国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

年度大会报告2019年涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019

国防部长办公室

Office of the Secretary of Defense

在2018-2019财政年度,编写这份报告花费了国防部大约181,000美元。其中包括12,000美元的费用和169,000美元的国防部劳动力。生成于2019年5月02日 RefID:E-1F4B924

Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $181,000 in Fiscal Years 2018-2019. This includes $12,000 in expenses and $169,000 in DoD labor. Generated on 2019May02 RefID: E-1F4B924

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

国防部长办公室国防部长办公室年度国会报告:中华人民共和国军事和安全事态发展年度国会报告:中华人民共和国军事和安全事态发展2019年国会报告根据经修订的《2000财政年度国防授权法》第1260条《中华人民共和国军事和安全事态发展年度报告》 ,对《2019财政年度国防授权法》第115-232号公法进行了修改,其中《2000财政年度国防授权法》第1202条第106-65号公法规定,国防部长应当提交"关于中华人民共和国军事和安。本报告将论述中国人民解放军军事技术发展的现状和可能的未来走向,中国安全战略和军事战略的原则和可能的发展,以及支持这种发展的军事组织和作战概念在未来20年的发展。报告还将述及 United States-China 在报告所述期间在安全事项上的接触与合作,包括通过 United States-China 军方之间的接触,以及美国今后此类接触与合作的战略。"

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as Amended Section 1260, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.”

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

行政摘要

Executive Summary

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   i

中国的战略是什么? 在21世纪最初的20年里,中国领导人受益于他们所认为的"战略机遇期",以发展国内经济,扩大中国的"综合国力" 在未来几十年里,他们致力于建设一个拥有"世界级"军事力量的强大而繁荣的中国,确保中国的大国地位,目标是成为印度-太平洋地区的超级大国。2018年,中国继续利用一系列经济、外交政策和安全工具来实现这一愿景。正在进行的国家主导的努力,中国在国内外实施,通常以经济和外交举措为特色,也支持中国的安全和军事目标:中国继续实施国家指导的长期规划,如中国制造2025和其他工业发展计划,强调用国产技术取代进口技术的必要性。这些计划给出口高科技产品的国家带来了经济挑战。这些计划还强调掌握先进的两用技术,从而直接支持军事现代化目标 中国领导人试图使民用和国防技术发展保持一致,以实现更高的效率、创新和增长。近年来,中国领导人将这一被称为军民融合(CMI)的举措升级为国家战略,鼓励民间部门进入国防市场。国家 CMI 战略的重点是硬件现代化、教育、人员、投资、基础设施和后勤 中国的领导人正在利用中国日益增长的经济、外交和军事影响力来建立地区优势并扩大国家的国际影响力。中国在"一带一路"等项目上的进步,可能会促使军队出国,因为他们认为需要为"一带一路"项目提供安全保障 中国对美国、其他国家和国际机构的媒体、文化、商业、学术和政策团体施加影响,以达到有利于其安全和军事战略目标的结果。中国共产党试图让外国和多边政治机构以及公众舆论接受中国关于其优先事项的说法,比如 OBOR 和南中国海的领土和海洋主张。

WHAT IS CHINA’S STRATEGY? China’s leaders have benefited from what they view as a “period of strategic opportunity” during the initial two decades of the 21st century to develop domestically and expand China’s “comprehensive national power.” Over the coming decades, they are focused on realizing a powerful and prosperous China that is equipped with a “world-class” military, securing China’s status as a great power with the aim of emerging as the preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2018, China continued harnessing an array of economic, foreign policy, and security tools to realize this vision. Ongoing state-led efforts, which China implements both at home and abroad and which often feature economic and diplomatic initiatives, also support China’s security and military objectives: > China continues to implement long-term state-directed planning, such as “Made in China 2025” and other industrial development plans, which stress the need to replace imported technology with domestically produced technology. These plans present an economic challenge to nations that export high-tech products. These plans also directly support military modernization goals by stressing proprietary mastery of advanced dual-use technologies. > China’s leaders seek to align civil and defense technology development to achieve greater efficiency, innovation, and growth. In recent years, China’s leaders elevated this initiative, known as Civil-Military Integration (CMI), to a national strategy that incentivizes the civilian sector to enter the defense market. The national CMI strategy focuses on hardware modernization, education, personnel, investment, infrastructure, and logistics. > China’s leaders are leveraging China’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military clout to establish regional preeminence and expand the country’s international influence. China’s advancement of projects such as the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative (OBOR) will probably drive military overseas basing through a perceived need to provide security for OBOR projects. > China conducts influence operations against media, cultural, business, academic, and policy communities of the United States, other countries, and international institutions to achieve outcomes favorable to its security and military strategy objectives. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to condition foreign and multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept China’s narrative surrounding its priorities like OBOR and South China Sea territorial and maritime claims.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展 ii

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   ii

中国领导人已经意识到,诸如"中国制造2025计划"和"预算外项目"等项目已经引发了人们对中国意图的担忧,在不改变这些项目的基本战略目标的情况下推动这些项目时,他们已经。全面管理地区争端中国寻求在不损害地区稳定的前提下实现其目标,而地区稳定对于帮助中共维持其权力垄断的经济发展至关重要。然而,中国领导人采用非武装冲突的战术,通过与美国、其盟友和伙伴以及印度-太平洋地区其他国家发生武装冲突的门槛以下的活动,追求中国的战略目标。这些策略在中国追求其在南中国海和东中国海以及与印度和不丹的边界的领土和海洋主张时尤为明显。2018年,中国在 Spratly Islands 的前哨部署了反舰巡航导弹和远程地对空导弹,继续在南海实现军事化,违反了中国国家主席习近平在2015年做出的承诺,即"中国不打算追求 Spratly Islands 的军事化"。中国也愿意采取强制措施——包括军事和非军事措施——以促进中国的利益,缓和其他国家的反对。建设更强大的人民解放军为了实现建设强大繁荣的中国的目标,中国领导人致力于发展与大国相称的军事力量。中国的军事战略文件强调要求中国人民解放军能够打赢战争,威慑潜在的敌人,保护中国的海外国家利益,包括越来越强调海上和信息领域、进攻性空中作战、远程机动作战以及空间和网络作战的重要性。2018年,中国人民解放军发布了新的《训练与评估大纲》 ,强调在所有战争领域进行现实的联合训练,并将针对"强大的军事对手"的任务和任务纳入其中 训练的重点是战备,通过实战训练提高人民解放军打赢战争的能力,包括多兵种演习、远距离机动和机动作战,以及增加使用职业"蓝军"对手。中共还继续大力铲除军队中的腐败现象。中国人民解放军还继续实施其历史上最全面的结构调整,以成为一支有能力开展复杂联合行动的部队。中国人民解放军力争有能力打赢"信息化局部战争"——区域冲突

Recognizing that programs such as “Made in China 2025” and OBOR have sparked concerns about China’s intentions, China’s leaders have softened their rhetoric when promoting these programs without altering the programs’ fundamental strategic goals. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO MANAGING REGIONAL DISPUTES China seeks to secure its objectives without jeopardizing the regional stability that remains critical to the economic development that has helped the CCP maintain its monopoly on power. However, China’s leaders employ tactics short of armed conflict to pursue China’s strategic objectives through activities calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region. These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its borders with India and Bhutan. In 2018, China continued militarization in the South China Sea by placing anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on outposts in the Spratly Islands, violating a 2015 pledge by Chinese President Xi Jinping that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” of the Spratly Islands. China is also willing to employ coercive measures – both military and non-military – to advance its interests and mitigate opposition from other countries. BUILDING A MORE CAPABLE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY In support of the goal to establish a powerful and prosperous China, China’s leaders are committed to developing military power commensurate with that of a great power. Chinese military strategy documents highlight the requirement for a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) able to fight and win wars, deter potential adversaries, and secure Chinese national interests overseas, including a growing emphasis on the importance of the maritime and information domains, offensive air operations, long-distance mobility operations, and space and cyber operations. In 2018, the PLA published a new Outline of Training and Evaluation that emphasized realistic and joint training across all warfare domains and included missions and tasks aimed at “strong military opponents.” Training focused on war preparedness and improving the PLA’s capability to win wars through realistic combat training, featuring multi-service exercises, long-distance maneuvers and mobility operations, and the increasing use of professional “blue force” opponents. The CCP also continued vigorous efforts to root out corruption in the armed forces. The PLA also continues to implement the most comprehensive restructure in its history to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of fighting and winning “informatized local wars” – regional conflicts

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展 iii

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   iii

定义了实时、数据网络化指挥控制(C2)和精确打击。解放军现代化包括指挥和部队结构改革,以提高作战灵活性和为未来部署做好准备。随着中国在全球的影响力和国际利益的增长,中国的军事现代化计划已经变得更加注重投资和基础设施,以支持中国周边地区以外的一系列任务,包括力量投射、海上航线安全、反海盗、维持和平、人道主义援助 / 救灾和非战斗人员撤离行动。中国军事现代化的目标还包括有可能削弱美国核心业务和技术优势的能力。中国利用各种方法获取外国军事和军民两用技术,包括有针对性的外国直接投资、网络盗窃、利用中国私人公民获取这些技术,以及利用其情报服务、计算机入侵和其他非法途径。2018年,中国试图从美国获得敏感、双重用途或军事级别的设备,包括动态随机存取存储器、航空技术和反潜作战技术。中国继续实施与建立五个战区司令部有关的改革,每个战区负责制定与具体威胁相关的指挥战略和联合作战计划及能力,以及应对危机和维护领土主权与稳定。台湾问题始终是中国人民解放军的主要"战略方向",也是中国领导层认为具有战略重要性的地理区域之一。其他战略方向包括东海、南海以及中国与印度和朝鲜的边界。中国对台湾的整体战略继续包含劝说和胁迫的因素,以阻碍台湾赞成独立的政治态度的发展。2018年,台湾又失去了三个外交伙伴,一些国际论坛继续拒绝台湾代表参加。尽管中国主张与台湾和平统一,但中国从未放弃使用武力,并继续发展和部署潜在军事行动所需的先进军事能力。2017年国家安全战略、2018年国防战略、2018年核态势评估和2019年导弹防御评估认识到动态安全环境下日益增长的军事竞争趋势。

defined by real-time, data-networked command and control (C2) and precision strike. PLA modernization includes command and force structure reforms to improve operational flexibility and readiness for future deployments. As China’s global footprint and international interests have grown, its military modernization program has become more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operations. China’s military modernization also targets capabilities with the potential to degrade core U.S. operational and technological advantages. China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military and dual-use technologies, including targeted foreign direct investment, cyber theft, and exploitation of private Chinese nationals’ access to these technologies, as well as harnessing its intelligence services, computer intrusions, and other illicit approaches. In 2018, Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment from the United States included dynamic random access memory, aviation technologies, and anti-submarine warfare technologies. REORGANIZING FOR OPERATIONS ALONG CHINA’S PERIPHERY China continues to implement reforms associated with the establishment of its five theater commands, each of which is responsible for developing command strategies and joint operational plans and capabilities relevant for specific threats, as well as responding to crises and safeguarding territorial sovereignty and stability. Taiwan persistently remains the PLA’s main “strategic direction,” one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as having strategic importance. Other strategic directions include the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and China’s borders with India and North Korea. China’s overall strategy toward Taiwan continues to incorporate elements of both persuasion and coercion to hinder the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence. Taiwan lost three additional diplomatic partners in 2018, and some international fora continued to deny the participation of representatives from Taiwan. Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign. THE U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP IN CONTEXT The 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, and the 2019 Missile Defense Review recognize the growing trend of military competition in a dynamic security environment.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展 iv

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   iv

美国将以实力地位进行竞争,同时鼓励中国在美国和中国利益一致的安全问题上与美国合作。与中国保持建设性的、注重结果的关系是美国在印度-太平洋地区战略的重要组成部分。2018年美国与中国进行的防务接触和交流旨在支持透明和互不侵犯的长期目标。美国国防部(DoD)与中国的接触寻求在紧张局势加剧时减少风险和防止误解。根据经修正的《2000财政年度国防授权法》的法定时效开展活动。尽管国防部与解放军保持接触,国防部也将继续监视和适应中国不断发展的军事战略、军事理论和军队发展。美国将调整其军队、姿态、投资和作战理念,以确保其保卫国土、遏制侵略、保护我们的盟友和伙伴,以及维护地区和平、繁荣和自由的能力。2018年报告的新内容该报告的总体结构已经精简,重点关注中国的战略、军队现代化、中国周边地区的作战能力、国防预算和资源,以及美中军事交流。不是每年更新一章,而是每一章的关键摘要总结趋势,并提供2018年值得注意的事件的快照。为了反映中国人民解放军的使命、优先事项和组织结构的变化,《中国周边地区作战能力》不仅包括解放军主要的"战略方向"——台湾应急能力,还包括5个战区司令部的军事和安全发展。这一章包括每个战区指挥部的图表和每个指挥部相关战略方向的信息,包括东海、南海、中印边界和 China-North Korea 关系的安全形势发展。报告背后的两个专题讨论了对美国具有军事和安全影响的关键事态发展:在"特别专题:影响行动"中,解放军至少从2003年开始在其作战计划中强调了其"三战"战略的发展,其中包括心理战、舆论战和法律战。根据这一战略,中国对美国、其他国家和国际上的文化机构、媒体组织、商业、学术和政策团体施加影响

The United States will compete from a position of strength while encouraging China to cooperate with the United States on security issues where U.S. and Chinese interests align. Maintaining a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China is an important part of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. defense contacts and exchanges with China conducted in 2018 were designed to support the long-term goal of transparency and non-aggression. U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) engagements with China seek to reduce risk and prevent misunderstanding in times of increased tension. Engagements are conducted in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended. Although DoD engages with the PLA, DoD will also continue to monitor and adapt to China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development. The United States will adapt its forces, posture, investments, and operational concepts to ensure it retains the ability to defend the homeland, deter aggression, protect our allies and partners, and preserve regional peace, prosperity, and freedom. NEW IN THE REPORT FOR 2018 The report’s overall structure has been streamlined to focus on China’s strategy, force modernization, capabilities for operations along China’s periphery, defense budget and resources, and U.S.-China military-to-military contacts. Instead of an annual update chapter, key takeaways in each chapter summarize trends and provide snapshots of notable events in 2018. Reflecting changes in the PLA’s mission, priorities, and organizational structure, “Capabilities for Operations along China’s Periphery” includes content not only on a Taiwan contingency, which remains the PLA’s main “strategic direction,” but also on military and security developments in each of the five theater commands. The chapter includes graphics for each theater command and information on each command’s relevant strategic direction, including developments in the security situation in the East China Sea, South China Sea, the China-India border region, and China-North Korea relations. Two special topics, located at the back of the report, address key developments that have military and security implications for the United States: > In “Special Topic: Influence Operations,” the PLA has emphasized the development of its Three Warfares strategy in its operational planning since at least 2003, which is comprised of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. Consistent with this strategy, China conducts influence operations against cultural institutions, media organizations, and the business, academic, and policy communities of the United States, other countries, and international

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展 v

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   v

实现有利于其安全和军事战略目标的结果。中国战略的一个基石包括呼吁海外中国公民或其他国家的华裔公民通过软实力或有时通过胁迫和勒索来推进党的目标。此外,中国利用学术界、教育机构、智囊团和官方媒体来推进中国的安全利益。中国的外国影响力活动主要集中在建立和维持一个外国政府的权力掮客,以促进政策,中国认为将促进中国的崛起,尽管中国声明的立场,不干涉外国的内政 在"特别主题:中国在北极"中,自2013年获得北极理事会观察员地位以来,中国增加了在北极地区的活动和参与。2018年1月,中国发布了《北极战略》 ,宣传"极地丝绸之路",自称中国是"近北极国家",并将中国的利益定位为获取自然资源和海上交通线,以及在北极事务中树立"负责任的大国"形象。该战略强调,中国的破冰船和在冰岛和挪威的研究站是其实施的组成部分。北极边境国家对中国在该地区不断扩大的能力和兴趣表示担忧。民用研究可以支持加强中国在北冰洋的军事存在,其中可能包括在该地区部署潜艇,作为对核攻击的威慑。

institutions to achieve outcomes favorable to its security and military strategy objectives. A cornerstone of China’s strategy includes appealing to overseas Chinese citizens or ethnic Chinese citizens of other countries to advance CCP objectives through soft power or, sometimes, coercion and blackmail. Furthermore, China harnesses academia and educational institutions, think tanks, and state-run media to advance China’s security interests. China’s foreign influence activities are predominately focused on establishing and maintaining power brokers within a foreign government to promote policies that China believes will facilitate China’s rise, despite China’s stated position of not interfering in foreign countries’ internal affairs. > In “Special Topic: China in the Arctic,” China has increased activities and engagement in the Arctic region since gaining observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013. China published an Arctic Strategy in January 2018 that promoted a “Polar Silk Road,” self-declared China to be a “Near-Arctic State,” and identified China’s interests as access to natural resources and sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and promoting an image of a “responsible major country” in Arctic affairs. The strategy highlights China’s icebreaker vessels and research stations in Iceland and Norway as integral to its implementation. Arctic border countries have raised concerns about China’s expanding capabilities and interest in the region. Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks.

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国防部长办公室国会年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展执行摘要一章:了解中国的战略一第二章:军队现代化的目标和趋势三十一章:中国周边地区的作战能力六十九章:军队现代化的资源九十三章第五章:中美军事-军事接触专题:影响北极地区的作战专题:中国与台湾军队数据附录二军事-军事交流附录三:2018年中国最大的原油供应国附录四

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY 1 CHAPTER 2: FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS 31 CHAPTER 3: CAPABILITIES FOR OPERATIONS ALONG CHINA’S PERIPHERY 69 CHAPTER 4: RESOURCES FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION 93 CHAPTER 5: U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS 107 SPECIAL TOPIC: INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 112 SPECIAL TOPIC: CHINA IN THE ARCTIC 114 APPENDIX I: CHINA AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA 115 APPENDIX II: MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES 118 APPENDIX III: CHINA’S TOP CRUDE SUPPLIERS IN 2018 120 APPENDIX IV: ACRONYMS 121

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展2

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  2

1了解中国的战略

1 UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  1

2018年,中国领导人在追求经济增长和提高技术实力的同时,继续推进雄心勃勃的军事现代化议程 中国领导人越来越认为美国采取了更具对抗性的方式,试图遏制中国的崛起 中国领导人认识到,"中国制造2025"和"一带一路"等计划已经引发了人们对中国意图的担忧,因此在推动这些计划而不改变其基本战略目标时,他们的措辞已经有所软化。中国2018年的总体战略推进了习近平主席在十九大上发表讲话时提出的各项举措。讲话详细介绍了中国在实现"中华民族伟大复兴"这一国家目标方面取得的进展 中国高层领导人称,2017年10月的党代会报告"不仅是中国共产党的行动纲领,也是了解中国最权威的教科书" 该报告每五年发布一次,旨在评估中国的发展状况,内容涉及政治、经济、文化、社会事务、环境、国防、国家统一、外交和党的建设等方面,所有这些都包含了更广泛的安全、内部和外部因素。2018年在全国人民代表大会上提交的政府工作报告再次强调了党代会报告的许多关键主题。全国人民代表大会将中国共产党和中国政府的努力路线联系在一起。2018年,中共中央和全国人大还批准了对党和政府机构进行重大改革,以支持这些努力。习的讲话体现了中国对国际趋势的看法,包括向多极化国际秩序的转变,以及通过全球化深化经济互联互通,并吹嘘中国从改革开放中获得的利益。党的代表大会报告强调,中国的崛起加速了改革全球治理体系和向多极化转变国际力量平衡的需要。报告还讨论了两个发展阶段,第一个发生在2020年至2035年。在此期间,中国认为自己的经济和技术实力"突飞猛进"地增长,加强法治,发展中产阶级,在解决收入差距的同时提高生活水平。下一个阶段,2035年至2050年,被确定为中国将成为一个富强、现代化、强大的社会主义国家,拥有"世界级"军事力量的时期。最后,这份报告称赞中国的发展是一个潜在的模式

Key Takeaways > In 2018, China’s leaders continued to advance an ambitious agenda of military modernization while pursuing economic growth and improving technological strength. > China’s leaders increasingly see the United States as adopting a more confrontational approach in an attempt to contain China’s rise. > Recognizing that programs such as “Made in China 2025” and the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative (OBOR) have sparked concerns about China’s intentions, China’s leaders have softened their rhetoric when promoting these programs without altering the programs’ fundamental strategic goals. China’s overall strategy in 2018 advanced initiatives presented during President Xi Jinping’s address to the 19th Party Congress, which detailed the progress China has made toward realizing its national objective of achieving the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Senior Chinese leaders have described the October 2017 Party Congress report as “not only the program of action of the Communist Party of China, but also the most authoritative textbook for understanding China.” Issued every five years to assess China’s development, the report contains lines of effort for addressing politics, economics, culture, social affairs, the environment, national defense, national unification, foreign affairs, and Party building, all of which have broader security, domestic, and external components. The 2018 government work report presented at the National People’s Congress (NPC), which aligns Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese government lines of effort, reemphasized many of the Party Congress report’s key themes. In 2018, the CCP Central Committee and the NPC also approved major reforms of Party and government institutions in support of these lines of effort. Xi’s speech characterizes China’s views of international trends, including the shift towards a multi-polar international order and deepening economic inter-connectivity through globalization, and touts the benefits China has gained from reform and opening up to the world. The Party Congress report highlights China’s rise as accelerating the need to reform global governance systems and shift the balance of international power towards multipolarity. The report also discusses two stages of development, the first occurring from 2020 to 2035. During this period, China sees itself as growing its economic and technological strength “by leaps and bounds,” strengthening rule of law, growing the middle class, and improving living standards while addressing income disparity. The next stage, 2035 to 2050, is identified as the period during which China will become a prosperous, modern, and strong socialist country with a “world-class” military. Finally, the report lauds China’s development as a potential model for

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展2

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  2

国际社会应该将中国的做法视为不具威胁性和建设性的。中国领导人将美国对华政策视为影响中国国家和战略目标的关键因素。中国领导人越来越多地认为,美国采取了更具对抗性的方式,这反映了中国长期以来的看法,即美国寻求遏制中国的崛起。此外,中国认为美国最近在贸易问题上的行动以及美国公开发布的国防和国家安全战略表明了这种遏制战略。中国似乎已经意识到它的一些项目,比如"中国制造2025"和"一带一路"倡议,已经引起了人们对中国意图的担忧。与过去对外部阻力的反应一致,中国领导人在推动这些项目而不改变其基本战略目标时,已经软化了他们的言辞。另外,中国官方媒体称,美国和中国之间"前所未有的战略不信任"正在增长。一些香港新闻界的评论员也批评中华人民共和国政府在准备取代其全球领导地位之前就采取了大规模的行动。中国在重要的地区论坛和双边会议上使用外交手段和公开信息来缓和对中国意图的担忧,并将自己展现为全球领导者。例如,2018年11月,李克强总理在东亚峰会上发表讲话时重申,东亚地区需要坚持多边主义,加强自由贸易,维护以规则为基础的国际秩序。这些呼吁反映了中国对一个稳定的国内和国际环境的偏好,这种环境将适应中国崛起为区域强国的需要,并促进其国家目标和战略目标在本章随后的章节中概述。战略目标关键外卖在21世纪的最初20年里,中国领导人受益于他们所认为的"战略机遇期",以促进国内发展,扩大中国的"综合国力" 中国越来越多地寻求利用其日益增长的经济、外交和军事影响力来建立地区优势并扩大其国际影响力。中国领导人认为,21世纪最初20年是中国国内发展和扩大"综合国力"的"战略机遇期",他们从中受益匪浅 在接下来的三十年里,他们确实如此

other countries to follow, claiming the international community should view China’s methods as unthreatening and constructive. China’s leadership sees the U.S. policy approach toward China as a critical factor affecting China’s national and strategic objectives. China’s leaders increasingly view the United States as adopting a more confrontational approach, reflecting China’s long-held perception that the United States seeks to contain China’s rise. Furthermore, China sees recent U.S. actions on trade and the public releases of U.S. defense and national security strategies as indicative of this containment strategy. China seems to recognize that some of its programs, such as “Made in China 2025” and its “One Belt, One Road” Initiative (OBOR), have sparked concerns about China’s intentions. In keeping with past responses to external pushback, China’s leaders have softened their rhetoric when promoting these programs without altering the programs’ fundamental strategic goals. Separately, official Chinese media outlets have described “unprecedented strategic distrust” growing between the United States and China. Some commentators in the Hong Kong press have also criticized the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for moving out on large-scale initiatives before being ready to take its place as a global leader. China uses diplomacy and public messaging at key regional forums and bilateral meetings to assuage concerns about China’s intentions and to present itself as a global leader. For example, during a speech at the East Asia Summit in November 2018, Premier Li Keqiang reiterated that the region needed to uphold multilateralism, strengthen free trade, and safeguard the rules-based international order. These calls reflect China’s preference for a stable domestic and international environment that will accommodate China’s rise to regional preeminence and facilitate its national goals and strategic objectives outlined in subsequent sections of this chapter. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES Key Takeaways > China’s leaders have benefited from what they view as a “period of strategic opportunity” during the initial two decades of the 21st century to facilitate domestic development and expand China’s “comprehensive national power.” > China increasingly seeks to leverage its growing economic, diplomatic, and military clout to establish regional preeminence and expand its international influence. China’s leaders have benefited from what they view as a “period of strategic opportunity” during the initial two decades of the 21st century for China to develop domestically and expand its “comprehensive national power.” Over the coming three decades, they are

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展3

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致力于在国际舞台上建设一个拥有"世界级"军事力量的强大繁荣的中国。他们对这一愿景的追求将实现外部观察家评估为中共压倒一切的战略目标:延续党的统治;维持国内稳定;维持经济增长和发展;捍卫国家主权和领土完整;以及确保中国作为一个大国的地位,并最终成为印度-太平洋地区的超级大国。这些目标反映在习近平主席的"中国梦"中 这个概念是习在2012年党的十八大领导层换届后不久首次提出的,体现了中国恢复强大繁荣国家地位的长期愿望。习主席和其他领导人还将中国梦与两个引人注目的百年里程碑联系起来:2021年在中共建党100周年之前实现"小康社会",2049年在中华人民共和国成立100周年之前建设"富强民主文明和谐美丽的社会主义现代化强国"。在2017年10月的第19次党代会上,习主席还列举了到2035年"基本实现社会主义现代化"的目标,其中包括中国成为最"创新导向"的国家之一,大大提高国家的软实力,改善经济繁荣。中国领导人越来越多地寻求利用中国日益增长的经济、外交和军事影响力来建立地区优势并扩大其国际影响力。例如,中国在全球经济项目上的进步,可能会促使新的中国人民解放军基于为 OBOR 项目提供安全保障的明显需求而走向海外。习主席对外交往概念的概述也反映了中共压倒一切的目标。这些概念包括"新型大国关系",试图将与美国的双边关系框定为近似同侪关系,以及印度-太平洋地区的"新区域安全概念",试图在没有联盟的情况下建立安全合作。然而,中国也寻求在不损害地区稳定的前提下实现这些目标,而地区稳定对经济发展至关重要;这种稳定有助于中共维持其执政的合法性。

focused on realizing a powerful and prosperous China on the international stage that is equipped with a “world-class” military. Their pursuit of this vision will fulfill what outside observers assess to be the overriding strategic objectives of the CCP: > Perpetuate CCP rule; > Maintain domestic stability; > Sustain economic growth and development; > Defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and, > Secure China’s status as a great power and, ultimately, emerge as the preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific region. These objectives are reflected in President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.” The concept, first articulated by Xi shortly after the 2012 leadership transition at the 18th Party Congress, encapsulates a long-standing national aspiration of restoring China’s status as a powerful and prosperous nation. President Xi and other leaders also link the China Dream to two high-profile centenary milestones: achieving a “moderately prosperous society” by the 100th anniversary of the CCP in 2021, and building a “prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and beautiful modernized socialist strong country” by the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC in 2049. At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, President Xi also enumerated objectives for the “basic realization of socialist modernization” by 2035, which included China becoming one of the most “innovation-oriented” countries, significantly enhancing the country’s soft power and improving its economic prosperity. China’s leaders increasingly seek ways to leverage China’s growing economic, diplomatic, and military clout to establish regional preeminence and expand its international influence. For example, China’s advancement of global economic projects will probably drive new PLA overseas basing through a perceived need to provide security for OBOR projects. President Xi’s outlining of foreign engagement concepts also reflect the CCP’s overriding goals. These are concepts such as the “new type of major power relations,” which attempts to frame bilateral ties with the United States as more of a near-peer relationship, and the “new regional security concept” for the Indo-Pacific region, which attempts to establish security cooperation without alliances. However, China also seeks to secure these goals without jeopardizing the regional stability that remains critical to economic development; this stability has helped the CCP maintain the legitimacy that has kept it in power.

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中国的国家安全管理中国对国家安全的广泛概念既包括国内稳定,也包括外部威胁,包括外部影响影响内部稳定的领域,如恐怖主义或亲民主思想的传播。中国正在实现党、军队和国家机构的现代化,以确保中国国家安全政策的协调和发展更加一致,并加强党对国家安全管理的控制。这些努力解决了一个长期存在的问题,即中国传统的炉灶式组织体系不足以应对随着中国利益和能力的扩张而面临的日益增长的动态挑战 在过去的四年里,全国人民代表大会通过了一系列法律,旨在解决复杂的国家安全问题,包括反间谍、情报、反恐和网络安全。此外,2015年一部范围广泛的《国家安全法》似乎将这些问题和其他问题归入国家安全的广泛概念,并加强了中央当局在保护国家安全方面的作用。到2015年,中共在2013年成立了新的国家安全委员会(NSC)之后,通过了中国第一个国家安全战略纲要。官方媒体指出,该战略旨在统一各部门在中央领导指导下的努力。在国家安全委员会第一次会议上,习主席要求国家安全委员会建立"一个集中、统一、高效、权威的国家安全领导体系" 根据学者的说法,国家安全委员会为政治局提供建议,监督政府内部国家安全事务的协调,并处理危机。委员会的职权范围似乎是处理外国影响影响国内稳定的安全问题,比美国国家安全委员会的职权范围要广得多。中国国家安全委员会的使命,法律的编纂,国家安全的广泛定义,以及强大的领导人建议国家安全委员会可以在习的第二个任期内拥有广泛的权威 国家安全委员会目前由习近平,李克强,可能还有李战书,中国三大领导人领导。中共中央办公厅主任很可能是中共中央政治局委员、中共中央办公厅主任丁学祥,在长达数十年的省级政府和党的职务生涯中,他可能几乎没有处理国际事务的经验。截至2018年5月,中共中央政治局委员、国家安全部部长陈文清还担任了国家安全委员会办公厅副主任,负责委员会的日常工作。中央军事委员会至少有一名副主席也可以是国家安全委员会的成员。

China’s National Security Management China’s broad concept of national security spans both domestic stability and foreign threats, including areas where external influence affects internal stability, such as terrorism or the spread of pro-democratic ideas. China is modernizing the CCP, its military, and state institutions to ensure greater coherence in the coordination and development of China’s national security policy and strengthen Party control of national security management. These efforts address long-standing concerns that China’s legacy system of stove-piped organizations is ill-equipped to meet the growing, dynamic challenges that China faces as its interests and capabilities expand. > Over the past four years, the National People’s Congress passed a suite of laws meant to address complex national security concerns, including counterespionage, intelligence, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity. In addition, an expansive 2015 National Security Law appeared to group these issues and others under a broad concept of national security and strengthen the role of central authorities in its protection. By 2015, the CCP adopted China’s first national security strategy outline following the establishment of a new National Security Commission (NSC) in 2013. Official media noted the strategy intends to unify efforts by various departments under the central leadership’s guidance. During the NSC’s first meeting, President Xi tasked the NSC with establishing “a centralized, unified, highly-effective and authoritative national security leading system.” The NSC advises the Politburo, oversees the coordination of national security issues across the government, and manages crises, according to academics. The Commission’s purview appears to address security issues where foreign influence affects domestic stability, a much wider scope than the U.S. National Security Council. The Chinese NSC’s mission, codification in law, sprawling definition of national security, and powerful leaders suggest the NSC may claim broad authority in Xi’s second term. > The NSC is currently led by Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and probably Li Zhanshu, China’s top three Party leaders. The head of its general office is likely Politburo member and CCP General Office Director Ding Xuexiang, who probably had little experience with international affairs during his decades-long career in provincial-level government and Party positions. As of May 2018, Chen Wenqing, a Politburo member and the Minister of State Security, has also filled the role of Deputy Director for the NSC General Office, responsible for the commission’s daily work. At least one Vice Chairman of the CMC may also be a member of the NSC.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展5

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  5

中国国内安全部队中国国内安全部队主要由公安部、国家安全部、人民武装警察部队和中国人民解放军组成。2018年,中央军事委员会(CMC)在人民行动党结束了人民行动党之前的 CMC- 国务院双重指挥系统之后,接管了人民行动党的直接控制权。中国海岸警卫队(CCG)隶属于人民行动党,规定了人民解放军在国内安全方面的持久作用,并可能加强了人民解放军与准军事部队的监督和协作。中国领导人依靠这些力量来应对各种挑战,从政治、社会、环境或经济问题的抗议,到可疑的恐怖袭击。近年来,中国越来越关注那些被认为与外国影响有关的抗议活动,另外还有突厥斯坦伊斯兰党,中国领导人将其描述为与新疆维吾尔族自治地方的维吾尔族民族主义者有关的恐怖组织。中国将中国的恐怖袭击归咎于维吾尔族"分裂分子",并在新疆实施了严格的安全措施,表面上是为了遏制潜在的袭击。公安部。公安部领导着中国的民警,民警是维护公共秩序的第一线力量。公共安全部的主要任务是国内执法和"维护社会安全和秩序",其职责包括反暴乱和反恐怖主义。国家安全部。Mss 是中国主要的民事情报 / 反间谍机构。国家安全部的任务是:保护中国的国家安全;维护政治和社会稳定;实施最近更新的《国家安全法》和相关法律法规;保护国家秘密;开展反间谍活动;调查中国境内实施或指挥、支持、帮助其他中国认为危害国家安全的人员的组织或人员。人民武装警察。人民行动党是中国武装力量的准军事组成部分,其主要任务是维护国内安全和稳定。截至2018年,人民行动党现在完全隶属于中央军事委员会,并对中央军事委员会拥有权力。武警是负责国内安全的主要力量。中国人民解放军。作为中共的武装力量,中国人民解放军是中共统治的最终保证者,除了国防任务之外,中国人民解放军还在国内安全方面发挥作用。例如,中国人民解放军可以提供交通、后勤和情报,以协助当地公安部队维持国内安全,并根据1997年《国防法》授权,在中共领导人认为必要时,直接"协助维护公共秩序"。

China’s Internal Security Forces China’s internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the PLA. In 2018, the Central Military Commission (CMC) assumed direct control of the PAP after the Party ended the PAP’s previous CMC-State Council dual-command system, and the China Coast Guard (CCG) was subordinated to the PAP, codifying the PLA’s enduring role in internal security and possibly increasing the PLA’s oversight and interoperability with the paramilitary forces. China’s leaders rely on these forces to address challenges ranging from protests over political, social, environmental, or economic problems to suspected terrorist attacks. In recent years, China has focused increasingly on protests perceived as being linked to foreign influences and, separately, the Turkestan Islamic Party, which China’s leaders characterize as a terrorist group connected to ethnic Uighur nationalists in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. China blames Uighur “separatists” for terrorist attacks in China, and has imposed strict security in Xinjiang, ostensibly to curb potential attacks. Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MPS leads China’s civilian national police, which serves as the first-line force for public order. The key mission of the MPS is domestic law enforcement and the “maintenance of social security and order” with duties including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism. Ministry of State Security (MSS). The MSS is China’s main civilian intelligence/counterintelligence service. The missions of the MSS are: to protect China’s national security; to secure political and social stability; to implement the recently updated State Security Law and related laws and regulations; to protect state secrets; to conduct counterintelligence; and to investigate organizations or people inside China who carry out or direct, support, or aid other people whom China perceives harm its national security. People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary component of China’s armed forces whose primary mission is internal security and domestic stability. As of 2018, the PAP now falls solely under the authority of the CMC and has authority over the CCG. The PAP is the primary force responsible for internal security. People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As the armed wing of the CCP, the PLA is the ultimate guarantor of the CCP’s rule, giving it a role in domestic security in addition to its national defense mission. For example, the PLA may provide transportation, logistics, and intelligence to assist local public security forces with internal security, and is authorized under the 1997 National Defense Law to directly “assist in maintaining public order” when CCP leaders consider it necessary.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展6

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  6

外交政策关键要点中国寻求提高其在现有区域和全球机构中的形象,同时有选择地寻求建立新的多边机制和机构,以促进其利益 中国继续主张建设"人类命运共同体",同时强调将捍卫核心利益,不畏挑衅。随着中国对外利益的扩大,中国已成为国际社会中一个更加突出的角色。自2017年10月中共十九大以来,中国国家主席习近平继续在国际论坛上倡导构建"人类命运共同体",强调中国愿意与所有国家的人民合作,同时强调中国将捍卫自己的核心利益和领土主权,不怕回应挑衅。在印度-太平洋地区,中国将自己描述为追求和平发展战略,并将美国确定为旨在遏制中国崛起的主要区域行为体。与此同时,中国表现出坚决捍卫自己的领土利益。中国的外交政策旨在提高中国在现有区域和全球机构中的形象,同时有选择地寻求建立新的多边机制和机构,以支持中国的利益。中国正在与该地区的16个国家谈判一项亚洲自由贸易协定,即区域全面经济伙伴关系协定(RCEP)。中国领导人希望 RCEP 加强与中国的区域经济联系,使中国成为该组织最大的经济体。中国在2016年成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行(AIIB) ,拥有57个创始成员国,以促进该地区的基础设施建设。中国利用习的标志性项目 OBOR,通过在亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲、中东和欧洲部分地区投资价值数千亿美元的大型基础设施项目,来加强其全球角色。中国已经与其他威权国家合作,比如俄罗斯,以缓和美国的压力战术。中国和俄罗斯都倾向于多极世界秩序,经常在联合国安理会上联合反对美国支持的措施。随着西方对俄罗斯的制裁,中国增加了对俄罗斯经济的投资。中国国防部长魏凤和于2018年4月访问莫斯科,"让美国了解中俄两国军队的密切关系。"

FOREIGN POLICY Key Takeaways > China seeks to enhance its profile in existing regional and global institutions while selectively pursuing the establishment of new multilateral mechanisms and institutions to further its interests. > China continues to advocate for the construction of a “community of common human destiny” while stressing that it will defend core interests and is not afraid to respond to provocations. As China’s foreign interests have expanded, it has become a more prominent player in the international community. Since the CCP’s 19th Party Congress in October 2017, President Xi Jinping has continued to advocate in international forums for the construction of a “community of common human destiny,” highlighting China’s willingness to work with the people of all countries, while stressing that China will defend its core interests and territorial sovereignty and is not afraid to respond to provocations. In the Indo-Pacific region, China depicts itself as pursuing a peaceful development strategy and identifies the United States as the dominant regional actor that intends to contain China’s rise. At the same time, China portrays itself as resolute in defending its territorial interests. China’s foreign policy seeks to enhance China’s profile in existing regional and global institutions, while selectively pursuing the establishment of new multilateral mechanisms and institutions to support its interests. China is negotiating an Asian free-trade agreement, known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), with 16 nations in the region. China’s leaders intend for RCEP to strengthen regional economic connectivity to China, with China as the largest economy in the organization. China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016, with 57 founding members, to promote infrastructure building in the region. China has used OBOR, Xi’s signature program, to enhance its global role by financing hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of major infrastructure projects throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Europe. China has partnered with other authoritarian states, such as Russia, to mitigate U.S. pressure tactics. China and Russia share a preference for a multipolar world order and frequently jointly oppose U.S.-sponsored measures at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In the wake of Western sanctions against Russia, China has increased investment in Russia’s economy. The Chinese Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe visited Moscow in April 2018 “to let the Americans know about close ties between the armed forces of China and Russia.”

