2019年5月6日

May 6, 2019

中国企业如何促进美国技术转移

How Chinese Companies Facilitate Technology Transfer from the United States

肖恩·奥康纳,政策分析师,经济与贸易

Sean O’Connor, Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade

免责声明:本文是美中经济与安全审查委员会(U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission)工作人员的专业研究成果,是应该委员会的要求编写的,以支持其审议工作。根据第106-398号公法和第113-291号公法的规定,委员会正在对美中经济关系及其对美国安全的影响进行评估,将报告张贴到委员会的网站,旨在促进公众更好地了解委员会所处理的问题及其对美国安全的影响。然而,公开发表这份文件并不一定意味着委员会、任何个别专员或委员会的其他专业人员认可这份工作人员研究报告所表达的意见或结论。

Disclaimer: This paper is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, the public release of this document does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report.

目录

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 3

Chinese Companies’ Methods for Facilitating Tech Transfer 4

Foreign Direct Investment 4

Venture Capital Investments 5

Joint Ventures 7

Licensing Requirements 8

Cyber Espionage 8

Talent Acquisition 9

U.S. Regulations Governing Tech Transfer 9

Disclosure Requirements 9

Export Controls 10

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 10

Conclusions and Considerations for Congress 11

美中经济与安全审查委员会

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

行政摘要

Executive Summary

中国公司——在许多情况下得到了中国政府的支持——使用各种方法从美国公司获得有价值的技术、知识产权和技术诀窍。其中一些策略是合法的,而另一些则涉及强制或隐蔽的手段。虽然中国公司不是唯一寻求获得美国技术的外国公司,但中国的情况是独一无二的,因为中国共产党将技术转让作为一项政策优先事项,并向从事这些反竞争活动的公司提供直接和间接的支持。中国的收购尝试经常以人工智能、生物技术和虚拟现实等先进技术为目标,这些技术仍处于早期发展阶段,但在未来可以提供军事和民用双重能力。

Chinese companies—in many cases with the backing of the Chinese government—use a variety of methods to acquire valuable technology, intellectual property (IP), and knowhow from U.S. firms. Some of these tactics are legal, while others involve coercive or covert means. Although Chinese companies are not the only foreign firms seeking to acquire U.S. technology, the Chinese case is unique because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has prioritized technology transfer as a matter of policy and provides direct and indirect support to companies engaging in these anticompetitive activities. Chinese acquisition attempts frequently target advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and virtual reality, which are still in the early stages of development but could provide dual military and civilian capabilities in the future.

表1:中国公司如何促进美国的技术转让

Table 1: How Chinese Companies Facilitate Technology Transfer from the United States

Description

Foreign Direct Investment The Chinese government directs Chinese firms to invest in and acquire U.S.

companies and assets in order to obtain cutting-edge technologies and IP,

(FDI)

fostering technology transfer in strategic industries.

Chinese VC investments in the United States have increased in recent years, in

Venture Capital (VC) particular targeting U.S. technology startups. Although the trends and

implications of Chinese VC investment in the United States are new and still

Investments

underexamined, they may allow Chinese firms to access valuable U.S.

technology and IP, including technologies with potential dual-use applications.

In many industries, foreign firms must enter into JVs to invest or operate in

Joint Ventures (JVs) China. JVs are often the source of Chinese companies’ most technologically

advanced and innovative procedures and products, acquired through technology

transfer from their foreign JV partner.

Licensing approval processes in China are often unclear and arduous, requiring

companies to disclose sensitive information typically not required in other

Licensing Agreements markets. Chinese government agencies often do not have to agree to destroy

company information submitted in the licensing process, so companies’ IP can

be shared or exposed even after the license is adjudicated.

Through covert cyber intrusions, Chinese actors gain unauthorized access to a

wide range of commercially valuable U.S. business information—including IP,

Cyber Espionage trade secrets, technical data, negotiating positions, and sensitive and proprietary

internal communications—which are then provided to and utilized by select

Chinese firms.

The Chinese government maintains government programs aimed at recruiting

overseas Chinese and foreign experts and entrepreneurs in strategic sectors to

teach and work in China. Moreover, Beijing utilizes intergovernmental and

Talent Acquisitions academic partnerships and collaborations in the United States, establishes

Chinese research facilities in the United States, and sends experts abroad to gain

access to cutting-edge research and equipment without disclosing the

organization’s or individual’s connections to the Chinese government.

迄今为止,美国对中国海外经济活动的监管规定,包括美国对外国投资者的信息披露要求、美国外国投资委员会(CFIUS)的运作以及美国的出口管制,一直无法充分评估和应对向中国转让更多技术的风险。这些监管方面的缺陷,加上情报和执法方面的限制,使得中国公司可以对美国的关键技术进行投资,而这些投资可能会危及美国的技术创新和国家安全。

To date, U.S. regulations governing Chinese economic activities abroad—including U.S. foreign investor disclosure requirements, the operations of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and U.S. export controls—have been unable to adequately assess and address the risks of increased technology transfers to China. These regulatory shortcomings, along with intelligence and law enforcement limitations, allow Chinese firms to pursue investments in critical U.S. technologies that could jeopardize U.S. technological innovation and national security.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 3

中国企业促进技术转移的方法

Chinese Companies’ Methods for Facilitating Tech Transfer

作为一些世界领先的高科技产品生产商,美国公司自然成为中国和其他跨国公司获取技术和知识产权努力的目标。然而,与其他全球性公司不同的是,中国公司经常在中国政府的指导和协助下获得美国的技术和知识产权。正如美国贸易代表办公室(USTR)2018年3月发布的第301条款报告所详述的那样,中国政府利用一系列指令和激励措施,促进中国企业对美国产品和知识产权的技术转让。这些政府政策是中国政府发展国内市场、成为一系列技术(尤其是先进技术)的全球领导者,以及增强军事实力的更大努力的一部分。*

As some of the world’s leading producers of high-tech products, U.S. companies are a natural target of Chinese and other global companies’ efforts to acquire technology and IP. Unlike other global firms, however, Chinese firms often acquire U.S. technology and IP at the direction of and with assistance from the Chinese government. As detailed in the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) March 2018 Section 301 report, the Chinese government uses an array of directives and incentives for Chinese companies to facilitate technology transfers of U.S. products and IP. These government policies are part of Beijing’s larger effort to develop its domestic market and become a global leader in a wide range of technologies, particularly advanced technologies, as well as aid its military capabilities.*

根据美国贸易代表办公室的第301条报告,中国政府利用"合资企业要求、外国投资限制、行政审查和许可程序,迫使或迫使美国公司进行技术转让。" 1. 综上所述,这些技术转让方法已经导致美国在研发、知识产权和技术产品方面损失了数十亿美元。根据美国知识产权盗窃委员会的数据,知识产权盗窃(全球范围内,不仅仅是中国)每年给美国经济造成的损失可能高达6000亿美元。该报告还将中国列为"世界知识产权主要侵权国",声明如下:

According to the USTR’s Section 301 report, the Chinese government uses “joint venture requirements, foreign investment restrictions, and administrative review and licensing processes to force or pressure technology transfers from American companies.”1 Taken together, these technology transfer methods have led to the loss of billions of dollars in U.S. research and development, IP, and technology products. According to the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, the annual cost of IP theft (globally, not just from China) to the U.S. economy could be as much as $600 billion.2 The report goes on to name China as “the world’s principal IP infringer,” stating:

中国继续从在中国境内运营的美国公司,从世界其他地方的实体,当然还有从美国直接通过传统和网络手段获得美国知识产权。其中包括国家旨在强制转让知识产权,或者为中国企业获取或窃取美国知识产权提供更好的地位的强制性活动

China continues to obtain American IP from U.S. companies operating inside China, from entities elsewhere in the world, and of course from the United States directly through conventional as well as cyber means. These include coercive activities by the state designed to force outright IP transfer or give Chinese entities a better position from which to acquire or steal American IP.3

为了支持中国的技术发展,中国政府依靠几种不同的方式来获取美国的技术,包括(1)寻求外国技术公司的外国直接投资,(2)对外国技术公司和初创企业进行风险投资,(3)在外国和中国公司之间建立合资企业,(4)要求外国公司在中国经营许可协议,(5)进行网络间谍活动窃取知识产权,(6)吸引美国专家和研究人员为中国公司工作或与中国公。以下部分将探讨中国公司如何应用这六种方法中的每一种来获取美国的技术和知识产权。

To support its technological development, the Chinese government relies on several different means by which to acquire U.S. technology, including (1) pursuing FDI in foreign technology firms, (2) making VC investments in foreign technology firms and startups, (3) establishing JVs between foreign and Chinese companies, (4) requiring licensing agreements for foreign firms to operate in China, (5) conducting cyber espionage to steal IP, and (6) attracting U.S. experts and researchers to work for or partner with Chinese companies. The following sections will explore how Chinese companies apply each of these six methods to acquire U.S. technology and IP.

