由的渠道,在专制和动乱的国家,它们仍然是试图行使其民主权利的记者、活动家和普通公民的生命线。民主国家必须以符合其长期价值观的方式进行反击,而不是将这些服务交给利用其弱点的恶意势力。

Social media are a crucial part of the modern media ecosystem. They dramatically expand access to information and freedom of expression, and in repressive and troubled countries they remain a lifeline to journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens attempting to exercise their democratic rights. Rather than surrendering these services to the malevolent forces that have exploited their weaknesses, democracies must fight back in a way that is consistent with their own long-standing values.

建议

Recommendations

对政府来说:

For governments:

专注于行为,而不是内容。反垄断行动有助于刺激竞争,使平台更有可能在公众压力下改善其服务。监管干预还可以用来加强用户的隐私和对自己数据的控制,并加强对黑客攻击和其他网络安全威胁的保护。必要时应对选举法进行修订,并大力执行这些法律,以确保网上竞选活动的透明度,防止外国的秘密干涉。在言论方面,政策制定者应建立独立的多方利益相关者机构,评估公司的内容审核做法,以确保透明度、相称性和上诉程序的有效性。这些机构还可以为侦查和消除协调的不真实活动设定最低标准,如付费钓鱼者和机器人账户。

Concentrate on conduct, not content. Antitrust actions can help stimulate competition, making platforms more likely to improve their services in response to public pressure. Regulatory interventions can also be used to strengthen users’ privacy and control over their own data, and to bolster safeguards against hacking and other cybersecurity threats. Election laws should be amended where necessary and vigorously enforced to ensure transparency in online campaign activities and prevent covert foreign interference. When it comes to speech, policymakers should establish independent multistakeholder bodies to evaluate companies’ content moderation practices for transparency, proportionality, and the effectiveness of appeal processes. These bodies could also set minimum standards for the detection and elimination of coordinated inauthentic activity, such as paid trolls and bot accounts.

确保所有与互联网有关的法律和做法符合国际人权法和标准。各国政府应该建立定期审查,以评估其关于网络言论的法律和实践是否符合美国世界人权宣言和美国公民权利和政治权利国际公约协会概述的原则。任何监管社交媒体的提议都应该根据其对言论自由可能产生的影响进行审查,特别是涉及到妇女、少数民族和宗教少数群体、 LGBT(女同性恋、男同性恋、双性恋和变性者)以及其他弱势群体。

Ensure that all internet-related laws and practices adhere to international human rights law and standards. National governments should establish periodic reviews to assess whether their laws and practices regarding online speech conform to the principles outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Any proposals to regulate social media should be examined in light of their likely impact on freedom of expression, particularly as it relates to women, ethnic and religious minorities, LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) people, and other vulnerable groups.

支持研究和信息共享。公职人员应向大学、非政府组织和调查记者提供资源,帮助他们了解、发现和分享协调的不真实活动,特别是国家和准国家行为者的活动。可以设计具体的赠款,以加强民间社会与技术平台的联系,特别是在全球南方国家。

Support research and information sharing. Public officials should provide resources to universities, nongovernmental organizations, and investigative journalists working to understand, detect, and share instances of coordinated inauthentic activity, particularly by state and quasi-state actors. Specific grants can be designed to strengthen civil society’s outreach to tech platforms, especially in countries of the global south.

对于公司来说:

For companies:

确保公平和透明的内容审核实践。为了在其平台和服务中公平和透明地缓和公共职位,私营公司应当做到以下几点:(1)明确和具体地界定在其指导方针和服务条款中哪些言论是不允许的。(2)如果某些言论需要加以限制,在适当情况下,考虑采取侵入性较小的行动,然后予以彻底限制,例如警告用户他们违反了服务条款,并调整算法,可能无意中助长虚假信息或煽动暴力。(3)确保政府提出的删除内容要求符合国际人权标准。(4)发布内容删除的详细透明度报告,包括政府发起的报告和公司自己发起的报告。(五)为认为言论受到不当限制的使用者提供有效的上诉途径。

Ensure fair and transparent content moderation practices. In order to fairly and transparently moderate public posts within their platforms and services, private companies should do the following: (1) Clearly and concretely define what speech is not permissible in their guidelines and terms of service. (2) If certain speech needs to be curbed, when appropriate, consider less invasive actions before restricting it outright, for example warning users that they are violating terms of service and adjusting algorithms that might unintentionally promote disinformation or incitement to violence. (3) Ensure that content removal requests by governments are in compliance with international human rights standards. (4) Publish detailed transparency reports on content takedowns—both for those initiated by governments and for those undertaken by the companies themselves. (5) Provide an efficient avenue for appeal for users who believe that their speech was unduly restricted.

与地方民间社会组织进行持续对话。公司应该在它们开展业务或其产品得到广泛使用的市场上寻求当地政治和文化背景方面的专门知识。这些与民间社会团体的磋商应该告知这些公司如何处理内容节制、政府要求和反击虚假信息等问题。

Engage in continuous dialogue with local civil society organizations. Companies should seek out local expertise on the political and cultural context in markets where they have a presence or where their products are widely used. These consultations with civil society groups should inform the companies’ approach to content moderation, government requests, and countering disinformation, among other things.

标记或消除自动化的"机器人"帐户。认识到机器人既可以用于有益的目的,也可以用于有害的目的,并承认它们在散布虚假信息方面的作用,公司应该努力为可疑的机器人账户提供明确的标签。那些即使贴上标签仍然有害的应该从平台上消除。尽管今天的技术使得机器人识别具有相当高的准确性,但是公司也应该建立透明的补救机制,从任何可能贴错标签的账户中删除机器人的名称。

Label or eliminate automated “bot” accounts. Recognizing that bots can be used for both helpful and harmful purposes, and acknowledging their role in spreading disinformation, companies should strive to provide clear labeling for suspected bot accounts. Those that remain harmful even if labeled should be eliminated from the platform. Although today’s technology allows reasonably high accuracy in bot recognition, companies should also establish transparent remedial mechanisms to remove the bot designation from any account that may have been mislabeled.

2019年自由与媒体:向下的螺旋:机译  2019-06-07 14:28   加密线路   快速线路 

(2019年6月4日,自由之家)发布,台湾排名最高的4分等级,中国列最低的0分等级。报告提到中共试图利用媒体干预台湾选举,也透过施压与监控发布系统,影响全球媒体报导。

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-media/freedom-media-2019

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