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展7

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  7

中国的领土争端自1949年以来,中国在领土争端中使用武力的情况差异很大。一些争端导致了战争,比如1962年与印度的边境冲突和1979年与越南的边境冲突。20世纪60年代,中国与前苏联之间存在争议的边界提高了发生核战争的可能性。在最近涉及土地边界争端的案例中,中国有时愿意与邻国妥协,甚至做出让步。自1998年以来,中国已经与六个邻国解决了11起陆地领土争端。近年来,中国采取了一种更加强制性的方式来处理一些持续存在的关于海洋特征和拥有潜在丰富的近海油气资源的争端。中国和日本对东海的大陆架和专属经济区都有重叠的主张。东海含有天然气和石油,但油气储量难以估计。日本坚持认为,来自每个相关国家的等距线应该将专属经济区分开,而中国则主张在冲绳海沟的等距线以外延长大陆架。日本指责中国违反了2008年达成的一项原则共识,即双方将尊重东海资源开发的等距中线,同时在该线北端划定的区域联合开发石油和天然气田。日本对中国自2013年以来在东海中线中国一侧进行石油和天然气钻探表示关切。中国继续抗议日本对附近的尖阁列岛的管理。南中国海在整个东亚的安全考虑中扮演着重要角色,因为东北亚严重依赖通过南中国海航道的石油和商业流通,其中包括运往日本、韩国和台湾的80% 以上的原油。中国宣称对斯普拉特利群岛和 Paracel Island 群岛拥有主权,并宣称对"九段线"内的其他陆地拥有主权。文莱、菲律宾、马来西亚和越南对九段线拥有全部或部分主权争议。在 Spratly Islands 占领 Itu Aba Island 的台湾,也提出了与中国同样的领土主张。2009年,中国抗议马来西亚和越南在南中国海延长大陆架划界案。在向联合国大陆架边界委员会提出抗议时,中国附上了模棱两可的"九段线"地图。中国还在2009年的普通照会中表示,中国"对南海及其邻近海域的岛屿拥有无可争辩的主权,对相关海域及其海床和底土享有主权权利和管辖权" 2016年7月,根据《海洋法公约》设立的一个法庭裁定,中国对"九段线"所涵盖的南海"历史性权利"的主张不得超出其根据《海洋法公约》享有的海洋权利。中国没有参与

China’s Territorial Disputes in Context China’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied widely since 1949. Some disputes led to war, as in border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. A contested border with the former Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In recent cases involving land border disputes, China has sometimes been willing to compromise with and even offer concessions to its neighbors. Since 1998, China has settled 11 land-based territorial disputes with six of its neighbors. In recent years, China has employed a more coercive approach to deal with several disputes that continue over maritime features and ownership of potentially rich offshore oil and gas deposits. China and Japan have overlapping claims to both the continental shelves and the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea. The East China Sea contains natural gas and oil, though hydrocarbon reserves are difficult to estimate. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while China claims an extended continental shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench. Japan has accused China of breaching a principled consensus reached in 2008 that both sides would respect an equidistant median line in the East China Sea for resource development while conducting joint development of oil and natural gas field in a delineated area spanning the line near the northern end. Japan is concerned that China has conducted oil and gas drilling on the Chinese side of the median line of the East China Sea since 2013. China continues to contest Japan’s administration of the nearby Senkaku Islands. The South China Sea plays an important role in security considerations across East Asia because Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through South China Sea shipping lanes, including more than 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Island groups and other land features within its self-proclaimed “nine-dash line” – claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba Island in the Spratly Islands, makes the same territorial assertions as China. In 2009, China protested extended continental shelf submissions in the South China Sea made by Malaysia and Vietnam. In its protest to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, China included its ambiguous “nine-dash line” map. China also stated in a 2009 note verbale that it has “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” In July 2016, a tribunal established pursuant to the Law of the Sea Convention ruled that China’s claims to “historic rights” over the South China Sea encompassed by the “nine-dash line” could not exceed its maritime rights under the Law of the Sea Convention. China did not participate

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展8

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  8

在仲裁中,中国官员公开表示反对这一裁决。根据公约条款,该裁决对中国具有约束力。在中印两国共同的边界阿鲁纳恰尔邦,中国声称西藏是中国的一部分,因此也是中国的一部分,以及西藏高原西端的 Aksai Chin 地区,紧张局势依然存在。中国和印度的巡逻队经常在有争议的边界上相遇,双方经常指责对方侵犯边界。2017年,印度军队在 Doka La Pass 附近的杜克拉姆高原拦截了一个解放军公路建设单位,该高原靠近中国、不丹和印度三国交界地区。这次会面导致了长达73天的对峙,最后双方同意相互脱离现场。

in the arbitration, and Chinese officials publicly voiced opposition to the ruling. By the terms of the Convention, the ruling is binding on China. Tensions remain with India along the shared border over Arunachal Pradesh, which China asserts is part of Tibet and therefore part of China, and over the Aksai Chin region at the western end of the Tibetan Plateau. Chinese and Indian patrols regularly encounter one another along the disputed border, and both sides often accuse one another of border incursions. In 2017, Indian forces intercepted a PLA road construction unit on the Doklam Plateau near the Doka La Pass, near the tri-border region of China, Bhutan, and India. The encounter led to a 73-day standoff before both sides agreed to mutually disengage from the site.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展9

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  9

12345678经济政策的发展主要外卖中国不遵守其世界贸易组织(WTO)的一些义务 中国领导人意识到"中国制造2025"和"OBOR"已经引发了对中国意图的担忧,在不改变这些项目的基本战略目标的情况下推动这些项目时,他们已经软化了措辞 中国继续实行中央控制的计划经济。中国限制对外投资,限制其它国家的出口,并推行政府主导的海外投资,包括在战略性领域的投资。保持中国的经济增长是党的战略目标之一。中国向市场经济的不完全过渡导致了管理可交易商品和服务部门、市场准入和外国直接投资的法律、法规和政策,使外国公司相对于中国公司处于不利地位。中国高层领导人最近重申,他们致力于中共控制国家主导的经济机器,包括通过国家指导的投资和创新。2018年3月,美国贸易代表办公室公布了根据1974年《贸易法》第301条进行的调查结果,该调查认定中国政府在技术转让、知识产权和创新方面的行为、政策和做法不合理或带有歧视性,给美国商业造成负担或限制,每年给美国经济造成至少500亿美元的损失。中国没有履行世界贸易组织(WTO)的一些义务,也没有遵守世贸组织协议中的一些既定规则和基本原则。此外,由于中国是世贸组织框架下的"发展中国家",中国可以继续采取某些保护主义措施。令人关切的问题包括以牺牲外国同行为代价支持国内产业的产业政策、商业合资企业要求、技术转让要求、降低投入成本的补贴、多个产业持续存在能力过剩、对外国直接投资的部门限制、歧视性的网络安全和数据转让规则、知识产权执法不足、透明度不足以及缺乏市场准入,特别是在农业和。对于外国公司来说,市场准入仍然具有挑战性,因为中国对入境投资的限制导致其他国家的服务出口持续表现不佳,特别是在银行、保险、互联网相关、专业和零售服务部门。

12345678  DEVELOPMENTS IN ECONOMIC POLICY Key Takeaways > China is non-compliant with some of its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. > Recognizing that “Made in China 2025” and OBOR have sparked concerns about China’s intentions, China’s leaders have softened their rhetoric when promoting these programs without altering the programs’ fundamental strategic goals. > China continues to operate as a centrally controlled, planned economy. China restricts inbound investment, limits other countries’ exports, and pursues state-guided investment overseas, including in strategic sectors. Sustaining China’s economic growth is one of the CCP’s strategic objectives. China’s incomplete transition to a market economy has resulted in laws, regulations, and policies governing the tradable goods and services sectors, market access, and foreign direct investment that disadvantage foreign firms vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts. China’s senior leaders recently reaffirmed their commitment to CCP control over the state-led economic apparatus, including through state-directed investment and innovation. In March 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative released findings of an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that determined the acts, policies, and practices of the Chinese government related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce, resulting in harm to the U.S. economy of at least $50 billion per year. China is non-compliant with some of its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, and China does not adhere to some of the agreed-upon rules and fundamental principles that undergird WTO agreements. In addition, because of its status as a “developing country” under the WTO framework, China is allowed to continue certain protectionist measures. Concerns include industrial policies that support domestic industries at the expense of foreign counterparts, commercial joint venture requirements, technology transfer requirements, subsidies to lower the cost of inputs, continued excess capacity in multiple industries, sector-specific limits on foreign direct investment, discriminatory cybersecurity and data transfer rules, insufficient intellectual property rights enforcement, inadequate transparency, and lack of market access particularly in the agriculture and service sectors. Market access remains challenging for foreign firms, as China’s restriction of inbound investment results in persistent underperformance in other countries’ services exports, particularly in the banking, insurance, Internet-related, professional, and retail services sectors.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展10

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  10

中国最近的一些法律寻求进一步限制外国公司:《国家安全法》 :该法于2015年7月通过,以国家安全为由,限制外国进入中国的信息和通信技术(ICT)市场 《反恐怖主义法》 :该法于2015年12月通过,要求电信运营商和互联网服务提供商向公共和国家安全组织"开展预防和调查恐怖活动"提供关于技术支持援助的信息 网络安全法:该法于2017年6月生效,旨在促进本土技术的发展,并限制国外 ICT 的销售。该法律还规定,外国公司必须向政府管理的国家安全审查机构提交 ICT 报告,在中国存储数据,并在数据传输到中国境外之前获得政府批准。由于中国限制对外投资,限制其它国家对中国的出口,中国也在追求政府主导的海外投资。除了在基础设施和商品方面的大量投资以支持其经济增长之外,中国正在投资于将成为未来商业和军事应用创新基础的技术。中国通过进口、外国直接投资、建立外国研发中心、合资企业、研究和学术合作、人才招聘、工业和网络间谍活动等途径获得外国技术。2018年12月,两名中国公民因密谋入侵计算机、密谋电信欺诈和严重的身份盗窃被起诉。这些中国公民为一家名为华英海泰科技发展公司的中国公司工作,并与中国国家安全部天津市国家安全局合作。通过参与一个在中国称为 APT10的黑客组织,中国公民进行了全球性的计算机入侵活动,目标是管理服务提供商的知识产权和保密商业和技术信息。这些黑客组织在中国被称为 APT10进阶持续性渗透攻击。Apt10集团窃取了数百千兆字节的敏感数据,并瞄准了受害公司的计算机,这些公司涉及航空、空间和卫星技术、制造技术、制药技术、石油和天然气勘探和生产技术、通信技术、计算机处理器技术和海洋技术。最近的政府政策促进了以加强国内产业为重点的创新,同时对外国公司施加了额外的限制。认识到其中的一些

Some recent Chinese laws seek further restrictions on foreign firms: > National Security Law: Adopted in July 2015, the law limits foreign access to the information and communications technology (ICT) market in China on national security grounds. > Counterterrorism Law: Adopted in December 2015, the law requires telecommunications operators and Internet service providers to provide information on technical support assistance to public and state security organizations “conducting prevention and investigation of terrorist activities.” > Cyber Security Law: The law, which went into effect in June 2017, promotes development of indigenous technologies and restricts sales of foreign ICT. The law also mandates that foreign companies submit ICT for government-administered national security reviews, store data in China, and seek government approval before transferring data outside of China. As China restricts inbound investment and limits other countries’ exports to China, it also pursues state-directed investment overseas. Along with heavy investments in infrastructure and commodities to support its economic growth, China is investing in technologies that will be foundational for future innovations with both commercial and military applications. China obtains foreign technology through imports, foreign direct investment, the establishment of foreign research and development (R&D) centers, joint ventures, research and academic partnerships, talent recruitment, and industrial and cyberespionage. In December 2018, two Chinese nationals were indicted for conspiracy to commit computer intrusions, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The Chinese nationals worked for a company in China called Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company and acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security’s Tianjin State Security Bureau. Through their involvement with a hacking group operating in China known as Advanced Persistent Threat 10 (APT10), the Chinese nationals conducted global campaigns of computer intrusions targeting intellectual property and confidential business and technological information at managed service providers. The APT10 group stole hundreds of gigabytes of sensitive data and targeted the computers of victim companies involved in aviation, space and satellite technology, manufacturing technology, pharmaceutical technology, oil and gas exploration and production technology, communications technology, computer processor technology, and maritime technology. Recent government policies have promoted innovation focused on strengthening domestic industry, while placing additional restrictions on foreign firms. Recognizing that some of its

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展11

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  11

诸如"中国制造2025"和"OBOR"计划引发了对中国意图的担忧,中国领导人在不改变其基本战略目标的情况下推动这些计划时已经软化了他们的言辞 中国制造2025:中国已经意识到发达工业化国家对中国制造2025的严重关切,2018年6月,中国媒体被要求淡化这个词的使用。2015年5月公布的《中国制造2025为2020年和2025年提高战略行业国内制造业水平设定了目标,目标是增加自主创新。中国计划提供补贴,加强对国内产业的保护,同时加大对外国公司转让技术以便在中国做生意的压力。该计划还试图在牺牲外国参与者在中国市场的利益的情况下,偏袒国内企业 Obor:OBOR 旨在与其他国家发展强有力的经济联系,塑造他们与中国一致的利益,并阻止对中国处理敏感问题的方式的对抗或批评。参与 OBOR 的国家可能会在经济上对中国资本产生依赖,而中国可以利用这种依赖来实现自身利益。中国全球经济足迹的增长也使其利益越来越容易受到国际和地区动荡、恐怖主义、海盗、严重自然灾害和流行病的影响,这对解放军应对这些威胁提出了新的要求。一些 OBOR 投资可能为中国创造潜在的军事优势,如果中国需要进入选定的外国港口,预先部署必要的后勤支持,以维持海军部署在遥远的水域,如印度洋、地中海和大西洋,以保护其日益增长的利益。在与邻国的政治紧张时期,中国采用了强制性的经济手段。在一艘悬挂 prc- 旗帜的渔船与一艘日本海上保安厅(Japanese Coast Guard)船只在尖阁列岛附近发生碰撞后,中国于2010年停止向日本出口用于高科技产业的稀土元素。2016年,在达赖喇嘛访问蒙古之后,中国暂停了有关重大援助贷款的谈判,加剧了蒙古面临的财政挑战,并最终迫使其向国际货币基金组织(imf)寻求援助。中国还提高了从蒙古进口矿产品的费用,并暂时关闭了一个重要的过境点。2017年,中国利用经济和外交压力,试图敦促韩国重新考虑部署末段高空区域防御系统(THAAD) ,但未能成功。

programs such as “Made in China 2025” and OBOR have sparked concerns about China’s intentions, China’s leaders have softened their rhetoric when promoting these programs without altering their fundamental strategic goals. > “Made in China 2025”: China has become aware of acute concerns that advanced industrial countries have regarding “Made in China 2025,” and in June 2018, Chinese media outlets were ordered to downplay use of the term. Announced in May 2015, the “Made in China 2025” plan sets targets for higher levels of domestic manufacturing in strategic industries by 2020 and 2025 with the goal of increasing indigenous innovation. China plans to award subsidies and strengthened protection of domestic industries, while increasing pressure on foreign firms to transfer technology in order to do business in China. The plan also seeks to favor domestic enterprises at the expense of foreign participants in China’s markets. > OBOR: OBOR is intended to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive issues. Countries participating in OBOR could develop economic dependence on Chinese capital, which China could leverage to achieve its interests. The growth of China’s global economic footprint also makes its interests increasingly vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, and serious natural disasters and epidemics, which places new requirements on the PLA to address these threats. Some OBOR investments could create potential military advantages for China, should China require access to selected foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean to protect its growing interests. China has employed economic tools coercively during periods of political tensions with its neighbors. Following the collision of a PRC-flagged fishing boat with a Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the Senkaku Islands, China halted exports to Japan in 2010 of rare earth elements used in high-tech industries. In 2016, after the visit of the Dalai Lama to Mongolia, China suspended talks on a major assistance loan, worsening Mongolia’s fiscal challenges and eventually driving it to seek a bailout from the International Monetary Fund. China also increased fees on imports of mining products from Mongolia and temporarily closed an important border crossing. China used economic and diplomatic pressure unsuccessfully in 2017 in an attempt to urge South Korea to reconsider the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展12

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  12

中国的碳氢化合物战略中国对确保可靠、高成本效益和多样化的能源来源以支持其经济增长的兴趣驱动着其海外投资 中国希望能源供应商和运输选择多样化。中国希望确保可靠、具有成本效益和多样化的燃料来源,以支持和维持其经济发展,因此参与了40多个国家的石油和天然气项目。2018年,中国进口石油满足了大约71% 的需求。据国际能源机构(IEA)预计,到2035年,这一数字将增长到大约80% 。2018年,中国通过进口满足了44% 的天然气需求,根据国际能源署的预测,这一比例将在2035年达到46% 。中国主要依靠波斯湾、非洲、俄罗斯和中亚来满足其不断增长的石油和天然气需求。中国大部分的碳氢化合物输送依赖于南中国海和东南亚马六甲海峡这样的特殊发展中国家。2018年,中国约78% 的石油进口和16% 的天然气进口通过南中国海和东南亚马六甲海峡。尽管中国努力使能源供应多样化,但从中东和非洲进口的大量石油和液化天然气,将使保护具有战略意义的特殊发展中国家成为中国多年来的首要任务。俄罗斯至中国、哈萨克斯坦至中国的新建或升级的原油管道,显示出中国对增加陆上供应的兴趣。2018年初,中国将通往俄罗斯的输油管道的日输送能力提高了一倍,从30万桶提高到60万桶。2017年4月,Burma-China 原油管道投入使用。这条每天输送44万桶原油的管道从缅甸的皎漂向中国昆明输送原油,绕过了中国马六甲海峡。输油管道已经完工,但部分产能仍将运行1-2年,而昆明炼油厂仍在试运行。沙特阿拉伯和其他中东和非洲国家为输油管道供应原油。2018年,中国从土库曼斯坦经哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦进口的天然气约占进口总量的28%(467亿立方米)。该管道的设计目标是每年输送550亿立方米的水,土库曼斯坦和中国计划在2020年将其扩大到每年800亿立方米。一条连接中国和缅甸的天然气管道每年可输送120亿立方米天然气,但2018年只输送了30.4亿立方米天然气。截至2018年9月,俄罗斯完成了西伯利亚电力管道的93% ,该管道将在2019年12月前将俄罗斯的天然气输送到中国。这条管道的合同价格是30英镑

CHINA’S HYDROCARBON STRATEGY Key Takeaways > China’s interest in ensuring reliable, cost-effective, and diverse energy sources to support its economic growth drives its overseas investments. > China hopes to diversify energy suppliers and transport options. China’s interest in ensuring reliable, cost-effective, and diverse fuel sources to support and sustain its economic development has led it to participate in oil and natural gas projects in more than 40 countries. In 2018, China imported oil to meet approximately 71 percent of its needs. This figure is projected to grow to approximately 80 percent by 2035 according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). In 2018, China met 44 percent of its natural gas demand with imports, which is projected to grow to 46 percent by 2035 according to the IEA. China looks primarily to the Persian Gulf, Africa, Russia, and Central Asia to satisfy its growing oil and gas demand. China relies on SLOCs such as the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca for the majority of its hydrocarbon deliveries. In 2018, approximately 78 percent of China’s oil imports and 16 percent of natural gas imports transited the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. Despite China’s efforts to diversify energy suppliers, the sheer volume of oil and liquefied natural gas imported from the Middle East and Africa will make securing strategic SLOCs a priority for China for many years. New or upgraded crude oil pipelines from Russia to China and Kazakhstan to China demonstrate China’s interest in increasing overland supply. In early 2018, China doubled the capacity of its pipeline to Russia from 300,000 to 600,000 barrels per day. In April 2017, the Burma-China crude oil pipeline was commissioned. This 440,000-barrels per day pipeline bypasses the Strait of Malacca by transporting crude oil from Kyaukpyu, Burma, to Kunming, China. The pipeline is completed; however, it will be operating at partial capacity for 1-2 years while the Kunming Refinery still operates in a testing capacity. Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern and African countries supply the crude oil for the pipeline. In 2018, approximately 28 percent of China’s natural gas imports (46.7 billion cubic meters) came from Turkmenistan by pipeline via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This pipeline is designed to carry 55 billion cubic meters per year with Turkmenistan and China planning to expand it to 80 billion cubic meters per year in 2020. A natural gas pipeline connecting China to Burma can deliver 12 billion cubic meters per year, but only 3.04 billion cubic meters of gas were shipped in 2018. As of September 2018, Russia completed about 93 percent of the Power of Siberia pipeline that will deliver Russian natural gas to China by December 2019. The contract for this pipeline is for 30

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展13

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  13

每年向中国输送380亿立方米的天然气。几家中国公司,经常追求中国的经济发展目标,也有兴趣获得先进的技术,试图提高效率,获得和部署清洁能源技术,并增加利润。2018年中国最大原油供应商名单见附件三。军事战略和原则关键要点中国领导人继续强调发展一支能够战斗并取得胜利的军队 2018年,中国发布了新的《训练与评估大纲》 ,强调在所有战争领域进行现实的联合训练,涵盖了针对"强大军事对手"的任务和任务 中国日益增长的海外利益,日益促使中国人民解放军思考如何在中国境外及周边地区开展行动 中国通常每两年发布一份关于其军事战略的白皮书,但自2015年以来一直没有发布过。中国的军事战略,正如其2015年国防白皮书《中国军事战略》中所概述的,以及在最新一期的中国人民解放军国防大学战略科学中进一步阐述的,是建立强大的、具有战斗力的、能够赢得地区冲突的武装力量,并使用集成的、实时的 C2网络。整个2018年,中国领导人都在强调这些原则,特别强调发展一支能够战斗并取得胜利的军队 2015年的国防白皮书也重复了以前出版物的主题,反映了对海洋领域重要性的日益强调,解放军空军向进攻性行动的转变,解放军的远程机动性行动,以及对信息领域优势的需求,包括通过空间和网络行动。通常每两年发布一次,中国没有在2017年或2018年发布新的国防白皮书 2018年,中国人民解放军颁布了新的《军事训练与评估纲要》 ,强调在所有战争领域进行现实的联合训练,处理近期军事改革后中国人民解放军的变化,纳入全球视野,涵盖针对"强大军事对手"的任务和任务 新的大纲还实施了依赖于培训的标准

years and provides that 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas be delivered to China each year. Several Chinese companies, often in pursuit of China’s economic development goals, are also interested in gaining access to advanced technologies to try to improve efficiency, obtain and deploy clean energy technologies, and increase profits. A list of China’s top crude suppliers in 2018 is provided in Appendix III. MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE Key Takeaways > China’s leaders continue to emphasize developing a military that can fight and win. > In 2018, China published a new Outline of Training and Evaluation that emphasized realistic and joint training across all warfare domains, and covered missions and tasks aimed at “strong military opponents.” > China’s growing overseas interests have increasingly propelled the PLA to think about how it will operate beyond China’s borders and immediate periphery. > China typically publishes a white paper on its military strategy every two years, but has not released one since 2015. China’s military strategy, as outlined in its 2015 defense white paper China’s Military Strategy and further delineated in the latest iteration of the PLA National Defense University’s Science of Strategy, is to build strong, combat-effective armed forces capable of winning regional conflicts and employing integrated, real-time C2 networks. Throughout 2018, China’s leaders stressed these tenets with a particular emphasis on developing a military that can fight and win. > The 2015 defense white paper also echoed themes from previous publications, reflecting a growing emphasis on the importance of the maritime domain, the PLA Air Force’s shift towards offensive operations, the PLA Army’s long-distance mobility operations, and the need for superiority in the information domain, including through space and cyber operations. Typically released every two years, China did not release a new defense white paper in 2017 or 2018. > In 2018, the PLA promulgated a new Outline of Military Training and Evaluation that emphasized realistic and joint training across all warfare domains, addressed changes in the PLA following recent military reforms, incorporated a global perspective, and covered missions and tasks aimed at “strong military opponents.” The new outline also implemented standards for training that rely on the

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展14

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  14

外国军队的经验,并吸收这些军队使用的方法。中国人民解放军正在追求一个雄心勃勃的现代化计划,这个计划符合中国的两个百年目标。中国军队领导人希望到2020年实现机械化,在实现第一个百年目标之前,向信息化"大步迈进"。"信息化"概念在解放军著作中占有突出地位,与美国军方的"网络中心"能力概念大致相似:一支部队利用先进信息技术和通信系统战胜对手获得作战优势的能力。解放军的著作强调了近实时共享战场意识的好处,使快速,统一的努力抓住战术机会。他们还希望到2035年完成军事现代化,到2049年实现第二个百年目标,成为"世界级"军队。尽管中国没有明确这个词的含义,但一些观察家将其解释为与其他全球军事力量,特别是美国相当的发展能力。军事战略方针。2015年,中国领导层指示人民解放军有能力打赢"信息化局部战争",并高度重视"海上军事斗争",调整了人民解放军应该准备打的战争类型的指导方针。中国通过其"军事战略指导方针"颁布了这一修订,这些指导方针源自中国的军事战略,规定了概念、评估了威胁,并为规划、兵力态势和现代化设定了优先事项。这一更新表明,中国预计现代冲突的重要因素将发生在海上 自苏联解体以来,中国领导层已经两次调整了国家军事战略方针,指导如何打好局部战争。1993年,江泽民在观察了美国在海湾战争中的军事行动后,指示中国人民解放军在现代高科技条件下为局部战争做准备。2004年,胡锦涛下令军队集中力量打赢"信息化条件下的局部战争" 在权威军事出版物中,台湾一直是中国人民解放军的主要"战略方向",是中国领导层认定具有战略重要性的地理区域之一。其他战略方向包括东海、南海以及中国与印度和朝鲜的边界。解放军的改革使每一个新的战区指挥都朝着一个具体的战略方向发展 2015年,中国的军事战略规划了八项"战略任务",即中国人民解放军必须准备执行的任务类型:维护中国领土主权;维护国家统一;在新的领域维护中国的利益

experiences of foreign militaries and absorbs the methods those militaries use. The PLA is pursuing an ambitious modernization program that aligns with China’s two centenary goals. China’s military leaders want to achieve mechanization and make “major progress” toward informatization by 2020, ahead of the first centenary goal. The concept of “informatization” figures prominently in PLA writings and is roughly analogous to the U.S. military’s concept of “net-centric” capability: a force’s ability to use advanced information technology and communications systems to gain operational advantage over an adversary. PLA writings highlight the benefit of near real-time shared awareness of the battlefield in enabling quick, unified effort to seize tactical opportunities. They also seek to complete military modernization by 2035 and become a “world-class” military by the second centenary goal of 2049. Although China has not defined what that means, some observers have interpreted it as meaning developing capabilities on par with other global militaries, especially the United States. Military Strategic Guidelines. In 2015, China’s leadership directed the PLA to be capable of fighting and winning “informatized local wars” with an elevated emphasis on “maritime military struggle,” adjusting its guidance on the type of war the PLA should be prepared to fight. China promulgated this revision through its “military strategic guidelines,” the top-level directives derived from China’s military strategy that prescribe concepts, assess threats, and set priorities for planning, force posture, and modernization. This update indicates China expects significant elements of a modern conflict to occur at sea. > China’s leadership has adjusted its national military strategic guidelines about how to fight local wars two other times since the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1993, Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to prepare for local war under modern, high-tech conditions after observing U.S. military operations in the Gulf War. In 2004, Hu Jintao ordered the military to focus on winning “local war under informatized conditions.” > Taiwan persistently remains the PLA’s main “strategic direction,” one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as having strategic importance, in authoritative military publications. Other strategic directions include the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and China’s borders with India and North Korea. PLA reforms have oriented each new theater command toward a specific strategic direction. > In 2015, China’s military strategy outlined eight “strategic tasks,” or types of missions the PLA must be ready to execute: safeguard the sovereignty of China’s territory; safeguard national unification; safeguard China’s interests in new domains

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展15

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  15

保持战略威慑,参与国际安全合作,维护中国政治安全和社会稳定,开展紧急救援、救灾和"权益保护"任务。积极防御。中国将其军事战略定性为"积极防御",这一概念被中国描述为战略防御但具有作战进攻性。它植根于一种承诺,即不发动武装冲突,而是在对手挑战中国的国家统一、领土主权或利益时予以有力回应。根据这一概念,中国可以通过对攻击作出反应或先发制人打击来破坏对方的攻击准备,从而进行防御性反击。人民解放军对积极防御的理解是既包括降级,又包括夺取主动权。积极防御被写入2015年国家安全法,并被列入解放军的主要战略文件。习主席在2017年中国人民解放军90周年阅兵仪式上的讲话进一步强调,中国绝不会进行"侵略和扩张",但也绝不允许"任何一块中国领土"脱离中国。强制手段。作为"积极防御"战略的一部分,中国领导人使用非武装冲突的战术来追求中国的战略目标。这些活动旨在降低与美国、其盟国和伙伴或印度-太平洋地区其他国家发生武装冲突的门槛。这些策略在中国追求其在南中国海和东中国海以及与印度和不丹的边界的领土和海洋主张时尤为明显。近年来,中国人民解放军也增加了在台湾周围和附近的巡逻,使用轰炸机、战斗机和侦察机向台湾发出信号。此外,中国还强制使用非军事手段,包括在与中国指责损害其国家利益的国家发生政治紧张时期使用经济手段。在澳大利亚就中国对澳大利亚政治的影响展开公开辩论后,中国在2018年初推迟了澳大利亚牛肉和葡萄酒进口的海关审批。中国驻悉尼领事馆也警告中国学生,在澳大利亚学习是危险的,超过20所中国学校取消了对澳大利亚的访问。全球影响力的增长。随着过去20年中国海外利益的增长,这些利益日益促使中国人民解放军思考如何在中国境外及其周边地区开展行动。2004年,时任中国国家主席胡锦涛赋予中国人民解放军的新的历史使命之一,就是支持中国的海外利益和外交。解放军海军的重点不断变化——从"近海水域防御"到"近海水域防御"和"公海保护"的结合——反映了最高指挥部对更广泛的作战范围不断扩大的兴趣。中国的军事战略

such as space and cyberspace; maintain strategic deterrence; participate in international security cooperation; maintain China’s political security and social stability; and conduct emergency rescue, disaster relief, and “rights and interest protection” missions. Active Defense. China characterizes its military strategy as one of “active defense,” a concept it describes as strategically defensive but operationally offensive. It is rooted in a commitment not to initiate armed conflict, but to respond robustly if an adversary challenges China’s national unity, territorial sovereignty, or interests. According to this concept, China may conduct defensive counterattacks by responding to an attack or striking pre-emptively to disrupt an adversary’s preparations to attack. The PLA interprets active defense to include both de-escalation and seizing the initiative. Active defense is enshrined in the 2015 National Security Law and is included in the PLA’s major strategy documents. President Xi’s speech during the PLA’s 90th anniversary parade in 2017 further highlighted that China would never conduct “invasion and expansion,” but also would never permit “any piece of Chinese territory” to separate from China. Coercive Approach. As part of its “active defense” strategy, China’s leaders use tactics short of armed conflict to pursue China’s strategic objectives. Activities are calculated to fall below the threshold of provoking armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region. These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan. In recent years, the PLA has also increased patrols around and near Taiwan using bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China additionally employs nonmilitary tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests. After Australia’s public debate on Chinese influence in Australian politics, China delayed customs approval for Australian beef and wine imports in early 2018. China’s consulate in Sydney also warned Chinese students that studying in Australia was dangerous, and more than 20 Chinese school visits to Australia were cancelled. Growing Global Presence. As China’s overseas interests have grown over the past two decades, they have increasingly propelled the PLA to think about how it will operate beyond China’s borders and its immediate periphery. In 2004, one of the new historic missions given to the PLA by then-Chinese President Hu Jintao was to support China’s overseas interests and diplomacy. The PLAN’s evolving focus – from “offshore waters defense” to a mix of “offshore waters defense” and “open seas protection” – reflects the high command’s expanding interest in a wider operational reach. China’s military strategy and

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展16

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  16

中国人民解放军正在进行的改革反映了它放弃了历史上对控制地理的重视,通过使用扩大的防御周界来支持海上战略以保卫海外利益。同样,理论上提到的"前沿防御"将把潜在的冲突转移到远离中国领土的地方,表明解放军战略家设想中国人民解放军在海外扮演越来越重要的角色。更强大的海外后勤和基础设施将使中国能够在更远的地方投射和维持军事力量。中国领导人可能会评估,多种军事物流模式,包括优先进入海外商业港口,以及数量有限的解放军专用物流设施(可能与商业港口配套使用) ,最符合中国的海外军事物流需求。2017年8月,中国在吉布提正式开设了第一个海外军事基地。中国官员声称,这个被他们称为后勤基地的基地,将支持中国在非洲之角的反海盗行动和联合国维和部署。中国将寻求在与其有着长期友好关系和类似战略利益的国家,如巴基斯坦,建立更多的军事基地,而且在这些国家中存在着容纳外国军队的先例。中国的海外军事基地将受到潜在东道国支持中国人民解放军存在的意愿的限制。2018年的国际新闻报道指出,中国寻求扩大其在中东、东南亚和西太平洋的军事基地和进入。稳定和安全行动。中国人民解放军继续强调稳定和安全行动的重要性,强调加强训练和装备以提高部队执行这些任务的能力。这些行动包括紧急反应、反恐怖主义、国际救援、人道主义援助 / 救灾、维持和平行动以及属于非战争军事行动类别的各种其他安全任务。近年来,中国人民解放军通过修改军事理论和教材,将军事理论纳入战备和现代化建设计划,接受了军事理论和教材。2018年,中国在新疆大规模拘留了100多万维吾尔人、哈萨克人和其他穆斯林,人民解放军将重点放在区域反恐合作上 国防部长魏凤和在 Beijing Xiangshan Forum 第八届会议上的讲话中强调了中国对"中国-阿富汗-巴基斯坦-塔吉克斯坦"四方反恐合作机制的推动。2018年,中国参与了

ongoing PLA reform reflect the abandonment of its historic focus on control of geography through the use of expanding defensive perimeters in favor of a maritime strategy to defend interests abroad. Similarly, doctrinal references to a “forward edge defense” that would move potential conflicts far from China’s territory suggest PLA strategists envision an increasing role for the PLA overseas. A more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure would allow China to project and sustain military power at greater distances. China’s leaders may assess that a mixture of military logistics models, including preferred access to overseas commercial ports and a limited number of exclusive PLA logistics facilities, probably collocated with commercial ports, most closely aligns with China’s overseas military logistics needs. In August 2017, China officially opened a military base in Djibouti, its first overseas military base. Chinese officials claim that the base – which they describe as a logistics facility – will support China’s anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa and its UN peacekeeping deployments. China will seek to establish additional military bases in countries with which it has a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan, and in which there is a precedent for hosting foreign militaries. China’s overseas military basing will be constrained by the willingness of potential host countries to support a PLA presence. International press reporting in 2018 indicated that China sought to expand its military basing and access in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the western Pacific. Stability and Security Operations. The PLA continues to emphasize the importance of stability and security operations, stressing training and equipment enhancements to improve force capabilities for these missions. These operations encompass emergency response, counterterrorism, international rescue, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), peacekeeping operations (PKO), and various other security tasks falling into the category of military operations other than war (MOOTW). In recent years, the PLA has embraced MOOTW by revising doctrine and teaching materials and incorporating MOOTW into its readiness and modernization plans. In 2018, the PLA focused on regional counterterrorism cooperation in the midst of China’s mass detention in Xinjiang of more than one million Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in government camps, where their daily activities are restricted and heavily monitored. > In a speech during the 8th Beijing Xiangshan Forum, Minister of National Defense General Wei Fenghe highlighted China’s promotion of the “China-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Tajikistan” four-country counterterrorism cooperation mechanism known as the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism. In 2018, China engaged in

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展17

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  17

与柬埔寨、尼泊尔、印度、巴基斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、哈萨克斯坦和俄罗斯进行反恐演习 中国还赋予人民行动党紧急反应和反恐行动的任务,到2018年,人民行动党部队将接受这些任务的训练。反腐败运动。2018年,中共继续努力根除军队中的腐败现象。2018年3月,中国橡皮图章式的立法机构全国人民代表大会批准了2017年秋季召开的第19次党代表大会的决定,将纪律检查委员会第一书记张胜民将军提升至中央军事委员会。中央军事委员会是军队的最高决策机构,从技术上讲,它是中共中央委员会的一个部门。在3月份的同一次会议上,全国人民代表大会批准了新成立的全国监察委员会,该委员会将中国的各个反腐机构合并为一个实体。国家监察委员会将在党和国家消除腐败的努力之间架起桥梁,给予追查党外政府官员更大的自由度,并将解放军进一步纳入中央集权的民间反腐败控制之下。2018年10月,两名2017年因腐败被拘留的前中央军委委员房峰辉和已故的张扬被开除党籍。中国人民解放军的反腐败调查是习主席上台后不久加强和加快的全党努力的一部分,其既定目标是维护党的合法性、根除腐败、改善治理和加强中央控制。在习近平领导的反腐运动加强以来的六年里,超过1.3万名解放军军官,包括100名将军,因腐败而受到惩罚。军纪检查人员已经瞄准了历史上容易腐败的个人权力网络和职业领域,比如与前中央军委副主席徐才厚和郭伯雄有联系的官员,以及最近与方峰辉和张扬有联系的官员。在2018年8月中国人民解放军成立周年之际,中央军委发布了两项规定,明确了党委和纪律检查委员会的监督职责,加强了党内监督和问责。

counterterrorism exercises with Cambodia, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. > China also tasks the PAP with emergency response and counterterrorism operations, with PAP forces training for these missions through 2018. Anticorruption Campaign. The CCP continued its effort to root out corruption in the armed forces in 2018. In March 2018, the National People’s Congress, China’s rubber-stamp legislature, endorsed the 19th Party Congress decision in fall 2017 to elevate the first secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission, General Zhang Shengmin, to the CMC, the military’s highest decision-making body and technically a department of the CCP Central Committee. At the same March meeting, the National People’s Congress ratified the newly established National Supervisory Commission, which consolidates the various Chinese anticorruption agencies under a single entity. The National Supervisory Commission will bridge Party and state efforts to remove corruption, giving wider latitude to pursue non-Party government officials and drawing the PLA further under centralized civilian anticorruption control. In October 2018, two former CMC members detained in 2017 for corruption, Fang Fenghui and the deceased Zhang Yang, were expelled from the CCP. Anticorruption investigations in the PLA are a component of a Party-wide effort that President Xi strengthened and accelerated shortly after taking office, with the stated goal of safeguarding the legitimacy of the CCP, rooting out corruption, improving governance, and strengthening central control. In the six years since the anticorruption campaign intensified under Xi Jinping, more than 13,000 PLA officers, including 100 generals, have been punished for corruption. Military discipline inspectors have targeted individual power networks and occupational specialties historically prone to corruption, such as officers connected to disgraced former CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong and, more recently, to Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang. On the anniversary of the PLA’s founding in August 2018, the CMC issued two regulations codifying oversight responsibilities for Party committees and discipline inspection commissions to strengthen intra-Party supervision and accountability.

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国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展19

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  19

中国的军事领导中央军事委员会是军队的最高决策机构,严格来说,它是中共中央委员会的一个部门。中央军委主席是文职人员,通常兼任中共总书记和中国国家主席。党的十九大之后,中央军委由两名副主席组成,即参谋部和政治工作部的负责人,纪律检查委员会的负责人和国防部长。中共中央军事委员会主席习近平在2012年被任命为党总书记和中央军事委员会主席,并在2013年春被选为国家主席,这是近几十年来中国三个最高职位首次同时移交给即将上任的领导人。习在第十九次党代会上被重新任命为党的领导人,并在2018年春天的全国人民代表大会上被重新任命为国家主席。同一次会议还批准取消国家主席的任期限制,允许习在第二个任期结束后继续担任国家主席。2016年,习被宣布为中央军委联合作战指挥中心总司令,并被任命为中共中央委员会的"核心"领导人。在成为中央军委主席之前,习近平是胡锦涛手下唯一的文职副主席。习近平的父亲是中国共产主义革命时期的一位重要军事人物,在20世纪80年代是政治局委员。年轻的习在他职业生涯的早期曾担任国防部长的助手,并作为一名省级党官员经常与中国人民解放军互动。在与美国官员的会晤中,习强调改善中美两军关系。副主席许其亮是第一位被任命为中国最高军警官员的职业空军军官。许志永是改革的公共倡导者,并作为中央军委改革领导小组副书记指导改革工作。徐先前在中央军事委员会担任中国人民解放军空军司令,在那里他负责快速的部队现代化和扩大空军的对外交战。他可能在职业生涯早期曾与习近平有过交集,当时两人都曾在福建工作。许志永是文革以来中国人民解放军第一位担任总参谋部副部长的空军军官,54岁的许志永是中国人民解放军历史上最年轻的一位。徐正在担任第三届中央军委委员。副董事长张有霞是中国第二高级军官,前设备开发部部长。在1979年中国与越南的短暂战争中,张学良作为战斗指挥官获得了难得的经验。张以前是中国沈阳军区的指挥官,中国与朝鲜和俄罗斯接壤。张是中国军队的"太子党"之一

China’s Military Leadership The military’s highest decision-making body, the CMC, is technically a department of the CCP Central Committee. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as the General Secretary of the CCP and President of China. Following the 19th Party Congress, the CMC consists of two vice chairs, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments, the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission, and the Minister of National Defense. Members of the CCP Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping’s appointment as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 2012 and his selection as President in the spring of 2013 represented the first simultaneous transfer of all three of China’s top positions to an incoming leader in recent decades. Xi was reappointed to his Party positions at the 19th Party Congress and was reappointed president in spring 2018 at the National People’s Congress. The same meeting also granted approval to remove presidential term limits, allowing Xi to potentially remain president beyond his second term. In 2016, Xi was announced as the commander-in-chief of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center and was named “core” leader of the CCP Central Committee. Prior to becoming CMC Chairman, Xi served as the CMC’s only civilian Vice Chairman under Hu Jintao. Xi’s father was an important military figure during China’s communist revolution and was a Politburo member in the 1980s. The younger Xi served as an aide to a defense minister early in his career and had regular interactions with the PLA as a provincial Party official. In meetings with U.S. officials, Xi has emphasized improving military-to-military relations between China and the United States. Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang is the first career air force officer to be appointed China’s top uniformed official. Xu is a public advocate for reform and guides the effort as a deputy secretary of the CMC’s reform leading group. Xu previously served on the CMC as the PLAAF commander, where he oversaw rapid force modernization and expanded the air force’s foreign engagement. He may have crossed paths with Xi Jinping early in his career, when both men served in Fujian Province. Xu was the first PLAAF officer to serve as deputy chief of the General Staff Department since the Cultural Revolution period, and – at 54 years of age at the time – the youngest in PLA history. Xu is serving a third term as a CMC member. Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia is China’s second-most senior officer and former head of the Equipment Development Department. Zhang gained rare experience as a combat commander during China’s brief war with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang formerly commanded the Shenyang Military Region, which shared a border with North Korea and Russia. Zhang is one of China’s military “princelings.”