外国直接投资

Foreign Direct Investment

中国在美国的外国直接投资仍然是获取美国技术的一个重要工具,尽管随着美国和中国监管限制的增加,其重要性已经减弱。根据美国贸易代表办公室301条款的调查,中国的外国直接投资交易旨在促成技术转移回中国:

Chinese FDI in the United States remains an important tool for acquiring U.S. technology, although its significance has waned amid increased regulatory constraints in both the United States and China. According to the USTR’s Section 301 investigation, Chinese FDI transactions seek to enable technology transfer back to China:

中国政府指导和不公平地促进中国公司对美国公司和资产的系统性投资和收购,以获得尖端技术和知识产权,并在被国家工业计划视为重要的行业进行大规模的技术转让

The Chinese government directs and unfairly facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies and assets by Chinese companies, to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property (IP) and generate large-scale technology transfer in industries deemed important by state industrial plans.4

中国政府鼓励国有和私营企业收购美国技术公司,以符合中国政府在电信和生物技术等行业的战略利益。†从2011年至2018年上半年,信息和通信技术(144亿美元)和能源(104亿美元)分别是中国对美国外国直接投资的第三和第四大目标,仅次于房地产(403亿美元)和运输和基础设施(169亿美元)

The Chinese government encourages state-owned and private firms to acquire U.S. technology companies in line with the government’s strategic interests in industries like telecommunications and biotechnology.† From 2011 to the first half of 2018, information and communications technology ($14.4 billion) and energy ($10.4 billion) were the third- and fourth-largest targets of Chinese FDI in the United States, respectively, behind only real estate ($40.3 billion) and transportation and infrastructure ($16.9 billion).5

62017年,私营经济咨询公司荣鼎咨询(Rhodium Group)估计,中国对美国的外国直接投资总额为294亿美元,低于2016年的456亿美元(见图1)。72018年,中国对美国的外国直接投资降至4.8美元

Increased uncertainty surrounding U.S. investment review procedures, along with Beijing’s recent efforts to tighten controls on capital outflows, has led Chinese FDI flows to the United States to decline in recent years.6 In 2017, the private economic consultancy Rhodium Group estimated Chinese FDI flows to the United States totaled $29.4 billion, down from $45.6 billion in 2016 (see Figure 1).7 In 2018, Chinese FDI in the United States fell to $4.8

更多信息,参见美国贸易代表办公室,对中国相关法案、政策和实践的调查结果

For more, see Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to

1974年贸易法案第301条下的技术转让、知识产权和创新,2018年3月22日。

Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, March 22, 2018.

Https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/section%20301%20final.

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF.

欲了解更多关于中国在美投资的趋势和影响,请参阅《美中经济与安全评论》

For more on trends and implications of Chinese investment in the United States, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review

委员会,第1章,第4节,"中国在美国的投资",2017年提交国会的年度报告,2017年11月,71-91。

Commission, Chapter 1, Section 4, “Chinese Investment in the United States,” in 2017 Annual Report to Congress, November 2017, 71– 91.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 4

这是自2010年以来的最低水平。中国对外直接投资的绝大部分(2017年为97%)来自併购

billion, the lowest level since 2010.8 Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) account for the vast majority (97 percent in 2017) of the total value of Chinese FDI, with the rest comprising capital-intensive greenfield investments.9

图1:2011-2018年上半年中国对美国的直接投资

Figure 1: Chinese FDI in the United States, 2011–H1 2018

US$ billions

50 120

45

100

40

35

80 Deals

30

25 60 of

20 No.

40

15

10

20

5

0 0

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 H1 2018

Greenfield Value Acquisitions Value

Greenfield No. of Deals Acquisitions No. of Deals

资料来源:荣鼎集团《中国投资观察》 Http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

Source: Rhodium Group, “China Investment Monitor.” http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

例如,在中东半导体产业,中国中央和地方政府已经建立了至少1070亿美元的国家和地区集成电路投资基金,用于增加国内生产能力和中国企业的海外收购。* 仅在2013年至2016年期间,中国公司利用这笔国家资金试图收购或投资至少27家美国半导体公司,总价值超过370亿美元。11. 在人工智能行业,中国公司在2010年至2016年期间投资至少51家美国人工智能创业公司和公司

Despite the recent decline in FDI flows, it is notable that Chinese firms’ attempts to directly acquire and invest in foreign firms focus on companies that have or are developing technology, IP, facilities, and talent in high-tech industries.10 In the semiconductor industry, for example, the Chinese central and local governments have established at least $107 billion of national and regional integrated circuit investment funds to finance increases in domestic capacity and Chinese firms’ acquisitions abroad.* Between 2013 and 2016 alone, China-based firms leveraged this state funding to attempt to acquire or invest in at least 27 U.S. semiconductor firms totaling more than $37 billion.11 In the AI industry, Chinese firms invested in at least 51 U.S. AI startups and firms from 2010 to 2016.12

政府对中国在美投资的私人和官方估计仅涵盖交易,即并购和绿地交易,导致外资拥有美国公司10% 或以上的有表决权证券。13其他不符合这一定义的少数股权投资形式,包括风险投资和商业交易,如合资企业和许可证要求,不包括在这些统计数据中。因此,对中国在美国投资的分析通常低估了中国在美国经济活动的实际水平

Private and official government estimates of Chinese investment in the United States only capture transactions— namely M&A and greenfield deals—resulting in foreign ownership of 10 percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated U.S. firm.13 Other forms of minority investment that do not meet this definition, including VC investments and business dealings such as JVs and licensing requirements, are not included in these statistics. As a result, analysis of Chinese investment in the United States generally underestimates the real level of Chinese economic activity in the United States.14

Venture Capital Investments

Venture Capital Investments

尽管大多数政府和私人对流入美国的外国直接投资的估计没有反映中国风险投资的流量,但它们在美国公司总投资中所占的份额越来越大。根据美国国防部国防创新部(DIU)的研究,2015年至2017年间,中国参与的美国风险投资支持的创业公司占美国全球风险投资交易的10% 至16% ,并且自2010年以来增长迅速(见图2)。152015年至2017年间,中国是美国公司最大的外国股权投资来源,在美国风险投资支持的公司投资总额达240亿美元,占全球对美投资的13% 。16作为比较,在同一时期,所有欧洲国家都是美国风险投资公司价值360亿美元的投资来源。17然而,DIU 的研究发现,与并购投资一样,中国在美国的股权投资在2015年至2017年期间有所下降,此前中国政府实施了严格的限制,以遏制资本外流

Although flows of Chinese VC investments are not captured in most government and private estimates of FDI flows to the United States, they represent an increasingly significant share of total investment in U.S. companies. According to research by the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), a U.S. Department of Defense initiative, Chinese participation in U.S. venture-backed startups accounted for between 10 and 16 percent of global venture deals in the United States between 2015 and 2017 and has increased rapidly since 2010 (see Figure 2).15 Between 2015 and 2017, China was the largest foreign source of equity investments in U.S. companies, investing a combined $24 billion in U.S. venture-backed companies, or 13 percent of worldwide investment in the United States. 16 For comparison, during the same period, all European countries were the source of $36 billion worth of investments in U.S. venture-backed companies.17 However, the DIU study found that—like M&A investments—Chinese equity investments in the United States declined between 2015 and 2017 after the Chinese government imposed strict limits to curb capital outflows.18

有关中国建设半导体能力的分析,请参阅美中经济与安全审查委员会,第章

For analysis on China’s efforts to build its semiconductor capabilities, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter

1,第三部分,"中国的十三五规划",2016年11月向国会提交的年度报告,151-161。

1, Section 3, “China’s 13th Five-Year Plan,” in 2016 Annual Report to Congress, November 2016, 151–161.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5

图2:2010-2017年中国在美国的风险投资

Figure 2: Chinese VC Investments in the United States, 2010–2017

US$ billions

14 300

12

250

10

200

8

150

6

100

4

50

2

0 0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

% Deal 1% 2% 4% 3% 6% 16% 10% 11%

Value from China

as Share of Total

Funding Participation (left axis) No. of deals (right axis)

注:截至2017年10月的数据。交易总额的百分比指的是每年中国在美国的风险投资占股权投资总额的比例。

Note: Data through October 2017. Percent of total deal value refers to Chinese VC in the United States as a share of total equity investments each year.

来源:Michael Brown 和 Pavneet Singh,《中国的技术转移战略:中国对新兴技术的投资如何使一个战略竞争对手获得美国创新的皇冠上的明珠》 ,国防创新单位,2018年1月6日。

Source: Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit, January 2018, 6.

另外,荣鼎集团的一份报告发现,2018年中国在美国的风险投资达到创纪录的33亿美元,高于2017年的21亿美元。例如,阿里巴巴是美国虚拟现实创业公司 Magic Leap 融资7.93亿美元、社交媒体公司 Snap 融资2亿美元、以及共乘应用 Lyft 融资2.5亿美元的主要投资者。21. 与此同时,中国社交网络服务商人人网是百万美元风险投资基金在美国金融科技创业公司(如 Fundrise 和 Motif)投资的领头公司。22、百度、阿里巴巴和腾讯都在加州设立了办事处,用于研发和企业风险投资。图23

Separately, a Rhodium Group report found that in 2018, Chinese VC investment in the United States reached a record $3.3 billion, up from $2.1 billion in 2017.19 Rhodium estimates that from 2000 to May 2018, Chinese VC capital contributions in the United States totaled $11 billion, 88 percent of which came from private Chinese investors.20 Alibaba, for example, was the lead investor in a $793 million financing round for the U.S. virtual reality startup Magic Leap, $200 million in the social media firm Snap, and $250 million in ride-sharing app Lyft.21 The Chinese social networking service Renren, meanwhile, was the lead company for million-dollar VC fund investments in U.S. fintech startups like Fundrise and Motif.22 Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent have all established offices in California for research and development and for corporate venture investing.23

尽管中国的风险投资决策与中共的政策或激励计划之间没有明确的联系,但中国的风险投资仍然典型地瞄准政府优先考虑的战略性行业的公司,如人工智能、自动驾驶汽车、虚拟现实、机器人和区块链技术

Although there is not a clear link between Chinese VC investment decisions and CCP policies or incentive programs, Chinese VC investments still typically target firms in industries the government has prioritized as strategic, such as AI, autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, robotics, and blockchain technology.24 The Rhodium Group study found that between 2000 and May 2018 Chinese investors targeted strategic technologies in 78 percent of all U.S. VC funding rounds involving a Chinese investor (out of a total of more than 1,200 funding rounds with Chinese participation).25 These investments are not just lucrative business opportunities; they could also enable Chinese firms to acquire valuable U.S. technology and IP.26

在 CFIUS 改革于2018年8月签署成为法律之前,中国通过美国风险投资基金的投资允许中国公司收购美国的技术资产,而不必遵守传统的外国直接投资交易所适用的严格规定和披露要求。27家风险投资基金通常不需要公开报告他们的投资,既不需要报告投资来源,也不需要报告投资目标。类似地,创业公司可以选择是否公开披露融资轮的信息,其中可能包括融资额和参与投资者,但他们通常不会分享每个投资者的投资额。由于这些原因,很难量化中国每年对美国创业公司的风险投资总额。28

Until CFIUS reforms were signed into law in August 2018, Chinese investments facilitated through U.S. VC funds allowed Chinese firms to acquire U.S. technology assets without being subjected to the same rigorous regulations and disclosure requirements that are applied to traditional FDI transactions.27 VC funds are not typically* required to publicly report their investments—neither the source of investments they received nor the target of investments they made. Similarly, startups can choose whether to publicly disclose information from funding rounds, which may include the amount of capital raised and participating investors, but they generally do not share the amount each investor contributed. For these reasons, it is difficult to quantify the total dollar amount of annual Chinese VC investments into U.S. startups.28

2018年8月,中国签署了一项法律,扩大了 CFIUS 对外国投资的审查权限,将某些非被动的外国少数股权纳入其中,比如风险投资交易

In August 2018, reforms were signed into law expanding CFIUS’ jurisdiction for foreign investment screening to include certain nonpassive foreign minority equity stakes such as venture transactions (for more on the impact of

一些公共养老基金和其他风险投资合伙人被法律授权披露他们投资的来源和价值。美国参议院银行、住房和城市事务委员会,关于 CFIUS 改革的听证会:审查基本要素,Scott Kupor 的书面证词,2018年1月18日。

Some public pension funds and other VC partners are legally mandated to disclose the source and value of their investments. U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing on CFIUS Reform: Examining the Essential Elements, written testimony of Scott Kupor, January 18, 2018.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 6

Cfius 的改革,见"美国技术转让管理条例"一节)。这些改革对一些中国投资者和美国初创企业之间的合作关系产生了寒蝉效应,这些企业担心 CFIUS 的冗长审查会耗尽资源,减缓商业活动。在接受路透社采访时,一位不愿透露姓名的美国风险投资家指出,由于 CFIUS 的担忧,至少有10笔交易失败。在2017年接受了中国资本之后,由于 CFIUS 的担忧,它在2018年拒绝了中国投资者的收购要约。Volley 首席执行官卡森·卡恩(Carson Kahn)表示:"出于光学原因,我们认为,向来自中国的投资者进一步展示自己是没有意义的。中国目前存在大量贸易紧张和知识产权紧张问题。"

CFIUS reforms, see section on “U.S. Regulations Governing Tech Transfer”). These reforms have had a chilling effect on partnerships between some Chinese investors and U.S. startups, which fear lengthy CFIUS reviews that could drain resources and slow business activity. In an interview with Reuters, one unnamed U.S. venture capitalist indicated at least ten deals had fallen apart due to CFIUS concerns.29 One example is U.S. AI startup Volley Labs, Inc. After accepting Chinese capital in 2017, it declined offers from Chinese investors in 2018 due to CFIUS concerns. “We decided for optical reasons it just wouldn’t make sense to expose ourselves further to investors coming from a country where there is now so much by way of trade tensions and IP tensions,” said Carson Kahn, Volley’s CEO.30

合资企业

Joint Ventures

由于中国政府严格限制外国直接投资流入,美国和其他外国企业除了默许中国公司的合资要求和签署他们的知识产权和技术以进入中国市场之外别无选择。合资企业是一种商业安排,其中两个或两个以上的合资方集中他们的资源,以追求一个特定的项目或商业机会。在典型的合资企业安排下,每个合资企业参与者对合资企业的利润、损失和成本承担责任,但这种安排本身被视为独立于合资企业参与者的其他商业利益的实体。然而,中国政府历来要求外国合资伙伴提供他们的知识产权和技术作为协议的一部分