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  20

他的父亲是中国著名的军事人物,在1949年中国内战结束时与习近平的父亲一起服役。张目前正在中央军事委员会任第二个任期。2018年3月,国防部长魏凤和在全国人民代表大会上被任命为国防部长。国防部长是中国人民解放军的第三把手,负责处理与国家官僚机构和外国军队的关系。与美国国防部长不同,他不属于指挥系统的一部分,他的主要政策影响力来自于中央军事委员会的成员资格。魏曾在不同军区的多个导弹基地服役,并曾在前中国人民解放军第二炮兵部队总部担任高级职务。中国人民解放军第二炮兵部队是中国人民解放军火箭部队的前身。2010年底,魏被提升为副总参谋长,成为第二炮兵部队的首位。魏最近是 PLARF 的指挥官。卫是第二任中央军委委员。联合参谋部主任李佐成负责监督解放军的行动,这缩小了前总参谋部在2015年开始改革之前承担的更广泛责任的范围。李是仅存的几个有作战经验的现役中国人民解放军军官之一,并因在中越边境战争中的服役而被公认为战斗英雄。他也是2015年解放军独立服役后的第一位陆军指挥官。李曾指挥成都军区,该军区负责西藏的敏感地区。政治工作部主任苗华负责中国人民解放军的政治工作,包括宣传、组织和教育工作。苗是一名前陆军军官,在2014年12月转到海军服役,当时他成为了解放军海军的政治委员。缪思可能和习有关系,当时他在福建省第三十一集团军服役,当时他的职业生涯与习的职业生涯重叠。2017年中期,缪思参加了海军的 OBOR 巡航任务,成为了解放军海军政治委员。纪律检查委员会秘书长张胜民负责监督负责调查违反党纪军事行为的最高级别组织。张还是中共中央纪律检查委员会常务委员会副书记和三等委员。张志军的任命表明,反腐败运动在未来的军队中将受到更高的关注。在他被任命为中央军事委员会后不久,张为将军,中国军队的最高军衔。

His father, a well-known military figure in China, served with Xi Jinping’s father at the close of China’s Civil War in 1949. Zhang is currently serving his second term on the CMC. Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe was appointed Minister of National Defense at the National People’s Congress in March 2018. The Minister of National Defense is the PLA’s third-most senior officer and manages its relationship with state bureaucracies and foreign militaries. Unlike the U.S. Secretary of Defense, he is not part of the chain of command and his primary policy influence is derived from membership in the CMC. Wei served in multiple missile bases across different military regions and held top posts in the headquarters of the former PLA Second Artillery Force, the PLA Rocket Force’s predecessor, before being promoted in late 2010 to Deputy Chief of the General Staff – the first officer from the Second Artillery to do so. Wei most recently was the PLARF commander. Wei is serving a second term as a CMC member. Joint Staff Department Chief Li Zuocheng oversees PLA operations, a narrowing of the wider responsibilities held by the former General Staff Department prior to reforms initiated in 2015. Li is one of few remaining active duty PLA officers with combat experience and is recognized as a combat hero for his service in China’s border war with Vietnam. He was also the first Army commander after the PLA Army became a separate service in 2015. Li previously commanded the Chengdu Military Region, which was responsible for the sensitive area of Tibet. Political Work Department Director Miao Hua oversees the PLA’s political work, including propaganda, organization, and education. Miao is a former Army officer who switched services to the Navy in December 2014 when he became political commissar of the PLA Navy. Miao may have ties to Xi from his time serving in the 31st Group Army in Fujian Province, when his career overlapped with Xi’s. Miao participated as the PLA Navy political commissar during the Navy’s OBOR cruise conducted in mid-2017. Discipline Inspection Commission Secretary Zhang Shengmin oversees the highest-level organization responsible for investigating military violations of Party discipline. Zhang is also a deputy secretary and third ranking member on the standing committee of the Party’s Discipline Inspection Commission. Zhang’s appointments indicate the anticorruption campaign will receive a higher profile in the military going forward. Shortly after his appointment to the CMC, Zhang was promoted to the rank of general, the highest rank in the Chinese military.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展21

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  21

近年来,中国领导人已经将文明与军事一体化提升为一项国家战略,其重点是协调民用和国防技术的发展,以实现更高的效率、创新和增长 中国希望 CMI 取得成功,支持到2035年完成军事现代化,到2049年发展成为"世界级"军事力量。Cmi,又称军民融合,自建国以来以各种形式存在,在20世纪90年代成为一种军事硬件现代化战略,随着中国从主要收购外国国防技术转向工业基地现代化和发展国内国防技术而演变。2015年,习主席将 CMI 提升为国家战略,致力于调整民用和国防技术的发展,以实现更高的效率、创新和增长。习主席呼吁中国军事委员会支持到2035年"基本"完成解放军现代化建设,支持到本世纪中叶中国成为"世界级"军事强国。中国通过税收优惠和其他财政补贴鼓励民用部门进入国防市场,并建立了一个采购网站,使公众能够对国防合同进行投标。高层协调不力、腐败以及对如何实施 CMI 缺乏了解,这些因素延缓了进展。2017年,中国成立了 CMI 发展中央委员会,以集中政府对 CMI 的控制和监督,并打破执行的组织障碍。该委员会发布了关于国防合同公共外包的指导意见和条例,以统一技术标准,改善合作项目的合作。该委员会还通过省级 CMI 示范区计划促进国防技术发展创新,在这些示范区,参与者试验减少组织障碍和进行创新的方法。在2018年主持委员会第三次会议期间,习主席呼吁对武器采购系统和海军军事委员会的其他努力进行更有重点的改革,以便在2018年取得突破。国家 CMI 战略不仅包括硬件现代化,还包括教育、人事、投资、基础设施和物流部门的举措。中国人民解放军正在裁减国防工业军装人员,并将文职人员纳入军事研究、训练和作战。国家 CMI 战略还强调,利用人工智能、机器学习、大数据和无人系统等新兴两用技术,促进解放军所称的"智能化"战争,或者利用多种数据流和信息流来支持解放军的行动。

CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION (CMI) Key Takeaways > In recent years, China’s leaders have elevated CMI to a national strategy focused on aligning civil and defense technology development to achieve greater efficiency, innovation, and growth. > China wants the successes of CMI to support completing military modernization by 2035 and developing a “world-class” military by 2049. After existing in various forms since the beginning of the PRC, CMI, also known as military-civil fusion, became a military hardware modernization strategy in the 1990s, evolving as China moved from primarily acquiring foreign defense technologies to modernizing its industrial base and developing domestic defense technologies. In 2015, President Xi elevated CMI to a national strategy focused on aligning civil and defense technology development to achieve greater efficiency, innovation, and growth. President Xi called on CMI to support the “basic” completion of PLA modernization by 2035 and the status of China as a “world-class” military power by mid-century. China incentivized the civilian sector to enter the defense market through tax incentives and other financial subsidies, and set up a procurement website to enable public bids on defense contracts. Ineffective top-level coordination, corruption, and lack of understanding on how to implement CMI slowed progress. In 2017, China established a central committee for CMI development to centralize government control and oversight of CMI and to break down organizational barriers to implementation. The committee has issued guidance on public outsourcing of defense contracts and regulations to align technology standards in order to improve cooperation on joint projects. The committee has also promoted increased innovation in defense technology development with plans for provincial-level CMI demonstration zones where participants experiment with methods of decreasing organizational impediments and practicing innovation. While chairing the third meeting of the committee in 2018, President Xi called for more focused reforms of weapons procurement systems and other CMI efforts to generate breakthroughs in 2018. The national CMI strategy goes beyond hardware modernization to include initiatives in the education, personnel, investment, infrastructure, and logistics sectors. The PLA is downsizing the number of uniformed defense industry personnel and integrating civilian personnel into military research, training, and operations. The national CMI strategy also emphasizes harnessing emerging dual-use technologies such as AI, machine learning, big data, and unmanned systems to facilitate what PLA writings refer to as “intelligentized” warfare, or using multiple data streams and information flows to enable PLA operations.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展22

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  22

军事演习和训练关键外卖中国正在通过现实战斗训练来训练自己的部队赢得战争,在训练中越来越多地使用专业的"蓝军"对手来提高现实感 2018年,培训重点包括较小规模的部队对部队演习、基于技能的竞赛,以及加强对军事指挥官的培训。2018年,中国人民解放军将训练重点放在战备上,通过大量小规模部队对抗演习和技能竞赛演习中的现实战斗训练,提高打赢战争的能力。另一个重点是加强对军事指挥官的培训,特别是指挥联合作战。中国人民解放军采取了不同寻常的措施,对所有13个集团军指挥官及其参谋进行了测试,以了解他们所在部队的任务和分配的任务,并要求他们回答有关作战情景的问题。中国人民解放军在2018年进行了一年一度的 STRIDE 和"火力演习",但也引入了"奇兵"("非常规部队")技能为基础的竞争情报,监视,侦察(ISR) ,特种作战部队,信息支持,电子对抗和陆军航空兵部队。这些竞赛在不同地点举行,每个专业一个,并利用与其他国家联合训练和竞赛的经验教训来确定评级标准。中国人民解放军还在早秋时节在东方战区进行了一次两栖联合演习,同时还进行了大量规模较小的军事演习,其中包括在南方战区由两个新改组的机械化步兵两栖旅进行的演习 2018年朱日和的 STRIDE 训练演习进行了三次,测试了重型联合武器旅与专门的反对力量的作战行动。Stride 2018的重点是评估重型联合武装旅的进攻和防御作战能力,并为所有这些旅制定战术 火力2018延续了系列的重点在防空和炮兵技能作为一个,或可能两个防空旅训练对模拟对手。中国人民解放军海军今年进行了重要的训练活动,其中最突出的是有史以来规模最大的舰队检阅和大规模实弹演习。2018年4月,习近平主席监督了中国人民解放军海军对包括辽宁航空母舰在内的大约50艘舰艇和潜艇以及超过75架飞机的舰队检查,检查发生在南中国海的海南岛以南。辽宁舰队检阅完毕后,

MILITARY EXERCISES AND TRAINING Key Takeaways > China is training its force to win wars through realistic combat training, increasingly using a professional “blue force” opponent during training to improve realism. > In 2018, training highlights included smaller force-on-force exercises, skills-based competitions, and strengthening training for military commanders. In 2018, the PLA focused its training on war-preparedness and improving its capability to win wars through realistic combat training during numerous smaller force-on-force exercises and skills-based competition exercises. Another focus was to strengthen training for military commanders, especially on commanding joint operations. The PLAA took the unusual step of testing all 13 group army commanders and their staffs on their knowledge of their unit’s missions and assigned tasks and required them to answer questions on operational scenarios. The PLAA conducted the annual STRIDE and FIREPOWER exercises in 2018 but also introduced the “QIBING” (“Unconventional Troops”) skills-based competition for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), special operations forces, information support, electronic countermeasures, and Army Aviation forces. These competitions took place at various sites, one for each specialty, and used lessons learned from joint training and competitions with other countries to establish the grading criteria. The PLA also conducted a joint amphibious exercise in the Eastern Theater in the early fall as well as numerous smaller force-on-force exercises, including an exercise between two newly reformed amphibious mechanized infantry brigades in the Southern Theater. > The STRIDE 2018 Zhurihe training exercise was conducted three times and tested heavy combined arms brigade operations against a dedicated opposing force. STRIDE 2018 focused on evaluating the offensive and defensive combat capabilities of the heavy combined arms brigade and developing tactics for all such brigades’ employment. > FIREPOWER 2018 continued the series’ focus on air defense and artillery skills as one, or possibly two, air defense brigades trained against simulated opponents. The PLA Navy conducted significant training events throughout the year, highlighted by its largest ever fleet review and a large-scale live-fire exercise. In April 2018, President Xi Jinping oversaw the PLAN’s fleet review of approximately 50 ships and submarines, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, and more than 75 aircraft, which took place just south of Hainan Island in the South China Sea. Following the fleet review, the Liaoning and its

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展23

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  23

护航飞机在菲律宾海进行演习,辽宁舰首次在第一岛链以外进行歼十五战斗机飞行作战。2018年7月中旬,中国海军在台湾北部的东海进行了一次大规模多舰队实弹演习。这次演习可能是遏制台独情绪和美国与台湾合作努力的一部分。从2018年3月到6月,解放军海军陆战队进行了一次长距离演习,向云南和山东半岛的训练区部署了大约10,000人。这次演习可能旨在提高解放军海军陆战队的远征作战能力。2018年,中国人民解放军空军继续进行标志性的"蓝盾"和"红剑"演习,重点强调了重组后的防空基地的能力和功能。在 BLUE SHIELD-2018防空演习中,空军首次将来自中国人民解放军陆军、海军、空军和火箭部队的防空部队纳入防空基地的指挥之下,致力于打造一个多服务、联合一体化的防空体系。Red SWORD-2018力量对抗演习包括战斗机、轰炸机、特别任务飞机、地对空导弹(SAMs)以及基地对基地方案中的电子作战单位。Red SWORD-2018基于实战计划,第一次有第三方"橙色部队"介入,并首次包括远程突袭和空降作战。人民解放军空降部队进行了一系列演习,旨在进行实战训练,提高其指挥和指挥参谋能力。2018年,PLARF 继续其每年一度的"天堂之剑"系列演习,并在其发射训练和力量对抗演习中纳入了一个新型的"蓝色部队"单位,包括 ISR、电子战和特种作战单位。战略支援部队(SSF)进行了洛阳2018系列力量对力量演习与 SSF 基地对抗五个 PLA 陆军,空军和火箭部队单位训练在复杂的电子战环境。联合后勤保障部队(JLSF)在西部战区的高原地区进行了联合后勤任务演习。这次演习包括联合后勤支援部队、现役后勤部队,以及来自西部战区的解放军陆军、空军和文职国防动员部队,这是联合战斗部队成立以来的首次综合后勤支援演习。这次演习很可能吸取了2017年在中国、不丹和印度三国交界地区附近的 Doka La Pass 与印度僵持不下的教训。

escorts conducted exercises in the Philippine Sea, where Liaoning embarked J-15 fighters conducted flight operations for the first time outside the First Island Chain. In mid-July 2018, the PLAN conducted a large-scale, multi-fleet live-fire exercise in the East China Sea, north of Taiwan. The exercise likely was part of an effort to deter Taiwan independence sentiment and U.S. cooperation with Taiwan. The PLAN Marine Corps conducted a long-distance maneuver exercise from March to June 2018, deploying approximately 10,000 personnel to training areas in Yunnan and the Shandong Peninsula. This exercise was likely aimed at improving the PLAN Marine Corps’ expeditionary warfare capabilities. The PLA Air Force continued its signature BLUE SHIELD and RED SWORD exercises in 2018, with an emphasis on the capabilities and functions of its reorganized air defense bases. In the BLUE SHIELD-2018 air defense exercise, the Air Force incorporated air defense units from the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force under the command of an air defense base for the first time, working to forge a multi-service, joint integrated air defense. The RED SWORD-2018 force-on-force exercise consisted of fighters, bombers, special mission aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and electronic warfare units in a base-versus-base scenario. RED SWORD-2018 was based on actual combat plans, featured an intervening third-party “orange force” for the first time, and included long-range raid and airborne operations for the first time as well. The PLAAF Airborne Corps conducted a series of exercises aimed at realistic combat training and improving its command and command staff capabilities. The PLARF continued its annual HEAVEN’S SWORD series of exercises in 2018 and incorporated a new type of “blue force” unit, comprised of ISR, electronic warfare, and special operations units into its launch training and force-on-force exercises. The Strategic Support Force (SSF) conducted the LUOYANG 2018 series of force-on-force exercises with a SSF base pitted against five PLA Army, Air Force, and Rocket Force units training in a complex electronic warfare environment. The Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) conducted the JOINT LOGISTICS MISSION exercise in the plateau region of the Western Theater. The exercise incorporated a joint logistic support force unit, service-level logistics units, as well as PLA Army, Air Force, and civilian national defense mobilization forces from the Western Theater in the first comprehensive, logistics support exercise since the establishment of the JLSF. The exercise probably incorporated lessons learned following the 2017 standoff with India at Doka La Pass, near the tri-border region of China, Bhutan, and India.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  24

中国在2018年至少进行了12次双边和多边军事演习,包括向俄罗斯部署3200名军事人员参加 VOSTOK 2018 人民解放军出国旅游和交流,增加了军官的国际接触,使人民解放军能够支持推进与其他国家的关系 2018年,支持中国更广泛外交政策目标的武器销售继续增长,包括武装无人驾驶飞行器(uav)和精确打击武器的销售。高层互访和交流为中国提供了机会,通过军事援助项目和人际关系发展,增加军官的国际接触,向交流伙伴学习,促进对外关系。扩大解放军出国旅行使解放军军官能够观察和研究外国军事指挥结构、单位编队和作战训练,并形成解决共同安全问题的方法。例如,2018年7月,国防部长魏凤和在北京举办了首届中非国防安全论坛,来自49个非洲国家的代表参加了论坛。2018年10月25日,魏还在 Xiangshan Forum 发表了演讲,这是一个由中国人民解放军下属组织和国家指导的智囊团主办的国际安全会议,主题是建立新的安全伙伴关系。中国还扩大了对双边和多边军事演习的参与,实现了中国人民解放军海外存在的正常化,并与外国军队建立了联系。2018年10月,中国首次主办中国ー东盟海上联合演习,参加中国与马来西亚、泰国举行的"和平友好2018"三方海军演习,这是中国改善与东南亚国家关系、缓和南海紧张局势努力的一部分。职业军事教育交流是中国军事外交的另一个工具。例如,一些拉丁美洲、加勒比海、东南亚和太平洋岛国向中国派遣军官,包括国防大学战略级别的国防研究学院。人民行动党学院还接待来自许多国家的同行,开展与维持和平和反恐行动有关的项目。

MILITARY COOPERATION Key Takeaways > China conducted at least 12 bilateral and multilateral exercises in 2018, including deploying 3,200 military personnel to Russia to participate in VOSTOK 2018. > PLA overseas travel and exchanges increase officers’ international exposure and enable the PLA to support advancing relations with other countries. > Arms sales, which support China’s broader foreign policy goals, continued to grow in 2018, including sales of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and precision-strike weapons. Senior-level visits and exchanges provide China with opportunities to increase military officers’ international exposure, learn from their exchange partners, and advance foreign relationships through military assistance programs and the development of personal relationships. Expanded PLA travel abroad enables PLA officers to observe and study foreign military command structures, unit formations, and operational training and shape approaches to shared security concerns. In July 2018, for example, Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe held the first China-Africa Defense Security Forum in Beijing, which included representatives from 49 African countries. On October 25, 2018, Wei also spoke at the Xiangshan Forum, an international security conference hosted by a PLA-affiliated organization and a state-directed think tank, which had the theme of building new security partnerships. China has also expanded its participation in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, normalizing the PLA’s presence overseas and establishing ties to foreign militaries. In October 2018, China hosted the first combined China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) maritime exercise and participated in the trilateral PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP 2018 naval exercise with Malaysia and Thailand as part of China’s effort to improve ties with Southeast Asian countries and calm tensions in the South China Sea. Professional military education exchanges are another tool of Chinese military diplomacy. For example, some Latin American, Caribbean, Southeast Asian, and Pacific Island countries send officers to China, including to the strategic-level College of Defense Studies at the National Defense University. The PAP Academy also hosts counterparts from many countries in programs related to peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  25

2018年部分双边和多边演习

Selected Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises in 2018

练习名称

Exercise Name

运动类别

Type of Exercise

参加者 SAGARMARTHA 友谊2018年尼泊尔特种作战金龙2018年反恐 / 人道主义援助柬埔寨

Participants SAGARMARTHA FRIENDSHIP 2018 Special Operations Nepal GOLDEN DRAGON 2018 Counterterrorism / Humanitarian Assistance Cambodia

俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、白俄罗斯、中国主办的国际陆军综合运动会

International Army Games Miscellaneous Hosted by Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, China

中国-东盟海上联合演习新加坡、泰国、文莱、越南、菲律宾、柬埔寨、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、缅甸

China-ASEAN Joint Maritime Exercise Maritime Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma

2018泰国马来西亚海上和平友谊

PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP 2018 Maritime Malaysia, Thailand

2018年泰国航空猎鹰攻击

FALCON STRIKE 2018 Air Thailand

2018战略俄罗斯

VOSTOK 2018 Strategic Russia

和平使命2018反恐俄罗斯,哈萨克斯坦,塔吉克斯坦,吉尔吉斯斯坦,印度,巴基斯坦

PEACE MISSION 2018 Counterterrorism Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan

猎鹰2018白俄罗斯反恐

HUNTING FALCON 2018 Counterterrorism Belarus

手拉手反恐印度

HAND IN HAND Counterterrorism India

SHAHEEN VII Air Pakistan

SHAHEEN VII Air Pakistan

2018年巴基斯坦反恐战士

WARRIOR VI 2018 Counterterrorism Pakistan

2018年9月中旬,俄罗斯在俄罗斯东部军区(VOSTOK 2018)举行了年度战略指挥和参谋演习。俄罗斯首次邀请中国和蒙古参加。在2018年东方观察站的活跃阶段,来自北方战区指挥部的大约25000名俄罗斯部队和3200名中国部队在俄罗斯的津戈尔训练区进行了训练。Vostok 2018年在楚戈尔的战术训练目标包括执行联合武器旅行动以抵御空袭,进行机动防御,进行火炮射击,过渡到有空中攻击支持的反攻,以及进行反水障碍穿越。

VOSTOK 2018 In mid-September 2018, Russia held its annual strategic command and staff exercise in the Russian Eastern Military District, VOSTOK 2018. For the first time, Russia invited China and Mongolia to participate. During the active phase of VOSTOK 2018, approximately 25,000 Russian forces and 3,200 Chinese forces from units based in the Northern Theater Command conducted training at Russia’s Tsugol Training Area. VOSTOK 2018 tactical training objectives at Tsugol included executing combined-arms brigade operations to defend against an aerial strike, conducting a maneuver defense, conducting artillery fires, transitioning to a counteroffensive with air assault support, and conducting an opposed water-obstacle crossing.

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维持和平行动。中国参与联合国维和行动支持中国的核心目标,突出中国作为全球行动者的作用,为中国人民解放军积累作战经验。中国的维和行动表明,中国人民解放军有能力在中国境外开展行动 中国为联合国维和行动在南苏丹、黎巴嫩、马里、苏丹和刚果民主共和国的行动提供人员。为维和行动部署的中国部队包括步兵、航空兵、工程师、医疗专业人员和后勤人员 2018年,中国继续在联合国安理会常任理事国中贡献最多的力量。截至2018年12月,中国是联合国维和行动的第十大部队派遣国,在非洲和中东的8个联合国维和行动特派团中约有2515人。2018年全年,中国派遣部队人数略有下降,从1月份的2634人减少到12月份的2515人。从2017年7月到2018年6月,中国资助了联合国维和行动67亿美元预算总额的10.25% ,成为仅次于美国的第二大捐助国。反盗版努力。2018年,中国继续在亚丁湾开展反海盗行动,自2008年以来向该地区部署了第28、29和30支海军护航特遣部队。在为期六个月的部署期间,第29特遣部队护送了40艘中国和外国船只,并派遣医疗人员协助两艘中国商船上的船员。部署结束后,任务组进行港口停留,与东道国军队和当地华人社区进行双边接触,为解放军军事外交提供了另一个平台。第29支海军护航特遣部队的重点是西非和欧洲,在喀麦隆、加蓬、南非、德国和波兰停靠。

Peacekeeping Operations. China’s participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) supports China’s core objectives by highlighting China’s role as a global actor and obtaining operational experience for the PLA. China’s PKO demonstrate the PLA’s ability to operate outside of China’s borders. > China provides personnel to UN PKO operations in South Sudan, Lebanon, Mali, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Chinese forces deployed for PKO consist of infantry, aviation, engineers, medical professionals, and logisticians. > In 2018, China continued to contribute the largest number of forces among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. As of December 2018, China was the tenth largest contributor of forces to UN PKO with approximately 2,515 personnel among eight UN PKO missions in Africa and the Middle East. China’s troop contributions slightly decreased throughout 2018 from approximately2,634 personnel in January to 2,515 personnel in December. From July 2017 to June 2018, China funded 10.25 percent of the total $6.7 billion UN PKO budget, making it the second largest contributor after the United States. Counterpiracy Efforts. In 2018, China continued to conduct counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden by deploying its 28th, 29th, and 30th naval escort task forces to the area since 2008. The 29th task force escorted 40 Chinese and foreign ships during its six-month deployment and dispatched medical personnel to assist sailors on two Chinese merchant ships. At the conclusion of deployments, the task groups conduct port calls and hold bilateral engagements with host country militaries and local Chinese communities, providing another platform for PLA military diplomacy. The 29th naval escort task force focused on western Africa and Europe, making port calls in Cameroon, Gabon, South Africa, Germany, and Poland.

中国武官在全球110多个办事处使用解放军军官作为军事参赞管理其日常海外军事外交工作。中国在世界各地的武官影响力不断增长,这反映了中国日益增长的全球利益。中国军事参赞担任驻华大使军事顾问,支持外交部和人民解放军外交政策目标,履行与人民解放军军事和安全合作有关的各种职责,包括与东道国和第三国人员的对口交流。军事参谋也在他们的国家或任务地区进行秘密和公开的情报收集。虽然世界各地附属办公室的一般职能相同,但由于双边关系密切或其他因素,一些附属办公室可能优先考虑具体任务或外交优先事项。中国的武官办公室大小不一,一般从2到10名解放军军官不等。大多数办事处只包括少数几个认可的官员;然而,在那些被认为对中国的战略利益很重要的国家,办事处的规模往往要大得多,可能包括多个助理参事、专职的海军或空军参事以及后勤人员。

Military Attaché Presence China manages its day-to-day overseas military diplomacy work using PLA officers assigned as military attachés in over 110 offices worldwide. China’s military attaché presence has grown around the world, which reflects China’s increasing global interests. China’s military attachés serve as military advisors to the ambassador, support Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objectives, and perform a variety of duties tied to PLA military and security cooperation, including counterpart exchanges with host-nation and third-country personnel. Military attachés also conduct clandestine and overt intelligence collection on their countries or areas of assignment. Although the general function of an attaché office is the same worldwide, some attaché offices probably prioritize specific missions or diplomatic priorities due to close bilateral relations or other factors. China’s military attaché offices vary in size, generally ranging from two to ten PLA officers. Most offices consist of just a few accredited officers; however, offices in countries considered important to China’s strategic interests are often considerably larger, potentially including multiple assistant attachés, dedicated naval or air force attachés, and support staff.

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中国的武器出口2018年,中国的武器销售有所增加,延续了过去15年中国成为世界上增长最快的武器供应国的趋势。从2013年到2017年,中国是世界第四大武器供应国,完成了价值超过250亿美元的武器销售。中国向中东出售了价值超过100亿美元的军事装备。沙特阿拉伯、伊拉克和中东阿拉伯联合酋长国占中国在该地区军售的大部分。印度-太平洋地区是中国的第二大区域军火市场,其军火销售额超过80亿美元,其中50多亿美元卖给了巴基斯坦。在过去几年里,中国签署了制导火箭、弹道导弹、武装无人机、潜艇和水面战舰的合同,这些合同为中国武器出口商带来了持续的销售增长。中国航空工业集团公司,一家武装无人机和固定翼飞机的出口商,在一份罕见的公开声明中宣称其在2017年获得了创纪录的利润,这说明中国在世界上最多产的武器供应商中的地位正在上升。中国能否保持全球五大军火供应国的地位,很大程度上取决于对中东和印度-太平洋地区主要客户的持续强劲销售,以及对其武装无人机和精确打击武器的持续需求 武装无人机。中国的武装无人机市场持续增长;中国现在至少向缅甸、伊拉克、巴基斯坦、沙特阿拉伯和中东阿拉伯联合酋长国出售彩虹系列无人机。中国在这些销售方面几乎没有竞争;大多数武装无人机出口商已经签署了《导弹技术控制制度》和 / 或《瓦圣纳协定面临销售限制 精确打击武器。为了填补全球军火市场的另一个利基市场,中国已经出售了精确制导火箭和弹道导弹导弹系统,尽管它通常不指明购买这类武器的国家。2018年的行业报告强调了中国制造的 WS-3A 和 WS-22卫星制导火箭的销售情况,以及一些出口变种的弹道导弹系统(M20、 BP-12和联合攻击火箭和导弹系统) 海军战斗人员。自2015年以来,中国海军军舰的销售也大幅增长,巴基斯坦以超过30亿美元的价格购买了8艘人民币变体潜艇。泰国还在2017年购买了一艘人民币变体潜艇,并表示有兴趣再购买两艘。到目前为止,中国还没有交付任何人民币版本的潜艇,尽管它在2016年向孟加拉国交付了两艘 mingclass 级潜艇。此外,在2017年和2018年,中国向孟加拉国(两艘053h3型护卫舰)和巴基斯坦(四艘054a 型护卫舰)出售护卫舰,并向斯里兰卡捐赠了一艘未指明的护卫舰。

China’s Arms Exports In 2018, China’s arms sales increased, continuing a trend that enabled China to become the world’s fastest-growing arms supplier during the past 15 years. From 2013 through 2017, China was the world’s fourth-largest arms supplier, completing more than $25 billion worth of arms sales. China sold military equipment worth more than $10 billion to the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates accounted for most of China’s arms sales in the region. The Indo-Pacific region was China’s second-largest regional arms market, with more than $8 billion worth of arms sales, more than $5 billion of which was to Pakistan. Contracts signed within the past few years for guided rockets, ballistic missiles, armed UAVs, submarines, and surface warships sustained sales growth for Chinese arms exporters. The Aviation Industry of China (AVIC), an exporter of armed UAVs and fixed-wing aircraft, claimed in a rare public statement that it secured record profits in 2017, illustrating China’s rising profile among the world’s most prolific arms suppliers. China’s ability to remain among the world’s top five global arms suppliers largely hinges on continued strong sales to key Middle East and Indo-Pacific customers, as well as sustained demand for its armed UAVs and precision-strike weapons. > Armed UAVs. China’s market for armed UAVs continues to grow; China now sells CAIHONG series UAVs to at least Burma, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. China faces little competition for these sales; most armed UAV exporters have signed the Missile Technology Control Regime and/or the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and face sales restrictions. > Precision-Strike Weapons. Filling another niche in the global arms market, China has sold precision-guided rockets and ballistic missile systems, though it typically does not identify countries purchasing these types of arms. Industry reports in 2018 highlighted sales of Chinese-made WS-3A and WS-22 satellite-guided rockets, as well as several export variant ballistic missile systems (the M20, BP-12, and Joint Attack Rocket and Missile systems). > Naval Combatants. China’s naval warship sales have also surged since 2015, highlighted by Pakistan’s purchase of eight YUAN variant submarines for more than $3 billion. Thailand also purchased one YUAN variant submarine in 2017 and has expressed interest in purchasing two more. To date, China has not delivered any YUAN variants, though it delivered two MING-class submarines to Bangladesh in 2016. Also, in 2017 and 2018, China sold frigates to Bangladesh (two Type 053H3s) and Pakistan (four Type 054As), and donated one unspecified frigate to Sri Lanka.

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中国的武器销售主要通过中国航空工业集团公司(AVIC)和北方工业集团公司(NORINCO)等国有出口组织进行,这些组织的主要目的是创造利润。武器转让也是中国外交政策的一个组成部分,与其他类型的军事、经济援助和发展援助一起使用,以支持更广泛的外交政策目标。这些措施包括确保获得自然资源和出口市场,提高东道国精英阶层的政治影响力,以及在国际论坛上争取支持。中国的许多武器接受国是发展中国家,这些国家倾向于购买中国的武器,因为它们比其他武器制造商出售的类似系统便宜。尽管一些潜在客户认为中国武器的质量和可靠性较低,但许多中国武器系统都有礼物、捐赠和灵活的支付方式等诱惑。一些中国系统包括先进的能力。与竞争对手的武器出口相比,中国的武器最终用途限制往往较少,受到的监管也较少。由于政治或经济原因,这一因素吸引了较少获得其他军事装备来源的客户。

China’s arms sales operate through state-run export organizations such as AVIC and North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) that primarily seek to generate profits. Arms transfers also are a component of China’s foreign policy, used in conjunction with other types of military, economic aid, and development assistance to support broader foreign policy goals. These include securing access to natural resources and export markets, promoting political influence among host country elites, and building support in international forums. Many of China’s arms recipients are developing countries that tend to buy Chinese arms because they are less expensive than comparable systems sold by other arms manufactures. Although Chinese arms are considered by some potential customers to be of lower quality and reliability, many Chinese systems are offered with enticements such as gifts, donations, and flexible payment options. Some Chinese systems include advanced capabilities. Chinese arms also tend to carry fewer end-use restrictions and are monitored less rigorously than competitors’ arms exports, a factor that attracts customers with less access to other sources of military equipment because of political or economic reasons.

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2部队现代化的目标和趋势

2 FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS

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2018年,人民解放军继续实施结构改革,在部署本土系统方面取得进展,加强战略支援部队和联合后勤支援部队的行动支援能力和联合行动能力 解放军在发展中的能力和概念正在加强中国的反介入 / 区域封锁(a 2 / ad)和力量投射能力 2018年,中央军事委员会收购了武警部队唯一的 C2,并将中国海岸警卫队(CCG)隶属于武警部队,这可以提高准军事部队在联合战区司令部指挥下为解放军行动提供支持的能力。中国正在推进一项全面的军事现代化计划,目标是到2035年实现现代化,到2049年使中国人民解放军成为"世界级"军队。中国的目标是到2035年完成军事现代化,到2049年使中国人民解放军成为"世界级"军队,通过现代化以及结构和指挥的变化。在过去的十年中,除了继续强调应对台湾突发事件的能力外,中国还增强了实现一系列地区安全目标的能力。现代化包括提高军事能力,对潜在的第三方干预进行 a2 / ad,以及核威慑和力量投射作战。中国人民解放军继续发展空间、对抗空间、电子战和网络空间作战能力。中国人民解放军寻求加强联合作战 C2、联合后勤保障,以及实时监视、侦察和预警系统,以增强其作战能力。解放军现代化包括指挥和部队结构改革,以提高作战灵活性和为未来部署做好准备。中国人民解放军主要外卖中国人民解放军继续适应2018年的结构和指挥变化 每个集团军都是标准化的,包括六个联合武器旅,作为人民解放军的主要机动部队,并控制六个作战支援和作战服务支援旅 中国人民解放军为联合武装旅的下属联合武装营配备了人员,并对其进行了改组,使其能够独立开展行动。这些营已经成为中国人民解放军联合作战的基本战术单位。

Key Takeaways > In 2018, the PLA continued to implement structural reforms, make progress on fielding indigenous systems, and strengthen the ability of the Strategic Support Force and the Joint Logistics Support Force to enable operational support capabilities and joint operations. > PLA capabilities and concepts in development are strengthening China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and power projection capabilities. > The CMC’s acquisition of sole C2 over the PAP and the subordination of the China Coast Guard (CCG) to the PAP in 2018 could improve paramilitary forces’ ability to provide support to PLA operations under the authority of the joint theater commands. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY Key Takeaway > China is advancing a comprehensive military modernization program aimed at completing modernization by 2035 and making the PLA into a “world-class” military by 2049. China aims to complete military modernization by 2035 and make the PLA into a “world-class” military by 2049, through both modernization as well as structural and command changes. During the last decade, China has increased its capability to address a range of regional security objectives, beyond its continued emphasis on capabilities for Taiwan contingencies. Modernization includes improvements to military capabilities to conduct A2/AD against potential third-party intervention, as well as nuclear deterrence and power projection operations. The PLA continues to develop capabilities to conduct space, counterspace, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations. The PLA seeks enhanced joint operations C2, joint logistics support, and a real-time surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning system to bolster its warfighting capability. PLA modernization includes command and force structure reforms to improve operational flexibility and readiness for future deployments. PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ARMY (PLAA) Key Takeaways > The PLAA continued to adapt to structural and command changes in 2018. > Each group army is standardized and includes six combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA's primary maneuver force, and controls six combat support and combat service support brigades. > The PLAA has staffed and restructured the combined-arms brigades’ subordinate combined-arms battalions to enable them to conduct independent operations. These battalions have become the PLAA’s basic tactical unit for joint operations.