Because the Chinese government enforces stringent restrictions on FDI inflows, U.S. and other foreign businesses have few options other than to acquiesce to Chinese firms’ JV requirements and sign over their IP and technology to access the Chinese market. A JV is a business arrangement in which two or more parties pool their resources to pursue a specific project or business opportunity. Under a typical JV arrangement, each JV participant shares responsibility for profits, losses, and costs of the venture, yet the arrangement itself is regarded as its own entity separate from the participants’ other business interests. 31 The Chinese government, however, has historically required foreign JV partners to provide both their IP and technology as part of the arrangement.32

美国国家经济研究局(National Bureau of Economic Research)2018年3月的一份研究报告发现,合资企业通常生产中国企业技术最先进、最具创新性的程序和产品,这些程序和产品是通过合资企业的外国合作伙伴的技术转让获得的。33该研究还发现,直接参与合资企业的中国企业——这意味着它们是外国先进技术和专门知识的直接受益者——。因此,这些技术转让使所有中国公司更具生产力和竞争力,使美国的经济竞争力和潜在的国家安全利益受到威胁

A March 2018 study from the National Bureau of Economic Research found that JVs often generate Chinese companies’ most technologically advanced and innovative procedures and products, acquired through technology transfer from their foreign JV partner.33 The study also found that the Chinese firms directly involved in the JV— meaning they are the direct beneficiaries of advanced foreign technology and knowhow—generate positive externalities to other domestic firms operating in the same industry. Thus, these technology transfers make all Chinese firms more productive and competitive, putting U.S. economic competitiveness and—potentially— national security interests at risk.34

根据中国商务部下属的中国投资促进机构的数据,仅2015年一年,就有6000多家新的中国合资企业与外国合作伙伴建立了合资企业,约占流入中国的外国直接投资总额的278亿美元。35. 在一些行业,外国公司必须与中国合伙人组成合资企业,才能在中国投资或经营(见表1)。36. 合资企业的中方合作伙伴通常会要求其外方合作伙伴共享技术和专有技术,从而导致技术转让到中国。37. 尽管近年来中国对外国投资的规定已经放宽,但中国的外国投资政策仍然要求外国公司与当地公司合伙,在受限制的行业开展业务,而在一些行业(通常是处理国家安全或其他关键基础设施部门的行业) ,外国投资仍然严格禁止。图38

According to data from China’s Investment Promotion Agency, which operates under China’s Ministry of Commerce, over 6,000 new China-based JVs with foreign partners were established in 2015 alone, accounting for around $27.8 billion of FDI flows to China.35 In several industries, foreign firms must form a JV with a Chinese partner in order to invest or operate in China (see Table 1).36 Frequently, the Chinese partner in a JV will require that its foreign partner share technology and knowhow, leading to technology transfer to China.37 Although Chinese regulations on foreign investment have been liberalized in recent years, China’s foreign investment policy still mandates that foreign firms partner with a local firm to conduct business in restricted industries, while in some industries (typically those dealing with national security or other critical infrastructure sectors) foreign investment remains strictly off limits.38

表1:中国对外国投资者的合资企业要求

Table 1: Chinese Industries with JV Requirements for Foreign Investors

JV with Chinese Company Required JV Required with Foreign Share Limited to Minority

Exploration and exploitation of oil and Auto manufacturing (allows for 50-50 stake)

natural gas General aviation companies

Medical institutions Market surveys (such as radio and television ratings

Production of radio and television

surveys)

programs and movies Educational institutions (excluding compulsory

Insurance companies education and religious education institutions)

注:有合资要求的行业清单不包括所有有所有权限制的行业。

Note: The list of industries with JV requirements does not include all industries with ownership restrictions.

资料来源:中国国家发展和改革委员会、商务部《引导外商投资产业目录》(2017年修订) ,2017年6月28日。Http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4851_0_7.html :2018年7月28日,国家发展和改革委员会,商务部,《外商投资准入特别行政措施(负面清单)》。Http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/pressconferencehomepage/foreigninvestment/201807/20180702767650.shtml.

Source: China’s National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Commerce, Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (Revision 2017), June 28, 2017. http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4851_0_7.html; China’s National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Commerce, Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for the Access of Foreign Investment (2018), July 28, 2018. http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/pressconferencehomepage/foreigninvestment/201807/20180702767650.shtml.

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2019年3月,中国政府通过了新的《外国投资法》 ,旨在促进对华外商直接投资,保护"外国投资者的合法权益" 39. 尽管法律要求政府官员保护外国公司的知识产权,并禁止技术转让要求,但法律只是提供了一般性保证,即使法律生效,仍然需要多年时间才能实施。德杰律师事务所(Dechert LLP)驻北京的执行合伙人陶表示,针对在华外国投资者,"修改或废除现有的监管和审批程序,需要中央和地方许多(中国)行政部门花费大量时间"

In March 2019, the Chinese government passed a new Foreign Investment Law, which seeks to promote inbound FDI to China and protect “the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors.”39 Although the law requires government officials to protect foreign firms’ IP rights and bans technology transfer requirements, the law only provides general assurances that, if enacted, will still take years to implement. According to Jingzhou Tao, a managing partner in Beijing at the law firm Dechert LLP, “It will take many [Chinese] administrations, both central and local, [and] a lot of time to amend or abolish [the] existing regulatory and approval processes” for foreign investors in China.40

发牌规定

Licensing Requirements

中国政府实行广泛而复杂的许可证制度,歧视外国投资者,导致外国公司延误和增加成本,同时也导致向中国竞争对手转让有价值的知识产权和技术。41许可证要求是要求外国公司或国内公司从事不同类型的经济活动(从销售产品到建设新的制造设施)都必须获得政府批准的法律。这包括获得在市场上合法经营的许可证、许可证和证书。中国对100多种不同的商业活动实行许可证要求,如食品和药品生产、采矿和电信服务

The Chinese government utilizes an extensive and complex licensing system that discriminates against foreign investors, resulting in significant delays and added costs for foreign companies while also leading to the transfer of valuable IP and technology to Chinese competitors.41 Licensing requirements are laws that demand companies— foreign or domestic—receive government approval for different types of economic activities (everything from selling products to building new manufacturing facilities). This includes obtaining licenses, permits, and certifications to operate legally in the market.42 China imposes licensing requirements on more than 100 different business activities, such as food and drug production, mining, and telecommunications services.43

许可程序允许中国监管机构歧视外国投资者,同时防止保护主义做法在世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization)被记录和使用来反对中国。44. 美国商会称,"中国对外直接投资审批流程相对不透明,使得中国的投资审批机构能够在愿意的情况下,优先考虑国内竞争对手,而不是外国投资者,同时不会留下可能明显违反(世界贸易组织)义务的歧视性书面规定。" 45经济合作与发展组织的外国直接投资限制指数说明了这一问题,该指数在2017年将中国列为世界上对外国投资限制最严格的市场第三位(仅次于沙特阿拉伯和菲律宾)

The licensing processes allow Chinese regulators to discriminate against foreign investors while keeping protectionist practices from being documented and used against China at the World Trade Organization. 44 According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “The relatively opaque nature of the inbound FDI approval processes enables China’s investment approval authorities to favor domestic competitors over foreign investors, should they so desire, without leaving a paper trail of discriminatory written regulations that could clearly offend [World Trade Organization] obligations.” 45 This problem is illustrated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s FDI Restrictiveness Index, which in 2017 ranked China as the third most restrictive market in the world for foreign investors (ahead of only Saudi Arabia and the Philippines).46

作为中国许可文件程序的一部分,商业公司被要求向中国地方和中央各级政府机构提供详细的产品和工艺信息。由于中国的许可审批程序不明确且艰巨,企业往往会披露其他市场通常不需要的敏感信息。在最近出台的《外国投资法》(Foreign Investment Law)出台之前,中国政府机构通常不需要同意销毁在许可审批过程中提交的公司信息,这样即使获得了批准,企业的知识产权也可以被共享或披露。《外国投资法》包括一些条款,建议取消这些做法,但该法的措辞仍然模糊。北京还修订了2019年3月生效的《技术进出口管理条例》的条款,但尚不清楚这些变化将如何影响外国公司

As part of China’s licensing documentation procedures, commercial firms are required to provide detailed product and process information to Chinese government agencies at the local and central levels. Because licensing approval processes in China are unclear and arduous, companies tend to disclose sensitive information that is typically not required in other markets.47 Prior to the recent Foreign Investment Law, Chinese government agencies did not typically have to agree to destroy company information submitted in the licensing process, so companies’ IP could be shared or exposed even after the approval was secured. The Foreign Investment Law includes provisions that suggest these practices will be eliminated, but the wording of the law remains vague.48 Beijing also revised provisions of its Administration of Technology Import/Export Regulations effective March 2019, but it remains unclear how the changes will impact foreign companies.49

根据美国商会在2019年中国商业调查中的数据,35% 的受访者将许可证要求列为在中国经营的最大挑战。50同样,美中贸易全国委员会(u.s.-China Business Council)也发现,一半以上的美国公司甚至在中国的更新过程中也遇到了许可证方面的挑战,并且报告称,它们在获得许可证方面遇到了国内竞争对手没有遇到的挑战

According to the American Chamber of Commerce in China’s 2019 business survey, 35 percent of survey respondents cited licensing requirements as a top challenge of operating in China.50 Similarly, the U.S.-China Business Council has found that more than half of U.S. companies experience licensing challenges even during renewal processes in China, and report facing challenges obtaining licenses that their domestic competitors do not.51

中国的数据保护和安全法律也允许中共通过对外国技术公司的本地化要求获得美国的知识产权和技术。例如,2017年6月生效的中国新《网络安全法》规定,数据必须在中国本地存储,这迫使外国公司要么投资于接受政府抽查的新的中国数据服务器,要么聘请华为、腾讯或阿里巴巴等本地服务器提供商

Chinese data protection and security laws also allow the CCP to acquire U.S. IP and technology through localization requirements for foreign technology firms. For example, China’s new Cybersecurity Law, which entered into force in June 2017, requires data to be stored locally in China, forcing foreign companies to either invest in new China-based data servers subject to government spot checks, or hire a local server provider such as Huawei, Tencent, or Alibaba.52

网络间谍

Cyber Espionage

网络入侵允许中国企业获取有关美国公司专有业务和项目融资信息的信息,以及窃取知识产权和技术。中国政府利用政府支持的协调网络间谍活动,从美国的各种商业公司窃取信息,包括石油、能源、钢铁和航空行业的公司

Cyber intrusions allow Chinese businesses—in some cases acting at the CCP’s direction or with government assistance—to access information about U.S. firms’ proprietary operations and project-financing information, as well as steal IP and technology. The Chinese government has utilized coordinated, government-backed cyber espionage campaigns to steal information from a variety of U.S.-based commercial firms, including those in the oil and energy, steel, and aviation industries.53 According to James Lewis, a senior vice president at the Center for

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 8

战略与国际研究—— 在过去的二十年中,中国的网络间谍活动每年可能给美国经济造成200亿到300亿美元的损失

Strategic and International Studies, over the past two decades Chinese cyber espionage has likely cost the U.S. economy between $20 billion and $30 billion annually.54

美国贸易代表办公室2018年的301部分报告发现,北京的政府行为者和中国公司的高管都利用秘密的网络入侵,获取"大量未经授权的"具有商业价值的美国商业信息,包括"商业机密、技术数据、谈判立场,以及敏感和专有的内部通信" 55例如,2018年10月,美国司法部指控中国国家安全部的一名官员从事经济间谍活动,并企图窃取通用电气的子公司通用航空公司和其他美国航空航天公司的商业机密。据主管国家安全的助理司法部长约翰·c·德默斯说,"这个案件不是一个孤立的事件。这是以美国为代价发展中国的总体经济政策的一部分。" 56

The 2018 USTR Section 301 report found that government actors in Beijing and executives at Chinese companies alike use covert cyber intrusions to gain “unauthorized access to a wide range” of commercially valuable U.S. business information, including “trade secrets, technical data, negotiating positions, and sensitive and proprietary internal communications.”55 For example, in October 2018 the U.S. Department of Justice indicted an official from China’s Ministry of State Security for economic espionage and attempting to steal trade secrets from GE Aviation, a subsidiary of General Electric, and other U.S. aviation and aerospace companies. According to Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, “This case [was] not an isolated incident. It is part of an overall economic policy of developing China at American expense.”56

从美国的角度来看,这些间谍活动违反了时任美国总统贝拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)与中国国家主席、中共中央总书记习近平2015年达成的协议,当时两位领导人都同意,"两国政府都不会进行或故意支持利用网络窃取知识产权的行为,包括商业机密或其他商业机密,目的是为企业或商业部门提供竞争优 57

From a U.S. perspective, these espionage campaigns represent a violation of the 2015 deal between then President Barack Obama and Chinese President and General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping, when both leaders agreed that “neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”57

人才引进

Talent Acquisition

中国政府设有官方项目,旨在招募海外华人、外国专家和战略部门的企业家来中国教学和工作。这些项目试图通过模糊非正式技术转让和知识产权盗窃之间的界限、利用开放源代码情报、招募美国高科技领域的顶尖专家以及促进学术交流等方法来获取美国的技术

The Chinese government maintains official programs aimed at recruiting overseas Chinese and foreign experts and entrepreneurs in strategic sectors to come teach and work in China. These programs seek to acquire U.S. technology by blurring the line between informal technology transfer and IP theft, using methods such as utilizing open source intelligence, recruiting leading U.S. experts in high-tech fields, and promoting academic exchanges.58

例如,中国政府在2006年启动了"111工程",从世界前100所大学和研究机构中招聘1000名战略领域的外国专家。截至2009年,该工程已招募了39名诺贝尔奖获得者和591名学者。同样,"千人计划"于2008年12月启动,截至2014年年中,已有4000多名外国人进入中国的科学实验室、企业和研究中心。61这些项目和类似项目提供的研究和创业资金用于激励外国专家和企业家在海外和中国之间分配职位,或将他们的工作完全放在中国

Project 111, for example, was launched by the Chinese government in 2006 to recruit 1,000 foreign experts in strategic sectors from the world’s top 100 universities and research institutes.59 By 2009, it had recruited 39 Nobel Prize winners and 591 academics.60 Similarly, the Thousand Talents Program was launched in December 2008 and by mid-2014 had brought more than 4,000 foreigners to China’s scientific laboratories, companies, and research centers.61 Research and startup funding provided under these and similar programs are used to incentivize foreign experts and entrepreneurs to either split time between positions overseas and in China or base their work entirely in China.62

中国政府还利用政府间和学术界的伙伴关系和交流,获得美国最先进的研究和设备。通过在美国开设研究中心和实验室,中国公司和研究人员开发技术,创建和运行先进的研究和开发设施,如美国能源部的国家实验室。根据澳大利亚战略政策研究所(Australian Strategic Policy Institute)2018年的一份报告,自2008年以来,中国军方资助了2500多名中国军事科学家和工程师前往美国和其他地方的大学,担任学生或访问学者。该报告称,这些交流直接使中国得以利用美国和其他国家在高科技行业的经验、设施和资源,发展更好的军事技术

The Chinese government also utilizes intergovernmental and academic partnerships and exchanges to gain access to cutting-edge U.S. research and equipment. By opening research centers and laboratories in the United States, Chinese companies and researchers develop the knowhow to create and run advanced research and development facilities such as the U.S. Department of Energy’s national laboratories.63 Exchange programs for Chinese students in science and technology fields, meanwhile, allow Chinese firms to access overseas expertise, research, and training. According to a 2018 report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, since 2008 the Chinese military sponsored more than 2,500 Chinese military scientists and engineers to travel to universities in the United States and elsewhere as students or visiting scholars. These exchanges, the report alleges, directly allowed China to develop better military technology by leveraging U.S. and other countries’ experience, facilities, and resources in high-tech industries.64

美国技术转让法规

U.S. Regulations Governing Tech Transfer

美国关于保护对美国国家安全至关重要的技术的法规主要分为三类:(1)披露要求,(2)出口管制,(3) CFIUS。以下各节探讨如何在中国技术转让实践中应用这些规定。

U.S. regulations governing the preservation of technologies critical for U.S. national security fall into three main categories: (1) disclosure requirements, (2) export controls, and (3) CFIUS. The sections below explore how each of these regulations is applied in the context of Chinese technology transfer practices.