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整个2018年,人民解放军继续适应2017年发生的结构和指挥变化。每个集团军(大致相当于一个美国军团级别)现在已经标准化,包括六个联合武器旅,作为解放军的主要机动部队。每个集团军还控制其他6个旅,负责战斗和作战支援职能:一个砲兵旅,一个防空旅,一个陆军航空(或空中突击)旅,一个特种作战部队旅,一个工兵和化学防御旅,以及一个服务支援旅。联合武装旅的下级联合武装营已经成为中国人民解放军联合行动的基本战术单位。中国人民解放军还为这些新营配备了人员,并对其进行了改组,使其能够独立行动。联合武器营指挥官现在有参谋,除了新的侦察和服务支助资产外,他们还协助制定和执行计划和命令。人民解放军将其联合武器营划分为三种类型:重型(履带式装甲车辆)、中型(轮式装甲车辆)和轻型(高机动性、山地 / 丛林、空中突击和机动化营)。这种多样化的作战单位使人民解放军能够灵活地组织未来的部队部署,而不需要组织那些可能没有经过充分训练的单位。2017年成立的两个空中突击旅取代了各自的集团军下属航空旅:第83集团军(中央战区)和第75集团军(南部战区)各有一个。这些"新型"作战单位在2018年受到了大量媒体的报道,中国的新闻来源将其描述为一支高度机动的部队,可以用于"三维作战行动" 空中突击旅使中国人民解放军能够执行部队投射和空中插入任务,并可用于补充新近模块化的中国人民解放军空军(PLAAF)空降兵联合武器旅。中国人民解放军的其余部队进行了额外的兵力重组和模块化。除西区战区外,大部分战区的边海防团已改编为旅。在南方战区建立了一个新的军属情报侦察旅。中国人民解放军内部也在同时发生较低级别的变化,包括坦克排的规模从3辆增加到4辆,据报道,中国人民解放军新兵完成初步训练的时间增加了一倍。连续第二年,中国人民解放军在2018年只参加了少量的指定演习。今年7月,STRIDE 2018年年度演习的一次迭代发生在

Throughout 2018, the PLAA continued to adapt to structural and command changes which occurred in 2017. Each group army (roughly a U.S. corps-level equivalent) is now standardized and includes six combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA’s primary maneuver force. Each group army also controls six other brigades responsible for combat and combat support functions: an artillery brigade, an air defense brigade, an army aviation (or air assault) brigade, a special operations forces (SOF) brigade, an engineer and chemical defense brigade, and a service support brigade. Combined-arms brigades’ subordinate combined-arms battalions have become the PLAA's basic tactical unit for joint operations. The PLAA has also staffed and restructured these new battalions to enable them to conduct independent operations. Combined-arms battalion commanders now have staff officers who assist in the development and implementation of plans and orders in addition to new reconnaissance and service support assets. The PLAA delineates its combined-arms battalions into three types: heavy (tracked armored vehicles), medium (wheeled armored vehicles), and light (high-mobility, mountain/jungle, air assault and motorized battalions). This variety of combat units provides the PLAA flexibility to structure future force deployments without needing to task organize units that may not have sufficiently trained together. Two air-assault brigades established in 2017 replaced their respective group army-subordinate army aviation brigades: one in the 83rd Group Army (Central Theater) and one in the 75th Group Army (Southern Theater). These “new-type” combat units received a large amount of press coverage in 2018 and have been described in Chinese news sources as a highly mobile force that can be used for “three-dimensional combat operations.” The air assault brigades enable the PLAA to perform force projection and air insertion missions, and can be used to supplement the newly modularized People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Airborne Corps’ combined-arms airborne brigades. Additional force restructuring and modularization has occurred across the remainder of the PLAA. Border and coastal defense regiments have been reorganized as brigades in most theaters, except the Western Theater. A new army-subordinate intelligence and reconnaissance brigade has been established in the Southern Theater. Lower level changes are also simultaneously occurring within the PLAA, including an ongoing increase in the size of tank platoons from three to four tanks and the reported doubling of the time PLAA recruits spend completing initial training. For the second consecutive year, the PLAA participated in only a small number of named exercises during 2018. In July, one iteration of the annual STRIDE 2018 exercise occurred at

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展33

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  33

朱日河训练基地,其中包括第81集团军的两个重装混编旅,其中一个旅作为永久对抗部队(OPFOR)。中国人民解放军的"红色部队"描绘了中国军队在一个真实的战斗环境中集中行动,尽管每个旅轮流扮演侵略者和防御者。2018年,第79集团军防空旅在山东渭北训练基地至少进行了一次一年一度的"火力演习"。虽然中国人民解放军领导的演习是有限的,但中国人民解放军部署了两个联合武器营,支持炮兵部队,工程资产,以及来自北方战区司令部的 C2单位,参加俄罗斯年度战略军事演习 VOSTOK 2018。虽然中国人民解放军已经在俄罗斯部署了部队参加上海合作组织之前举行的和平使命演习,但东方之声2018是中国人民解放军在海外演习中部署部队最多的一次。

the Zhurihe Training Base, and it involved two heavy combined-arms brigades from the 81st Group Army, one of which served as the permanent opposing force (OPFOR). The PLAA “red force” portraying Chinese forces focused on operating in a realistic combat environment, though each brigade took turns portraying the aggressor and defender. At least one iteration of the annual FIREPOWER exercise series took place in 2018 at the Weibei Training Base in Shandong involving the air defense brigade of the 79th Group Army.Although PLAA-led exercises were limited, the PLAA deployed two combined-arms battalions, supporting artillery elements, engineering assets, and C2 units from the Northern Theater Command to participate in VOSTOK 2018, Russia's annual strategic military exercise. While the PLAA has deployed forces to Russia for previous PEACE MISSION exercises conducted under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, VOSTOK 2018 represented the PLAA's largest deployment of forces to a foreign exercise.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展34

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  34

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展35

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  35

中国人民解放军海军(PLAN)主要外卖中国人民解放军海军是该地区最大的海军,拥有300多艘舰船,并继续快速现代化为多功能平台 中国第一艘国产航空母舰可能在2019年加入该舰队,中国在2018年开始建造第二艘国产航空母舰。解放军海军是该地区最大的海军,拥有300多艘水面作战舰艇、潜艇、两栖舰艇、巡逻艇和特种舰艇。它也是一支日益现代化和灵活的力量。解放军海军正在迅速取代过时的、通常是单一用途的平台,取而代之的是拥有先进的反舰、反空中和反潜武器和传感器的大型多用途战斗机。这种现代化与中国对海洋领域的日益重视和对解放军海军日益增长的需求相吻合,解放军海军利用具有强大自卫能力的多任务、远程、可持续的海军平台,在距离中国大陆不断扩大的距离上执行作战任务。2018年,中国人民解放军继续实施于2015年底和2016年初开始的结构改革。这些新的安排集中于海军部队的组织、人员配备、训练和装备,而不是指挥行动。中国人民解放军海军似乎也正在将其部分单位改造成类似于空军的基地作战单位结构。海军继续扩大海军陆战队(PLANMC)的兵力结构。此前,海军陆战队由两个旅和大约10,000人组成,在地理和任务上仅限于对南海前哨进行两栖攻击和防御。到2020年,资源规划委员会将由7个旅组成,可能有超过3万人,并将扩大其使命,包括在中国境外的远征行动。新成立的 PLANMC 总部现在负责 PLANMC 部队的人员配备、培训和装备。虽然仍然隶属于解放军海军,但是国家海军计划第一次有了自己的指挥官。还可能建立一个航空旅,提供有机的直升机运输和攻击能力,增强其两栖作战和远征作战作战能力。潜艇。中国潜艇部队的现代化建设仍然是解放军海军的重中之重。解放军海军目前拥有4艘核动力弹道导弹潜艇(SSBN)、6艘核动力攻击潜艇(SSN)和50艘常规动力攻击潜艇(SS)。潜艇部队的增长速度已经放缓

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY (PLAN) Key Takeaways > The PLAN is the largest navy in the region with more than 300 ships and continues to undergo rapid modernization to multi-role platforms. > China’s first domestically-built aircraft carrier will likely join the fleet in 2019, and China began construction of its second domestic aircraft carrier in 2018. The PLAN is the region’s largest navy, with more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, patrol craft, and specialized types. It is also an increasingly modern and flexible force. The PLAN is rapidly replacing obsolescent, generally single-purpose platforms in favor of larger, multi-role combatants featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. This modernization aligns with China’s growing emphasis on the maritime domain and increasing demands on the PLAN to conduct operational tasks at expanding distances from the Chinese mainland using multi-mission, long-range, sustainable naval platforms possessing robust self-defense capabilities. In 2018, the PLAN continued to implement structural reforms which began in late 2015 and early 2016. These new arrangements focus the service on organizing, manning, training, and equipping naval forces rather than conducting operations. The PLAN also appears to be converting some of its units to a base-operational unit structure, similar to the Air Force. The PLAN has continued expanding the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) force structure. The PLANMC previously consisted of two brigades and approximately 10,000 personnel, and it was limited in geography and mission to amphibious assault and defense of South China Sea outposts. By 2020, the PLANMC will consist of seven brigades, may have more than 30,000 personnel, and it will expand its mission to include expeditionary operations beyond China’s borders. A newly established PLANMC headquarters is now responsible for manning, training, and equipping PLANMC forces. For the first time, the PLANMC also has its own commander, although it remains subordinate to the PLAN. The PLANMC may also establish an aviation brigade, which could provide an organic helicopter transport and attack capability, increasing its amphibious and expeditionary warfare capabilities. Submarines. Modernization of China’s submarine force remains a high priority for the PLAN. The PLAN currently operates four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 50 conventionally powered attack submarines (SS). The speed of growth of the submarine force has slowed and

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展36

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  36

到2020年,潜艇数量可能增加到65至70艘。中国继续增加其先进反舰巡航导弹(ASCM)能力的常规潜艇的库存。自20世纪90年代中期以来,中国人民解放军已购买了12套俄罗斯制造的千级党卫军装备,其中8套能够发射厌氧反应堆。这些年来,中国造船厂已经交付了13艘宋级 SS(039型)和17艘039A 型(SSP)柴油-电动攻击型攻击潜艇,预计到2020年总共将生产20艘 YUANs。在过去的15年中,解放军海军建造了十二艘核潜艇——2艘 SHANG I-class SSNs(Type 093) ,4艘 SHANG II-class SSNs(Type 093A)和6艘 JIN-class SSBNs(Type 094)。中国装备了 CSS-N-14(JL-2)潜射潜射弹道导弹(SLBM) ,4枚可投入使用的晋级潜射导弹是中国第一枚可靠的海基核威慑力量。据报道,中国的下一代096 SSBN 型潜射弹道导弹将装备后续的 JL-3潜射弹道导弹,可能在2020年代初开始建造。到2020年代中期,中国可能会建造093B 型制导导弹核攻击潜艇。这种新型的上级变体将增强解放军海军的反舰作战能力,并可能提供一种更加秘密的对地攻击选择。水面战斗机。中国人民解放军海军还在进行强有力的水面舰艇建设计划,生产新型导弹巡洋舰(CG)、导弹驱逐舰(DDG)和导弹护卫舰(FFG) ,这将大大提升中国人民解放军海军的防空、反舰和反潜能力。这些资产将是至关重要的,因为解放军海军扩大行动到远海超出岸基防空系统的范围。2017-2018年,中国推出了第一批四个人海级(055型) CGs,还有几个正在建设中。Renhai 将于2019年投入使用,并携带大量的 ASCMs、 SAMs 和反潜武器。在2018年,至少有三个以上的 LUYANG iii 级 DDG(052D 型)投入使用,使运行总数达到9个单位,其中至少有四个以上的 DDG 和一个新的、扩大的变体,在建设或装备的各个阶段。陆洋三级 DDG 有一个多用途垂直发射系统,能够发射巡航导弹、地空导弹和反潜导弹。中国继续生产江凯 ii 级 FFG(054A 型) ,目前在舰队中有27艘或更多,还有几艘处于不同建造阶段。中国海军正在加强其沿海作战能力,特别是在南海和东海,高速生产江岛级(056型)轻巡洋舰。截至2018年底,这些轻型护卫舰中已有40多艘投入使用,目前还有十多艘正在建造或装备中。这个

will likely grow to between 65 and 70 submarines by 2020. China continues to increase its inventory of advanced anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM)-capable conventional submarines. Since the mid-1990s, the PLAN has purchased 12 Russian-built KILO-class SS units, eight capable of launching ASCMs. During these years, Chinese shipyards have delivered 13 SONG-class SS units (Type 039) and 17 YUAN-class diesel-electric air-independent power attack submarines (SSP) (Type 039A) with a total of 20 YUANs projected for production by 2020. Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed twelve nuclear submarines – two SHANG I-class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II-class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), China’s four operational JIN-class SSBNs represent China’s first credible, sea-based nuclear deterrent. China’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN reportedly will be armed with the follow-on JL-3 SLBM, which will likely begin construction in the early-2020s. By the mid-2020s, China will likely build the Type 093B guided-missile nuclear attack submarine. This new SHANG-class variant will enhance the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a more clandestine land-attack option. Surface Combatants. The PLAN also remains engaged in a robust surface combatant construction program, producing new guided-missile cruisers (CG), guided-missile destroyers (DDG), and guided-missile frigates (FFG) which will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities. These assets will be critical as the PLAN expands operations into distant seas beyond the range of shore-based air defense systems. In 2017-2018, China launched its first four RENHAI-class (Type 055) CGs, with several more under construction. The RENHAI will enter operational service in 2019 and carry a large loadout of ASCMs, SAMs, and anti-submarine weapons. In 2018, at least three more LUYANG III-class DDGs (Type 052D) entered service, bringing the operational total to nine units with at least four more of this DDG and a new, enlarged variant in various stages of construction or outfitting. The LUYANG III-class DDG has a multipurpose vertical launch system capable of launching cruise missiles, SAMs, and anti-submarine missiles. China continues to produce the JIANGKAI II-class FFG (Type 054A) with 27 or more ships currently in the fleet and several more in various stages of construction. The PLAN is augmenting its littoral warfare capabilities, especially in the South China Sea and East China Sea, with high-rate production of the JIANGDAO-class corvettes (FFL) (Type 056). More than 40 of these corvettes entered service by the end of 2018, and more than a dozen more are currently under construction or outfitting. The

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  37

最新的 FFLs 是带有拖曳阵列声纳的 ASW 变体。中国还拥有60艘后北级穿浪双体导弹巡逻艇(022型) ,用于在中国"近海"执行任务 中国人民解放军海军继续强调反舰作战。护卫舰和轻型护卫舰,以及现代化的老式战斗机,携带着 YJ-83 ASCM(65海里,120公里)的变种,而较新的水面战斗机,如 LUYANG ii 级 DDGs 则配备了 YJ-62(120海里,222公里)。陆洋三级 DDG 和人海级 CG 将配备中国最新 ASCM 的变种 YJ-18(290纳米,537公里)。一些现代化的驱逐舰已经改装了超音速 YJ-12 ASCM。中国12千级党卫军有8架装备了俄罗斯制造的 SS-n-27 ASCM(120海里,222公里)。中国宋级 SS、元级 SSP 和上级 SSN 潜艇将投入使用中国最新的国产 YJ-18潜艇及其改进型潜艇,构成对 SS-n-27 ASCM 的改进。中国人民解放军海军认识到,远程 ASCMs 需要强大的超视距(OTH)瞄准能力,以实现其全部潜力。中国正在投资于战略、行动和战术层面的侦察、监视、指挥、控制和通信系统,以便向地面和地下发射平台提供高保真的目标信息。两栖作战。中国在两栖舰队方面的投资表明了中国发展远征作战作战能力的意图。中国人民解放军拥有五个大型豫兆级(071型)两栖运输码头(LPD) ,2018年还有三个正在建设或装备中。与解放军海军老式登陆舰相比,宇照 LPD 为远程作战提供了更强大和更灵活的能力。它可以携带几架新的 yuyi- 级气垫中型登陆艇和四架或更多的直升机,以及装甲车和海军陆战队进行远距离部署。中国人民解放军海军可能会继续建造鱼照 lpd,即使它追求的是一个后续的两栖突击舰,不仅更大,而且还包括一个完整的直升机飞行甲板。航空母舰。中国第一艘国产航空母舰于2017年发射,在2018年完成了多次海上试验,并有可能在2019年底加入舰队。新航母是辽宁号的改进版,但由于缺乏弹射发射系统和比美国航母甲板更小的飞行甲板,其性能也同样有限。2018年,中国开始建造第二座国产航空母舰,规模可能会更大,并配备弹射发射系统。这种设计将使其能够支持更多的战斗机、固定翼预警机和更快速的飞行行动。中国第二

latest FFLs are ASW variants with a towed-array sonar. China also has 60 HOUBEI-class wave-piercing catamaran guided-missile patrol boats (Type 022) built for operations in China’s “near seas.” The PLAN continues to emphasize anti-surface warfare. Frigates and corvettes, as well as modernized older combatants, carry variants of the YJ-83 ASCM (65 nm, 120 km), while newer surface combatants such as the LUYANG II-class DDGs are fitted with the YJ-62 (120 nm, 222 km). The LUYANG III-class DDG and the RENHAI-class CG will be fitted with a variant of China’s newest ASCM, the YJ-18 (290 nm, 537 km). A few modernized destroyers have been retrofitted with the supersonic YJ-12 ASCM. Eight of China’s 12 KILO-class SS are equipped with the Russian-built SS-N-27 ASCM (120-nm, 222-km). Chinese SONG-class SS, YUAN-class SSP, and SHANG-class SSN boats will field China’s newest domestic submarine-launched YJ-18 and its variants, which constitute an improvement over the SS-N-27 ASCM. The PLAN recognizes that long-range ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability to realize their full potential. China is investing in reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and communications systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity targeting information to surface and subsurface launch platforms. Amphibious Warfare Ships. China’s investments in its amphibious ship force signal its intent to develop expeditionary warfare capabilities. The PLAN has five large YUZHAO-class (Type 071) amphibious transport docks (LPD), with three more under construction or outfitting during 2018. The YUZHAO LPD provides a greater and more flexible capability for long-range operations than the PLAN’s older landing ships. It can carry several of the new YUYI-class air-cushion medium landing craft and four or more helicopters, as well as armored vehicles and PLAN Marines for long-distance deployments. The PLAN probably will continue constructing YUZHAO LPDs even as it pursues a follow-on amphibious assault ship that is not only larger but also incorporates a full flight deck for helicopters. Aircraft Carriers. China’s first domestically-built aircraft carrier was launched in 2017, completed multiple sea trials during 2018, and will likely join the fleet by the end of 2019. The new carrier is a modified version of the Liaoning but is similarly limited in its capabilities due to its lack of a catapult launch system and a smaller flight deck than the deck on U.S. carriers. China began construction of its second domestically built aircraft carrier in 2018, which will likely be larger and fitted with a catapult launch system. This design will enable it to support additional fighter aircraft, fixed-wing early-warning aircraft, and more rapid flight operations. China’s second

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展38

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  38

国产航母预计在2022年投入使用。辅助船舶。中国海军继续建造大量的海上辅助和支援船,包括情报收集船、声音收集船、舰队补给油船、潜艇救援和打捞船,以及其他各种特种部队。此外,中国在2018年发射了第一艘国产极地破冰船雪龙2号。

domestically built carrier is projected to be operational by 2022. Auxiliary Ships. The PLAN continues to build a large number of seagoing auxiliary and support ships, including intelligence collection ships (AGIs), acoustic collection ships (AGOS), fleet replenishment oilers, submarine rescue and salvage ships, and various other specialized units. Additionally China launched its first domestically built polar icebreaker Xuelong 2 in 2018.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展39

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  39

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展40

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  40

中国人民解放军空军和解放军海军航空兵关键部队解放军空军和解放军海军航空兵航空兵这一地区最大的航空兵部队,解放军空军和解放军海军航空兵继续致力于实现远程力量投射作战 中国人民解放军空军继续实现现代化,提供本地有人驾驶飞机和各种无人驾驶飞机 中国已经开始试射俄罗斯生产的 S-400远程地空导弹系统,并且正在开发可能具有美国弹道导弹防御能力的 HQ-19。解放军空军和海军航空兵是该地区最大的航空兵力量,也是世界第三大航空兵力量,拥有超过2700架飞机(不包括教练机或无人机)和大约2000架战斗机(包括战斗机、战略轰炸机、战术轰炸机、多任务战术和攻击机)。2017年,丁来航中将担任中国人民解放军空军司令,并力劝中国人民解放军建立一支真正的"战略"空军,能够在远程投射空中力量。中国人民解放军空军继续现代化,并在广泛的能力范围内迅速缩小与西方空军的差距。这一趋势正在逐渐侵蚀美国长期以来在航空领域相对于中国的重大技术优势。Pla 重组显著影响 PLAAF 的兵力结构。变化包括建立至少6个新的空军基地,并通过解散其战斗机和战斗轰炸机师,将以前的下属团改编为新建基地下的旅。改革可能也同样影响到解放军航空兵,因为至少有一个解放军航空兵团被改组成了一个旅,就像解放军空军的对手一样。空气传播。2018年,中国人民解放军空降兵第15军的重组将兵团分成5个联合武装旅,接受空中突击旅的支援。在重组之前,中国人民解放军空降兵第15军是一支传统的摩托化部队,主要负责空降任务。改革后,其空中突击旅现在是解放军三个空中突击单位之一,也是解放军空军中唯一的突击旅。这支部队正在获得额外的技能,例如从直升机和运输机上进行空中登陆攻击(空中攻击) ,重点是快速反应。空降兵在总体结构上相当于一个 PLA 集团军。战斗机。中国人民解放军空军继续派遣第四代战斗机(现在大约600架) ,并可能在未来几年内成为第四代战斗机的主力。Plaaf 仍在开发第五代

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF) AND PLAN AVIATION Key Takeaways > The largest aviation forces in the region, the PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continue to work toward achieving long-range power projection capability. > The PLAAF continues to modernize with the delivery of indigenous manned aircraft and a wide range of UAVs. > China has begun test firing the Russia-produced S-400 long-range SAM system, and is developing the HQ-19, which will likely have a ballistic missile defense capability. The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation are the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with more than 2,700 total aircraft (not including trainer variants or UAVs) and approximately 2,000 combat aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft). In 2017, Lieutenant General Ding Laihang assumed the post of PLAAF commander and exhorted the service to build a truly “strategic” air force capable of projecting airpower at a long range. The PLAAF continues to modernize and is rapidly closing the gap with Western air forces across a broad spectrum of capabilities. This trend is gradually eroding U.S. longstanding, significant technical advantages against China in the air domain. PLA reorganization significantly affected the force structure of the PLAAF. Changes included establishing at least six new air bases, and restructuring previously subordinate regiments into brigades under the newly established bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber divisions. Reform may have similarly affected PLAN Aviation, as at least one PLAN Aviation fighter regiment was restructured into a brigade like its PLAAF counterparts. Airborne. In 2018, reorganization in the 15th Airborne Corps divided the Corps into five combined arms brigades that receive support from an air assault brigade. Prior to the reorganization, the 15th Airborne Corps was a traditional motorized force that primarily focused on parachuting operations. After the reforms, its air assault brigade is now one of three air assault units PLA-wide and the only assault brigade in the PLAAF. This unit is acquiring additional skills, such as conducting air landing assaults (air assaults) from helicopters and transport aircraft with an emphasis on rapid reaction. The Airborne Corps is equivalent to one PLA group army in the overall structure. Fighters. The PLAAF continues to field fourth-generation aircraft (now about 600) and probably will become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years. The PLAAF is still developing fifth-generation

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  41

包括歼 -20和 FC-31在内的战斗机,并在2016年底开始从俄罗斯进口24架苏 -35先进的第四代战斗机。在2017年7月中国人民解放军90周年阅兵式上,中国人民解放军空军公开高调飞越歼 -20第五代战斗机,并首次展示了装备最新武器的歼 -16和歼 -10c 第四代先进战斗机。在2018年11月的珠海航展上,中国人民解放军空军的 J-10C 展示了推力矢量的技术,中国人民解放军空军还与 J-20进行了展示。轰炸机。中国的轰炸机力量是由 H-6獾型变种组成,它一直致力于维护和提高这些飞机的作战效能。最新的 H-6型轰 -6k 战斗机正在投入更多的部队,整合了防区外武器和更高效的涡轮风扇发动机。这种扩展范围的飞机有能力携带六个 LACMs,使解放军远程防区精确打击能力,可以打击关岛。至少自2016年以来,中国媒体一直将 H-6K 战斗机称为双核常规轰炸机。Plan 航空公司的 H-6G 战斗机配备了系统和四个武器塔架,用于支持海上任务。此外,人民解放军空军正在寻求扩大其覆盖范围,开发一种新的隐形战略轰炸机。前解放军空军司令官马晓天将军在2016年公开宣布了这一计划,评论员预计新平台将在2025年左右首次亮相。特派团飞机。中国使用了一种被称为 H-6U 的改进型 H-6战斗机,以及从乌克兰购买的少量 IL-78 MIDAS 战斗机,用于部分国产战斗机的空中加油作战,从而扩大了它们的作战范围。该服务还整合了美国空中预警机的飞机-如 KJ-2000 MAINRING,KJ-200 MOTH,和 KJ-500-增强 PLAAF 的能力,在不同的条件下,在更大的容量下,在更远的距离上探测,跟踪和目标威胁。这些飞机有助于扩大中国综合防空系统(IADS)网络的覆盖范围。中国航空工业继续向前发展,首次交付了国产 Y-20大型运输机,并完成了世界上最大的水上飞机 AG600。两架飞机在2016年11月的珠海航展上首次亮相。这些新运输机将补充并最终取代中国的小型战略空运资产机队,该机队目前由数量有限的俄罗斯制造的 IL-76飞机组成。这些大型运输机用于支持空降 C2、后勤、空降、空中加油、战略侦察行动以及人道主义援助 / 救灾任务。无人驾驶飞行器。2018年11月,中国在珠海航展上展示了有史以来最大的无人机套件。除了展示武装能力

fighters, including the J-20 and FC-31, and, in late 2016, began importing 24 Su-35 advanced fourth-generation fighters from Russia. During the PLA’s 90th anniversary parade in July 2017, the PLAAF publicly conducted high-profile flybys of its J-20 fifth-generation fighters and debuted its J-16 and J-10C advanced fourth-generation fighters armed with the latest weapons. At the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2018, the PLAAF’s J-10C demonstration featured thrust vectoring technology, and the PLAAF also conducted a demonstration with the J-20. Bombers. China’s bomber force is comprised of H-6 BADGER variants and it has worked to maintain and enhance the operational effectiveness of these aircraft. The latest H-6 variant, the H-6K, is being fielded in greater numbers and integrates standoff weapons and features more efficient, turbofan engines. This extended-range aircraft has the capability to carry six LACMs, giving the PLA a long-range standoff precision strike capability which can range Guam. Since at least 2016, Chinese media have been referring to the H-6K as a dual nuclear-conventional bomber. PLAN Aviation fields the H-6G with systems and four weapons pylons for ASCMs to support maritime missions. In addition, the PLAAF is seeking to extend its reach with the development of a new, stealth strategic bomber. Former PLAAF Commander General Ma Xiaotian publicly announced the program in 2016, and commentators anticipate the new platform will debut sometime around 2025. Special Mission Aircraft. China uses a modified version of the H-6, known as the H-6U, as well as a small number of IL-78 MIDAS purchased from Ukraine to conduct aerial refueling operations for some of its indigenous fighter aircraft, thereby increasing their operational ranges. The service is also integrating airborne early warning and control aircraft – such as KJ-2000 MAINRING, KJ-200 MOTH, and KJ-500 – amplifying PLAAF capabilities to detect, track, and target threats in varying conditions, in larger volumes, and at greater distances. These aircraft help to extend the range of China’s integrated air defense system (IADS) network. China’s aviation industry continues to advance with initial deliveries of its domestic Y-20 large transport aircraft and completion of the world’s largest seaplane, the AG600. Both aircraft made debut appearances at the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2016. These new transports will supplement and eventually replace China’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which currently consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft. These large transports are intended to support airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial refueling, and strategic reconnaissance operations as well as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). China displayed its largest ever suite of UAV aircraft at the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2018. In addition to displays of armed-capable

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展42

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  42

侦察无人机如云鹰、彩虹 CH-4和 CH-5,以及翼龙系列,都有多个低可见飞翼飞机的显示屏,例如 CH-7、天鹰和姚鹰ー iii,以配合早期的飞翼无人机如安舰和立舰。腾登公司还展示了武装无人机,如 TW328,以及一个大型双引擎运输无人机 TW356,悬挂一个大型货物吊舱之间的两个大型发动机短舱。中国已经开始在中国西部和海南岛的机场部署"翔龙"联合翼高空侦察无人机。中国正在继续开发"神雕",并将 BZK-005"长鹰"升级为更大、更耐用的飞机。空中和导弹防御系统。解放军空军拥有世界上最大的先进远程地空导弹系统部队之一,由来自俄罗斯的 SA-20(S-300 pmu1 / 2)营和国产的 CSA-9营组成。中国已经与俄罗斯签订了 S-400 / Triumf SAM 系统的合同,作为 SA-20和 CSA-9系统的后续,以改进战略性远程防空系统;中国在2018年12月进行了首次 S-400试射。中国也正在开发自主研发的 HQ-19,它很可能拥有美国弹道导弹的防御能力。

reconnaissance UAVs such as the YUNYING, CAIHONG CH-4 and CH-5, and YILONG (Wing Loong) series of aircraft, there were multiple of displays of low-observable flying-wing aircraft such as the CH-7, TIANYING, and YAOYING-III to complement earlier flying wing UAVs such as the ANJIAN and LIJIAN. The Tengden Company also displayed armed UAVs, such as the TW328, as well as a large dual-engine TW356 transport UAV that suspends a large cargo pod between the two large engine nacelles. China has begun deploying its XIANGLONG joined-wing high altitude reconnaissance UAV to airfields in western China and to Hainan Island. China is continuing to develop the SHENDIAO and upgrade the BZK-005 CHANGYING to a larger and longer enduring aircraft. Air and Missile Defense. The PLAAF possesses one of the largest forces of advanced long-range SAM systems in the world, consisting of a combination of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300 PMU1/2) battalions and domestically produced CSA-9 battalions. China has contracted with Russia for the S-400/Triumf SAM system, as a follow-on to the SA-20 and CSA-9, to improve strategic long-range air defenses; China conducted its first S-400 test fires in December 2018. China is also developing its indigenous HQ-19, which will likely have a ballistic missile defense capability.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展43

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  43

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展44

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  44

中国人民解放军火箭部队(PLARF)2018年,PLARF 推进了长期的现代化计划,以加强其"战略威慑" Plarf 继续增加其远程弹道导弹库存,包括2016年首次部署的 DF-26 正在研制的洲际弹道导弹是中国核能力导弹力量的重大改进。Plarf 训练、装备和操作中国的陆基核导弹和常规导弹。2018年,中国推进了长期现代化计划,以增强"战略威慑能力"。2016年9月,中国国家主席习近平访问了解放阵线总部,呼吁加快解放阵线的发展步伐,"突破…… …… 战略威慑能力" Plarf 正在开发和测试几种新型导弹,并开发对抗弹道导弹组织防御系统的方法。中国的常规导弹力量包括 CSS-6型 SRBM(射程725-850公里)、 CSS-7型 SRBM(射程600公里)、 CSS-11型 SRBM(射程超过700公里)、 CSS-5型 MRBM 的陆上攻击和反舰变体(射程约1500公里)、东风 -26型 IRBM(射程约4000公里)和 j-c10型地面发射巡航导弹(射程约1500公里)。中国常规装备的 CSS-5模块5(DF-21D)反舰弹道导弹导弹(ASBM)改型使人民解放军有能力在西太平洋攻击包括航空母舰在内的船只。东风 -21d 的射程超过1500公里,配备了一个机动再入飞行器(MaRV)弹头,并声称能够在战场上快速重新装填。Plarf 继续增加其远程弹道导弹库存,包括2016年首次部署的 DF-26。东风 -26能够对地面目标进行常规和核精确打击,也能对西太平洋、印度洋和南中国海的海军目标进行常规打击。中国已经测试了高超音速滑翔式飞行器。2018年8月,中国成功测试了星空 -2(Starry Sky-2) ,公开将其描述为高超音速乘波飞行器。解放军火箭部队也继续加强其固定洲际弹道导弹,并增加更多的生存能力,移动运载系统。迄今为止,中国的洲际弹道导弹库包括90枚洲际弹道导弹,其中包括基于发射井的 CSS-4 Mod 2(DF-5A)和装备有 MIRV 的 Mod 3(DF-5B) ;固体燃料的道路机动 CSS-10级导弹;以及较短程的 CSS-3(DF-4)。Css-10 Mod 2的射程超过11,200公里,可以到达大陆内的大部分地区

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE (PLARF) Key Takeaways > In 2018, the PLARF advanced long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence.” > The PLARF continues to grow its IRBM inventories, including that of the DF-26, which it first fielded in 2016. > ICBMs under development represent a significant improvement in China’s nuclear-capable missile forces. The PLARF trains, equips, and operates China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missiles. In 2018, it advanced long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence capability,” a theme President Xi Jinping echoed during a visit to PLARF headquarters in September 2016 where he called for accelerating the PLARF’s pace of development and “breakthroughs . . . in strategic deterrence capability.” The PLARF is developing and testing several new variants of missiles and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. China’s conventional missile force includes the CSS-6 SRBM (range 725-850 km); the CSS-7 SRBM (600 km); the CSS-11 SRBM (over 700 km); land-attack and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 MRBM (approximately 1,500 km); the DF-26 IRBM (approximately 4,000 km); and the CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km). China’s conventionally armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) variant gives the PLA the capability to attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) warhead, and is claimed to be capable of rapidly reloading in the field. The PLARF continues to grow its IRBM inventories, including that of the DF-26, which it first fielded in 2016. The DF-26 is capable of conducting conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval targets in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans and the South China Sea. China has tested hypersonic glide vehicles. In August 2018, China successfully tested the XINGKONG-2 (Starry Sky-2), which it publicly described as a hypersonic waverider vehicle. The PLA Rocket Force also continues to enhance its fixed ICBMs and is adding more survivable, mobile delivery systems. China’s ICBM arsenal to date consists of 90 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)-equipped Mod 3 (DF-5B); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 class missiles; and the shorter range CSS-3 (DF-4). The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the continental

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  45

美国。Css-x-20(DF-41)——一种新型的、具有 mirv 能力的道路移动洲际弹道导弹——的开发工作在2018年继续进行。中国似乎正在考虑其他的东风 -41发射方案,包括铁路移动和发射井基地。

United States. Development of the CSS-X-20 (DF-41), a new MIRV-capable, road-mobile ICBM, continued in 2018. China appears to be considering additional DF-41 launch options, including rail-mobile and silo basing.

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国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展47

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  47

常规精确打击短程弹道导弹(300-1,000公里)。火箭部队拥有大约750至1500架 srbm。这些导弹系统包括具有改进射程和精确度的先进型以及更复杂的有效载荷;早期型号正在被淘汰,取而代之的是具有真正精确打击能力的型号。中程弹道导弹(1000-3000公里)。解放军正在部署大约150-450个常规的中程弹道导弹,以增加其能够对陆地目标和海军舰艇进行精确打击的范围。中程弹道导弹(3000-5500公里)。中国人民解放军的 DF-26是一种公路机动、核能和常规能力的 IRBM,能够近乎精确地打击远离中国的第二岛链。解放军海军还在扩展其天波和面波超视距雷达网络。这些超视距系统与侦察卫星一起,提供距离中国较远的目标瞄准能力,以支持远程精确打击,包括使用反舰导弹。对地攻击巡航导弹。人民解放军发射了大约270-540枚地面发射的激光雷达,用于远距离精确打击。解放军继续开发额外的 lacm 变种部署与解放军空军和人民解放军空军。反舰巡航导弹。中国部署了大量的先进的 ascs 系列,其中 YJ-83系列是数量最多的,并且它正在装备中国的大多数船只以及多架飞机。中国还为几艘舰艇配备了 YJ-62型 ASCMs。Yj-18是一种远程鱼雷管发射的带有超音速终端的 ASCM。它很可能已经在宋级、袁级和尚级潜艇上取代了老式的 YJ-82,中国声称新的陆洋三级 DDG 和人海 CG 配备了垂直发射的 YJ-18变体。中国还为 H-6轰炸机研制了远程超音速 YJ-12 ASCM。在2018年的一次展览会上,中国展示了 YJ-12的舰对舰变体 YJ-12A 和地面发射的反舰变体 YJ-12B。中国已经在南海的几个前哨部署了 YJ-12B。中国还在俄罗斯建造的4艘 sovremennyy 级 DDGs 和8艘千级潜艇上搭载了俄罗斯建造的 SS-N-22"日晒"导弹和俄罗斯的 SS-N-27b"SIZZLER"导弹。地面攻击弹药。解放军空军拥有少量的战术空对地导弹(ASM)以及精确弹药;制导选项包括卫星定位、激光、电光和红外成像。中国正在开发或改装一系列小型反辐射导弹和制导炸弹,用于增加其武装无人机的射程。

Conventional Precision Strike Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (300-1,000 km). The Rocket Force has approximately 750-1,500 SRBMs. These missile systems include advanced variants with improved ranges and accuracy as well as more sophisticated payloads; earlier generations are being phased out and replaced by variants with true precision strike capability. Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (1,000-3,000 km). The PLA is fielding approximately 150-450 conventional MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships operating out to the first island chain. Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (3,000-5,500 km). The PLA’s DF-26 is a road-mobile, nuclear and conventional capable IRBM capable of near-precision strike capability as far away from China as the second island chain. The PLAN is also expanding its network of sky wave and surface wave OTH radars. In conjunction with reconnaissance satellites, these OTH systems provide targeting capabilities at extended distances from China to support long-range precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs. Land-Attack Cruise Missiles. The PLA fields approximately 270-540 ground-launched LACMs for standoff precision strikes. The PLA continues to develop additional LACM-variants for deployment with the PLAN and PLAAF. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles. China deploys a wide range of advanced ASCMs with the YJ-83 series as the most numerous, and it is equipping the majority of China’s ships as well as multiple aircraft. China has also outfitted several ships with YJ-62 ASCMs. The YJ-18 is a long-range, torpedo tube-launched ASCM with a supersonic terminal sprint. It has likely replaced the older YJ-82 on SONG, YUAN, and SHANG class submarines, and China claims the new LUYANG III-class DDG and RENHAI CG are outfitted with a vertically launched variant of the YJ-18. China has also developed the long-range supersonic YJ-12 ASCM for the H-6 bomber. At a 2018 exhibition, China displayed a ship-to-ship variant of the YJ-12 called the YJ-12A and the ground-launched anti-ship variant YJ-12B. China has deployed the YJ-12B to several outposts in the South China Sea. China also carries the Russian SS-N-22 SUNBURN on four Russian-built SOVREMENNYY-class DDGs and the Russian SS-N-27b SIZZLER on eight Russian-built KILO-class submarines. Ground Attack Munitions. The PLAAF has a small number of tactical air-to-surface missiles (ASM) as well as precision munitions; guidance options include satellite positioning, laser, electro-optic, and imaging infrared. China is developing or adapting a range of smaller ASMs and guided bombs for use on its increasing range of armed UAVs.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展48

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  48

反辐射武器。上世纪90年代,中国人民解放军进口了以色列制造的"哈比"无人机和俄罗斯制造的反辐射导弹。中国正在将俄罗斯本土的 Kh-31P(AS-17)战斗轰炸机 YJ-91整合到其战斗轰炸机部队中,并为改进型国产 HARPY 反辐射无人机 ASN-301做广告。火炮投掷的高精度弹药。中国人民解放军正在部署远程火箭炮导弹系统,其射程可以打击台湾海峡内甚至两岸的目标。这些系统中最常见的是 phl-0312x300毫米多管火箭发射器——类似于俄罗斯的9A52-2 SMERCH ——射程150公里。这些火箭的改进弹头可能包括垂直穿甲弹和传感器引信弹药。战略支援部队(SSF)的关键外卖 SSF 集中战略空间,网络,电子和心理战任务 2018年,SSF 与中国人民解放军和中国人民解放军空军进行了联合通信和侦察训练,以提高在先进电磁环境下的行动支持能力和联合作战能力 2018年,中国成功发射了39艘航天运载火箭中的38艘,在轨运行的航天器约100艘。中国人民解放军在2016年创建了 SSF,作为一个战区指挥级组织,集中执行战略空间、网络、电子和心理战任务。Ssf 的建立突出了中国对信息作为现代战争战略资源的理解。中国领导层认为,在中东电磁波谱取得信息主导地位,并拒绝对手使用信息,是在冲突中掌握和保持战略主动权的必要条件。中国国家安全局是由原隶属于中国人民解放军军种和总参谋部(GSD)的机构组成的,其目标是在以前完全不同的信息战能力之间创造作战协同效应,使中国认为将在未来战争中起决定性作用的信息优势成为可能。国家安全局监督两个战区指挥级的副部门:负责军事空间行动的空间系统部和负责信息行动的网络系统部。在总部一级,社会保障基金设有四个部门的行政架构,包括员工、设备、

Anti-Radiation Weapons. The PLA imported Israeli-made HARPY UAVs and Russian-made anti-radiation missiles during the 1990s. China is integrating the YJ-91, an indigenous version of the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17), into its fighter-bomber force and advertising the ASN-301 anti-radiation drone, an improved domestic variant of the HARPY. Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions. The PLA is fielding long-range rocket artillery systems with the range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait. The most common of these systems is the PHL-03 12x300 mm multiple-rocket launcher – similar to the Russian 9A52-2 SMERCH – with a 150 km range. Improved warheads for these rockets may include vertical penetrators and sensor-fuzed munitions. STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE (SSF) Key Takeaways > The SSF centralizes strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions. > In 2018, the SSF conducted joint communications and reconnaissance training with the PLAA and the PLAAF to improve operational support capabilities and joint operations in advanced electromagnetic environments. > In 2018, China marked its largest space launch year to-date, successfully launching 38 of 39 space launch vehicles (SLVs) and orbiting approximately 100 spacecraft. The PLA created the SSF in 2016 as a theater command-level organization to centralize strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions. The creation of the SSF highlights China’s understanding of information as a strategic resource in modern warfare. China’s leadership believes that achieving information dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum and denying its use to adversaries is necessary to seize and maintain the strategic initiative in a conflict. The SSF was formed from organizations formerly subordinate to the PLA services and General Staff Departments (GSD) with the goal of creating operational synergies between formerly disparate information warfare capabilities to enable the information dominance that China believes will be decisive in future wars. The SSF oversees two deputy theater command-level departments: the Space Systems Department responsible for military space operations, and the Network Systems Department responsible for information operations (IO). At the headquarters level, the SSF has a four-department administrative structure that includes the Staff, Equipment,

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展49

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  49

政治工作与后勤部门。作为一个战略性组织,国家安全保卫部队直接向中央军事委员会(CMC)报告,而不是向战区指挥部报告。网络系统部负责信息战,任务包括网络战、技术侦察、电子战和心理战。通过将这些任务置于同一个组织机构之下,中国寻求解决改革前组织结构下阻碍信息共享的业务协调挑战。Ssf 的心理战任务由前总政治部的311基地执行。这个基地是中国人民解放军中唯一一个公开承担心理战任务的组织。2018年,战略支援部队加强了与中国人民解放军和中国人民解放军空军的联合通信和侦察训练,以提高在先进电磁环境下的行动支援能力和联合行动。此次训练包括"洛阳 -2018"系列力量对抗演习,其中一个 SSF 基地以敌对干扰和中断作战电磁环境对解放军某集团军旅的通信构成挑战。空间系统部负责几乎所有的 PLA 空间行动,包括空间发射和支持、空间信息支持、空间遥测、跟踪和空间战。空间系统部的成立旨在解决人民解放军空间飞行任务中存在的官僚权力斗争,因为飞行任务的组成部分分散在几个国家和服务下属组织中。中国在其2015年国防白皮书中正式将太空作为一个新的战争领域,强调了太空领域在战略军事竞争中的重要性。值得注意的是,中国期望太空在实现远程精确打击和禁止其他军队使用高空 C4ISR 系统方面发挥重要作用。空间系统部的核心任务之一是卫星的发射和运行,这些卫星对中国空中的 C4ISR 架构至关重要。空间和对抗空间能力。中国的太空计划继续迅速成熟。中国人民解放军,历来管理这项工作,继续投资提高其能力在基于空间的 ISR,卫星通信,卫星导航,气象学,以及载人航天和机器人太空探索。中国已经建立了庞大的地面支持基础设施,以支持其不断增长的在轨舰队和相关功能,包括航天器和航天运载火箭(SLV)的制造、发射、 C2和数据下行链路。此外,中国继续发展多种反太空能力,旨在降低和拒绝敌方在危机或冲突期间使用天基资产。此外,中国

Political Work, and Logistics Departments. As a strategic organization, the SSF reports directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC) and not to the Theater Commands. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for information warfare with a mission set that includes cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. By placing these missions under the same organizational umbrella, China seeks to remedy the operational coordination challenges that hindered information sharing under the pre-reform organizational structure. The SSF’s psychological warfare mission is performed by the former General Political Department’s 311 Base. This base is the only organization in the PLA that is publicly known to perform psychological warfare operations. In 2018, the Strategic Support Force increased joint communications and reconnaissance training with the PLAA and the PLAAF to improve operational support capabilities and joint operations in advanced electromagnetic environments. Included in this training was the LUOYANG-2018 series of force-on-force exercises in which an SSF base challenged a PLA group army brigade’s communications with hostile jamming and interruptions to their operational electromagnetic environment. The SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support, space information support, space telemetry, tracking, and space warfare. The formation of the Space Systems Department seeks to resolve the bureaucratic power struggles that existed over the PLA space mission, as elements of the mission had been dispersed across several national and service-subordinate organizations. China officially designated space as a new domain of warfare in its 2015 defense white paper, highlighting the importance of the space domain in strategic military competition. Notably, China expects space to play an important role in enabling long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead C4ISR systems. Among the Space System Department’s core missions is the launch and operation of the satellites that are vital to China’s overhead C4ISR architecture. Space and Counterspace Capabilities. China’s space program continues to mature rapidly. The PLA, which has historically managed the effort, continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. China has built an expansive ground support infrastructure to support its growing on-orbit fleet and related functions including spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink. Additionally, China continues development of multiple counterspace capabilities designed to degrade and deny adversary use of space-based assets during a crisis or conflict. Furthermore, China