披露规定

Disclosure Requirements

风险投资者被要求向美国政府透露很少的信息,只要他们是被动的投资者,比如通过风险投资基金进行的投资。美国和国外的风险投资家通常不受1940年《投资公司法》(Investment Company Act)的约束,该法为其他形式的公司制定了指导方针

VC investors are required to disclose little information to the U.S. government provided they are passive investors, such as investments facilitated through VC funds. Venture capitalists—both in the United States and abroad—are typically exempt from the Investment Company Act of 1940, which set the guidelines for other forms of corporate

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 9

65. 尽管美国证券交易委员会(SEC)保留了私人融资的备案文件,但这些文件只提供了融资金额的信息,而没有提供投资者的姓名或国籍。66因此,缺乏关于通过美国风险投资基金促进的外国投资的可靠行业数据,使得难以充分评估涉及美国个人或公司的非并购外国投资和商业安排的影响

activities like mutual fund investments.65 Although the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) maintains filings of private financings, these documents only provide information on the amount of funding, not the names or home countries of the investors.66 As a result, there is a shortage of reliable industry data on foreign investment facilitated through VC funds in the United States, making it difficult to fully assess the implications of non-M&A foreign investments and business arrangements involving U.S. persons or companies.67

出口管制

Export Controls

美国目前的出口管制制度旨在防止外国拥有敏感技术、公司和基础设施,重点是保护两用技术。然而,出口管制已变得更加难以实施,因为管制者必须设法预测为商业目的开发的早期阶段技术今后是否可用于军事目的

The current U.S. export control regime is designed to prevent foreign ownership of sensitive technology, companies, and infrastructure, with an emphasis on the protection of dual-use technologies. However, export controls have become more difficult to apply as regulators must attempt to predict whether early-stage technologies developed for commercial purposes could be used for military purposes in the future.68

2018年8月,唐纳德·特朗普总统签署了《2018年出口管制改革法案》(ECRA) ,使之成为法律,成为2018年约翰·s·麦凯恩国防授权法案的一部分,对某些商业、双重用途和军事物品建立永久性出口管制。根据这项法律,美国商务部工业与安全局(u.s. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security)将领导一个跨部门、定期的程序,以确定并适当控制被视为"对美国国家安全至关重要"的"新兴"和"基础"技术 69

In August 2018, President Donald Trump signed the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) into law as part of the 2018 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act, establishing permanent export controls on certain commercial, dual-use, and military items. Under the law, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security will lead an interagency, regularly scheduled process to identify and appropriately control “emerging” and “foundational” technologies deemed “essential to the national security of the United States.”69

美国外国投资委员会

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

外国投资委员会是负责审查进入美国的外国直接投资的主要政府实体。* 2018年8月,特朗普总统签署了《外国投资风险审查现代化法案》(FIRRMA) ,该法案除其他事项外,扩大了 CFIUS 下"涵盖的交易"(即受 CFIUS 审查的交易)的定义,包括为外国投资者提供获得关键技术、关键基础设施和敏感信息的交易,以及某些类型的投资基金交易。

CFIUS is the primary government entity tasked with reviewing FDI into the United States.* In August 2018, President Trump signed into law the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which, among other things, expanded the definition of “covered transactions” under CFIUS (i.e., transactions subject to a CFIUS review) to include transactions that provide foreign investors access to critical technology, critical infrastructure, and sensitive information, as well as certain types of investment fund transactions.

随着 FIRRMA 签署成为法律,CFIUS 现在必须考虑一笔交易是否涉及一个"特别关注"的国家,这个国家的"战略目标是获取一种关键技术或关键基础设施,这将影响"美国在这些领域的领导地位。† FIRRMA 还规定,外国人的任何非控制性投资(例如通过风险投资基金) ,如果这种投资使外国人控制了一家美国企业,即:(1)拥有、经营、制造、供应或服务关键基础设施;(2)生产、设计、测试、制造、制造或开发一项或多项关键技术;或(3)维护或收集美国公民的敏感个人数据,这些数据可能被用于威胁国家安全

With FIRRMA signed into law, CFIUS must now consider whether a transaction involves a country of “special concern” that has the “strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect” U.S. leadership in those areas.† FIRRMA also provides that any noncontrolling investment (such as through a VC fund) by a foreign person is subject to CFIUS scrutiny if such an investment grants a foreign person control over a U.S. business that (1) owns, operates, manufactures, supplies, or services critical infrastructure; (2) produces, designs, tests, manufactures, fabricates, or develops one or more critical technologies; or (3) maintains or collects sensitive personal data of United States citizens that may be exploited in a manner that threatens national security.70

Firrma 还扩大了"关键技术"的定义,超出了传统的出口管制条款,包括 ECRA 中定义的"新兴基础技术"。此外,FIRRMA 建立了一个正常的、持续的机构间进程,以确定应在 FIRRMA 和 ECRA 下涵盖的新兴基础技术

FIRRMA also broadens the definition of “critical technology” beyond traditional export-controlled articles to include “emerging and foundational technologies” as defined in ECRA. Moreover, FIRRMA establishes a regular, ongoing interagency process to identify emerging and foundational technologies that should be covered under FIRRMA and ECRA.71

这些改革加强了特朗普政府加强 CFIUS 对外国投资美国科技公司的审查的更广泛努力。2019年,中国在美国的两项科技投资——2016年昆仑投资约会应用程序 Grindr 和2017年投资于美国医疗公司 patientslikeme ——在来自 CFIUS 的压力下得以解除

These reforms add to a broader effort by the Trump Administration to ramp up CFIUS scrutiny of foreign investments in U.S. technology companies. In 2019, two Chinese tech investments in the United States—Kunlun’s 2016 investment in the dating app Grindr and iCarbonX’s 2017 investment in U.S. health firm PatientsLikeMe— were unwound following pressure from CFIUS.72

尽管 FIRRMA 扩大了 CFIUS 审查涉及国家安全问题的交易的能力,但中国技术转让的一些方法仍然没有得到解决,最显著的是对美国以外的关键技术的投资。总部设在美国以外、依赖美国知识产权和技术的公司,或通过空壳公司在美国科技行业进行投资以掩盖所有权的公司,可能不会被发现,因此可以避开 CFIUS 的审查。此外,FIRRMA 的规模仍不确定

Although FIRRMA expanded CFIUS’s ability to review deals with national security implications, some methods of Chinese technology transfer remain unaddressed, most notably investments in U.S. critical technologies based outside the United States. Companies based outside the United States that rely on U.S. IP and technology—or investments in U.S. technology industries facilitated through shell companies to obscure ownership—may not be detected, and thus could avoid CFIUS’s scrutiny. Moreover, it remains uncertain how FIRRMA will be

欲了解更多关于 CFIUS 审查程序的信息,请参阅美中经济与安全审查委员会,第1章,第2节,"中国

For more on the CFIUS review process, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 1, Section 2, “Chinese

欲了解更多关于 FIRRMA 的影响,请参见《美中经济与安全审查委员会,经济与贸易公报,2018年9月5日,2-4,美国改革中的外国投资委员会成为法律》。Https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/trade_bulletins/september%202018%20trade%20bulleti

For more on the implications of FIRRMA, see “Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Reform Becomes Law,” in U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Economics and Trade Bulletin, September 5, 2018, 2–4. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/trade_bulletins/September%202018%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 10

从2018年11月开始,美国财政部开始了第一个试点项目,并在 FIRRMA 签署生效后发布了临时(2020年3月结束)的 CFIUS 规定

implemented; effective November 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury began the first pilot programs and issued temporary (ending in March 2020) CFIUS regulations since FIRRMA was signed into law.73

国会的结论和考虑

Conclusions and Considerations for Congress

随着北京寻求进一步发展国内高科技产业,中国政府鼓励和指导企业从美国获取技术的努力可能会继续下去。除了并购投资,中国公司还通过风险投资和商业安排在美国投资并与美国公司合作,这些投资和商业安排在美国缺乏监管和充分的信息披露要求。中国公司也从网络间谍和人才收购活动中受益,这使他们能够复制使美国企业在世界市场上具有竞争力的技术和流程。作为对这些策略的回应,美国在2018年结束了一项301条款调查,并与其他贸易工具一起实施了关税,以迫使中国政府调整其政策。然而,北京一再表示将继续促进国家利益,国家政策旨在促进国家的技术发展,利用中国政府的资源和权力对抗美国公司。

Chinese government efforts to encourage and direct firms to acquire technology from the United States are likely to continue as Beijing seeks to further develop its domestic high-tech industries. Aside from M&A investments, Chinese firms invest in and partner with U.S. businesses through VC investments and business arrangements that are poorly regulated and lack sufficient disclosure requirements in the United States. Chinese companies also benefit from cyber espionage and talent acquisition campaigns, allowing them to replicate the technologies and processes that make U.S. businesses competitive in markets around the world. In response to these tactics, the United States concluded a Section 301 investigation in 2018 and implemented tariffs—along with other trade tools—to pressure the Chinese government to adjust its policies. However, Beijing has repeatedly indicated it will continue to promote its national interests, with state policies designed to further the country’s technological development that leverage the resources and powers of the Chinese government against U.S. companies.

中国公司还通过合资企业和许可证要求,以及对外国技术公司的本土化要求,在海外获得美国的知识产权和技术。总部设在美国和中国以外的美国公司(如总部设在欧洲、加拿大或日本的公司)也受制于中国获取或窃取其技术的努力,因此必须采取多边方式对抗中国的技术转让做法。

Chinese firms are also acquiring U.S. IP and technology overseas through JV and licensing requirements, as well as through localization requirements for foreign technology firms. U.S. companies based outside both the United States and China (such as firms based in Europe, Canada, or Japan) are also subject to Chinese efforts to acquire or steal their technology, necessitating a multilateral approach to confronting Chinese technology transfer practices.

技术转让和知识产权盗窃威胁着美国现在和未来的技术发展和能力。像人工智能和虚拟现实这样的高科技产业被期望生产基础技术,未来的创新将建立在这些技术之上。就像半导体对于后来的电子和通信产品的创造至关重要一样,今天的高科技领域预计将成为未来几十年发展和创新的平台。因此,允许技术转让的外国投资可以直接支持中国更先进的军事能力。74据美国对外关系委员会(Council on Foreign Relations)研究员亚当·西格尔(Adam Segal)称,中国政府非常清楚这些长期影响,并且正在"越来越多地思考如何确保它们在下一波技术浪潮中具有竞争力 75

Technology transfers and IP theft threaten to undermine U.S. technological development and capabilities both now and in the future. High-tech industries like AI and virtual reality are expected to produce foundational technologies upon which future innovations will be built. Much like semiconductors were crucial for the creation of later electronic and telecommunication products, today’s high-tech fields are expected to serve as the platforms for development and innovation in the decades to come. Consequently, foreign investments that enable technology transfers could directly support more advanced Chinese military capabilities.74 According to Adam Segal, fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, the Chinese government is well aware of these long-term implications and is “increasingly thinking about how to ensure they are competitive in the next wave of technologies.”75

尽管美国长期以来一直保持着自由开放的外国投资环境,但中国政府主导的获取美国技术的努力,引发了人们对美国目前的披露、投资审查和出口控制法律是否足以维护美国经济和国家安全利益的疑问。为了确保这些利益继续有效地防范外国影响和技术转让的风险,国会应考虑以下问题:

While the United States has long maintained a free and open foreign investment environment, Chinese government-led efforts to acquire U.S. technology raise questions about whether current U.S. disclosure, investment review, and export control laws are sufficient for preserving U.S. economic and national security interests. To ensure these interests remain effectively guarded against the risks of foreign influence and technology transfers, Congress should consider the following questions:

美国目前的信息披露要求是否提供了有关外国投资美国早期技术公司和联合研究伙伴关系的足够信息?

Do current U.S. disclosure requirements provide sufficient information on foreign investments in U.S. early-stage technology companies and joint research partnerships?

美国政府审查在美国的外国投资交易的能力是否扩展到所有可以授予外国实体对美国资产有效控制权的投资或商业安排?

Does the U.S. government’s ability to review foreign investment transactions in the United States extend to all investments or business arrangements that could grant a foreign entity effective control over U.S. assets?

目前的出口管制如何适用于美国创业公司或发展中公司开发的技术?

How are current export controls applied to technologies developed by U.S. startups or developing companies?

美国如何与其盟友和经济伙伴合作,应对中国技术转让行为带来的风险?

How can the United States work with its allies and economic partners to address the risks posed by Chinese technology transfer practices?

中国的人才招聘计划意味着什么? 是否应该施加任何限制来限制这些项目引起的技术转让风险?

What are the implications of Chinese talent recruitment programs? Should any restrictions be imposed to limit technology transfer risks resulting from these programs?

美国政府是否对中共的努力进行了充分的评估,以利用战略两用产业的发展来帮助中国应对与美国的竞争(一种通常被称为军民融合的战略) ? 如果有的话,还应该采取什么措施来确保从美国的利益角度对中国的这些活动进行适当的评估?

Are there sufficient U.S. government assessments of CCP efforts to leverage the development of strategic dual-use industries to aid in China’s competition with the United States (a strategy commonly referred to as military-civil fusion)? What additional steps, if any, should be taken to ensure a proper evaluation of these Chinese activities vis-à-vis U.S. interests?

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 11

尾注

Endnotes

美国贸易代表办公室,301章节,2018年3月。Https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ustr%20301%20fact%20shee

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Section 301 Fact Sheet, March 2018. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%20301%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.

盗窃美国知识产权委员会,知识产权委员会报告更新,2017,1。Http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_update_2017.pdf.

Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report, 2017, 1. http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf.

盗窃美国知识产权委员会,知识产权委员会报告更新,2017,2-3。Http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_update_2017.pdf.

Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report, 2017, 2–3. http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf.

美国贸易代表办公室,对中国技术相关法案、政策和实践的调查结果

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology

1974年贸易法第301条下的转让、知识产权和创新,2018年3月22日,65。Https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/section%20301%20final.

Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, March 22, 2018, 65. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF.

荣鼎集团,《中国投资观察》 Http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

Rhodium Group, “China Investment Monitor.” http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

Thilo Hanemann,"发展受阻:2018年上半年中国对美国的直接投资",荣鼎集团,2018年6月19日。Https://rhg.com/research/arrested-development-chinese-fdi-in-the-us-in-1h-2018/ .

Thilo Hanemann, “Arrested Development: Chinese FDI in the U.S. in 1H 2018,” Rhodium Group, June 19, 2018. https://rhg.com/research/arrested-development-chinese-fdi-in-the-us-in-1h-2018/.

荣鼎集团,《中国投资观察》 Http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

Rhodium Group, “China Investment Monitor.” http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

Thilo Hanemann,Cassie Gao 和 Adam Lysenko,"Net Negative:Chinese Investment in the u.s. in 2018,"Rhodium Group,January 13,2019。Https://rhg.com/research/chinese-Investment-in-the-us-2018-recap/ :《中国投资观察》 Http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

Thilo Hanemann, Cassie Gao, and Adam Lysenko, “Net Negative: Chinese Investment in the U.S. in 2018,” Rhodium Group, January 13, 2019. https://rhg.com/research/chinese-investment-in-the-us-2018-recap/; Rhodium Group, “China Investment Monitor.” http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

荣鼎集团,《中国投资观察》 Http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

Rhodium Group, “China Investment Monitor.” http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.