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展50

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  50

美国可能寻求扩大其海外卫星跟踪站,以支持其太空计划类似于阿根廷的诺伊曲 n 深空设施。中国为支持月球探测任务而建造和运营的诺伊曲 n 深空设施,由中国人民解放军管理的中国国家太空计划运营。2018年,中国发射了39个 SLVs,其中38个成功,轨道约100个航天器,包括导航、 ISR 和测试 / 工程卫星。2018年的其他活动包括:北斗导航卫星星座:自2017年初以来,中国已经为其全球卫星导航星座发射了19颗 Beidou 卫星,使 Beidou 在2018年12月达到初始运行能力,并计划在2020年底达到全面运行能力。新的北斗卫星配备了射频和激光卫星间链路、新的原子钟和其他先进的新技术。此外,中国计划提供基于卫星的增强服务,一个全球性的短信服务,以及国际认可的搜索和救援能力 月球探测计划:2018年12月,中国发射了嫦娥四号月球车和着陆器,这将是有史以来第一次在月球远端软着陆。2018年5月,中国发射了奎桥月球中继卫星,作为该任务的第一部分,以促进中国在地球上的地面站与嫦娥四号着陆器和月球车之间在月球远端的通信。中国计划在2025年前后在月球上建立一个月球研究站,并在2050年前后建立一个月球研究开发基地 商业太空发射:中国的 Expace 技术公司是中国中国航天科工集团航天科技集团的一个商业子公司,继2017年1月首次发射之后,在2018年继续发射快舟1a(KZ-1A)商业 SLV,增加了两次发射。2018年,9家中国政府支持的发射公司表示,他们正在开发运载火箭。其中至少有五家公司在2018年完成了发动机测试,两家公司完成了亚轨道测试,一家公司试图进行轨道发射。2018年,商业发射公司的存在及其进展大幅度增加。中国人民解放军正在获得一系列技术,以提高中国的对抗空间能力。除了发展定向能武器和卫星干扰器,中国还在发展反卫星能力,并可能在2014年7月试验的反卫星导弹系统方面取得了进展。

may seek to expand its overseas satellite tracking stations to support its space program analogous to the Neuquén Deep Space Facility in Argentina. The Neuquén Deep Space Facility, built and operated by China to support lunar exploration missions, is operated by China’s national space program, which is administered by the PLA. In 2018, China launched 39 SLVs, of which 38 were successful, orbiting approximately 100 spacecraft that include navigation, ISR, and test/engineering satellites. Other activities in 2018 included: > Beidou Navigation Satellite Constellation: Since the beginning of 2017, China has launched 19 new Beidou satellites for its worldwide satellite navigation constellation, bringing Beidou to initial operating capability in December 2018, with plans to reach full operating capability by the end of 2020. The new Beidou satellites are equipped with radiofrequency and laser inter-satellite links, new atomic clocks, and other new advanced technologies. Additionally, China plans to offer satellite-based augmentation services, a worldwide short-message service, and internationally recognized search and rescue capabilities. > Lunar Exploration Program: In December 2018, China launched the Chang’e-4 lunar rover and lander, which will be the first-ever probe to soft land on the far side of the Moon. In May 2018, China launched the Queqiao lunar relay satellite as the first part of the mission to facilitate communications between China’s ground stations on Earth and the Chang’e-4 lander and rover while on the lunar far side. Building on the enabling capabilities such as lunar orbiting, soft landing, and sample return mastered through the legacy Chang’e program, China plans to assemble a lunar research station on the Moon around 2025 and a lunar research and development base around 2050. > Commercial Space Launch: China’s Expace Technology, a commercial subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), continued to launch its Kuaizhou-1A (KZ-1A) commercial SLV in 2018 with two additional launches, following its debut in January 2017. In 2018, nine Chinese state-backed launch companies indicated they were developing launch vehicles. At least five of these companies completed engine testing in 2018, while two companies achieved suborbital testing and one attempted an orbital launch. The presence of commercial launch companies and their progress grew substantially in 2018. The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s counterspace capabilities. In addition to the development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, China is also developing anti-satellite capabilities and has probably made progress on the anti-satellite missile system it tested in July 2014.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展51

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  51

中国正在采用更为复杂的卫星操作,可能正在测试可用于对抗空间任务的空间两用技术。尽管中国自2007年证实使用反卫星导弹摧毁了一颗气象卫星以来,一直没有公开承认存在任何新项目,但中国国防学者经常发表关于反太空威胁技术的文章。这些学者强调了"摧毁、破坏和干扰敌方侦察…… …… 和通信卫星"的必要性,并指出这些系统,以及导航和预警卫星,可能会成为旨在"使敌人盲目和震耳欲聋"的攻击目标 联合后勤保障部队中国军方领导人建立了联合后勤保障部队,以简化对解放军的后勤保障 2018年,中国人民解放军将 JLSF 提升为战区级组织 中国人民解放军正在整合民用控制的支援设备,包括船舶和卡车,进入军事行动和演习。2018年,中国人民解放军将 JLSF 的地位提升到战区级组织,这给了 JLSF 额外的权力来消除与服务的冲突支持需求。2016年9月,作为军队总体结构调整的一部分,中国人民解放军在中央军事委员会下设立了联合后勤部队和五个下属联合后勤服务中心,以精简中国人民解放军的后勤保障。联合作战部队总部设在武汉联合后勤保障基地,控制联合作战指挥中心的和平时期活动;战争时期,战区指挥部负责控制位于各自地理区域内的联合作战指挥中心。自联合攻击部队成立以来,中国人民解放军不断调整这一组织,以确保与联合作战的更大一体化。联合战斗部队为每个战区联合指挥中心指派了一名代表,从而使支援部队在演习期间能够与作战部队在同一指挥网络中运作,从而更好地协调各种支援任务。自2016年联合战斗部队成立以来,允许后勤部队在冲突期间与作战部队直接部署和机动一直是年度演习的重点。中国人民解放军正在将民用控制的支援设备和部件(包括船舶和卡车)纳入其军事行动和演习,军方计划在未来几年内增加此类支援。2018年2月,无锡 JLSC 在一个民用汽车渡轮上练习运输弹药

China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and is probably testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to counterspace missions. Although China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed it used an anti-satellite missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007, Chinese defense academics often publish on counterspace threat technologies. These scholars stress the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance . . . and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.” JOINT LOGISTICS SUPPORT FORCE (JLSF) Key Takeaways > China’s military leaders established the JLSF to streamline logistics support for the PLA. > In 2018, the PLA elevated the JLSF’s status to a theater-level organization. > The PLA is integrating civilian-controlled support equipment, including ships and trucks, into military operations and exercises. In 2018, the PLA elevated the JLSF’s status to a theater-level organization, which gives the JLSF additional authority to deconflict support requirements with the services. In September 2016, as a part of the overall military structure reorganization, the PLA established the JLSF and five subordinate Joint Logistics Service Centers (JLSCs) under the CMC to streamline logistics support for the PLA. Headquartered at the Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base, the JLSF controls the peacetime activities of the JLSCs; in wartime, the theater commands assume control of the JLSC located within its respective geographic area. Since the establishment of the JLSF, the PLA has continued to adjust this organization to ensure greater integration with joint operations. The JLSF has assigned a representative to each of the theater joint command centers, thereby allowing support forces to operate in the same command network as combat forces during an exercise, which results in better coordination of various support missions. Allowing logistic units to deploy and maneuver directly with combat units during conflict has been a focus of annual exercises since the JLSF’s inception in 2016. The PLA is integrating civilian-controlled support equipment and components, including ships and trucks, into its military operations and exercises, and the military plans to increase this type of support during the next several years. In February 2018, the Wuxi JLSC practiced transporting ammunition on a civilian roll-on/roll-off ship that met military

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运输标准,根据运动后新闻报道。最近两次以后勤为重点的演习包括2018年基地保安和2018年联合后勤特派团 b。2018年6月,中国人民解放军西藏军区主办了吉迪保障行动,其后勤保障部门与当地民间团体密切合作,建设临时桥梁,运输燃料,并向野战部队运送粮食。中国人民解放军强调,军民融合是此次演习的一个关键组成部分。2018年8月,2018B 联合后勤任务的参与者包括来自 JLSF 的后勤部队、来自西部战区的陆军部队、空军后勤部队以及来自甘肃、青海和四川省的民用国防动员部队。增加与准军事组织和民兵关键外卖的互操作性2018年,中央军事委员会承担了对武装警察的直接控制。作为改革的一部分,人民行动党还接管了中国国家海洋局海岸警卫队的控制权 准军事改革可以提高准军事部队在联合战区司令部指挥下为解放军行动提供支援的能力 2018年,解放军和准军事部队之间的互操作性包括中国人民解放军、中央军事委员会和人民武装海上民兵(PAFMM)之间的协调。人民武装警察。人民行动党是中国武装力量的准军事组成部分,其主要任务是维护国内安全和稳定。2018年初,中央军事委员会在中共结束了之前的中央军事委员会-国务院双重指挥系统之后,接管了人民行动党的直接控制权。作为改革的一部分,2018年7月,人民行动党从中国国家海洋局手中接过了 CCG 的控制权。虽然武装警察有专门的单位履行各种职能,但最多的是内部安全单位。此外,作为更广泛的军事改革的一部分,人民行动党正在进行迄今为止最广泛的组织改革。此前,武警内部安全部队分为各省、自治地方和中央管理城市的特遣队,以及为应对不断升级的内部危机而在全国各地部署的较少数量的机动师。2018年,机动部门被解散。一些单位分配给31个省级特遣队,另一些单位分配给两个没有固定地理责任区的新的流动特遣队。但在2018年,中国人民解放军、中国人民解放军、中国人民解放军和中国人民解放军之间的互操作性更加明显

transportation standards, according to post-exercise press reporting. Two recent logistics-focused exercises include JIDI BAOZHANG (Base Security) 2018 and JOINT LOGISTICS MISSION 2018B. The PLA Tibet Military District hosted JIDI BAOZHANG 2018 in June, during which its logistic support department worked closely with local civilian entities to construct temporary bridges, transport fuel, and deliver food to troops in the field. The PLA highlighted civil-military integration as a key component of the exercise. In August 2018, participants in JOINT LOGISTICS MISSION 2018B included logistic forces from the JLSF, Army units from the Western Theater Command, Air Force logistic forces, and civilian national defense mobilization forces from Gansu, Qinghai, and Sichuan Provinces. INCREASING INTEROPERABILITY WITH PARAMILITARY AND MILITIA Key Takeaways > As of 2018, the CMC assumed direct control of the PAP. As part of this reform, the PAP also assumed control of the China Coast Guard (CCG) from China’s State Oceanic Administration. > Paramilitary reforms could improve paramilitary forces’ ability to provide support to PLA operations under the command of the joint theater commands. > In 2018, examples of interoperability between the PLA and paramilitary forces included coordination between the PLAN, the CCG, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary component of China’s armed forces whose primary mission is internal security and domestic stability. In early 2018, the CMC assumed direct control of the PAP after the CCP ended the previous CMC-State Council dual-command system. As part of this reform, the PAP also assumed control of the CCG in July 2018 from China’s State Oceanic Administration. Although the PAP has specialized units for a variety of functions, the most numerous are for internal security. Additionally, the PAP is undergoing its most extensive organizational transformation to date as part of broader military reforms. Previously, PAP internal security units were organized into contingents for each province, autonomous region, and centrally administered city, as well as a smaller number of mobile divisions available to deploy anywhere in the country in response to escalating internal crises. In 2018, the mobile divisions were disbanded. Some units went to the 31 provincial contingents, and other units were assigned to two new mobile contingents which do not have a fixed geographic area of responsibility. PAP reform could lead to further interoperability between the PLA and the PAP, but in 2018, examples of interoperability were more apparent in coordination between the PLAN, the CCG,

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和 PAFMM 之间的武装警察和解放军。中国海岸警卫队。中国海洋法委员会在海洋权益保护的框架下,负责执行各种任务,包括执行中国的主权要求、监视、保护渔业资源、打击走私和一般执法。截至2018年7月,中央军事委员会通过隶属于人民行动党完成了与军事指挥结构的合并,这有助于加强中央军事委员会与中国人民解放军之间的协调。中国在海事纠纷中主要使用准军事海事执法机构,在事态升级时有选择地使用解放军海军提供监视。在中国人民行动党行政权力移交给中国人民行动党几天后,中国人民行动党在东海有争议的尖阁诸岛附近执行了一次巡逻任务。中国海洋法委员会的迅速扩张和现代化提高了中国执行其海洋主张的能力。自2010年以来,CCG 的大型巡逻船队(超过1000吨)增加了一倍以上,从大约60艘增加到130多艘,使其成为迄今为止世界上最大的海岸警卫队,并提高了在多个争议地区同时开展扩大的近海作业的能力。此外,新船比旧船大得多,能力也更强,大多数装备有直升机设施、大容量水炮和30毫米至76毫米口径的火炮。这些船只中有许多能够长时间在区域外执行任务。正如2016年10月在黄岩岛附近发生的事件一样,这些特征使中国渔政船具有恐吓当地非中国渔船的能力。此外,海岸巡逻组管理着70多艘快速巡逻战斗人员(500多吨) ,可用于有限的近海作业,管理着400多艘沿海巡逻艇,以及大约1000艘近海和沿河巡逻艇。在建设项目水平下降之前的十年内,中央海军陆战队有可能再增加25-30艘巡逻舰和巡逻战斗人员。人民武装部队海上民兵。人民武装部队是中国民兵组织的一个分支,是一支可供动员的平民武装后备部队。民兵部队在城镇、乡村、城市街道和企业周围组织起来,其组成和任务千差万别。在南中国海,人民武装部队在不打仗的情况下实现中国政治目标的强制性行动中扮演了重要角色,这是中国更广泛的军事理论的一部分,该理论认为,对抗性行动而非战争是实现政治目标的有效手段。这些年来,民兵组织在一系列的军事行动和强制事件中扮演了重要角色,包括2009年骚扰正常行动的美国海军无瑕号黄岩岛

and the PAFMM than between the PAP and the PLA. China Coast Guard (CCG). The CCG is responsible for a wide range of missions under the umbrella of maritime rights protection, including enforcement of China’s sovereignty claims, surveillance, protection of fisheries’ resources, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement. As of July 2018, the CCG completed its merger into the military command structure through its subordination to the PAP, which could facilitate closer coordination between the CCG and the PLAN. China primarily uses paramilitary maritime law enforcement agencies in maritime disputes, selectively using the PLAN to provide overwatch in case of escalation. Days after the administrative transfer of the CCG to the PAP, the CCG conducted a patrol mission near the contested Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. The CCG’s rapid expansion and modernization has improved China’s ability to enforce its maritime claims. Since 2010, the CCG’s fleet of large patrol ships (more than 1,000 tons) has more than doubled from approximately 60 to more than 130 ships, making it by far the largest coast guard force in the world and increasing its capacity to conduct simultaneous, extended offshore operations in multiple disputed areas. Furthermore, the newer ships are substantially larger and more capable than the older ships, and the majority are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, and guns ranging from 30 mm to 76 mm. A number of these ships are capable of long-endurance out-of-area operations. These characteristics give CCG vessels the ability to intimidate local, non-Chinese fishing boats, as occurred in an October 2016 incident near Scarborough Reef. In addition, the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants (more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, more than 400 coastal patrol craft, and approximately 1,000 inshore and riverine patrol boats. The CCG is likely to add another 25-30 patrol ships and patrol combatants by the end of the decade before the construction program levels off. People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization. Militia units organize around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and vary widely in composition and mission. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing political objectives. The militia has played significant roles in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over the years, including the 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable conducting normal operations, the 2012 Scarborough Reef

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2014年海洋石油-981钻井平台的对峙,以及2016年尖阁诸岛附近海域的大规模入侵。大量 PAFMM 船只接受培训,协助解放军海军和中国海军协调小组执行保卫海洋权利主张、监视和侦察、渔业保护、后勤支援和搜索与救援等任务。政府补贴各种地方和省级商业组织,让民兵船只在其正常民间商业活动之外临时执行"官方"任务。过去,PAFMM 从公司或渔民那里租用渔船,但中国在南海建立了一支国有渔船队,至少部分海上民兵部队是这样。毗邻南海的海南省政府下令建造84艘大型民兵渔船,船体和弹药加固,到2016年底,这些民兵将获得大量补贴,以鼓励他们频繁在 Spratly Islands 作战。这个特殊的 PAFMM 单位也是中国最专业的。其部队领取的薪金与任何明确的商业捕鱼职责无关,并从最近离散的退伍军人中招募。中国人民解放军在发展中的关键能力解放军在发展中的关键能力为中国提供了一些选择,在大规模的战区活动(如台湾突发事件)中劝阻、阻止或者(如果接到命令)挫败第三方干预。美国国防规划者经常把这些集体能力称为 a2 / ad 为了在第二岛链、太平洋和印度洋,甚至在某些情况下在全球范围内进行攻击行动,中国人民解放军还在发展力量投射的能力和作战概念。除了打击、空中和导弹防御、反水面和反潜能力的提高之外,中国还专注于信息、网络、空间和对抗空间行动 解放军 a2 / ad 能力目前在第一岛链中最为强大,尽管中国的目标是加强其能力,进一步延伸到太平洋。

standoff, the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig standoff, and a large incursion in waters near the Senkakus in 2016. A large number of PAFMM vessels train with and assist the PLAN and CCG in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistic support, and search and rescue. The government subsidizes various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia vessels to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing vessels from companies or individual fishermen, but China has built a state-owned fishing fleet for at least part of its maritime militia force in the South China Sea. The Hainan provincial government, adjacent to the South China Sea, ordered the building of 84 large militia fishing vessels with reinforced hulls and ammunition storage, which the militia received by the end of 2016, along with extensive subsidies to encourage frequent operations in the Spratly Islands. This particular PAFMM unit is also China’s most professional. Its forces are paid salaries independent of any clear commercial fishing responsibilities and recruited from recently separated veterans.  PLA CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT Key Takeaways > PLA capabilities in development provide options for China to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. U.S. defense planners often term these collective capabilities as A2/AD. > The PLA is additionally developing power projection capabilities and concepts of operation in order to conduct offensive operations within the second island chain, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in some cases, globally. ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL (A2/AD) Key Takeaways > In addition to strike, air and missile defense, anti-surface, and anti-submarine capabilities improvements, China is focusing on information, cyber, and space and counterspace operations. > PLA A2/AD capabilities are currently most robust within the first island chain, though China aims to strengthen its capabilities to extend farther into the Pacific Ocean.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  55

中国的军事现代化计划包括发展 a2 / ad 能力,对可能在西太平洋部署或开展行动的敌方部队进行远程攻击。中国人民解放军的能力目前在第一岛链中最强大,尽管中国的目标是加强其能力,进一步延伸到太平洋。这些能力跨越了空气、海洋、空间、电磁和信息领域。远程精确打击。军事现代化导致了中国人民解放军导弹部队的迅速转型。美国在日本的基地在中国越来越多的 mrbm 和 LACMs 的范围内。飞入西太平洋的轰 -6k 轰炸机展示了中国用空中发射的 LACMs 轰炸关岛的能力。东风 -26于2015年首次公开亮相,并于2017年再次受到中国的检阅,能够对地面目标进行精确的常规或核打击,其中可能包括美国在关岛的基地。解放军的著作将后勤和力量投射资产视为现代战争中的潜在弱点——这一判断符合对区域空军基地、后勤和港口设施、通信和其他地面基础设施不断扩大的打击能力。弹道导弹防御系统。中国正致力于发展由大气层外和大气层内动能拦截器组成的弹道导弹防御系统。2016年,官方媒体证实了中国推进陆基和海基中段导弹防御能力的意图。红旗 -19中段拦截弹已经进行了测试,以验证其抵御3000公里级弹道导弹的能力,红旗 -19部队可能已经在中国西部开始了初步行动。据报道,包括 JY-27A 和 JL-1A 在内的国产雷达能够精确跟踪多枚弹道导弹,为该系统提供目标探测。中国人民解放军的远程防空导弹库存也提供了有限的对抗弹道导弹的能力。中国的国产 CSA-9(HQ-9)远程地空导弹系统对战术弹道导弹的点防御能力有限。中国已经部署了 SA-20(S-300 PMU2)地空导弹,其 SA-21(S-400)地空导弹可能具有一定的攻击弹道导弹能力,这取决于拦截器和支持基础设施。水面和水下作业。中国继续建设一系列的进攻和防御能力,使中国人民解放军能够在第一岛链——从 Kurils 到婆罗洲,大致包括黄海、东中国海和南中国海的岛屿——获得海上优势,并朝着远程投射有限战斗力的方向发展。中国拥有各种各样的 ASCMs 和发射平台,以及潜艇发射的鱼雷和水雷

China’s military modernization plan includes the development of A2/AD capabilities to conduct long-range attacks against adversary forces who might deploy or operate within the western Pacific Ocean. PLA capabilities are currently most robust within the first island chain, though China aims to strengthen its capabilities to extend farther into the Pacific Ocean. These capabilities span the air, maritime, space, electromagnetic, and information domains. Long-Range Precision Strike. Military modernization has resulted in the rapid transformation of the PLA’s missile force. U.S. bases in Japan are in range of a growing number of Chinese MRBMs and LACMs. H-6K bomber flights into the western Pacific Ocean demonstrate China’s ability to range Guam with air-launched LACMs. The DF-26, which debuted publicly in 2015 and was paraded by China again in 2017, is capable of conducting precision conventional or nuclear strikes against ground targets, which could include U.S. bases on Guam. PLA writings see logistics and power projection assets as potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare – a judgement in accord with an expanding ability to target regional air bases, logistics and port facilities, communications, and other ground-based infrastructure. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). China is working to develop ballistic missile defenses consisting of exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric kinetic-energy interceptors. In 2016, official media confirmed China’s intent to move ahead with land- and sea-based mid-course missile defense capabilities. The HQ-19 mid-course interceptor has undergone tests to verify its capability against 3,000 km-class ballistic missiles, and an HQ-19 unit may have begun preliminary operations in western China. Indigenous radars including the JY-27A and JL-1A – the latter advertised as capable of precision tracking of multiple ballistic missiles – reportedly provide target detection for the system. The PLA’s long-range SAM inventory also offers a limited capability against ballistic missiles. China’s domestic CSA-9 (HQ-9) long-range SAM system likely has a limited capability to provide point defense against tactical ballistic missiles. China has fielded SA-20 (S-300 PMU2) SAMs, and its SA-21 (S-400) SAMs may have some capability to engage ballistic missiles, depending on the interceptors and supporting infrastructure. Surface and Undersea Operations. China continues to construct an array of offensive and defensive capabilities to enable the PLA to gain maritime superiority within the first island chain – the islands running from the Kurils, through Taiwan, to Borneo, roughly encompassing the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea – and grow toward projecting limited combat power at longer ranges. China’s broad range of ASCMs and launch platforms as well as submarine-launched torpedoes and naval mines allow the

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展56

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  56

解放军海军计划创造一个越来越致命的,多途径的威胁,对抗一个接近中国水域和作业区域的对手。此外,中国人民解放军还部署了专门设计的 CSS-5反舰弹道导弹,当敌方航空母舰位于距离中国海岸1500公里的地方时,可以将其置于危险之中。中国人民解放军的海底能力也在逐步发展,但它仍然缺乏强大的深水反潜作战能力。中国正在安装海底监测系统,这可以提高中国对海底环境的了解。人民解放军是否能够收集准确的目标信息,并及时将其传送到发射平台,以便对第一岛链以外的海域进行成功打击,目前尚不清楚。资讯营运。中国评估认为,控制现代战场上的信息频谱,即使不是根本的先决条件,也是中国有能力对抗第三方干预冲突的关键推动因素。解放军作者经常将这种能力——有时被称为"信息封锁"或"信息优势"——作为掌握主动权并为获得空中和海上优势创造必要条件的必要条件。这种"信息封锁"概念可能设想将跨空间和网络领域的军事能力与国家权力的非军事手段结合起来。中国在先进电子战(EW)系统、对抗空间能力和网络作战方面的投入,以及更为传统的信息控制形式(如通过不透明的方式进行宣传和拒绝) ,反映出中国人民解放军对信息优势的重视。空间与对位空间。解放军战略家认为,使用天基系统的能力——以及拒绝敌人使用它们的能力——是现代战争的核心。中国人民解放军继续加强其军事太空能力,尽管其公开立场反对太空军事化。中国人民解放军认为,空间作战是中国人民解放军打击第三方干预的主要推动力量,尽管许多解放军的著作没有将这些作战提升到单独的"战役"水平 中国寻求在联合行动中加强 C2,建立实时监视、侦察和预警系统,并且正在增加其空间系统的数量和能力,包括各种通信和情报卫星以及北斗卫星导航系统空间站。中国还继续发展反空间能力和相关技术,包括动能杀伤导弹、地基激光器和轨道空间机器人,并扩大空间监视能力,这种能力可以监视全球和空间中的物体,并实施反空间行动。网络行动。解放军研究人员认为,建设强大的网络能力是保护中国网络和

PLAN to create an increasingly lethal, multi-access threat against an adversary approaching Chinese waters and operating areas. Additionally, the PLA has fielded CSS-5 ASBMs specifically designed to hold adversary aircraft carriers at risk when located 1,500 km off China’s coast, and it has an ASBM variant of the longer range DF-26 IRBM. The PLA’s undersea domain capabilities are gradually progressing as well, but it continues to lack a robust deep-water anti-submarine warfare capability. China is installing undersea monitoring systems, which could improve China’s knowledge of the undersea environment. Whether the PLA can collect accurate targeting information and pass it to launch platforms in time for successful strikes in sea areas beyond the first island chain is unclear. Information Operations (IO). China assesses that controlling the information spectrum in the modern battlespace is a critical enabler, if not a fundamental prerequisite, of its ability to counter third-party intervention in a conflict. PLA authors often cite this capability – sometimes termed “information blockade” or “information dominance” – as necessary to seize the initiative and set the conditions necessary to gain air and sea superiority. This “information blockade” concept likely envisions combining military capabilities across space and cyber domains with non-military instruments of state power. China’s investment in advanced electronic warfare (EW) systems, counterspace capabilities, and cyber operations – combined with more traditional forms of information control, such as propaganda and denial via opacity – reflect the priority the PLA places on information advantage. Space and Counterspace. PLA strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems – and to deny them to adversaries – as central to modern warfare. The PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities, despite its public stance against the militarization of space. The PLA views space operations as a key enabler of PLA campaigns aimed at countering third-party intervention, although many PLA writings have not elevated these operations to the level of a separate “campaign.” China seeks to enhance C2 in joint operations and establish a real-time surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning system, and it is increasing the number and capabilities of its space systems, including various communications and intelligence satellites as well as the Beidou navigation satellite system. China also continues to develop counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects across the globe and in space and enable counterspace actions. Cyber Operations. PLA researchers believe that building strong cyber capabilities are necessary to protect Chinese networks and

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展57

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  57

主张通过进攻性网络行动夺取"网络空间优势",威慑或削弱对手对中国进行军事行动的能力。中国的文章表明,网络行动使中国能够控制冲突的升级,因为网络攻击是一种低成本的威慑手段。这些文章还表明,网络攻击向对手展示了自己的能力和决心。为了支持 a2 / ad,中国的网络攻击行动旨在针对关键的军事和民用节点,以威慑或破坏敌方干预,并保留扩大这些攻击的选择权,以最小的战略成本实现理想的条件。中国认为其网络能力和网络人员落后于美国,中国正在努力改善培训和支持国内创新,以克服这些已知的不足,推进网络空间的运作。综合防空系统。中国在陆地和海岸300海里(556公里)范围内拥有强大的 IADS 架构,依靠广泛的早期预警雷达网络、战斗机和各种地空导弹系统。中国还在南中国海的前哨部署了雷达和防空武器,进一步扩大了其 IADS。它还采用点防御,主要用于防御敌方远程巡航导弹和空中打击平台的战略目标。中国拥有越来越多的先进远程导弹,包括国产的 CSA-9、俄罗斯的 SA-10(S-300 PMU)和 SA-20(S-300 pmu1 / pmu2) ,所有这些导弹都具有公开宣称的防御飞机和低空巡航导弹的能力。为了提高其战略防空能力,中国已经首次交付了俄罗斯制造的 S-400三角导弹系统,作为 SA-20的后续。与其他系统相比,s-400拥有更长的最大射程,更先进的导弹搜索系统和更先进的雷达。中国生产各种远程空中监视雷达,包括声称支持美国弹道导弹防御系统的型号和其他声称具有探测隐形战机能力的型号。营销材料还强调这些系统有能力对抗远程空中打击和作战支援飞机。像 KJ-2000和 KJ-500这样的中国人民解放军空中预警机空军(aew & c)飞机可以进一步扩大中国的雷达覆盖范围,远远超过其地面雷达的覆盖范围。空中业务。中国人民解放军计划部署的第五代战斗机将增强其空对空能力,增强中国第四代俄制苏 -27 / 苏 -30和 J-11A 的空中力量,以及国产的 J-10A / b / c、 J-11B 和更先进的 J-16战斗机。歼 -20和 FC-31具有高机动性、隐身特性和内部武器舱,以及先进的航空电子设备和传感器,提供增强的情势察觉、先进的雷达跟踪和瞄准能力,以及集成的电子战系统。一架歼 -20飞机在日本空军基地执行了一次飞越任务

advocate seizing “cyberspace superiority” by using offensive cyber operations to deter or degrade an adversary’s ability to conduct military operations against China. Chinese writings suggest cyber operations allow China to manage the escalation of a conflict because cyber attacks are a low-cost deterrent. The writings also suggest that cyber attacks demonstrate capabilities and resolve to an adversary. To support A2/AD, Chinese cyber attack operations aim to target critical military and civilian nodes to deter or disrupt adversary intervention, and to retain the option to scale these attacks to achieve desired conditions with minimal strategic cost. China believes its cyber capabilities and cyber personnel lag behind the United States, and it is working to improve training and bolster domestic innovation to overcome these perceived deficiencies and advance cyberspace operations. Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). China has a robust and redundant IADS architecture over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems. China is also placing radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the South China Sea, further extending its IADS. It also employs point defenses, primarily to defend strategic targets against adversary long-range cruise missiles and airborne strike platforms. China has increasing numbers of advanced long-range SAMs, including its indigenous CSA-9, Russian SA-10 (S-300 PMU), and SA-20 (S-300 PMU1/PMU2), all of which have the advertised capability to protect against both aircraft and low-flying cruise missiles. To improve its strategic air defenses, China has taken initial delivery of the Russian-built S-400 Triumf SAM system as a follow-on to the SA-20. Compared to these other systems, the S-400s feature a longer maximum range, improved missile seekers, and more sophisticated radars. China manufactures a variety of long-range air surveillance radars, including models claiming to support ballistic missile defense and other models asserting the ability to detect stealth aircraft. Marketing materials also emphasize these systems’ ability to counter long-range airborne strike and combat support aircraft. PLAAF airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft such as the KJ-2000 and KJ-500 can further extend China’s radar coverage well past the range of its ground-based radars. Air Operations. The PLA’s planned fielding of a fifth-generation fighter force will bolster its air-to-air capability, adding to the airpower of China’s fourth-generation Russian-built Su-27/Su-30 and J-11A, and the indigenous J-10A/B/C, J-11B, and more advanced J-16 fighters. The J-20 and FC-31 feature high maneuverability, stealth characteristics, and an internal weapons bay, as well as advanced avionics and sensors providing enhanced situational awareness, advanced radar tracking and targeting capabilities, and integrated EW systems. A flight of J-20s performed a flyby at

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展58

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  58

2017年7月中国人民解放军90周年阅兵,歼 -20可能已经开始少量的现役,可能有一个测试和训练单位。一架经过改装的 FC-31原型机于2016年12月底首飞,不过至少要到2019年才能开始生产。中国在这些飞机的发动机和雷达方面遇到了困难 中国工程师报告说,固体燃料冲压式导弹发动机测试成功,他们认为这将使 J-20能够携带未来5300马赫范围的空对空导弹。中国不断升级其轰炸机机群,将使其具备携带新型远程巡航导弹的能力。中国可能会在至少部分轰 -6战斗机上增加空中加油能力,以延长轰 -6战斗机的射程和 / 或停留时间 人民解放军空军使用中程轰 -6k 轰炸机,每架可携带6枚 CJ-20高空导弹,使其能够与远在关岛的美军作战。自2016年以来,中国人民解放军空军在西太平洋和南中国海稳步增加 H-6K 作战区域。中国从乌克兰获得3架 IL-78 MIDAS 空中加油可能使中国人民解放军空军在支援 H-6K 轰炸机时,将苏 -30战斗机的航程扩大到第一岛链以外 同样,远程无人机的获得和发展增强了中国进行远程 ISR 和打击行动的能力。多种武装无人机类型正在开发中,在测试中,或在部署的初始阶段。此外,中国成功地测试了 AT-200,它声称这是"世界上第一个大型货运无人机" 这种无人机可以携带1.5吨的货物,可以在200米的未改进跑道上运行,它可能特别适合为解放军在南中国海的部队提供后勤支援。中国已经提高了实现地区和全球安全目标的能力 中国在第一岛链内部以及越来越远离第一岛链的地方不断提高空基和地基导弹打击能力,使其他军事资产能够在离中国更远的地方运作 中国将在2019年实现其建立多航母力量的目标,届时中国第一艘国产航母可能会投入使用。中国的下一代航母,包括2018年开始建造的航母,将具有更强的航母续航力和弹射发射系统。在过去十年中,除了继续强调台湾的能力外,中国还提高了实现区域和全球安全目标的能力

the PLA 90th anniversary parade in July 2017, and the J-20 may have begun active service in small numbers, possibly with a testing and training unit. A modified FC-31 prototype made its first flight in late December 2016, although production is unlikely to begin until at least 2019. China is having difficulty with the engines and radars for these aircraft. > Chinese engineers report successful testing of a solid-fuel ramjet missile engine, and they suggest this will enable the J-20 to carry future Mach 5, 300 km-range air-to-air missiles. China’s continuing upgrades to its bomber fleet will give it the capability to carry new, longer-range cruise missiles. China may add an aerial refueling capability to at least some H-6s, extending their range and/or loiter time. > The PLAAF employs the medium-range H-6K bomber, which can carry up to six precision-guided CJ-20 ALCMs each, giving it the ability to engage U.S. forces as far away as Guam. Since 2016, the PLAAF has steadily increased H-6K operating areas into the western Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. China’s acquisition of three IL-78 MIDAS aerial refueling tankers from Ukraine probably allowed the PLAAF to extend the range of Su-30 fighter aircraft beyond the first island chain when supporting H-6K bombers. > Similarly, the acquisition and development of longer-range UAVs is increasing China’s ability to conduct long-range ISR and strike operations. Multiple armed UAV types are under development, in testing, or in the initial phases of deployment. In addition, China successfully tested the AT-200, which it claims is the “world’s first large cargo UAV.” This drone can carry up to 1.5 tons of cargo and can operate from unimproved runways as short as 200 meters, and it may be especially suited to provide logistic support to PLA forces in the South China Sea. POWER PROJECTION Key Takeaways > China has increased its capability to address regional and global security objectives. > China’s continuing improvements of air and ground-based missile strike capabilities within and, increasingly, beyond the first island chain enable other military assets to operate farther from China. > China will realize its goal of a multi-carrier force in 2019 when China’s first domestically produced carrier will likely be commissioned. China’s next generation of carriers, including one that began construction in 2018, will have greater endurance and a catapult launch system. During the last decade, China has increased its capability to address regional and global security objectives beyond its continued emphasis on capabilities for Taiwan

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展59

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  59

意外事故。解放军的地面、海上、空中和导弹部队越来越有能力通过和平时期的作战来投射力量,延长作战时间和 / 或与中国的距离,他们正在扩大解放军的能力,以便在发生区域冲突时与美国的军事优势抗衡。中国在第一岛链内部以及越来越远离第一岛链的地方不断提高空基和地基导弹打击能力,使其他军事资产能够在离中国更远的地方运作。这些资产可以执行各种任务,包括驻留和执行主权,以及封锁等进攻任务。中国还致力于加强解放军的情报侦察能力,扩大解放军情势察觉的影响范围,以及改进目标定位和对感知到的威胁作出及时反应。人民解放军海军。中国人民解放军海军继续发展成为一支全球性部队,逐步将其行动范围扩大到东亚以外,使其具有在越来越长的范围内开展行动的持续能力。解放军海军最新的地面和地下平台使作战行动超出了中国陆基防御的范围。特别值得一提的是,中国的航空母舰和计划中的后续航母一旦投入使用,将把防空覆盖范围扩大到沿海和舰载导弹系统的射程之外,并使特遣部队能够在越来越远的射程进行作战。中国海军对海基陆基攻击系统的新需求也将增强中国的投射力量的能力。此外,解放军海军现在拥有相当规模的高性能后勤补给船,以支持长距离、长时间的部署,包括正在建造的专门支持航空母舰作战的两艘新船。海军在中国周边地区的扩张也将促进非战争使用军事力量 解放军海军的兵力结构不断演变,包括了更多具有海上和远程力量投射通用性的平台。中国从事人海级 CG、芦阳三级 DDG、江凯三级 FFG、江刀级 FFL 的系列生产。Renhai CG 是一艘10,000吨的船只,可以携带一系列远程的 ASCMs 和 SAMs。一旦这些武器可用,它很可能能够发射反导弹和陆空混合导弹。人海 CG 将成为中国首屈一指的远洋护航航母。四个单元目前正在装备,还有几个单元正在建设中 除了20世纪90年代和21世纪初从俄罗斯进口的一些老式导弹外,解放军海军继续通过更多的国产舰艇、潜艇和飞机部署的 ascs 来扩大其打击范围。

contingencies. PLA ground, naval, air, and missile forces are increasingly able to project power through peacetime operations, increasing the operating duration and/or distance from China, and they are expanding the PLA’s capacity to contest U.S. military superiority in the event of a regional conflict. China’s continuing improvements of air- and ground-based missile strike capabilities within and, increasingly, beyond the first island chain enable other military assets to operate farther from China. These assets can conduct a variety of missions including presence and sovereignty enforcement, as well as offensive missions such as blockades. China also focuses on enhancing the PLA’s ISR capabilities, extending the reach of the PLA’s situational awareness, as well as enabling improved targeting and timely responses to perceived threats. PLA Navy. The PLAN continues to develop into a global force, gradually extending its operational reach beyond East Asia into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly longer ranges. The PLAN’s latest surface and subsurface platforms enable combat operations beyond the reach of China’s land-based defenses. In particular, China’s aircraft carrier and planned follow-on carriers, once operational, will extend air defense coverage beyond the range of coastal and shipboard missile systems and will enable task group operations at increasingly longer ranges. The PLAN’s emerging requirement for sea-based land-attack systems will also enhance China’s ability to project power. Furthermore, the PLAN now has a sizable force of high-capability logistical replenishment ships to support long-distance, long-duration deployments, including two new ships being built specifically to support aircraft carrier operations. The expansion of naval operations beyond China’s immediate region will also facilitate non-war uses of military force. > The PLAN’s force structure continues to evolve, incorporating more platforms with the versatility for both offshore and long-distance power projection. China is engaged in series production of the RENHAI-class CG, the LUYANG III-class DDG, the JIANGKAI II-class FFG, and the JIANGDAO-class FFL. The RENHAI CG is a 10,000-ton vessel that can carry an array of long-range ASCMs and SAMs. It will likely be able to launch ASBMs and LACMs once these weapons are available. The RENHAI CG will be China’s premier carrier escort for blue-water operations. Four units are currently outfitting with several more under construction. > The PLAN continues to extend its strike range with more domestically produced ship-, submarine-, and aircraft-deployed ASCMs with the exception of a few legacy missiles imported from Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展60

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  60

中国继续从第一个航空母舰辽宁号的运营中吸取教训。中国第一艘国产航空母舰于2017年发射,可能在2019年服役——这是中国人民解放军建立多航母部队的开始。中国的下一代航母,包括2018年开始建造的航母,将具有更强的耐力和弹射发射系统,能够发射各种类型的固定翼飞机,包括早期预警和反潜作战。这些改进将增加潜在航空母舰战斗群的打击力量,当部署到中国周边地区以外的地区 解放军海军继续建造多艘新的大型舰艇,以支持部队的投射作业,包括 LPDs、大型后勤支援船和专门的蓝水辅助船——包括高能力的情报收集船(agis / agos)。中国海军在第一岛链以外执行任务的能力有限,但随着在遥远水域作业经验的增加以及获得更大和更先进的平台,这种能力在不断增强。中国在远程作战方面的经验主要来自于远程任务组的部署以及在亚丁湾的持续反海盗任务 2018年,中国在亚丁湾维持了反海盗任务组,这是中国海军首次在印度-太平洋地区以外持续开展行动,历时10年。中国海军还继续向印度洋部署潜艇,表明中国越来越熟悉在该地区的作业,并强调中国有兴趣保护南海以外的特别岛屿 2018年,中国海军陆战队远远超出了第一岛链的范围;一架815型"东钓鱼级""AGI"被部署到夏威夷,以对抗美国领导的一年两次的海军演习"环太平洋"(RIMPAC)。中国长期以来一直对外国在其海域的军事活动提出质疑,其方式不符合《海洋法公约》(Law of the Sea Convention)所反映的国际习惯法安全规则。然而,近年来,中国人民解放军开始在其他国家海洋区的第一岛链内外进行同样类型的军事活动。这一活动凸显了中国在国际法适用上的双重标准。海军陆战队。最终,PLANMC 将能够作为中国人民解放军的全球军事力量从陆地、海上和空中作战,但这个目标很可能不会实现中国声明的到2020年完成解放军改革的目标。四个新的旅已经建立,使总数达到

> China continues to learn lessons from operating its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning. Its first domestically built aircraft carrier was launched in 2017 and will likely be commissioned in 2019 – the beginning of what the PLA states will be a multi-carrier force. China’s next generation of carriers, including one that began construction in 2018, will have greater endurance and a catapult launch system capable of launching various types of fixed-wing aircraft, including early warning and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. These improvements would increase the striking power of a potential carrier battle group when deployed to areas beyond China’s immediate periphery. > The PLAN continues to build multiple new, large ships that can support force projection operations, including LPDs, large logistical support ships, and specialized blue-water auxiliary ships – including high-capability intelligence collection ships (AGIs/AGOS). The PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the first island chain is modest but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms. China’s experience in extended range operations primarily comes from extended task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. > China sustained its counter piracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden in 2018, a ten-year effort that is the first enduring Chinese naval operation beyond the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAN also continued submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, demonstrating its increasing familiarity with operating in that region and underscoring China’s interest in protecting SLOCs beyond the South China Sea. > Chinese AGIs operated well beyond the first island chain in 2018; one Type 815 DONGDIAO-class AGI deployed to Hawaii to collect against the U.S.-led biannual naval exercise, RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC). China has long challenged foreign military activities in its maritime zones in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). However, in recent years, the PLA has begun conducting the very same types of military activities inside and outside the first island chain in the maritime zones of other countries. This activity highlights China’s double-standard in the application of international law. PLAN Marine Corps. Ultimately, the PLANMC will be capable of operating from land, sea, and air as the PLA’s global military force, but this goal will likely not be realized by China’s stated goal to complete PLA reforms by 2020. Four new brigades have been established, bringing the total number of