乔纳森·雷等,"中国的工业和军事机器人技术发展",国防集团(为美中经济和安全审查委员会做准备) ,2016年10月25日,12。

Jonathan Ray et al., “China’s Industrial and Military Robotics Development,” Defense Group, Inc. (prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission), October 25, 2016, 12.

Thilo Hanemann and Daniel h. Rosen,"Chinese Investment in the United States:Recent Trends and the Policy Agenda,"荣鼎集团(prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission) ,2016年12月8日,79-81。

Thilo Hanemann and Daniel H. Rosen, “Chinese Investment in the United States: Recent Trends and the Policy Agenda,” Rhodium Group (prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission), December 8, 2016, 79–81.

保罗·莫祖尔(Paul Mozur)和约翰·马尔科夫(John Markoff) ,《 China Outsmarting America 在人工智能领域吗? 》 纽约时报,2017年5月27日。

Paul Mozur and John Markoff, “Is China Outsmarting America in A.I.?” New York Times, May 27, 2017.

Thilo Hanemann,《中国投资监测:方法更新》 ,荣鼎咨询,2015年7月21日。Https://rhg.com/research/china-Investment-monitor-methodology-update/ :《美国经济分析局》 ,1990年2月29日。Https://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/internat/fdinvest/1990/0290iid.pdf.

Thilo Hanemann, “China Investment Monitor: Methodology Update,” Rhodium Group, July 21, 2015. https://rhg.com/research/china-investment-monitor-methodology-update/; Alicia M. Quijano, “A Guide to BEA Statistics on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States,” U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, February 1990, 29. https://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/internat/fdinvest/1990/0290iid.pdf.

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh,"中国的技术转移战略:中国在新兴技术上的投资如何使一个战略竞争对手获得美国创新的皇冠上的明珠",国防创新单位,2018年1月,10。

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit, January 2018, 10.

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh,"中国的技术转移战略:中国在新兴技术上的投资如何使一个战略竞争对手获得美国创新的皇冠上的明珠",国防创新单位,2018年1月6日。

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit, January 2018, 6.

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh,"中国的技术转移战略:中国在新兴技术上的投资如何使一个战略竞争对手获得美国创新的皇冠上的明珠",国防创新单位,2018年1月28日。

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit, January 2018, 28.

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh,"中国的技术转移战略:中国在新兴技术上的投资如何使一个战略竞争对手获得美国创新的皇冠上的明珠",国防创新单位,2018年1月28日。

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit, January 2018, 28.

Matt Sheehan,"The Rise,Fall,and Future of Chinese Money in Silicon Valley,"MacroPolo,2017年7月31日。Https://macropolo.org/rise-fall-future-chinese-money-silicon-valley/ .

Matt Sheehan, “The Rise, Fall, and Future of Chinese Money in Silicon Valley,” MacroPolo, July 31, 2017. https://macropolo.org/rise-fall-future-chinese-money-silicon-valley/.

Thilo Hanemann,Cassie Gao 和 Adam Lysenko,"Net Negative:Chinese Investment in the u.s. in 2018,"Rhodium Group,January 13,2019。中国在美国的风险投资:第一个 FIRRMA 影响评估》 ,荣鼎 https://rhg.com/research/Chinese-Investment-in-the-us-2018-recap/ ,2019年3月8日。

Thilo Hanemann, Cassie Gao, and Adam Lysenko, “Net Negative: Chinese Investment in the U.S. in 2018,” Rhodium Group, January 13, 2019. https://rhg.com/research/chinese-investment-in-the-us-2018-recap/; Adam Lysenko and Thilo Hanemann, “Chinese Venture Investment in the U.S.: A First FIRRMA Impact Assessment,” Rhodium Group, March 8, 2019, 1.

Thilo Hanemann,Adam Lysenko,和 Daniel h. Rosen,"美国的中国风险投资:最近的趋势和 FIRRMA 的影响,"

Thilo Hanemann, Adam Lysenko, and Daniel H. Rosen, “Chinese Venture Capital in the U.S.: Recent Trends and FIRRMA Impacts,”

Rhodium Group,2018年7月11日,1。

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Steven N. Kaplan and Josh Lerner, “Venture Capital Data: Opportunities and Challenges,” Harvard Business School (Working Paper), August 2016, 4–5. http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/17-012_10de1f93-30e4-4a98-858c-4137556ec037.pdf.

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh,"中国的技术转移战略:中国在新兴技术上的投资如何使一个战略竞争对手获得美国创新的皇冠上的明珠",国防创新单位,2018年1月,2。

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit, January 2018, 2.

2019财政年度国防授权法案,公法第115-232号,2018年,Sec. ,1758年。

John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law No. 115-232, 2018, Sec. 1758.

2019财政年度国防授权法案,公法第115-232号,2018年,Sec. 1703年。

John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law No. 115-232, 2018, Sec. 1703.

2019财政年度国防授权法案,公法第115-232号,2018年,Sec. 1703年。

John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law No. 115-232, 2018, Sec. 1703.

卡尔·奥唐纳(Carl O'Donnell)、利亚娜·b·贝克(Liana b. Baker)和王(Echo Wang) ,"独家报道:告知美国安全处于危险之中,中国公司寻求出售 Grindr 约会应用",路透社,2019年3月27日。2019年4月4日,美国 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-grindr-m-a-exclusive/exclusive-us-pushes-Chinese-owner-of-grindr-to-divest-The-dating-app-sources-iduskcn1r809l 财经频道。Https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/04/cfius-forces-patientslikeme-into-fire-sale-booting-chinese-investor.html.

Carl O’Donnell, Liana B. Baker, and Echo Wang, “Exclusive: Told U.S. Security at Risk, Chinese Firm Seeks to Sell Grindr Dating App,” Reuters, March 27, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-grindr-m-a-exclusive/exclusive-us-pushes-chinese-owner-of-grindr-to-divest-the-dating-app-sources-idUSKCN1R809L; Christina Farr and Ari Levy, “The Trump Administration Is Forcing This Health Start-up That Took Chinese Money into a Fire Sale,” CNBC, April 4, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/04/cfius-forces-patientslikeme-into-fire-sale-booting-chinese-investor.html.

美国财政部于2018年10月10日发布 FIRRMA 试点项目暂行条例。Https://home.Treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm506,美国财政部,FIRRMA 关键技术试点项目的常见问题解答,2018年11月。Https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/291/-pilot-program-faqs.pdf.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Interim Regulations for FIRRMA Pilot Program, October 10, 2018. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm506; U.S. Department of the Treasury, FAQS on FIRRMA Critical Technology Pilot Program, November 2018. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/291/-Pilot-Program-FAQs.pdf.

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh,"中国的技术转移战略:中国在新兴技术上的投资如何使一个战略竞争对手获得美国创新的皇冠上的明珠",国防创新单位,2018年1月8日。

Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit, January 2018, 8.

约翰·马尔科夫和马修·罗森博格,"中国的智能武器变得更聪明",《纽约时报》 ,2017年2月3日。Https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/technology/artificial-intelligence-china-united-states.html.

John Markoff and Matthew Rosenberg, “China’s Intelligent Weaponry Gets Smarter,” New York Times, February 3, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/technology/artificial-intelligence-china-united-states.html.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 14

中国企业如何获得美国技术:机译:机译中文  2019-05-13 03:53   线路1   线路2   线路3 

(2019年5月6日,美国国会)中国公司利用各种方法——其中许多是秘密或强制性的——从美国公司获取有价值的技术、知识产权和技术诀窍。这些努力往往是在中国政府的指导和协助下进行的,这是中国政府发展国内市场、成为各种技术领域全球领先者的更大努力的一部分。

https://www.uscc.gov/Research/how-chinese-companies-facilitate-technology-transfer-united-states

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