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展61

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  61

战斗旅增加到六个,但只有原来的两个旅完全有能力执行任务。没有证据表明新的旅是有人的,训练,和装备执行远征任务尚未。此外,PLANMC 可能建立一个航空旅,但是还没有证据表明这个单位的存在。Planmc 正在使用新的设备执行远征任务,但是到达的设备数量不足以实现2020年的目标。目前在吉布提的 PLANMC 部队已经部署了十五轮装甲战车,它们比两栖作战更有效地进行陆基作战,是 PLANMC 中第一批观察到的轮式装甲车。中国缺乏足够的轮式装甲车辆库存来充分支持 PLANMC 的多个远征部署。全面作战的旅都装备有两栖装甲车辆。资培计划没有收到空袭能力所需的直升机,可能需要至少120架攻击直升机和中型运输直升机才能完全执行任务。达到这一水平的能力将包括在海外部署直升机以支持 PLANMC 部队,以及使用两栖舰艇作战。2018年,PLANMC 驻军外演习的频率和规模都有所增加。在一次可能是有记录以来最大规模的 PLANMC 演习中,超过10000名海军陆战队员参加了一系列非常简单化的训练。这种激增的训练可能是为了向新的解放军海军陆战队员灌输服役的思想,但是它缺乏使这些部队精通远征作战的复杂性。解放军空军和解放军海军航空兵。中国人民解放军空军和解放军海军航空兵继续提高他们在近海进行攻击和防御作战的能力,例如打击、空中和导弹防御、战略机动性、早期预警和侦察任务。尽管解放军空军和解放军海军航空兵目前只有有限的力量投射空军能力,但他们都在寻求扩大他们的作战范围。尤其是中国人民解放军空军,一再接到其领导层的呼吁,希望成为一支真正"具有战略意义"的空军,能够远距离投射力量,支持中国的国家利益,无论它们延伸到哪里 2016年,中国人民解放军空军司令官马晓天将军公开声明中国正在研制新一代远程轰炸机,一些报道暗示这种新型轰炸机,可能命名为 H-20,可能在未来十年的某个时候首次亮相,具有以下特点:采用许多第五代技术的隐形设计;可能射程至少8500公里;有效载荷至少10公吨;以及同时使用常规和核武器的能力。一张可能的 H-20原型机的照片描绘了一个类似于 B-2轰炸机和 X-47B 隐形机的飞翼机身

combat brigades to six, but only the original two brigades are fully mission-capable. There is no evidence to indicate the new brigades are manned, trained, and equipped to perform expeditionary missions yet. Additionally, the PLANMC may establish an aviation brigade, but there is no evidence this unit exists yet. The PLANMC is employing new equipment to perform an expeditionary mission, but the equipment is not arriving in sufficient numbers to meet the 2020 goal. Fifteen wheeled armored combat vehicles, more effective for land-based operations than amphibious operations, have been deployed with the PLANMC unit currently in Djibouti; they are the first-observed wheeled armored vehicles in the PLANMC. China lacks a sufficient inventory of wheeled armored vehicles to support multiple PLANMC expeditionary deployments adequately. Fully operational brigades are equipped exclusively with amphibious armored vehicles. The PLANMC has not received the helicopters required for an air assault capability, and it will likely need a minimum of 120 attack and medium-lift helicopters to be fully mission capable. Achieving this level of capability would include basing helicopters overseas to support PLANMC units and operating from amphibious ships. In 2018, PLANMC out-of-garrison exercises increased in frequency and size. In one exercise, likely the largest PLANMC exercise on record, more than 10,000 marines participated in a series of very simplistic training. This surge in training likely served to indoctrinate new PLAN marines into the service, but it lacked the complexity needed to allow these units to become proficient in expeditionary warfare. PLA Air Force and PLA Navy Aviation. The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continued to improve their capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive offshore operations such as strike, air and missile defense, strategic mobility, and early warning and reconnaissance missions. Although they currently have limited power projection capability, both the PLAAF and PLAN Aviation are seeking to extend their reach. The PLAAF, in particular, has received repeated calls from its leadership to become a truly “strategic” air force, able to project power at long distances and support Chinese national interests wherever they extend. > Following PLAAF Commander General Ma Xiaotian’s 2016 public statement that China was developing a new generation of long-range bombers, a number of reports suggest the new bomber, likely named the H-20, could debut sometime in the next decade with the following features: a stealthy design, employing many fifth-generation technologies; a likely range of at least 8,500 km; a payload of at least 10 metric tons; and a capability to employ both conventional and nuclear weaponry. A photograph of a possible H-20 prototype depicted a flying wing airframe akin to the B-2 bomber and X-47B stealth

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无人战斗航空载具。中国可能还在研制一种可加油的轰炸机,这种轰炸机可以在远程轰炸机之前达到初始作战能力,这种轰炸机可以将远程进攻轰炸机的能力扩展到第二岛链之外 在南海前哨基地建设新的机场和机库扩大了解放军航空兵可能的作战区域。未来部署在 Spratly Island 前哨基地的中国战斗机可以在南中国海上空延长航程和 / 或逗留时间,甚至可以进入印度洋。中国还可以复制其在吉布提建立海军基地的成功经验,建立海外后勤设施,进一步扩大和维持区域和全球空中业务 2018年,解放军空降部队的主要训练活动包括6月份解放军空军最新运输机 Y-20首次空投人员和重型装备,以及参加8月份在俄罗斯举行的国际陆军运动会(国际陆军运动会)的一项活动——2018年 AVIADARTS 国际运动会。在这次活动中,解放军空军 IL-76和 Y-9运输机从低空空投了部队和装备。中国继续生产 Y-20重型运输机,以纠正限制其力量投射能力的战略空运不足。运 -20战斗机将增强中国人民解放军空军第13运输师现有的战略运输单位。运 -20还可以获得额外的任务,如作为空中预警机空间站系统(aew & c)和空中加油空中加油机。中国还在继续发展预计射程4500公里的 AG-600大型两栖水上飞机,并有能力从水面起飞以支持远离大陆的作战行动。Ag-600于2017年12月完成了首次飞行,并于2018年10月完成了首次水基试飞。中国政府已经订购了17架飞机。解放军火箭部队。Plarf 部署了多枚导弹,能够对第一岛链以外的地区进行打击。其中包括射程1500公里的 CSS-5模块5反舰弹道导弹和挑战弹道导弹防御的 MaRV。中国还部署了对地攻击的 CSS-5模式4和地面发射的 CJ-10 LACM,将冲绳岛和日本主要岛屿的目标置于危险之中。东风 -26远程弹道导弹的最大射程为4000公里,能够对地面和船只目标进行精确打击,对远至关岛的美国陆基和海基部队构成潜在威胁。

unmanned combat aerial vehicle. China may also be developing a refuelable bomber that could reach initial operating capability before the long-range bomber, which could expand long-range offensive bomber capability beyond the second island chain. > The construction of new airfields and hangars on outposts in the South China Sea extends the possible operating areas of PLA aviation forces. Future deployed Chinese combat aircraft operating from Spratly Island outposts could extend their range and/or loiter time over the South China Sea or even reach into the Indian Ocean. China could also replicate its success establishing a naval base in Djibouti to establish overseas logistics facilities that would further extend and sustain regional and global air operations. > In 2018, major training events for PLAAF airborne units included the first drop of personnel and heavy equipment from the PLAAF’s newest transport aircraft, the Y-20, in June, and participation in the AVIADARTS International Games-2018, an event that is part of the International Army Games, in Russia in August. During the event, PLAAF IL-76 and Y-9 transport aircraft airdropped forces and equipment from low altitudes. China continues to produce the Y-20 heavy lift transport aircraft to correct a strategic airlift deficiency that limits its force projection capabilities. The Y-20s will augment China’s current strategic lift units in the PLAAF’s 13th Transport Division, which fly IL-76s. The Y-20 could also acquire additional missions, such as serving as an airborne early warning and control system (AEW&C) and as an aerial refueling tanker. China also continues to develop the AG-600 large amphibious seaplane with an anticipated range of 4,500 km and the ability to take off from water to support operations far from the mainland. The AG-600 completed its first flight in December 2017 and its first water-based test flight in October 2018. The Chinese government has already ordered 17 aircraft. PLA Rocket Force. The PLARF fields multiple missiles capable of conducting strikes beyond the first island chain. Among these are the CSS-5 Mod 5 ASBM with a range of 1,500 km and a MaRV to challenge ballistic missile defenses. China also deploys the land-attack CSS-5 Mod 4 and the ground-launched CJ-10 LACM, placing targets on Okinawa and the main Japanese islands at risk. The DF-26 IRBM has a maximum range of 4,000 km and is capable of conducting precision strikes against ground and ship targets, potentially threatening U.S. land and sea-based forces as far away as Guam.

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习主席的战略构想呼吁中国人民解放军建立一支高度信息化的军队,能够控制所有网络,扩大国家的安全和发展利益 中国人民解放军认为信息作战是在冲突早期实现信息优势的一种手段,并继续扩大信息作战在军事演习中的范围和规律。习主席的战略构想要求中国人民解放军建立一支高度信息化的军队,能够控制所有网络,扩大国家的安全和发展利益。中国的军事著作将信息化战争描述为利用信息技术创建一个系统的作战系统,使解放军能够在冲突期间获取、传输、处理和使用信息,以便在地面、海上、空中、空间、网络空间和电磁波谱领域进行联合军事行动。正在进行的军事改革正在加速采用指挥信息系统,使部队和指挥官能够更有效地执行任务和任务,赢得信息化的局部战争。中国人民解放军继续扩大模拟信息化作战的军事演习的范围和规律性,可能将常规和网络作战视为在意外或冲突早期获得信息优势的一种手段。指挥、控制、通信、计算机和情报现代化(C4I)。中国继续优先考虑 C4I 现代化,以应对强调快速信息共享、处理和决策重要性的现代战争趋势。中国人民解放军寻求在技术和组织上实现自身的现代化,在近距离和远距离战场上指挥复杂的联合作战,使用日益先进的 C4ISR 系统和尖端武器。中国人民解放军认为,网络化、技术先进的 C4I 系统对于向固定和移动指挥所提供可靠、安全的通信至关重要,从而实现快速、高效、多层决策。这些系统旨在通过冗余、弹性的通信网络分发包括情报、战场信息、后勤信息和天气报告在内的数据,以改善指挥官的情势察觉。解放军认为向战地指挥官提供接近实时的 ISR 数据对于简化他们的决策过程特别有价值。中国正在部署综合指挥平台(ICP)到多个级别的部队,使联合行动所需的横向和跨服务通信成为可能。通过使用数字数据库和指挥自动化工具,指挥官可以同时向多个部队下达命令

ADVANCING TOWARD AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY Key Takeaways > President Xi’s strategic vision calls for the PLA to create a highly informatized force capable of dominating all networks and expanding the country’s security and development interests. > The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict, and continues to expand the scope and regularity of IO in military exercises. President Xi’s strategic vision calls for the PLA to create a highly informatized force capable of dominating all networks and expanding the country’s security and development interests. Chinese military writings describe informatized warfare as the use of information technology to create an operational system-of-systems, which would enable the PLA to acquire, transmit, process, and use information during a conflict to conduct joint military operations across the ground, maritime, air, space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum domains. Ongoing military reforms are accelerating the incorporation of command information systems enabling forces and commanders to carry out missions and tasks more effectively to win informatized local wars. The PLA continues to expand the scope and regularity of military exercises simulating informatized operations and likely views conventional and cyberspace operations as a means of achieving information dominance early in a contingency or conflict. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Modernization (C4I). China continues to prioritize C4I modernization as a response to trends in modern warfare that emphasize the importance of rapid information sharing, processing, and decision-making. The PLA seeks to modernize itself, both technologically and organizationally, to command complex, joint operations in near and distant battlefields with increasingly advanced C4ISR systems and sophisticated weapons. The PLA sees networked, technologically advanced C4I systems as essential to provide reliable, secure communications to fixed and mobile command posts, thereby enabling rapid, effective, multi-echelon decision-making. These systems were designed to distribute data including intelligence, battlefield information, logistical information, and weather reports via redundant, resilient communications networks to improve commanders’ situational awareness. The PLA views making near-real-time ISR data available to field commanders as especially valuable in streamlining their decision processes. China is fielding the Integrated Command Platform (ICP) to units at multiple levels across the force to enable lateral and cross-service communications required for joint operations. Using digital databases and command automation tools allows commanders to simultaneously issue orders to multiple units while on the move and they

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使得部队能够快速调整行动,以适应战场环境的变化。这些技术改进显著提高了解放军作战的灵活性和反应能力。随着中国人民解放军继续关注其打赢信息化战争的能力,未来的信息系统将可能实现诸如大数据、物联网、人工智能(AI)和云计算等新兴技术,以提供可靠的、自动化的平台,进一步提高处理效率。中国人民解放军已经开始了这一进程,采用了大数据分析,将各种数据融合在一起,以提高自动化程度,并创建一个全面的、实时的图像。电子战。解放军认为电子战是现代战争不可或缺的组成部分。它的电子战战略强调压制、降低、破坏或欺骗敌人的电子设备。潜在的电子战受害者包括在无线电、雷达、微波、红外和光学频率范围内操作的敌对系统,以及敌对计算机和信息系统。2017年7月解放军90周年阅兵期间,中国部署了几种具有电子战有效载荷的无人机,并展示了其中的几种。解放军电子战部队定期接受训练,对多个通信和雷达系统或 GPS 卫星系统进行干扰和抗干扰行动。这些演习测试作战单位对电子战武器、装备和性能的理解,但它们也使操作人员能够提高对其在复杂电磁环境中有效作战能力的信心。此外,据报道 PLA 在这些演习中测试和验证电子战武器研究和发展的进步。网络战。网络战能力的发展与解放军的著作是一致的,解放军的著作认为信息战——包括网络战、电子战和心理战——是实现信息优势的组成部分,也是对付更强大敌人的有效手段。中国已公开确认网络空间是国家安全的一个关键领域,并宣布打算加快网络力量的发展。解放军的著作指出了 IO 和网络战在最近冲突中的有效性,并提倡以敌方的 C2和后勤网络为目标,以影响其在冲突早期阶段的作战能力。他们认为对敌人 C2系统的网络攻击有可能"完全破坏"这些系统,使受害者瘫痪,从而为攻击者赢得战场优势。因此,人民解放军可以利用其网络战能力收集数据,用于情报和网络攻击目的;通过以网络为基础的后勤、通信和商业活动为目标来限制对手的行动;或者在武装冲突期间与动能攻击相结合时充当力量倍增器。解放军正在进行的结构改革可能会进一步改变解放军组织和指挥 IO 的方式,特别是随着 SSF 的发展

allow units to quickly adapt their actions to shifting conditions in the battlespace. These technical improvements are notably boosting PLA operational flexibility and responsiveness. As the PLA continues to focus on its ability to fight and win informatized wars, future information systems will likely implement emerging technologies such as big-data, the internet of things, artificial intelligence (AI), and cloud computing to provide reliable, automated platforms yielding further process efficiencies. The PLA has already begun this process by embracing big-data analytics that fuse together a variety of data to improve automation and to create a comprehensive, real-time picture. Electronic Warfare. The PLA considers electronic warfare (EW) an integral component of modern warfare. Its EW strategy emphasizes suppressing, degrading, disrupting, or deceiving enemy electronic equipment. Potential EW victims include adversary systems operating in radio, radar, microwave, infrared, and optical frequency ranges, as well as adversary computer and information systems. China fielded several types of UAVs with EW payloads and displayed several of these during the PLA 90th anniversary parade in July 2017. PLA EW units routinely train to conduct jamming and anti-jamming operations against multiple communication and radar systems or GPS satellite systems in force-on-force exercises. These exercises test operational units’ understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and performance but they also enable operators to improve confidence in their ability to operate effectively in a complex electromagnetic environment. In addition, the PLA reportedly tests and validates advances in EW weapons research and development during these exercises. Cyberwarfare. The development of cyberwarfare capabilities is consistent with PLA writings, which identify IO – comprising cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare – as integral to achieving information superiority and as an effective means for countering a stronger foe. China has publicly identified cyberspace as a critical domain for national security and declared its intent to expedite the development of its cyber forces. PLA writings note the effectiveness of IO and cyberwarfare in recent conflicts and advocate targeting an adversary’s C2 and logistics networks to affect its ability to operate during the early stages of conflict. They credit cyberattacks on an enemy’s C2 system with the potential to “completely disrupt” these systems, paralyzing the victim and thus gaining battlefield superiority for the attacker. Accordingly, the PLA may seek to use its cyberwarfare capabilities to collect data for intelligence and cyberattack purposes; to constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting network-based logistics, communications, and commercial activities; or to serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during armed conflict. The PLA’s ongoing structural reforms may further change how the PLA organizes and commands IO, particularly as the SSF evolves

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展65

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  65

随着时间的推移。在整合网络和其他与国际战略组织有关的因素时,SSF 可能通过在其组织中结合国家级别的网络侦察、攻击和防御能力来产生协同效应。核威慑关键外卖中国的核武器政策优先考虑维持一支有限但可生存的核力量 长期以来,中国一直坚持"不首先使用"(NFU)政策,尽管中国的 NFU 政策不再适用的条件仍然模糊不清 中国继续提高其陆基和潜基核能力,并且通过发展具有核能力的空中发射弹道导弹,正在寻求一种可行的核"三合一"。中国的核武器政策优先考虑的是保持一支能够在第一次打击中幸存下来的核力量,并以足够的力量对敌人造成不可接受的破坏。中国投入了大量资源来维持一支有限但可以生存的核力量。中国正在提高这些核力量在和平时期的战备水平,以确保它们的反应能力。此外,中国坚持其新一代机动导弹,包括 mirv 和突防辅助弹头,旨在确保其战略核力量的生存能力面对美国的持续进步,并在较小程度上,俄罗斯的战略情报、精确打击和导弹防御能力。直到2018年,针对世界各地国防部计算机系统的网络活动,包括美国政府拥有的系统,仍然是中国入侵的目标。这些和过去的入侵集中在访问网络和提取信息。中国利用其网络能力不仅支持针对美国外交、经济、学术和国防工业基地(DIB)部门的情报收集,而且还从 DIB 窃取敏感信息以获得军事优势。目标信息可以有利于中国的国防高科技工业,支持中国的军事现代化,为中共提供美国领导视角的洞察力,并使外交谈判成为可能,例如那些支持 OBOR。此外,有针对性的信息可以使解放军网络部队建立一个美国国防网络,军事部署,后勤和相关的军事能力,可以利用之前或在危机期间。这些入侵所需的入口和技能类似于在冲突之前或冲突期间进行网络操作以阻止、延迟、干扰和削弱国防部操作所需的技能。总的来说,这些网络战可能会削弱美国的军事优势,危及这些优势所依赖的基础设施和繁荣。

over time. In consolidating cyber and other IO-related elements, the SSF is likely generating synergies by combining national-level cyber reconnaissance, attack, and defense capabilities in its organization.         NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Key Takeaways > China’s nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the maintenance of a limited but survivable nuclear force. > China has long maintained a “no first use” (NFU) policy, though ambiguity remains over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would no longer apply. > China continues to improve its ground and submarine-based nuclear capability and is pursuing a viable nuclear “triad” with the development of a nuclear capable air-launched ballistic missile. China’s nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the maintenance of a nuclear force able to survive a first strike and respond with sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy. China invests considerable resources to maintain a limited, but survivable, nuclear force. China is enhancing peacetime readiness levels for these nuclear forces to ensure their responsiveness. In addition, China insists its new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVs and penetration aids, are intended to ensure the viability of its strategic nuclear forces in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities. Cyber Activities Directed Against the Department of Defense Computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. Government, continued to be targeted by China-based intrusions through 2018. These and past intrusions focus on accessing networks and extracting information. China uses its cyber capabilities to not only support intelligence collection against U.S. diplomatic, economic, academic, and defense industrial base (DIB) sectors, but also to exfiltrate sensitive information from the DIB to gain military advantage. The information targeted can benefit China’s defense high-technology industries, support China’s military modernization, provide the CCP insights into U.S. leadership perspectives, and enable diplomatic negotiations, such as those supporting OBOR. Additionally, targeted information could enable PLA cyber forces to build an operational picture of U.S. defense networks, military disposition, logistics, and related military capabilities that could be exploited prior to or during a crisis. The accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct cyber operations in an attempt to deter, delay, disrupt, and degrade DoD operations prior to or during a conflict. In aggregate, these cyber-enabled campaigns threaten to erode U.S. military advantages and imperil the infrastructure and prosperity on which those advantages rely.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  66

长期以来,中国一直奉行核不扩散政策,声明只有在对中国进行核打击时,中国才会使用核力量。中国的核不扩散承诺包括两项承诺:在任何时候和任何情况下,中国绝不首先使用核武器,无条件不对任何无核武器国家和无核武器区使用或威胁使用核武器。然而,在中国,关于中国将在何种条件下实施 NFU 政策的说法有些模棱两可。一些中国人民解放军军官曾公开表示,中国可能需要在哪些条件下首先使用核武器;例如,如果敌人的常规攻击威胁到中国核力量或政权本身的生存。没有迹象表明国家领导人愿意在中国现有的国家安全基金政策上附加这些细微差别和警告。然而,中国在其核现代化项目的范围和规模方面缺乏透明度,引发了人们对其未来意图的疑问,因为中国正在部署更大、更有能力的核力量。中国混合部分常规导弹和核导弹部队,以及对中国核武装力量条件的含糊不清,可能会使冲突期间的威慑和升级管理复杂化。针对中国常规导弹力量相关 C2中心的潜在对手攻击,可能会在不经意间削弱中国的 C2核能,并在中国领导层中产生核能使用或损失的压力。一旦冲突开始,中国将移动导弹系统分散到隐蔽地点,可能使区分核力量和常规力量的任务进一步复杂化,从而增加无意中攻击常规力量的可能性。中国领导层在应对核武器常规攻击方面的考量,仍然是一个关键的未知数。陆上平台。中国目前的核武库包括大约90枚洲际弹道导弹,其中包括基于发射井的 CSS-4 Mod 2(DF-5A)和 Mod 3(DF-5B) ;固体燃料的道路机动 css-10级(DF-31、 DF-31A 和 DF-31AG) ;以及更有限的推出至发射的 CSS-3(DF-4)。这一战略武器库得到了道路机动、固体燃料 CSS-5 Mod 2和 Mod 6(东风 -21) mrbm 和东风 -26 irbm 的补充,这些 irbm 能够在印度-太平洋地区进行定位。海上平台。中国已建成6艘晋级 SSBN,其中4艘投入使用,2艘在 Huludao Shipyard 装备。中国的 JIN SSBNs 装备了多达12枚 CSS-N-14(JL-2)潜射导弹,是中国第一个可行的海基核威慑力量。据报道,中国的下一代096型 SSBN 将装备后续的 JL-3型 SLBM,可能在2020年代初开始建造。基于中国第一代 ssn 的40年以上的使用寿命,中国将同时运行 JIN 和096型 SSBN 舰队。

China has long maintained a NFU policy, stating it would use nuclear forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China. China’s NFU pledge consists of two stated commitments: China will never use nuclear weapons first at any time and under any circumstances, and will unconditionally refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. There is some ambiguity, however, in the narrative in China over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would apply. Some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force or of the regime itself. There has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s existing NFU policy. China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program, however, raises questions regarding its future intent as it fields larger, more-capable nuclear forces. China’s commingling of some of its conventional and nuclear missile forces, and ambiguities in China’s NFU conditions, could complicate deterrence and escalation management during a conflict. Potential adversary attacks against Chinese conventional missile force-associated C2 centers could inadvertently degrade Chinese nuclear C2 and generate nuclear use-or-lose pressures among China’s leadership. Once a conflict has begun, China’s dispersal of mobile missile systems to hide sites could further complicate the task of distinguishing between nuclear and conventional forces and, thus, increase the potential for inadvertent attacks on the latter. China’s leadership calculus for responding to conventional attacks on nuclear forces remains a key unknown. Land-Based Platforms. China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of approximately 90 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A) and Mod 3 (DF-5B); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10-class (DF-31, DF-31A and DF-31AG); and the more limited range roll-out-to-launch CSS-3 (DF-4). This strategic arsenal is complemented by road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 Mod 2 and Mod 6 (DF-21) MRBMs and DF-26 IRBMs capable of ranging targets in the Indo-Pacific region. Sea-Based Platforms. China has constructed six JIN-class SSBN, with four operational and two outfitting at Huludao Shipyard. China’s JIN SSBNs, which are equipped to carry up to 12 CSS-N-14 (JL-2) SLBMs, are the country’s first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent. China’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN reportedly will be armed with the follow-on JL-3 SLBM, and it will likely begin construction in the early-2020s. Based on the 40-plus-year service life of China’s first generation SSNs, China will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  67

未来发展。中国人民解放军正在升级其飞机,使用两种新型空射弹道导弹,其中一种可能包括核载荷。它的部署和整合将首次为中国提供一个可行的核"三合一"运载系统,分散在陆地、海上和空中部队 解放军认为开发一系列中国认为对抗美国和其他国家弹道导弹防御系统所必需的技术是合理的,包括 MaRV、 mirv、诱饵、箔条、干扰、热屏蔽和高超音速滑翔机 随着越来越多的移动洲际弹道导弹和未来的 SSBN 威慑巡逻需要解放军保护核泄漏授权的完整性,为了一支更大、更分散的部队,解放军可能会继续部署复杂的 C2系统和改进 C2程序。解放军的著作表达了"预警后发射"核态势的价值,这是一种威慑方式,通过提高准备状态、改进监视和简化决策过程,以便能够对敌人的攻击作出更快速的反应。这些文章强调了这种姿态与中国核能联盟政策的一致性,表明这可能是中国对核力量的渴望。中国正在努力发展天基预警能力,以支持未来的这一态势。解放军地下设施解放军继续保持一个强大的和技术先进的地下设施(UGF)计划,以保护其军事力量的所有方面,包括 C2,后勤,导弹系统和海军部队。中国有成千上万的地下工程,而且每年还在建造更多的地下工程。人民解放军利用这些地下工事来保护宝贵的资产免受导弹袭击的影响,并对敌人隐瞒军事行动。中国的核安全保障政策还有助于为中国核力量建造地下工程设施,这些设施可能计划在对手的首次核打击中幸存下来。中国在20世纪80年代中后期开始更新和扩大其军用地下工程项目。1991年海湾战争期间,中国观察了美国和联军的空中作战行动,并在20世纪90年代北约轰炸南斯拉夫使用了这些武器,这种现代化的努力再次变得紧迫起来。这些军事行动使中国确信,它需要建造更多生存能力更强、埋藏更深的设施,以保护军事资产免受渗透常规弹药和核打击的影响。中国可能会继续发展和扩大其 UGF 项目,以支持其不断扩大的力量。

Future Developments. The PLA is upgrading its aircraft with two new air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may include a nuclear payload. Its deployment and integration would, for the first time, provide China with a viable nuclear “triad” of delivery systems dispersed across land, sea, and air forces. > The PLA justifies developing a range of technologies China perceives are necessary to counter U.S. and other countries’ ballistic missile defense systems, including MaRV, MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and hypersonic glide vehicles. > The PLA will likely continue deploying sophisticated C2 systems and refining C2 processes as growing numbers of mobile ICBMs and future SSBN deterrence patrols require the PLA to safeguard the integrity of nuclear release authority for a larger, more dispersed force. PLA writings express the value of a “launch on warning” nuclear posture, an approach to deterrence that uses heightened readiness, improved surveillance, and streamlined decision-making processes to enable a more rapid response to enemy attack. These writings highlight the posture’s consistency with China’s nuclear NFU policy, suggesting it may be an aspiration for China’s nuclear forces. China is working to develop a space-based early warning capability that could support this posture in the future.   PLA Underground Facilities The PLA continues to maintain a robust and technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program to protect all aspects of its military forces, including C2, logistics, missile systems, and naval forces. China has thousands of UGFs and it continues to construct more each year. The PLA utilizes these UGFs to protect valuable assets from the effects of missile strikes and to conceal military operations from adversaries. China’s NFU policy also contributed to the construction of UGFs for the country’s nuclear forces, which may have planned to survive an initial nuclear first strike by an adversary. China began to update and expand its military UGF program in the mid- to late-1980s. This modernization effort took on renewed urgency following China’s observation of U.S. and Coalition air operations during the 1991 Gulf War and their use in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. These military campaigns convinced China it needs to build more survivable, deeply buried facilities to protect military assets from the effects of penetrating conventional munition and nuclear strikes. China will likely continue to develop and expand its UGF program to support its expanding forces.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展68

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  68

中国周边地区的3种作战能力

3 CAPABILITIES FOR OPERATIONS ALONG CHINA’S PERIPHERY

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展69

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 69

关键外卖中国继续实施与建立东部,南部,西部,北部和中央战区司令部相关的改革,这是基于中国对周边威胁的感知而组织的 在中央军事委员会(CMC)的指挥下,每个战区司令部对战区内的军种和常规部队拥有管辖权。中国继续实施与2016年初建立五个战区司令部相关的改革。东区、南区、西区、北区和中区战区司令部取代了7个以陆军为基地的军区,现在是各自地理区域内级别最高的"联合作战司令部"组织。每个战区指挥部接受来自中央军事委员会的指示,并对其战区内的服务拥有管辖权。战区司令部还负责其职责范围内的所有非核战斗和非战斗行动。战区指挥部负责制定针对具体战区的指挥战略,旨在准备与对手作战并取胜,制定联合作战计划和军事能力,应对危机,维护领土主权和稳定。东部战区指挥部外卖东部战区指挥部面向台湾和东海。东部战区司令部(ETC)可能对日本和台湾的国防事务实行行动控制,包括台湾海峡和尖阁诸岛及其周边地区的突发事件。2018年,镇执行委员会重点开展了一系列培训和演习,以提高联合行动和作战准备能力,组织了近20次演习和演习,包括远距离海上训练、空中作战和实弹训练。Etc 内设有三个集团军、一支海军舰队、两个海军旅、两个空军基地和一个导弹基地 2018年5月,ETC 联合作战指挥中心(JOCC)在东战区和南战区指挥部之间组织了一次紧密协调的解放军空军演习。此外,中国人民解放军空军还在台湾附近驾驶战斗机和具有远程巡航导弹能力的轰炸机。人民解放军空军还使用了一架 KJ-2000预警机,用于指挥、控制和护航,以支持苏 -35战斗机和歼 -11战斗机飞往 Miyako Strait 和巴士海峡 在中国东海,ETC 全年都在进行海军作战演习。2018年10月

Key Takeaways > China continues to implement reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on China’s perception of peripheral threats. > Under the direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), each Theater Command has authority over the services and conventional forces within the theater. China continues to implement reforms associated with the establishment of its five theater commands in early 2016. The Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Central Theater Commands replaced seven army-based military regions and are now the highest-ranking “joint operations command” organizations within their respective geographical areas. Each theater command receives direction from the CMC and has authority over the services within its theater. The Theater Command is also responsible for all non-nuclear combat and non-combat operations within their area of responsibility. Theater commands are responsible for developing theater-specific command strategies aimed at preparing to fight and win against an adversary, developing joint operational plans and military capabilities, responding to crises, and safeguarding the sovereignty and stability of territories. EASTERN THEATER COMMAND Key Takeaway > The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea. The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Japan and Taiwan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2018, the ETC focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing almost 20 exercises and drills consisting of long-distance sea training, aerial combat, and live-fire training. Located within the ETC are three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and one missile base. > In May 2018, the ETC Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) organized a closely coordinated PLAAF exercise between the Eastern Theater and Southern Theater Commands. In addition, the PLAAF flew fighter aircraft and long-range cruise missile capable bombers around Taiwan. The PLAAF also employed a KJ-2000 early warning aircraft for command, control, and escort to support Su-35 fighters and J-11 fighter flights to the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel. > In the East China Sea, the ETC conducted combat drills throughout the year focused on naval operations. In October 2018, a

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展70

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  70

海军舰队进行了一系列演习,包括反潜作战训练,使用驱逐舰和护卫舰编队模拟包围水下目标。他们进一步完成了十多个辅助射击训练目标,参观登船搜查和扣押演习,以及核和化学防御演习。台湾海峡安全形势发展2018年中国大陆与台湾关键外卖关系保持冷静 迫于中国的压力,美国、布基纳法索和萨尔瓦多将外交关系从台北转向北京 解放军继续进行台湾海峡应急准备工作。中国大陆和台湾的关系在2018年一直处于僵局状态。自2016年蔡英文当选台湾总统以来,中国停止了与台湾的正式沟通,并一再强调,台湾必须接受"九二共识",以重启正式接触。自2016年11月以来,中国领导人直接将"九二共识"等同于"一个中国",习主席在十九大工作报告中重申了这一点。台湾总统蔡英文一直承诺维持21海峡两岸关系的现状,并呼吁在不以"九二共识"作为谈判前提的情况下与中国举行会谈。2016年5月,中国暂停了2014年开始的台湾事务办公室与台湾陆委会之间的磋商。中国继续阻挠台湾参加世界卫生组织和国际刑警组织等国际组织的努力。中国也继续对台湾施加外交压力,说服多米尼加、布基纳法索和萨尔瓦多在2018年将外交关系从台北转向北京。尽管政府与政府之间的磋商陷入停滞,但中共仍继续与反对党国民党(KMT)保持接触,中国大陆继续举行低层次的两岸交流,如上海-台北双城论坛(Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum)。中国人民解放军继续准备应对台湾海峡的突发事件,以威慑台湾,并在必要时迫使台湾放弃走向独立的举动。中国人民解放军还可能准备一个应急方案,以武力统一台湾与大陆,同时威慑、拖延或否认任何代表台湾的第三方干预。作为向台湾和蔡英文政府施压的综合行动的一部分,中国增加了在台湾附近的军事演习,包括中国人民解放军空军的环游世界飞行和在东海的海军演习。

PLAN flotilla conducted a series of drills, including anti-submarine warfare training by employing destroyers and frigates in formations simulating encirclement of underwater targets. They further completed more than ten training objectives in auxiliary gun firing, visit-board-search-and-seizure drills, and nuclear and chemical defense drills. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT Key Takeaways > Relations between China and Taiwan remained cool through 2018. > Bowing to Chinese pressure, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing. > The PLA continued Taiwan Strait contingency preparations. Relations between China and Taiwan remained at an impasse through 2018. Since the 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s president, China halted formal communication with Taiwan and has repeatedly stressed that Taiwan must accept the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. Since November 2016, China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to “one China,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in the 19th Party Congress work report. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations and called for talks with China without using the “1992 Consensus” as a precondition for negotiations. In May 2016, China suspended consultations between its Taiwan Affairs Office and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council that had begun in 2014. China continues to thwart Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations such as the World Health Organization and INTERPOL. China has also maintained its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, convincing the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador to switch diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing in 2018. Despite the stalled government-to-government consultations, the CCP continues to engage with the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party, and China continues to hold lower-level cross-Strait exchanges such as the municipal Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum. The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai Administration, China has increased military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLAAF and naval exercises in the East China Sea.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  71

台湾2017年发布的国防报告引用了人们的担忧,即解放军在台湾附近增加的军事活动对台湾海峡的安全构成了巨大威胁,台湾需要一个"多重威慑战略",包括强调发展非对称作战以对抗解放军的进步。2018年,台湾继续扩大其本土防御系统项目。中国继续使用海事执法船只和飞机在日本管辖的尖阁列岛附近巡逻 2018年5月,中日签署海空通信机制。中国宣称对日本管理的东海尖阁诸岛拥有主权,台湾也宣称对这些岛屿拥有主权。美国在钓鱼岛主权问题上没有表明立场,但承认日本对钓鱼岛的管理权,并继续重申钓鱼岛属于《美日安保条约》(u.s.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty)第5条的范围。中国使用海上执法船只和飞机在岛屿附近巡逻。2018年期间,中国在尖阁诸岛(Senkaku Islands,中国称为"钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿")保持存在,通常有四艘中国海警船在该岛附近海域(12海里内)巡逻。2018年1月,PLAN 商级攻击型核潜艇在尖阁诸岛附近水下航行。另外,解放军海军经常经过日本冲绳和 Miyako Islands 之间进入太平洋。解放军海军东海舰队定期在日本海举行军事演习,为潜在的冲突做准备。然而,在2018年5月李克强总理访问日本期间,中日签署了旨在避免意外遭遇的海上和空中通信机制。

Taiwan’s national defense report released in 2017 cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan poses an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait,” and that Taiwan requires a “multiple deterrence strategy,” including an emphasis on developing asymmetric warfare to counter PLA advances. In 2018, Taiwan has continued to expand its indigenous defense systems program. EAST CHINA SEA Key Takeaways > China continues to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. > In May 2018, China and Japan signed the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism. China claims sovereignty over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which are also claimed by Taiwan. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. China uses maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the islands. During 2018, China maintained a presence in the Senkaku Islands with typically four China Coast Guard ships in the territorial waters (within 12 nm) around the islands. In January 2018, a PLAN Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) sailed underwater in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands. Separately, the PLAN frequently advances into the Pacific Ocean by passing between Japan’s Okinawa and Miyako Islands. The PLAN East Sea Fleet regularly conducts military exercises in the Sea of Japan to prepare for potential conflicts. However, during Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Japan in May 2018, China and Japan signed the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism, designed to avoid accidental encounters.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 72

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  73

南方战区指挥中心南方战区指挥中心面向南中国海、东南亚边境安全以及领土和海上争端。南方战区的职责范围包括大陆和中国海洋东南亚,包括南中国海。这一地理区域意味着,STC 负责保卫南中国海,支持 ETC 对台湾的任何入侵,应对领土争端,并确保对中国的全球野心至关重要的特殊目的地的安全。在 STC 内部有两个集团军、一个海军舰队、两个海军旅、一个空军基地和两个火箭军基地。虽然中国已经停止了在南海的填海,并在3个前哨基地完成了主要军事基础设施的建设,但是中国通过在 Spratly Islands 前哨基地部署反舰和防空导弹系统继续军事化 自2018年初中国在其前哨部署先进武器系统以来,前哨基地有能力支持军事行动,但在 Spratly Islands 没有观察到大规模的空中存在。安全局势的发展。2016年7月,《海洋法公约》(Law of the Sea Convention)下的一个法庭在菲律宾提起的案件中裁定,中国对"九段线"所涵盖的南海"历史性权利"的主张,不得超出其根据《海洋法公约》享有的海洋权利。尽管做出了这个决定,中国仍然继续使用强制手段,包括使用解放军的海军和准军事船只,来执行其主权要求和促进其利益。中国这样做的方式被认为低于挑起冲突的门槛。在南海,中国继续军事化。反舰巡航导弹和远程地对空导弹已经部署到 Spratly Islands 哨所,中国的战略轰炸机已经在 Paracel Islands 的永兴岛进行了起飞和着陆演习 中国表示,在南海的国际军事存在是对中国主权的挑战。中国继续升级强制手段,以执行其在南中国海的领土主张。2018年9月,美国军舰迪凯特号与中国军舰发生了一次不安全的冲突,导致冲突升级,一些美国国际伙伴对中国提出了批评。

SOUTHERN THEATER COMMAND Key Takeaway > The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the South China Sea, Southeast Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes. The area of responsibility of the Southern Theater Command (STC) covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea. This geographic area implies that the STC is responsible for securing the South China Sea, supporting the ETC in any invasion of Taiwan, responding to territorial disputes, and assuring the security of SLOCs vital to China’s global ambitions. Located within the STC are two group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, one Air Force base, and two Rocket Force bases. SOUTH CHINA SEA Key Takeaways > Though China has ceased South China Sea land reclamation and completed major military infrastructure at three outposts, it has continued militarization by deploying anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems to its Spratly Islands outposts. > Outposts are capable of supporting military operations since China deployed advanced weapon systems to its outposts in early 2018; however, no large-scale air presence has been observed in the Spratly Islands. Developments in the Security Situation. In July 2016, a tribunal under the Law of the Sea Convention ruled in the case brought by the Philippines that China’s claims to “historic rights” over the South China Sea encompassed by the “nine-dash line” could not exceed its maritime rights under the Law of the Sea Convention. Despite the decision, China continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims and advance its interests. China does so in ways calculated to be below the threshold of provoking conflict. In the South China Sea, China has continued militarization. Anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles have been deployed to Spratly Islands outposts, and China’s strategic bombers have conducted take-off and landing drills on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands. > China states that international military presence within the South China Sea is a challenge to its sovereignty. China has continued to escalate coercive tactics to enforce its claims within the South China Sea. This escalation culminated in an unsafe encounter with the USS Decatur in September 2018 that led to criticism against China from some U.S. international partners.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  74

在东盟国家和中国就行为准则协议进行谈判期间,紧张局势仍在继续。据报道,中国已经提议,行为准则要求所有各方一致批准在南海举行涉及中国或东盟以外国家的军事演习。2018年8月,中国在永兴岛安装了海浪监测设备,并在争议地区进行了科学调查,尽管越南做出了负面反应。

> Tensions have continued during negotiations between ASEAN countries and China on a code of conduct agreement. China has reportedly proposed that the code of conduct require unanimous approval by all parties for military exercises involving countries outside of China or ASEAN in the South China Sea. In August 2018, China mounted wave-monitoring devices on Woody Island and conducted scientific surveys in contested regions despite negative reactions from Vietnam.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 75

能够支助军事行动的前哨基地。2018年初,中国继续在 Spratly Islands 前哨逐步部署军事干扰设备以及先进的反舰和防空导弹系统。这些导弹系统是中国在有争议的南海部署的最有能力的陆基武器系统。2016年初,中国在 Spratly Islands 的4个小型前哨基地完成了岸基基础设施建设。约翰逊礁、加文礁、休斯礁和库阿特龙礁上的设施包括行政大楼、武器站和传感器阵地。到2018年初,中国在永暑礁、渚碧礁和美济礁的 Spratly Islands 三个较大的前哨基地完成了更广泛的军事基础设施建设。这些设施现在包括航空设施、港口设施、固定武器阵地、营房、行政大楼和通讯设施。自2015年末中国完成在 Spratly Islands 建造人工岛以来,在任何一个前哨基地都没有开垦出大量土地。中国在 Spratlys 占用了7个地块,新增了逾3200英亩土地。中国表示,这些项目主要是为了改善海洋研究、航行安全以及驻扎在前哨的人员的生活和工作条件。然而,这些前哨基地提供了机场、停泊区和补给设施,这将使中国在该地区保持更加灵活和持久的军事和准军事存在。这提高了中国侦查和挑战敌对势力或第三方活动的能力,扩大了中国可用能力的范围,并减少了部署这些能力所需的时间。

Outposts Capable of Supporting Military Operations. In early 2018, China continued its gradual deployment of military jamming equipment as well as advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems to its Spratly Islands outposts. The missile systems are the most capable land-based weapons systems deployed by China in the disputed South China Sea. China completed shore-based infrastructure on four small outposts in the Spratly Islands in early 2016. Facilities on Johnson, Gaven, Hughes, and Cuarteron Reefs include administrative buildings, weapons stations, and sensor emplacements. By early 2018, China had completed more extensive military infrastructure on three larger outposts in the Spratly Islands at Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs. These installations now include aviation facilities, port facilities, fixed-weapons positions, barracks, administration buildings, and communications facilities. No substantial land has been reclaimed at any of the outposts since China completed its artificial island creation in the Spratly Islands in late 2015, after adding over 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. China has stated these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that will allow China to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves China’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties, widen the range of capabilities available to China, and reduce the time required to deploy them.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  76

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展77

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 77

西部战区指挥中心外卖西部战区指挥中心面向印度和反恐任务。西部战区司令部是中国地理上最大的战区司令部,可能负责应对与印度的冲突和管理中国西部的恐怖主义。在世贸中心内部有两个集团军,三个空军基地,一个火箭部队基地,以及执行内部安全行动的武装警察部队。在 WTC,反恐是一个关键问题,其中包括新疆和西藏自治区,在这些地区,中国主要关注分裂主义和恐怖主义的威胁。中国的行动的特点是在恐怖主义和分裂势力进入中国,特别是从阿富汗进入中国之前打击他们,同时对任何被怀疑同情反政府分子的个人进行内部"再教育"。尽管2018年夏天在 Demchok 发生了低层对峙,中国和印度迄今为止还是阻止了这些分歧升级到类似于2017年洞朗高原73天的边境对峙的水平。中国和印度在两国有争议的边界西部和东部地区的紧张关系持续存在。中国和印度的巡逻队经常在有争议的边界上相遇,双方经常指责对方侵犯边界。尽管2018年夏天在 Demchok 发生了低层对峙,但迄今为止,中国和印度一直阻止这些分歧升级到类似于在洞朗高原(Doklam Plateau)发生的73天边界对峙的水平。中国和印度军队定期举行边界会议,讨论争端,总体上能够消除误解,防止小冲突升级。然而,2017年边界争端的持久解决仍然遥遥无期 中国和印度的军事和文职领导人继续讨论通过军事交流和拟议的危机直接热线,在紧邻的边境地区和国家一级建立缓和紧张局势的机制 2018年4月,习主席与莫迪总理举行非正式会晤,表示支持边境问题的解决方案。2018年11月,印度和中国恢复了年度防务对话,随后举行了由印度国家安全顾问阿吉特·多瓦尔和中国国务委员王毅共同主持的边境问题特别代表会议。

WESTERN THEATER COMMAND Key Takeaway > The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions. The Western Theater Command (WTC) is geographically the largest theater command within China and is likely responsible for responding to conflict with India and managing terrorism in western China. Located within the WTC are two group armies, three Air Force bases, one Rocket Force base, and PAP units that conduct internal security operations. Counterterrorism is a key issue within the WTC, which includes the Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions where China is focused on perceived threats of separatism and terrorism. China’s campaign is characterized as combating terror and separatist forces before they enter China, particularly from Afghanistan, while employing an internal “re-education” campaign for any individuals suspected of having sympathies for anti-government elements. CHINA-INDIA BORDER Key Takeaway > Despite a summer 2018 low-level standoff in Demchok, China and India have thus far prevented these disagreements from escalating to a level similar to the 73-day border standoff at the Doklam Plateau in 2017. Tensions between China and India persist along the western and eastern sections of their disputed border. Chinese and Indian patrols regularly encounter one another along the disputed border, and both sides often accuse one another of border incursions. Despite a summer 2018 low-level standoff in Demchok, China and India have thus far prevented these disagreements from escalating to a level similar to the 73-day border standoff at the Doklam Plateau. Chinese and Indian forces engage in regular border meetings to discuss disputes and are generally able to resolve misunderstandings to prevent the escalation of minor confrontations. However, an enduring settlement of the 2017 border dispute remains elusive. > Chinese and Indian military and civilian leaders continue discussions on the development of mechanisms to defuse tensions, at both the immediate border areas as well as the national level, through military exchanges and a proposed direct crisis hotline. > In April 2018, President Xi and Prime Minister Modi held an informal meeting and expressed support for a resolution on the border. In November 2018, India and China resumed their annual defense dialogue, which was followed by a special representative meeting on the border co-chaired by Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展78

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 78

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展79

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 79

北方战区指挥中心外卖北方战区指挥中心面向朝鲜半岛和俄罗斯边境安全。北方战区司令部(NTC)的职责范围包括大部分的蒙古和俄罗斯边境地区,北朝鲜和黄海。它负责中国北部周边地区的行动,以及反恐行动。全国过渡委员会内设有三个集团军、一支海军舰队、两个海军旅、两个空军基地、一个火箭军基地和执行内部安全行动的武装警察部队。中国与朝鲜的关系中国与朝鲜的关系从2017年的紧张时期有了积极的转变 中国人民解放军继续进行军事演习,为朝鲜半岛突发事件做准备。2017年,中国加大了对联合国安理会决议的执行力度,中国与朝鲜的关系由此出现了积极转变。中国在很大程度上执行了联合国安理会对朝鲜的制裁决议。2018年,习近平与金正恩进行了三次会晤,此外还在朝鲜和中国进行了大量的低层官员交流。中国对朝鲜半岛的目标包括稳定、无核化以及在中国边境附近没有美国军队。中国维护朝鲜半岛稳定的重点包括防止朝鲜崩溃和防止半岛发生军事冲突。中国继续主张对朝鲜采取包括对话和施压在内的双轨方式,并声称美韩暂停军事演习以换取朝鲜暂停核活动和导弹活动。长期以来,中国一直关注中朝边境的稳定。中国人民解放军在朝鲜半岛举行军事演习,包括空中、陆地、海上和化学防御训练等应急准备活动。如果朝鲜半岛发生危机或冲突,中国领导人可以命令全国过渡委员会参与一系列行动。这些措施可能包括确保中朝边界安全局的安全,以防止难民流入或军事干预进入朝鲜。中国还可以援引1961年7月与朝鲜签署的《友好合作互助条约》(Treaty of Friendship,Co-operation and Mutual Assistance) ,作为越境进入朝鲜的理由。

NORTHERN THEATER COMMAND Key Takeaway > The Northern Theater Command is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security. The area of responsibility of the Northern Theater Command (NTC) covers the majority of its Mongolian and Russian border areas, North Korea, and the Yellow Sea. It is responsible for operations along China’s northern periphery, as well as counterterrorism operations. Located within the NTC are three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, one Rocket Force base, and PAP units that conduct internal security operations. RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA Key Takeaways > China’s relationship with North Korea has taken a positive turn from a strained period during 2017. > The PLA continues to conduct military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. China’s relationship with North Korea has taken a positive turn from a strained period after China increased implementation of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in 2017. China has largely enforced the UNSC resolution sanctions against North Korea. Xi had three meetings with Kim Jong Un in 2018, along with numerous lower-level official exchanges in both North Korea and China. China’s objectives for the Korean Peninsula include stability, denuclearization, and the absence of U.S. forces near China’s border. China’s focus on maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula includes preventing North Korea’s collapse and preventing a military conflict on the Peninsula. China continues to advocate for a dual-track approach towards North Korea that embraces both dialogue and pressure, and has claimed credit for the suspension of U.S.-South Korean military exercises in exchange for the suspension of North Korean nuclear and missile activity. China has long been concerned about stability along its border with North Korea. The PLA conducts military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula including air, land, sea, and chemical defense training events. Should a crisis or conflict occur on the Peninsula, China’s leaders could order the NTC to engage in a range of operations. These could include securing the China-North Korea border to prevent the flow of refugees or a military intervention into North Korea. China could also cite the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance it signed with North Korea in July 1961 as a justification to cross the border into North Korea.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展80

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  80

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展81

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 81

中央战区指挥中心战区指挥中心战区指挥中心指挥中心指挥中心指挥中心指挥中心指挥中心指挥中心指挥中心指挥中心指挥中心。中央战区司令部的职责范围从 Bohai Gulf 一直延伸到中国内陆,连接着其他四个战区司令部。反恐委员会负责北京首都地区的防卫,为领导层提供安全保障,并作为其他战区司令部的战略后备力量。Ctc 责任区内的单位有三个集团军、两个空军基地和一个火箭军基地。虽然战区司令部负责沿海地区,但它并没有下属的海军舰队。

CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND Key Takeaway > The Central Theater Command is oriented toward capital defense and providing surge support to other theaters. The area of responsibility of the Central Theater Command (CTC) stretches from the Bohai Gulf into the interior of China, connecting the other four theater commands. The CTC is responsible for the defense of the Beijing capital region, providing security for the leadership, and serving as a strategic reserve to the other theater commands. Units within the CTC area of responsibility are three group armies, two Air Force bases, and one Rocket Force base. Although the theater command has coastal responsibilities, it does not have a subordinate naval fleet.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展82

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  82

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展83

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 83

中国在台湾海峡的战略和能力发展尽管中国主张与台湾和平统一,但中国从未放弃使用武力;中国历来警告将使用武力的情况仍然模棱两可,而且随着时间的推移而不断演变 对于台湾战争,中国有一系列选择,从空中和海上封锁到全面两栖入侵,夺取和占领部分或全部台湾或其近海岛屿 解放军的服务和支援部队继续改善训练和获得台湾应急的新能力,但没有迹象表明中国大陆正在显著扩大其登陆舰力量,这对于两栖攻击台湾是必要的。中国似乎准备推迟使用武力,只要它认为,从长远来看,与台湾统一仍然是可能的,而且冲突的代价超过了利益。中国认为,可信的武力威胁对于维持政治进步的条件和防止台湾走向独立至关重要。几十年来,中国一直拒绝放弃使用武力解决台湾问题。与此同时,中国领导人宣布,他们希望在"一国两制"的原则下实现和平统一,习近平主席在中共十九大开幕式上的讲话强调了这一点。中国大陆历来警告将动用武力的环境,随着时间的推移已经发生了变化。这些情况包括:正式宣布台湾独立;走向台湾独立的不明确行动;台湾内部动荡;台湾获得核武器;无限期推迟恢复两岸统一对话;外国干涉台湾内政;以及驻台外国军队。中国2005年3月反分裂国家法第8条规定,如果"分裂势力. 造成台湾脱离中国的事实",如果"发生导致台湾分裂的重大事件",或者"和平统一的可能性已经用尽,中国可以使用"非和平手段"。中国使用这种非特异性

CHINA’S STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT Key Takeaways > Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which China has historically warned it would use force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time. > China has an array of options for a Taiwan campaign, ranging from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands. > PLA services and support forces continue to improve training and acquire new capabilities for a Taiwan contingency, but there is no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan. China appears prepared to defer the use of military force as long as it believes that unification with Taiwan over the long-term remains possible and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and prevent Taiwan from making moves toward independence. For decades, China has refused to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Simultaneously, China’s leaders proclaim their desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems,” as emphasized in President Xi Jinping’s address opening the CCP’s 19th Party Congress. The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included: > Formal declaration of Taiwan independence; > Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence; > Internal unrest in Taiwan; > Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; > Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification; > Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and, > Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan. Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces . . . cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. China’s use of such non-specific

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  84

情况通过故意的战略模糊性增加了他们的政策灵活性。中国仍然认为台湾问题是中美之间最重要、最敏感的问题。基于中国人民解放军在多个领域不断增强的能力,中国对台湾的行动方针有一系列的选择。中国可以通过发出准备使用武力或对台湾采取惩罚性行动的信号,来寻求一种谨慎的方式。中国人民解放军还可以开展更全面的行动,迫使台湾屈服于中国条件下的统一或统一对话。中国将寻求阻止美国对任何台湾应急行动的潜在干预。如果做不到这一点,中国将试图推迟干预,并在一场不对称的、短期的有限战争中寻求胜利。如果冲突旷日持久,中国可能会选择将网络空间、太空或核活动升级,以结束冲突,也可能选择战斗到停滞不前,寻求政治解决。中国人民解放军可以单独或联合启动以下列出的军事选项。空中和海上封锁。解放军的文章描述了一场联合封锁战役,在这场战役中,中国将动用海上和空中交通的动能封锁,包括切断台湾至关重要的进口,以迫使台湾投降。根据这些文章,大规模导弹打击和可能占领台湾近海岛屿的行动将伴随着联合封锁,以求台湾迅速投降,与此同时,空军和海军部队故作姿态,在必要时进行数周或数月的封锁行动。中国的空中和海上封锁行动也很可能辅之以同时发生的电子战、网络攻击和信息战,以进一步孤立台湾当局和民众。有限的武力或强制性选择。中国可以使用各种破坏性的,惩罚性的,或致命的军事行动对台湾进行有限的运动,可能与公开和秘密的经济和政治活动相结合,由各种 IO 支持形成认识或削弱台湾当局的效力和合法性。这样的运动可能包括计算机网络或对台湾的政治、军事和经济基础设施进行有限的动态攻击,以引起台湾的恐惧,降低台湾民众对其领导人的信心。同样,中国人民解放军特种作战部队可以渗透到台湾,对基础设施或领导目标发动攻击。空中和导弹战役。中国可以使用导弹攻击和精确空袭来打击包括空军基地、雷达站、导弹、太空资产和通信设施在内的防空系统,以削弱台湾的防御能力,压制台湾的领导力,或打破台湾人民的决心。

conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity. China continues to view the Taiwan issue as the most important and sensitive issue between the United States and China. CHINA’S COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN China has a range of options based on the PLA’s increasing capabilities in multiple domains. China could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or unification dialogue, under China’s terms. China would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign. Failing that, China would attempt to delay intervention and seek victory in an asymmetric, limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, China might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a standstill and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination. Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which China would employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. According to these writings, large-scale missile strikes and possibly seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade in an attempt to achieve a rapid Taiwan surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. China’s air and maritime blockade operations will also likely be complemented by concurrent EW, network attacks, and IO to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace. Limited Force or Coercive Options. China could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets. Air and Missile Campaign. China could use missile attacks and precision air strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  85

入侵台湾。中国公开发表的文章描述了两栖入侵台湾的不同作战概念。其中最突出的是联合岛屿登陆战役,它设想了一个依靠后勤、空中和海上支援以及电子战的协调、连锁战役的复杂行动。目标是突破或绕过海岸防御,在台湾西部海岸线以北或以南的指定登陆地点建立滩头阵地、运输人员和物资,并发动攻击,夺取和占领关键目标或整个岛屿。大规模两栖入侵是最复杂、最困难的军事行动之一。成功取决于空中和海上的优势,陆上供给的快速集结和维持,以及不间断的支援。入侵台湾的企图可能会使中国的军事力量承受压力,并招致国际干预。这些压力,加上中国的作战力量消耗,城市战争和反叛乱的复杂性,甚至假设成功登陆和突围,使两栖入侵台湾成为一个重大的政治和军事风险。中国人民解放军有能力完成各种两栖作战,但不能全面入侵台湾。由于除了例行训练之外几乎没有公开的军事准备,中国可能会发动对 Pratas 或 Itu Aba 等台湾控制的南海小岛的入侵。中国人民解放军入侵一个中等规模、防卫更加严密的岛屿,如 Matsu 或 Jinmen,是中国力所能及的。这种入侵将表明军事能力和政治决心,同时获得实实在在的领土利益,并同时表现出某种程度的克制。然而,这种行动涉及重大的、甚至可能是禁止的政治风险,因为它可能会激起台湾的独立情绪,并引起国际反对。

Invasion of Taiwan. Publicly available Chinese writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and electronic warfare. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island. Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations. Success depends upon air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability and political resolve while achieving tangible territorial gain and simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate international opposition.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展86

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  86

解放军改革对台湾应变的影响重塑解放军结构改革的首要目标之一,是建设一支能够执行复杂联合行动的军队,包括那些将参与台湾应变的军队。解放军改革旨在明确指挥权限,促进联合一体化,促进从和平到战争的过渡。取消军事区域有利于军事战场,在这种情况下,解放军的东方战区司令部(ETC) ,也可能精简和提高解放军的能力进行为期一年的规划和准备跨台湾海峡的联合军事行动。解放军作战单位在重组单位、整合新能力和适应新的指挥结构时,可能正在经历进行大规模联合作战的准备和熟练程度的降低。解放军总体结构中的一个重要组成部分是 SSF 和 JLSF 的建立。在台湾应急期间,联合攻击部队将与下属联合后勤支助中心一道,协调联合后勤和物资交付,并监督各种军民支助系统,以维持战役。Ssf 的建立可能提高解放军在台湾紧急情况下执行和协调 IO(特别是网络、电子战和对抗空间)的能力。它还可以提高中国人民解放军管理和向中央军委和 ETC 提供天基侦察的能力,改善中国人民解放军指挥参谋对台湾军事单位和设施的情势察觉。中国人民解放军可能仍在探索如何改革其联合指挥流程,以便在战区一级更充分地整合 IO 和 ISR 能力,但结构性改革已经消除了在战区一级整合这些战略能力的最大障碍。军队和准军事部队的结构改革也影响到解放军未来应对台湾突发事件的资源和作战能力 2018年,解放军空降部队根据实际作战计划进行了包括远程突袭和空降作战在内的训练演习。空降部队在2017年经历了重大变革,将之前的部队重组为空降步兵旅、特种作战旅、航空旅和支援旅。自2017年以来,正在进行的中国人民解放军改革已经将集团军的数量从18个减少到13个,退役或缩编的陆军师改编为联合武装旅,并将陆军的两栖机械化步兵改编为两栖旅。2018年,资培计划继续扩大,从两个旅扩大到六个旅,但新成立的部队缺乏必要的装备和业务培训。

Effect of PLA Reform on a Taiwan Contingency One of the overarching goals of the structural reforms to reshape the PLA was to construct a military capable of conducting complex joint operations, including those that would be involved in a Taiwan contingency. PLA reforms are aimed at clarifying command authorities, improving joint integration, and facilitating the transition from peace to war. The abolishment of military regions in favor of military theaters – in this case, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command (ETC) – has also likely streamlined and improved the PLA’s ability to conduct yearlong planning and preparation for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait. PLA combat units are likely experiencing decreased readiness and proficiency to conduct large-scale joint operations as they reorganize units, integrate new capabilities, and adjust to new command structures. A significant addition to the overall structure of the PLA is the establishment of the SSF and the JLSF. During a Taiwan contingency, the JLSF, in conjunction with subordinate joint logistics support centers, would coordinate joint logistics and the delivery of materiel as well as oversee various civil-military support systems to sustain the campaign. The creation of the SSF likely improves the PLA’s ability to execute and coordinate IO (particularly cyber, electronic warfare, and counterspace) in a Taiwan contingency. It may also improve the PLA’s ability to manage and provide space-based reconnaissance to the CMC and the ETC, improving PLA command staffs’ situational awareness of Taiwan’s military units and facilities. The PLA is likely still exploring how to reform its joint command processes to integrate IO and ISR capabilities more fully at the theater-level, but structural reforms have removed the biggest barriers to integrating these strategic capabilities at the theater-level. Structural reforms within the military and paramilitary forces also have implications on resources and operational capabilities available to the PLA for a future Taiwan contingency. > In 2018, the PLAAF Airborne Corps conducted training exercises involving long-range raid and airborne operations based on actual warplans. The airborne corps underwent major changes in 2017, reorganizing its previous units into airborne infantry brigades, a special operations brigade, an aviation brigade, and a support brigade. Since 2017, ongoing PLA Army reforms have reduced the number of group armies from 18 to 13, retired or downsized army divisions into combined arms brigades, and reorganized the Army’s two amphibious mechanized infantry divisions into amphibious brigades. The PLANMC in 2018 continued to expand from two to six brigades, but the newly created units lack required equipment and operational training.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展87

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  87

中国人民解放军目前对台湾冲突的态度。中国人民解放军正在改进并增加其入侵台湾的选择。它正在将其大部分机动部队转变为联合武装旅,包括前两栖师和两栖装甲旅。作为这一改变的一部分,人民解放军增加了这些旅的武器和作战支援功能的类型,这些旅最终将创造出更有能力的、模块化的旅和营。陆军航空兵的扩张和两个新的空中突击旅的建立也为台湾的入侵提供了更多的攻击、空中攻击和近距离空中支援选择。此外,中国人民解放军正在进行的先进防空、电子战和 C2系统的部署,增强了其旅的战斗力、力量保护和维持能力。改进通信网络

THE PLA’S CURRENT POSTURE FOR A TAIWAN CONFLICT PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA is improving and increasing its options for a Taiwan invasion. It is converting the bulk of its maneuver units to combined arms brigades, including the former amphibious divisions and amphibious armor brigades. As part of this change, the PLAA has increased the types of arms and combat support functions organic to these brigades, which should eventually create more capable, modular brigades and battalions. The expansion of army aviation and the creation of two new air assault brigades also provides more attack, air assault and close air support options for a Taiwan invasion. Additionally, the PLAA’s ongoing fielding of advanced air defense, electronic warfare, and C2 systems enhances the combat power, force protection, and sustainment capabilities of its brigades. Improved communications networks

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展88

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  88

提供单元内部和单元之间的实时数据传输,从而在操作过程中(包括服务之间)实现更好的 C2。中国人民解放军继续进行连级两栖登陆训练,包括在恶劣天气和夜间进行训练,但需要增加更大梯队的训练,以充分整合他们的新结构和立体能力。随着这些新系统的激增,人民解放军将增强其建立、防御和利用滩头阵地的能力。中国人民解放军海军。解放军海军正在提高防空和反舰作战能力,发展海上核威慑力量,引进能够在两岸冲突中打击台湾的新型多任务平台,并在其他应急行动中执行多种任务。新型攻击潜艇、具有防空能力的现代水面战斗机以及进入部队的第四代海军飞机旨在在第一岛链内取得海上优势,并威慑和反击任何可能的第三方干预台湾冲突。然而,中国的两栖舰艇舰队近年来一直专注于获取少量的 lpd,这表明近期的重点是小规模的远征任务,而不是大量的 lst 和中型登陆艇,这对于大规模的海滩直接攻击是必要的。也没有迹象表明中国此时正在大幅扩充其登陆舰力量——这表明需要大规模升空的直接海滩攻击行动不太可能在计划之中。解放军空军(PLAAF)。人民解放军空军一直保持着为台湾应急提供各种能力的兵力态势。部署了大量无需加油就能对台作战的先进飞机,为其进行空中优势和地面攻击作战提供了重要能力。许多远程防空系统为中国大陆提供了强大的防御反击层。此外,中国支援飞机的发展为解放军空军提供了更好的 ISR 能力,以支持解放军的应急行动。解放军火箭部队(PLARF)。Plarf 准备对台湾的指挥和控制设施、空军基地、雷达站等高价值目标进行导弹攻击,试图削弱台湾的防御能力,压制台湾的领导力,或打破公众的战斗意愿。战略支援部队。解放军理论著作强调空间和网络空间领域在联合行动中的重要性。解放军的文件表明,SSF 将负责在台湾突发事件中使用电子战和网络作战,因为该部队的任务之一是"在当代信息化战争中夺取和维护战场信息控制"

provide real-time data transmissions within and between units, enabling better C2 during operations, including between services. The PLAA continues to conduct company-level amphibious landing training, including during difficult weather and at night, but will need increased training at larger echelons to fully integrate their new structure and three-dimensional capabilities. As these new systems proliferate, the PLAA will increase its ability to establish, defend, and exploit a beachhead lodgment. PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities, developing an at-sea nuclear deterrent, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of striking Taiwan in a cross-Strait conflict as well as conducting diverse missions in other contingency operations. New attack submarines, modern surface combatants with anti-air capability, and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the first island chain as well as to deter and counter any potential third party intervention in a Taiwan conflict. China’s amphibious ship fleet, however, has in recent years focused on acquiring a small number of LPDs, indicating a near term focus on smaller scale expeditionary missions rather than a large number of LSTs and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault. There is also no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force at this time – suggesting a direct beach-assault operation requiring extensive lift is less likely in planning. PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a force posture that provides a variety of capabilities for a Taiwan contingency. It has stationed a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air-superiority and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense of China’s mainland against counterattack. In addition, China’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations in a contingency. PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s command and control facilities, air bases, radar sites, and others in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of electronic warfare and cyber operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is “seizing and maintaining battlefield information control in contemporary informatized warfare.”

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展89

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  89

联合后勤支援部队。中国人民解放军于2016年底成立的联合战斗部队(JLSF)的主要目标是,通过联合后勤的 C2运输、物资运输以及监督各种军民一体化支持机制,支持战略行动,例如入侵台湾。中国的两栖作战能力中国人民解放军通过增强两栖登陆、夺取和保卫小岛的能力,在21两栖作战继续取得适度的进展。中国人民解放军有组织装备两栖作战的12个单位。在过去的五年里,中国人民解放军和普兰姆克海军已经部署了专门为两栖作战设计的新装备,如 zbd05两栖步兵战车和 PLZ-07B 两栖自行榴弹炮。中国人民解放军还努力提高空中插入部队的能力,重组空降部队,并建立陆军空中突击部队,这些部队将负责空中插入和夺取关键地形。为两栖作战装备的中国人民解放军和美国海军陆战队都进行连营级两栖作战训练,中国人民解放军继续将空中插入训练纳入更大规模的演习,包括首次从 Y-20重型运输机空投空降部队。然而,解放军很少进行涉及营以上梯队的两栖演习,尽管解放军和 PLANMC 单位都强调自2012年以来联合武器营编队的发展。2018年,国家海洋资源规划委员会(PLANMC)在进行两栖作战能力方面取得的进展微乎其微。只有最初的两个旅继续表现出执行这一任务的能力。虽然为了向新的旅灌输思想,资培计划培训的规模和速度有所增加,但他们没有得到所需装备的全部补充,也没有完全具备执行任务的能力。因此,训练的范围很小,新的旅仍然没有装备来执行两栖攻击行动。

Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF). The PLA’s JLSF, established in late 2016, has the primary goal of supporting a strategic campaign such as a Taiwan invasion by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various civil-military integration support mechanisms. China’s Amphibious Capabilities The PLA continues to make modest gains in amphibious warfare by developing additional capabilities to conduct amphibious landings and seize and defend small islands. The PLA has 12 units organized and equipped to conduct amphibious operations. During the last five years, the PLAA and the PLANMC have fielded new equipment designed specifically for amphibious operations such as the ZBD-05 amphibious infantry fighting vehicle and the PLZ-07B amphibious self-propelled howitzer. The PLA has also made efforts to improve its ability to insert forces by air, restructuring the Airborne Corps and establishing Army Air assault units, which would which would be charged with aerial insertion and seizing key terrain. Both PLAA and PLANMC units equipped for amphibious operations conduct regular company- to battalion-level amphibious training exercises, and the PLA continues to integrate aerial insertion training into larger exercises, including dropping airborne forces from the Y-20 heavy-lift aircraft for the first time. However, the PLA rarely conducts amphibious exercises involving echelons above a battalion, though both PLAA and PLANMC units have emphasized the development of combined arms battalion formations since 2012. In 2018, the PLANMC writ large made minimal gains in its proficiency to conduct amphibious operations. Only its original two brigades continued to demonstrate the capacity to conduct this mission set. Although the scale and tempo of PLANMC training increased in an effort to indoctrinate the new brigades, they have not received their full complement of required equipment and are not fully mission capable. Consequently, the scope of training was rudimentary and the new brigades remain unequipped to perform amphibious assault operations.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 90

台湾的防御能力随着中国现代化进程的继续,台湾的主要优势继续下降 为了对抗中国不断增强的军事实力,台湾正在为非对称作战发展新的概念和能力。台湾历来在海峡两岸冲突中享有军事优势,如技术优势和岛屿防御固有的地理优势,但中国数十年的军事现代化努力侵蚀或否定了其中许多优势。尽管台湾正在采取重要措施来弥补不断扩大的差距——建立战争储备、扩大国防工业基础、提高联合行动和危机应对能力,以及加强军官和士官队伍——但这些改进只是部分地解决了台湾不断下降的防御优势。台湾国防部发布的《2017年国防报告》反映了台湾军队保卫岛屿战略的调整,更加重视保护沿海和近岸海域。修改后的战略强调增强非对称能力,并建议更多地依赖台湾空军和海军。台湾武装部队被授权填补大约215,000个钢坯,包括188,000现役钢坯。现役部队由预备役军人和民防志愿军支援。国防部表示,他们的目标是到2020年填满90% 的钢坯(约16.9万个)。台湾的军事现代化计划设想将台湾的现役部队持续减少到大约175,000人,作为向全志愿部队过渡的一部分。由于很难招募到足够的志愿者,这种转变已经放缓。减少人力所节省的费用为改善个人薪酬和福利、住房和奖励津贴提供了一些余地;但是,这些节省不足以支付在新制度下吸引和留住人员所需的与人力有关的费用的全部增加。过渡成本的意外规模导致台湾将资金从国外和本土的国防采办项目,以及近期的培训和准备工作中转移出来。台湾还面临着大量装备和准备就绪方面的挑战。此外,台湾的军费开支仍然约占其国内生产总值的百分之二。2018年10月,国防部表示将把台湾的国防预算增加5.6% ,达到3460亿新台币(约合113亿美元)。与此同时,中国官方的国防预算持续增长,2018年大约是台湾的14.5倍,其中大部分用于发展中国家的国防预算

TAIWAN’S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES Key Takeaways > Taiwan’s advantages continue to decline as China’s modernization efforts continue. > To counter China’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Taiwan has historically enjoyed military advantages in the context of a cross-Strait conflict, such as technological superiority and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense, but China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of these advantages. Although Taiwan is taking important steps to compensate for the growing disparities – building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps – these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s declining defensive advantages. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense 2017 National Defense Report reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing greater emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy. Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. Active duty forces are supported by reservists and civil defense volunteers. The Ministry of National Defense has stated that its goal is to fill 90 percent of the billets (or about 169,000) by 2020. Taiwan’s military modernization program envisions a continued decrease in Taiwan’s active duty force to approximately 175,000 personnel as part of a transition to an all-volunteer force. This transition has slowed due to severe difficulties recruiting enough volunteers. The cost savings from manpower reductions provides some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. The unanticipated magnitude of transition costs has led Taiwan to divert funds from foreign and indigenous defense acquisition programs, as well as near-term training and readiness. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. In addition, Taiwan’s military spending remains at approximately two percent of its gross domestic product. In October 2018, the MND said it would increase the island’s defense budget by 5.6 percent to NT $346 billion ($11.3 billion). Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow, and for 2018, is roughly 14.5 times that of Taiwan, with much of it focused on developing the

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  91

以武力统一台湾和大陆的能力。认识到两国各自国防开支之间的差距越来越大,台湾已经表示,它正在努力开发未来非对称作战的新概念和新能力。一些具体的重点领域包括进攻和防御信息和电子战、高速隐形船只、岸基移动导弹、快速采矿和扫雷、无人驾驶航空系统和关键基础设施保护。美国在《台湾关系法》和《中美三个联合公报》的基础上坚持"一个中国"政策。美国反对旨在改变现状的单方面行动。美国继续支持以双方都能接受的方式、范围和速度和平解决两岸问题。根据《台湾海峡法》 ,美国通过提供国防物资和服务,为台湾海峡的和平、安全和稳定作出贡献,使台湾保持足够的自卫能力。2018年9月,美国宣布出售价值3.3亿美元的军事装备,主要包括各种军用飞机的备件,包括 F-16、 C-130、 F-5、 F-CK-1经国号战斗机、所有其他飞机系统和子系统,以及其他相关的后勤和项目支持部分。自2010年以来,美国已经宣布向台湾出售超过150亿美元的武器。

capability to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. The United States maintains a “one-China” policy that is based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the three Joint Communiqués. The United States opposes unilateral actions aimed at altering the status quo. The United States continues to support the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace acceptable to both sides. Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In September 2018, the United States announced the sale of $330 million in military equipment, comprised mostly of spare parts for various military aircraft including F-16, C-130, F-5, Indigenous Defense Fighter, all other aircraft systems and subsystems, and other related elements of logistics and program support. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $15 billion in arms sales to Taiwan.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  92

4部队现代化的资源

4 RESOURCES FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  93

中国宣布的年度军事预算增长继续超过20年的年度国防开支增长,保持了中国作为世界第二大军费开支国的地位 中国动员了大量资源支持国防现代化,包括"中国制造2025"和其他工业发展计划,以及间谍活动,以获取敏感的、两用的或军事级别的装备。中国有政治意愿和财政实力在未来十年保持国防开支的稳步增长,这将有助于支持解放军现代化,发展军民一体化的国防工业,并探索具有国防应用的新技术。中国从多方面支持人民解放军的现代化建设,包括国内国防投资、国内国防工业发展、不断扩大的研发和科技基地、部分通过军民融合传播的两用技术,以及获取外国技术和专门知识。中国的长期目标是建立一个完全国内的国防工业部门,辅之以强大的商业部门,以满足解放军现代化的需要,并作为全球军火贸易的顶级供应商进行竞争。然而,中国人民解放军仍然指望外国能力来填补一些关键的短期能力差距,并加快发展速度。中国利用外国投资、商业合资企业、併购、学术交流、中国学生和研究人员在国外学习获得的经验、国家支持的工业和技术间谍活动,以及操纵出口管制来非法转移两用技术,以提高可用于支持军事研究、开发和获取的技术和专业知识水平。中国宣布的年度军事预算增长维持了中国作为世界第二大军费支出国的地位 中国公布的军事预算忽略了几个主要支出类别;实际军事相关支出高于其官方预算。2018年初,中国宣布经通货膨胀调整后的年度军事预算增长6.1% ,达到1704亿美元,约占 GDP 的1.3% 。这一预算延续了20多年来每年国防开支的增长,并使中国保持了仅次于美国的世界第二大军费开支国的地位。过去10年,中国的国防预算几乎翻了一番——从2009年到2018年的数据表明,中国官方

Key Takeaways > China’s announced annual military budget increase continues more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases, sustaining China’s position as the second-largest military spender in the world. > China has mobilized vast resources in support of defense modernization, including “Made in China 2025” and other industrial development plans, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment. China has the political will and fiscal strength to sustain a steady increase in defense spending during the next decade, which will help support PLA modernization, develop an integrated military-civilian defense industry, and explore new technologies with defense applications. China draws from diverse sources to support PLA modernization, including domestic defense investments, domestic defense-industrial development, a growing R&D and science and technology (S&T) base, dual-use technologies conveyed in part through civil-military integration, and the acquisition of foreign technology and expertise. China’s long-term goal is creating a wholly domestic defense-industrial sector, augmented by a strong commercial sector, to meet the needs of PLA modernization and compete as a top-tier supplier in the global arms trade. However, the PLA still looks to foreign capabilities to fill some critical, near-term capability gaps and accelerate the rate of advancement. China leverages foreign investments, commercial joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), academic exchanges, the experience that Chinese students and researchers gain from studying in foreign nations, state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage, and the manipulation of export controls for the illicit diversion of dual-use technologies to increase the level of technologies and expertise available to support military research, development, and acquisition. MILITARY EXPENDITURES TRENDS Key Takeaways > China’s announced annual military budget increase sustains China’s position as the second-largest military spender in the world. > China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure; actual military-related spending is higher than its official budget. In early 2018, China announced a 6.1-percent inflation-adjusted increase in its annual military budget, increasing it to $170.4 billion, approximately 1.3 percent of GDP. This budget continues more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustains China’s position as the second-largest military spender in the world after the United States. China’s defense budget has nearly doubled during the past 10 years – data from 2009 through 2018 indicates that China’s official

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  94

在此期间,经通货膨胀调整后,军事预算平均每年增长8% 。从经济数据和增长预测来看,中国至少在未来5至10年内将支持国防开支的持续增长。

military budget grew at an annual average of 8 percent in inflation-adjusted terms during that period. China is positioned to support continued defense spending growth for at least the next 5 to 10 years, judging from economic data and growth projections.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  95

中国军费预算。中国公布的军事预算省略了几个主要支出类别,包括研发和国外武器采购。与军事有关的实际支出高于官方预算,2018年估计超过2000亿美元。实际军费很难计算,主要是因为中国的会计透明度很差。中国国防预算增长预期。在接下来的几年里,中国的官方国防预算可能会以每年6% 的平均速度增长,到2022年将达到2600亿美元。这将使中国人民解放军在2015年的改革之后,能够投入更多的资金用于训练、作战和现代化建设,中国人民解放军的规模缩减了30万人。经济预测人士预测,中国的经济增长将在未来10年放缓,从2018年的6.6% 下降到2030年的3% ,这可能会减缓未来的国防开支增长。假设有准确的经济预测和稳定的国防负担,中国仍将是印度-太平洋地区除美国之外最大的支出国。2018年官方国防预算比较(根据通货膨胀调整至2018年美元)

China’s Estimated Military Expenditures. China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditures, including R&D and foreign weapons procurement. Actual military-related spending is higher than stated in the official budget, estimated at more than $200 billion in 2018. It is difficult to calculate actual military expenses, largely because of China’s poor accounting transparency. China’s Estimated Defense Budget Growth. Over the next few years, China’s official defense budget will likely increase by an annual average of 6 percent, growing to $260 billion by 2022. This will allow the PLA to dedicate more money for training, operations, and modernization following China’s 2015 reforms, which reduced the PLA’s size by 300,000 personnel. Economic forecasters project that China’s economic growth will slow during the next 10 years, falling from 6.6 percent in 2018 to 3 percent in 2030, which could slow future defense spending growth. Assuming accurate economic projections and a steady defense burden, China will remain the largest spender in the Indo-Pacific region besides the United States. 2018 Official Defense Budget Comparison (adjusted for inflation to 2018 USD)

中国(官方预算)170.4美元印度60.8美元日本47.4美元俄罗斯(国防预算)43.8美元韩国36.6美元台湾10.6美元

Billion (USD) China (official budget) $170.4 India $60.8 Japan $47.4 Russia (national defense budget) $43.8 South Korea $36.6 Taiwan $10.6

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  96

中国国防工业的发展和趋势中国的国防工业联合体继续调整和重组,以改进武器系统的研究、开发、获取、测试、评估和生产 中国重新调整了科技决策机构,设立了两个咨询小组,以促进军事现代化的战略方针和加强合作。国防部门改革。中国的国防工业联合体继续调整和重组,以改进武器系统的研究、开发、获取、测试、评估和生产(rdate & p)。这一努力的本质是中国科技决策机构的重组,以及在政府最高层设立两个咨询小组。一个组织致力于推动军事现代化的战略方针,另一个组织则通过加强中国军工和国有(国防)工业部门与私营和商业工业企业之间的合作来鼓励创新。四年来,中央军事委员会和国务院实施了组织和政策变革,通过市场部门合作,推进军队国防科研,提高军队创新能力 2015年成立了国防科技工业发展战略委员会(Strategic Committee of Science,Technology,and Industry Development for National Defense) ,这是一个由国家国防科技工业局(State Administration for Science,Technology,Industry for National Defense)主持的高级别咨询小组。该委员会由军事和民用工业、政府、技术领导人和专家组成,就军事现代化问题和开发新兴技术的机会向中国军事和国防工业领导人提供咨询 2016年,中央军委成立了高级国防研究机构科技委员会,作为高级指挥下的一个独立组织。它还强调了军民一体化(CMI) ,这个短语部分用于指国防和商业工业部门共享或合并资源,以发展两用技术、政策和组织,实现互利,但特别强调将私营部门的创新纳入国防工业基础。2017年成立的军民一体化发展中央委员会,负责监督海军陆战队军事委员会的工作,突显了中国对这一举措的重视。

DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN CHINA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY Key Takeaways > China’s defense-industrial complex continues to adapt and reorganize to improve weapon system research, development, acquisition, test, evaluation, and production. > China has realigned its S&T decision-making apparatus by establishing two advisory groups that promote a strategic approach to military modernization and enhance collaboration. Defense Sector Reform. China’s defense-industrial complex continues to adapt and reorganize to improve weapon system research, development, acquisition, test, evaluation, and production (RDATE&P). Inherent to this effort is a realignment of China’s S&T decision-making apparatus and the establishment of two advisory groups at the highest levels of government. One group is focused on promoting a strategic approach to military modernization, and the other encourages innovation through a doctrine of increased collaboration between China’s military- and state-owned (defense) industrial sector and its private and commercial industrial enterprises. During the past four years, the CMC and the State Council implemented organizational and policy changes to advance the PLA’s defense research and increase its capacity for innovation through market sector cooperation. > One of the most influential reforms to help improve RDATE&P occurred in 2015 with the establishment of the Strategic Committee of Science, Technology, and Industry Development for National Defense, a high-level advisory group chaired by the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense. The committee, comprising military and civilian industrial, government, and technical leaders and experts, advises China’s military and defense-industrial leaders on military modernization issues and on opportunities to develop emerging technologies. > The CMC, in 2016, established the S&T Commission, a high-level defense research body, as an independent organization under the high command. It also emphasized Civil-Military Integration (CMI), a phrase used in part to refer to the defense and commercial industrial sectors sharing or combining resources to develop dual-use technologies, policies, and organizations for mutual benefit but with a particular emphasis on assimilating private sector innovation into the defense industrial base. The 2017 establishment of a Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development, responsible for overseeing CMI efforts, underscores the importance China assigns to this initiative.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  97

2017年初,中国人民解放军成立了一个科学研究指导委员会,该委员会直属中央军事委员会,由具有尖端技术经验的科学家和工程师组成。该委员会将与 CMC 科技委员会一起带头推动科技创新,就初期研究项目向 CMC 提供建议 2017年7月,作为中国人民解放军改革计划的一部分,中国重组了三大解放军学术机构-中国人民解放军军事科学院、国防大学和国防科技大学。在新的体制下,加拿大军事科学研究院将重点开展与军事相关的科研工作,促进军事理论与科技发展的紧密联系。2016年,中国通过了第十三个五年计划(2016-2020年) ,其中规定了研发和创新的重点领域。许多重点领域涉及国防问题,例如航空航天发动机——包括涡轮风扇技术——和燃气涡轮机;量子通信和计算机;创新电子和软件;自动化和机器人;特殊材料和应用;纳米技术;神经科学、神经研究和人工智能;以及深空探测和在轨服务和维护系统。中国还将大量研发资源集中于核聚变、高超音速技术以及扩展多用途卫星群的部署和加固。在推动和执行中国的 rdate & p、 s & t 和 CMI 计划方面,两个最有影响力的支持者是国家国防科学技术工业局和中央军事委员会装备发展部(EDD) ,它们共同监测和指导中国国防工业装备的国家和军事方面。欧洲发展局及其军队对口单位通过军事代表处网络与中国10家国有国防工业企业合作,监督质量控制和国防合同遵守情况。2018年,美国宣布根据《通过制裁打击美国对手法》 ,对从俄罗斯购买军事装备的国防发展司实施制裁。中国国家科学基金会(NSFC)、中国科学院(CAS)和科学技术部(MOST)是科技决策、资助和促进基础研究和应用研究、科学创新以及整个中国科学、工程和军民工业联合体的高科技一体化的关键。中国科学院与国家自然科学基金会紧密合作,是中国自然科学和应用科学综合研究与开发的最高学术机构,以顾问身份直接向国务院报告

> In early 2017, the PLA set up a Scientific Research Steering Committee, which falls directly under the CMC, consisting of scientists and engineers that have experience with cutting-edge technologies. Along with the CMC S&T Commission, the committee will spearhead S&T innovation by advising the CMC on early-stage research projects. > In July 2017, China reorganized the three top PLA academic institutes – the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), the National Defense University, and the National University of Defense Technology – as part of its PLA reform initiative. With the new structure, the AMS will focus on scientific research related to military affairs, facilitating closer ties between military theory and S&T development. In 2016, China adopted its 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) which, among other things, sets focus areas for R&D and innovation. Many of the focus areas featured have defense implications, such as aerospace engines – including turbofan technology – and gas turbines; quantum communications and computing; innovative electronics and software; automation and robotics; special materials and applications; nanotechnology; neuroscience, neural research, and AI; and deep space exploration and on-orbit servicing and maintenance systems. China also is concentrating substantial R&D resources on nuclear fusion, hypersonic technology, and the deployment and hardening of an expanding constellation of multipurpose satellites. Two of the most influential proponents in promoting and enforcing China’s RDATE&P, S&T, and CMI initiatives are the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense and the CMC’s Equipment Development Department (EDD), which work together to monitor and guide the state and military sides of China’s defense-industrial apparatus, respectively. The EDD and its military service counterparts cooperate with China’s 10 state-owned defense industrial corporations through a network of military representative bureaus and offices to supervise quality control and defense contract compliance. In 2018, the United States announced sanctions against the EDD related to purchases of military equipment from Russia and imposed pursuant to the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The National Science Foundation of China (NSFC), the China Academy of Sciences (CAS), and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) are key to S&T decision-making, funding and promoting basic and applied research, scientific innovation, and high-tech integration throughout China’s scientific, engineering, and civil-military industrial complex. CAS, working closely with NSFC, is the highest academic institution for comprehensive R&D in the natural and applied sciences in China and reports directly to the State Council in an advisory capacity, with

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  98

它的大部分工作是为军事用途的产品做贡献。国家自然科学基金委员会和 CMC 科技委员会是新兴和破坏性技术的主要顾问,在2016年8月签署了一项为期五年的战略合作协议,在军民合作创新和国防基础研究方面进行合作。军事装备现代化趋势关键要点中国的许多导弹项目都可以与其他顶级制造商相媲美,中国可以利用从2018年开始从俄罗斯获得的 S-400地空导弹系统的某些方面,对其缺乏的能力进行逆向工程 按吨位计算,中国是世界上最大的船舶生产国,有能力在国内生产舰用燃气轮机和柴油发动机以及舰载武器和电子系统,使其几乎能够自给自足生产所有造船零部件。导弹和航天工业。中国的大多数导弹项目,包括弹道导弹和巡航导弹系统,在质量上可与其他国际顶级制造商相媲美。中国为人民解放军和出口生产各种弹道导弹、巡航导弹、空对空导弹和地对空导弹,这增强了其主要组装和固体推进剂火箭发动机生产设施。2018年4月,中国从俄罗斯购买了第一套 S-400地空导弹系统。中国可以利用 S-400的某些方面来实现其所缺乏的逆向工程能力。中国的航天工业正在迅速扩展其 ISR、导航和通信卫星星座,并在空间发射能力、载人航天和月球探测计划方面取得长足进展。中国正在寻求扩大其航天运载火箭工业,以支持商业发射,并向外国客户提供快速卫星发射服务。中国计划在2025年前发射、在轨组装和运行载人空间站。海军和造船工业。以吨位计算,中国是世界上最大的造船国,中国的造船能力和各种海军级别的造船能力不断提高,包括潜艇和水面作战舰艇以及水陆两用舰艇。中国最大的两家国有造船企业—— 中国中国船舶工业集团公司和中国中国船舶重工集团公司—— 在船舶设计和建造方面进行合作,以提高造船效率。中国在国内生产其海军燃气轮机和柴油发动机,以及几乎所有的舰载武器和电子系统,使其几乎自给自足的所有造船零部件。军备工业。中国的生产能力几乎在解放军地面系统的每一个类别都有所提高,包括装甲运兵车、突击车辆、防空系统

much of its work contributing to products for military use. The NSFC and CMC S&T Commission, key advisors on emerging and disruptive technologies, signed a five-year strategic cooperation agreement in August 2016 to collaborate on civil-military co-innovation and basic research for national defense. MILITARY EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION TRENDS Key Takeaways > Many of China’s missile programs are comparable to other top-tier producers, and China can use aspects of the S-400 SAM system it began receiving from Russia in 2018 to reverse-engineer capabilities it lacks. > China is the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, with the capability to domestically produce naval gas turbine and diesel engines as well as shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding components. Missile and Space Industry. Most of China’s missile programs, including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, are comparable in quality to other international top-tier producers. China produces a wide range of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for the PLA and for export, which has enhanced its primary assembly and solid-propellant rocket motor production facilities. China received the first S-400 SAM system it purchased from Russia in April 2018. China can use aspects of the S-400 to reverse-engineer capabilities it lacks. China’s space industry is rapidly expanding its ISR, navigation, and communication satellite constellations and making substantial strides in its space lift capabilities, human spaceflight, and lunar exploration programs. China is looking to expand its space launch vehicle industry to support commercial launches and make rapid satellite launch services available to foreign customers. China is planning to launch, assemble in-orbit, and operate a crewed Chinese space station before 2025. Naval and Shipbuilding Industry. China is the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, increasing its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes, including submarines and surface combatants as well as lift and amphibious ships. China’s two largest state-owned shipbuilders – the China State Shipbuilding Corporation and the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation – collaborate on ship designs and construction to increase shipbuilding efficiency. China produces its naval gas turbine and diesel engines domestically – as well as almost all shipboard weapons and electronic systems – making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding components. Armaments Industry. China’s production capacity is advancing in nearly every category of PLA ground systems, including armored personnel carriers, assault vehicles, air defense

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  99

火炮系统,火炮系统和零件,主战坦克和轻型战坦克。值得注意的是,中国在2018年11月开始测试无人驾驶的59式坦克。中国可以生产达到或接近世界水平的地面武器系统;然而,一些出口装备仍存在质量缺陷,这限制了中国广泛扩大出口市场的能力。航空业。中国航空工业生产了大型运输机、结合了隐身技术的现代第四代和第五代战斗机、现代侦察攻击无人机和攻击直升机。中国商用飞机工业已投资于高科技机床和生产流程,以开发生产军用飞机所需的航空电子设备和其它部件。然而,即使在航空发动机行业投入巨资,中国的军用和商用飞机制造业仍然依赖于来自国外的可靠的、经过验证的、高性能的飞机引擎,例如中国在2018年5月决定用法国的 CFM国际LEAP-X 1 c 引擎制造商用 C919客机。中国正在开发 CJ-1000AX 高涵道风扇发动机来驱动 C919,目标是在2021年投入使用。由于中国正在国内投资 ARJ21、 C919、 CR929宽体商用客机和 Y-20大型运输机项目,中国生产商用和军用飞机的能力正在提高。支持军队现代化的科技目标中国的"十三五"规划要求加快研究"影响重大的破坏性技术",追求"跨越式"科技发展,以赢得"新一轮产业转型的竞争优势" 中国动员了大量资源来资助研究和补贴涉及战略性科技领域的公司,同时敦促私营企业、大学和省级政府与军方合作开发先进技术 中国正在发展一些具有破坏潜力的先进军事能力,如高超音速武器、电磁轨道炮、定向能武器和反太空能力。国家计划。过去十年,中国发布了一系列重大国家计划,强调自主创新和战略性科技部门的快速发展,如信息和通信技术、高端制造业、替代能源和生物技术。中国的"十三五"计划呼吁加快对"影响最大的破坏性技术"的研究,并在年追求"跨越式"的科技发展

artillery systems, artillery systems and pieces, and main and light battle tanks. Notably, China began testing unmanned Type-59 tanks in November 2018. China can produce ground weapon systems at or near world-class standards; however, quality deficiencies persist with some exported equipment, which is limiting China’s ability to broadly expand export markets. Aviation Industry. China’s aviation industry has produced large transport aircraft, modern fourth- and fifth-generation fighters incorporating low-observable technologies, modern reconnaissance and attack UAVs, and attack helicopters. China’s commercial aircraft industry has invested in high-tech machine tooling and production processes to develop avionics and other components needed to produce military aircraft. However, even with heavy investment in its aero-engine industry, China’s military and commercial aircraft industry remains reliant on foreign-sourced components for dependable, proven, and high-performance aircraft engines as exemplified in China’s decision in May 2018 to build its commercial C919 airliner with France’s CFM International Leap 1C engine. China is developing the CJ-1000AX high-bypass turbofan to power the C919 and aims to have it enter service in 2021. China’s ability to produce commercial and military aircraft is improving because of China’s ongoing investment in the domestic ARJ21, C919, and CR929 wide-body commercial airliners and the Y-20 large transport program. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY GOALS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY MODERNIZATION Key Takeaways > China’s 13th Five-Year Plan calls for accelerating research on “majorly influential disruptive technologies” and the pursuit of “leapfrog” S&T developments in order to win “a competitive advantage in the new round of industry transformation.” > China has mobilized vast resources to fund research and subsidize companies involved in strategic S&T fields while pressing private firms, universities, and provincial governments to cooperate with the military in developing advanced technologies. > China is pursuing a number of advanced military capabilities with disruptive potential such as hypersonic weapons, electromagnetic railguns, directed energy weapons, and counterspace capabilities. State Plans. China has issued an array of major national plans over the last decade that stress indigenous innovation and the rapid development of strategic S&T sectors, such as information and communications technology, high-end manufacturing, alternative energy, and biotechnology. China’s 13th Five-Year Plan calls for accelerating research on “majorly influential disruptive technologies” and the pursuit of “leapfrog” S&T developments in

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展100

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  100

以赢得"新一轮产业转型中的竞争优势" 在过去的十年中,中国越来越多地资助基础研究,并为提高国家的创造能力作出了全面的努力 《2017年国家人工智能计划》描述了中国到2030年成为"世界主要人工智能创新中心"的步骤,并呼吁中国加快人工智能与经济、社会和国防的整合。该计划预计将在"国防建设中人工智能应用的广度和深度"方面有很大的扩展 其他计划涉及中国强大的互联网生态系统的各个部门的发展,包括云计算、大数据产业、电子商务和下一代宽带无线通信网络,包括第五代(5G)无线网络。由于中国法律规定了与中国安全部门的信息共享要求,中国制造的5G 网络设备在世界范围内的扩展将对其他国家网络的安全性和弹性构成挑战。中国将继续实施以"智能制造"为核心的雄心勃勃的工业总体规划"中国制造2025",旨在打造中国企业的先锋队,成为以下10个战略行业的全球领导者:新一代信息技术、高级机械和机器人;航空航天设备;海洋工程设备和高科技船舶;先进的轨道交通设备;新能源汽车;电力设备;农业设备;新材料;生物医药和高科技医疗设备。该计划强调用国产技术取代进口技术的必要性,这一目标符合中国减少对其他国家依赖、发展完全自主的国防部门的愿望。除了给出口高科技产品的国家带来经济挑战之外,该计划还强调掌握先进的两用技术,直接支持中国的军事现代化目标。中国领导人已经软化了他们关于中国制造2025的言辞,以回应发达工业国家对于中国依照这一政策合法和非法获取敏感知识产权的担忧。政府和企业部门的大量投资。中国动员了大量资源来资助研究和补贴涉及战略性科技领域的公司,同时敦促私营企业、大学和省级政府与军方合作开发先进技术。尽管中国仍然依赖某些类型的外国技术,但中国数十年来通过大规模技术转让推进国内科技研发战略的实施,加深了中国对外国技术的依赖

order to win “a competitive advantage in the new round of industry transformation.” China has increasingly funded basic research and made comprehensive efforts to grow the country’s inventive capabilities over the last decade. > The 2017 National Artificial Intelligence Plan describes steps for China to become the “world’s major AI innovation center” by 2030 and calls for the country to accelerate the integration of AI with the economy, society, and national defense. The plan foresees a great expansion in the “breadth and depth of AI applications in… national defense construction.” > Other plans address the development of various sectors of China’s robust Internet ecosystem to include cloud computing, the big data industry, e-commerce, and next-generation broadband wireless communications networks, including fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks. Due to information-sharing requirements with Chinese security services as stipulated in Chinese laws, worldwide expansion of Chinese-made equipment in 5G networks will challenge the security and resiliency of other countries’ networks. China continues to execute “Made in China 2025,” an ambitious industrial masterplan centered around “smart manufacturing,” that aims to create a vanguard of Chinese corporations that are global leaders in these 10 strategic industries: new generation information technology, high-grade machine tooling and robotics; aerospace equipment; marine engineering equipment and high-tech ships; advanced rail transportation equipment; new-energy automobiles; electric power equipment; agricultural equipment; new materials; and biomedicine and high-tech medical devices. The plan stresses the need to replace imported technology with domestically produced technology, a goal that corresponds with China’s desire to reduce its reliance on other nations and develop a fully indigenous defense sector. In addition to presenting an economic challenge to nations that export high-tech products, the plan directly supports China’s military modernization goals by stressing proprietary mastery of advanced dual-use technologies. China’s leaders have softened their rhetoric regarding “Made in China 2025” in response to concerns that advanced industrial countries have regarding Chinese licit and illicit acquisition of sensitive intellectual property pursuant to that policy. Heavy Government and Corporate Sector Investment. China has mobilized vast resources to fund research and subsidize companies involved in strategic S&T fields while pressing private firms, universities, and provincial governments to cooperate with the military in developing advanced technologies. Although China remains reliant on certain types of foreign technology, the country’s decades-long execution of a strategy of advancing domestic S&T R&D through large-scale technology transfer has deepened the

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展101

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  101

中国科学家和工程师的专业知识,使他们处于或接近前沿的许多科学领域 为支持重点行业而设立的中国政府投资基金,估计已筹集了数千亿美元的资金 中国预计到2020年,基于国产技术的百亿亿次计算机将领先于美国、欧盟和日本 中国于2017年9月举行了第一次量子安全洲际视频会议,并计划到2030年实现卫星支持的全球量子加密通信能力。据报道,中国还在建造世界上最大的量子研究设施,计划于2020年在合肥开放 2018年1月,中科院的科学家报告说,他们成功克隆灵长类动物,打破了技术壁垒。以互联网公司百度、阿里巴巴和腾讯(BATs)以及电信设备制造商华为和中兴(ZTE)为首的中国私营部门,通过建立创新中心和资助科技创业公司,推动了人脸识别和5G 等新兴技术的发展。中国科技公司也在向海外市场扩张,在某些情况下是通过提供智能城市技术,这种发展可能增加它们接触外国人才和数据的机会 2018年,腾讯和阿里巴巴分别对中国机器人初创公司 UBTech 和人工智能初创公司 Sensetime 进行了大量投资 2017年11月,中国初创企业依图赢得了美国政府赞助的人脸识别技术比赛。依图,以及其他中国人工智能和面部识别公司,如 SenseTime,Megvii 和 Deepglint,据报道在2017年收到了数亿美元的投资。中国是世界上最大的视频监控技术市场 2017年的《国家情报法》要求中国公司,比如华为和中兴,在中国的国家情报工作中提供支持、协助和合作,无论它们在哪里运作。潜在的军事应用。中国正在发展一些具有破坏潜力的先进军事能力,如高超音速武器、电磁轨道炮、定向能武器和反太空能力。中国努力打造国家企业龙头企业,在一系列前沿技术领域实现快速市场主导地位,这与中国人民解放军的现代化努力形成了直接互补

expertise of Chinese scientists and engineers and placed them at, or near, the forefront of many scientific fields. > Chinese state investment funds established to support priority industries have marshalled an estimated hundreds of billions of dollars in capital. > China expects to field an exascale computer based on domestically produced technology by 2020, ahead of the United States, the European Union, and Japan. > China conducted the first quantum-secured intercontinental videoconference in September 2017 and plans to have a satellite-enabled, global quantum-encrypted communications capability operational by 2030. China is also reportedly building the world’s largest quantum research facility slated to open in the city of Hefei in 2020. > In January 2018, scientists from CAS reported they had broken a technological barrier by successfully cloning primates. China’s private sector, led by Internet companies Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (BATs) and telecommunications equipment manufacturers Huawei and ZTE, is driving the development of emerging technologies, such as facial recognition and 5G, by establishing innovation centers and funding technology startups, or in the case of 5G, competing to build the world’s next-generation networks. Chinese technology companies are also expanding into overseas markets, in some cases, by offering smart-city technologies, a development that could increase their access to foreign talent and data. > In 2018, Tencent and Alibaba made intensive investments in the Chinese robotics start-up UBTech and the AI startup Sensetime, respectively. > In November 2017, the Chinese start-up Yitu won a U.S. government-sponsored competition involving facial recognition technology. Yitu, along with other Chinese AI and facial recognition firms like SenseTime, Megvii, and Deepglint, reportedly received hundreds of millions of dollars in investments in 2017. China is the world’s largest market for video surveillance technologies. > The 2017 National Intelligence Law requires Chinese companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, to support, provide assistance, and cooperate in China’s national intelligence work, wherever they operate. Potential Military Applications. China is pursuing a number of advanced military capabilities with disruptive potential such as hypersonic weapons, electromagnetic railguns, directed energy weapons, and counterspace capabilities. The country’s effort to build national corporate champions that achieve rapid market dominance across a range of frontier technologies directly complements the PLA’s modernization efforts and carries

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展102

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  102

严重的军事影响。鉴于中国愿意迅速大规模部署新兴技术,以及中国对 CMI 的关注,中国任何具有军事用途的科学突破都可能很快让解放军受益。一些新兴技术的潜在军事应用包括:人工智能和先进机器人:增强预测、制造、 C4ISR 和监视技术、无人系统、人机合作、群集技术和致命的自主武器 半导体和高级计算:增强网络操作和武器设计,缩短研发周期 量子技术:安全的全球通信,增强的计算和解密能力,隐形平台的探测,以及增强的潜艇导航 高超音速和定向能武器:导弹防御系统的全球打击和失败,以及反卫星、反导弹和反无人机系统能力 先进材料和替代能源:改进军事装备和武器系统。中国正在投资关键技术,这些技术将成为未来商业和军事应用创新的基础 2018年,中国试图获取敏感、双重用途或军用级设备的间谍活动包括动态随机存取存储器、航空技术和反潜作战技术。2018年,中国继续通过获取外国技术和专门知识来补充本国的军事现代化努力。中国正在积极开展密集活动,通过进口、外国直接投资、工业和网络间谍活动以及建立外国研发中心等途径获取外国技术。中国正在投资一些关键技术,这些技术将成为未来商业和军事应用创新的基础:人工智能、机器人、自主车辆、量子信息科学、增强和虚拟现实、金融技术和基因编辑。为商业和军事目的而设计的产品与这些新技术之间的界限是模糊的。中国的合法采购努力通过各种方法和做法来补充其军工基地,其中包括:

serious military implications. Given China’s willingness to deploy emerging technologies rapidly and at massive scale as well as China’s focus on CMI, the PLA would likely quickly benefit from any Chinese scientific breakthroughs with military utility. Potential military applications of some emerging technologies include: > AI and Advanced Robotics: enhanced forecasting, manufacturing, C4ISR, and surveillance technology, unmanned systems, human-machine teaming, swarming technology, and lethal autonomous weapons. > Semiconductors and Advanced Computing: enhanced cyber operations and weapons design, and shortened R&D cycles. > Quantum Technologies: secure global communications, enhanced computing and decryption capabilities, detection of stealth platforms, and enhanced submarine navigation. > Hypersonic and Directed Energy Weapons: global strike and defeat of missile defense systems, and anti-satellite, anti-missile, and anti-unmanned aircraft system capabilities. > Advanced Materials and Alternative Energy: improved military equipment and weapon systems. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION Key Takeaways > China is investing in the critical technologies that will be foundational for future innovations, both for commercial and military applications. > In 2018, Chinese espionage efforts to acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment included dynamic random access memory, aviation technologies, and anti-submarine warfare technologies. In 2018, China continued to supplement indigenous military modernization efforts through the acquisition of foreign technologies and know-how. China is actively pursuing an intensive campaign to obtain foreign technology through imports, foreign direct investment, industrial and cyberespionage, and establishment of foreign R&D centers. China is investing in the critical technologies that will be foundational for future innovations both for commercial and military applications: AI, robotics, autonomous vehicles, quantum information sciences, augmented and virtual reality, financial technology, and gene editing. The line demarcating products designed for commercial versus military purposes is blurring with these new technologies. China’s legal acquisition efforts supplement its military-industrial base through methods and practices, which include:

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展103

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  103

进口:中国通过美国商务部申请许可证获得两用出口管制技术。中国进口的大部分产品传统上是电子和材料加工、测试、检验和生产设备 外国直接投资:中国积极投资或直接收购在关键技术领域拥有技术、设施和工作人员的外国公司 人才招聘:中国采用各种激励策略,吸引外国人参与和管理战略项目,填补技术知识空白,包括"千人计划",该计划优先招聘中国血统的人或最近的中国移民,中国政府认为这些人的招聘对中国科技现代化,特别是国防技术现代化是必要的 研发中心:中国积极寻求与私人、政府和学术研究实验室的合作,以获得前沿技术和研究人员的接触。这些伙伴关系还提供了运行、管理和组织这些设施的技术诀窍。支持中国军事现代化的间谍活动。根据美国司法部对美国重大出口执法、经济间谍活动和制裁相关刑事案件的总结,自2015年以来,多起美国刑事诉讼涉及中国公民、非华裔美国公民、归化的中国美国公民或永久居民外国人采购并向中国出口受管制物品。中国在获取敏感、两用或军事级装备方面的努力包括抗辐射集成电路、单片微波集成电路、加速度计、陀螺仪、海军和海洋技术、句法泡沫贸易秘密、空间通信、军事通信干扰设备、动态随机存取存储器、航空技术和反潜作战 2018年11月,一名居住在美国的中国公民被指控阴谋向中国政府和军方出口具有军事用途的设备。中国国家履行了中国军方的指示,获得了用于反潜作战和其他先进军事能力的两用技术。这包括远程操作的侧扫声纳系统,水听器,机器人船,无人驾驶

> Imports: China acquires dual-use, export controlled technology by applying for licenses through the U.S. Department of Commerce. The majority of China’s imports have traditionally been electronic and materials processing and test, inspection, and production equipment. > Foreign Direct Investment: China actively invests in or outright purchases foreign companies that have technology, facilities, and people working in key technology areas. > Talent Recruitment: China uses various incentive strategies to attract foreign personnel to work on and manage strategic programs and fill technical knowledge gaps, including the “Thousand Talents Program,” which prioritizes recruiting people of Chinese descent or recent Chinese emigrants whose recruitment the Chinese government views as necessary to Chinese scientific and technical modernization, especially with regard to defense technology. > Research and Development Centers: China actively seeks partnerships with private, government, and academic research labs to gain exposure to cutting-edge technology and researchers. These partnerships also provide the technical know-how to run, manage, and organize such facilities. ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION. Multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involve Chinese nationals, non-ethnic Chinese U.S. citizens, and naturalized Chinese U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens procuring and exporting controlled items to China, according to a U.S. Department of Justice summary of major U.S. export enforcement, economic espionage, and sanctions-related criminal cases. Chinese efforts to acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment included radiation hardened integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, naval and marine technologies, syntactic foam trade secrets, space communications, military communication jamming equipment, dynamic random access memory, aviation technologies, and anti-submarine warfare. > In November 2018, a Chinese national residing in the United States was charged with conspiring to export devices with military applications to Chinese government and military actors. The Chinese national fulfilled instructions from the Chinese military to obtain dual-use technology used for anti-submarine warfare and other advanced military capabilities. This included remotely operated side scan sonar systems, hydrophones, robotic boats, unmanned

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水下航行器和水面无人驾驶航行器 2018年10月,中国国家安全部(MSS)情报官员、相关网络行为体和其他同谋被指控密谋窃取与商用飞机使用的涡轮风扇发动机有关的敏感技术信息。在这些入侵事件发生时,一家中国国有企业正在开发一种类似的发动机,用于在中国和其它地方制造的商用飞机 2018年10月,一名中国海军安全部官员被捕,并被指控从美国主要航空公司窃取民用和军用飞机技术的商业机密,这些技术涉及工程服务和特征材料、先进通信系统、喷气发动机和飞机推进系统,以及发动机遏制结构。此外,该官员还以提供大学演讲为幌子,为赴华旅行提供便利,以招聘行业专家。情报官员还向这些专家提供了金钱补偿和其他形式的报销 2018年9月,一家中国国有企业涉嫌通过从一家美国半导体公司盗窃、运输和占有被盗商业机密,从事经济间谍活动。这家美国公司是半导体产业的全球领导者,专门从事动态随机存取存储器动态随机存取存储器(DRAM)。中国将动态随机存取存储器的开发列为国家优先事项 同样在2018年9月,一名中国公民被指控在美国充当中国政府的非法代理人。Mss 要求这名中国公民提供招聘人员的履历数据,其中包括在美国工作的中国工程师和科学家(有些是国防承包商)。这名中国公民持学生签证进入美国学习电气工程,并根据对国家利益至关重要的军事行动计划加入美国陆军预备役。

underwater vehicles, and unmanned surface vehicles. > In October 2018, a group of Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) intelligence officers, associated cyber actors, and other co-conspirators were indicted on charges of conspiring to steal sensitive technological information related to turbofan engines used in commercial airliners. At the time of the intrusions, a Chinese state-owned enterprise was developing a comparable engine for use in commercial aircraft manufactured in China and elsewhere. > In October 2018, a Chinese MSS officer was arrested and charged with economic espionage involving the theft of trade secrets for civilian and military aircraft technology related to engineering services and signature material, advanced communication systems, jet engines and aircraft propulsion, and engine containment structures from leading U.S. aviation firms. In addition, the officer targeted industry experts for recruitment by facilitating travel to China under the guise of delivering university presentations. The intelligence officer also provided monetary compensation and other forms of reimbursement to these experts. > In September 2018, a Chinese state-owned enterprise was implicated in a conspiracy to commit economic espionage through the theft, conveyance, and possession of stolen trade secrets from a U.S. semiconductor company. The U.S. company is a global leader in the semiconductor industry and specializes in dynamic random-access memory (DRAM). China identifies DRAM development as a national priority. > Also in September 2018, a Chinese national was charged for acting within the United States as an illegal agent of the Chinese government. The MSS tasked the Chinese national with providing biographical data on individuals for recruitment, including Chinese nationals working in the United States as engineers and scientists (some as defense contractors). The Chinese national entered the United States on a student visa to study electrical engineering and enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserves under the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program.

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5次美中军事对话

5 U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS

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国防部与中国的接触支持美国对华的整体政策和战略 国防部在2018年与中国进行了多次高层接触。国防部计划与中国进行军事对军事接触,将国防部的国防战略目标推向提高透明度和互不侵犯的长期目标 美中国防交往促进持续和实质性的对话,以减少风险。美国在2018年进行的国防接触和交流旨在支持美国对中国的整体政策和战略。2017年国家安全战略、2018年国防战略、2018年核态势评估和2019年导弹防御评估认识到动态安全环境下军事竞争的增长趋势。美国将以实力竞争,同时鼓励中国在我们利益一致的安全问题上与美国合作。美国国防部与中国的接触寻求在紧张局势加剧时减少风险和防止误解。根据经修正的《2000财政年度国防授权法》的法定时效开展活动。与中国的军事接触旨在建立必要的结构和习惯,以防止、化解和管理危机。2018年,美国国防部与中国进行军事接触的计划侧重于三个相互关联的优先事项:(1)鼓励中国以符合自由开放的国际秩序的方式采取行动;(2)促进降低风险和风险管理的努力,以减少误解或误判的可能性;(3)解除在近距离活动的部队的冲突。中国军事现代化的速度和范围为军事交往提供了机遇,同时也提出了挑战。随着中国军事力量的发展和扩张,事故或误判的风险也在增加,降低风险的努力受到重视,并突出表明需要确保近距离作战部队的行动安全。寻求与中国建立建设性的、以结果为导向的关系是美国在印度-太平洋地区战略的重要组成部分。《国防战略》旨在使两军关系走上透明和互不侵犯的道路,鼓励中国以符合自由开放的国际秩序的方式行事。

Key Takeaways > DoD engagement with China supports overall U.S. policy and strategy toward China. > DoD conducted multiple senior level engagements with China in 2018. U.S. STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT Key Takeaways > DoD’s plan for military-to-military contacts with China advances DoD objectives in the National Defense Strategy toward the long-term goal of advancing transparency and non-aggression. > U.S.-China defense contacts promote sustained and substantive dialogue to reduce risk. U.S. defense contacts and exchanges conducted in 2018 were designed to support overall U.S. policy and strategy toward China. The 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, and the 2019 Missile Defense Review recognize the growing trend of military competition in a dynamic security environment. The United States will compete from a position of strength while encouraging China to cooperate with the United States on security issues where our interests align. DoD engagements with China seek to reduce risk and prevent misunderstanding in times of increased tension. Engagements are conducted in accordance with the statutory limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended. Military-to-military contacts with China aim to build the structures and habits necessary to prevent, defuse, and manage crises. In 2018, DoD’s plan for military-to-military contacts with China focused on three interconnected priorities: (1) encouraging China to act in ways consistent with the free and open international order; (2) promoting risk reduction and risk management efforts that diminish the potential for misunderstanding or miscalculation; and (3) deconflicting forces operating in close proximity. The pace and scope of China’s military modernization provides opportunities as well as challenges for military-to-military engagement. As China’s military develops and expands its reach, the risk of an accident or miscalculation also increases, putting a premium on risk reduction efforts and highlighting the need to ensure the operational safety of forces operating in close proximity. Pursuit of a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China is an important part of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. The National Defense Strategy aims to set the military-to- military relationship on a path of transparency and non-aggression, and to encourage China to act in a manner consistent with the free and open international order.

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2018年的军事对抗——关键要点高层接触使美国领导人能够挑战与自由开放的国际秩序不一致的中国行为,洞察中国的战略意图,处理分歧,并在利益一致的地方进行合作 例如,国防部长在这一年中多次会见了中国国防部长,并与国务卿一道在哥伦比亚特区华盛顿主办了第二次美中外交和安全对话 职能部门的工作重点是减少风险和沟通渠道,以促进消除冲突和协调 交流提高了在共同关心的领域提供国际公共产品的互动和协调能力。国防部根据2000财政年度国防授权法案的相关规定与中国进行所有接触。2018年,中美两军关系的重点是通过高层接触和经常性交流,推进战略沟通,减少误解或误判的风险。国防部长年内三次会见中国国防部长,两军通过《海上军事协商协定》会议推进空中和海上安全磋商。国防部继续与中国人民解放军在发展多边合作能力方面取得进展。两国军队参加了灾害管理交流活动,重点是消除多国协调小组内的冲突。这种军方对军方接触的例子有助于减少风险,增进对双方在提供国际公益物方面如何互动的了解。正如《2018年国防战略》指出的那样,美国"对合作机会持开放态度,但要以实力和国家利益为基础。如果合作失败,我们将准备捍卫美国人民、我们的价值观和利益。" 以下重点介绍部分访问和交流。附录二提供了2018年聘用情况的完整清单。高层访问和接触。高层交往是就国际安全环境交换意见、确定共同关心的领域、管控分歧、促进和平共处的重要手段

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN 2018 – HIGHLIGHTS Key Takeaways > High-level contacts enable U.S. leaders to challenge PRC behaviors that are inconsistent with the free and open international order, gain insight into China’s strategic intent, manage differences, and cooperate where our interests align. > For example, the Secretary of Defense met with the Chinese Minister of National Defense on multiple occasions during the year and, alongside the Secretary of State, hosted the second U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue in Washington, D.C. > Recurring institutionalized events serve as a mechanism for dialogue at the strategic and policy-levels, including risk reduction and practical cooperation. > Functional engagements focus on risk reduction and communication channels to promote deconfliction and coordination. > Exchanges improve the ability to interact and coordinate in providing international public goods in areas of mutual interest. DoD conducts all contacts with China in a manner consistent with the relevant provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended. In 2018, the U.S. and China military-to-military relationship focused on advancing strategic communications and reducing the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation through high-level engagements and recurrent exchanges. The Secretary of Defense met with the Chinese Minister of National Defense on three occasions during the year, and the two militaries advanced consultations on air and maritime safety via the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings. DoD continued to make progress with the PLA in developing the capacity to cooperate in multilateral settings. The two militaries participated in a Disaster Management Exchange with an emphasis on deconfliction in a Multinational Coordination Cell. Such examples of military-to-military engagement enable risk reduction and enhance understanding of how each side interacts in the delivery of international public goods. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy states, the United States is “open to opportunities for cooperation but from a position of strength and based on our national interests. Should cooperation fail, we will be ready to defend the American people, our values, and interests.” Selected visits and exchanges are highlighted below. A complete list of 2018 engagements is provided in Appendix II. High-Level Visits and Engagements. High-level contacts are an important means to exchange views on the international security environment, to identify areas of common interest, to manage differences, and to facilitate

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应对共同挑战的共同方法。讨论的重点是军事合作领域,并坦率地处理分歧。2018年6月,时任国防部长的詹姆斯·马蒂斯访问北京。在分别会见中国国家主席习近平、中央政治局委员杨洁篪、中央军委副主席许其亮和国防部长魏凤和。2018年10月,国防部长在东盟国防部长扩大会议期间会见了魏部长。2018年11月,美国国务卿和国防部长在华盛顿特区主持了第二次美中外交与安全对话。D & sd 代表了最高级别的防务和外交对话框架,以缩小在关键的外交和安全问题上的分歧。以中共中央政治局委员杨洁篪和国防部长魏为代表的中方参加了会谈,会谈旨在集中讨论如何改善双边关系,促进更大程度的减少风险,并保持有效的沟通渠道。双方在战略问题上进行了接触,讨论了分歧,并确认坚定致力于建立注重成果的双边关系。2018年5月,美国陆军参谋长马克·米利将军在华盛顿特区会见了中国人民解放军总司令韩卫国将军,讨论了两军关系和关切问题。中国人民解放军海军中将沈金龙于2018年9月访问美国,并参加了国际海洋能源研讨会,但在美国宣布对中央军事委员会设备开发部(EDD)实施制裁后,中国政府召回了他。这些制裁涉及从俄罗斯购买军事装备,并依照 CAATSA 的规定实施。制裁的目的是让俄罗斯为其恶意活动付出代价。2018年1月,美国参谋长联席会议主席将军 Joseph Dunford 通过国防电话线路与联合参谋部参谋长 Li Zuocheng 将军进行了一次视频电话会议。2018年6月和2018年12月,海军作战司令约翰·理查森通过 DTL 与中国人民解放军指挥官沈进行了一次视频电话会议。Dtl 使国防领导人之间的持续沟通渠道成为可能。经常性交流。每年反复出现的制度化事件构成了美中防务讨论的主干。它们是战略和政策层面对话的正规化机制,包括减少风险和实际合作。

common approaches to shared challenges. Discussions focused on areas of military cooperation and candidly addressed differences. In June 2018, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis visited Beijing. In separate meetings, the Secretary met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Politburo Member Yang Jiechi, Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang, and Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe. In October 2018, the Secretary of Defense met with Minster Wei on the margins of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus. The following month, the Secretary hosted Minister Wei in Washington, D.C. Also in November 2018, the Secretaries of State and Defense hosted the second U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (D&SD) in Washington, D.C. The D&SD represents the highest-level defense and diplomatic framework for dialogue to narrow differences on key diplomatic and security issues. The Chinese side, represented by Politburo Member Yang Jiechi and Defense Minister Wei, participated in the talks designed to focus bilateral discussion on ways to improve relations, contribute to greater risk reduction, and maintain effective channels of communication. Both sides engaged on strategic topics, discussed differences, and affirmed a strong commitment to a results oriented bilateral relationship. In May 2018, U.S. Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark Milley hosted General Han Weiguo, Commander of the PLA Army, in Washington, D.C., to discuss the military-to-military relationship and issues of concern. Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, PLAN Commander, visited the United States in September 2018 and attended the International Seapower Symposium, but was recalled by the Chinese government after the United States announced sanctions against the CMC’s Equipment Development Department (EDD). The sanctions, related to purchases of military equipment from Russia and imposed pursuant to CAATSA, are intended to inflict costs on Russia for its malign activities. In January 2018, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford conducted a video teleconference through the Defense Telephone Link (DTL) with Chief of the Joint Staff Department General Li Zuocheng. In June 2018 and again in December 2018, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson conducted a video teleconference through the DTL with PLAN Commander Shen. The DTL enables sustained channels of communication between defense leaders. Recurrent Exchanges. Recurring institutionalized events form the backbone of U.S.-China defense discussions each year. They serve as a regularized mechanism for dialogue at the strategic and policy levels, including risk reduction and practical cooperation.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China  110

2018年5月,军事海事协商协定(MMCA)工作组在檀香山举行会议,通过美国和中国海空军之间的公开沟通,改善海上安全。2018年12月,MMCA 工作组和 MMCA 全体会议在青岛召开。美国印度洋太平洋司令部战略规划和政策司司长华金·马拉维少将、美国太平洋空军、美国太平洋舰队和美国非洲司令部(AFRICOM)的代表会见了中国人民解放军海军少将、中国人民解放军空军副参谋长王中才率领的代表团。双方回顾了去年发生的不安全事故,并讨论了《空中和海上遭遇谅解备忘录安全行为规则》的实施和评估。2018年12月,负责东亚事务的国防部代理副助理准将 Roberta Shea 主持了与国际军事合作办公室副主任黄学平少将的国防政策协调会谈。美国代表团包括来自联合参谋部、 INDOPACOM 和国务院的代表。对话涉及从军事交战、建立信任措施、关键的双边防务问题和实际合作领域等问题。2018年9月,在美国宣布对厄立特里亚经济发展部实施制裁后,中国推迟了计划中的联合工作人员对话机制会议。职能交流与学术交流。职能部门的工作重点是提高风险减少、理解和沟通渠道,以促进消除冲突和协调。诸如港口停靠等功能交换也被用来加强业务安全和演习通信和导航协议。2018年5月,美国取消了2018年环太平洋(RIMPAC)军事演习中的中国人民解放军计划,因为中国在南海有争议的地区继续军事化,违反了中国国家主席习近平不使 Spratly Islands 军事化的承诺。2018年11月,中国人民解放军和美国陆军士兵参加了南京灾害管理交流会(DME)。美军太平洋司令罗伯特·布朗将军会见了中国人民解放军东方战区司令部副司令员秦伟江中将。这次交流的重点是在第三国发生地震的情况下,双方军队作为多国协调中心的一部分进行交流。相互学术交流——包括职能官员、新晋领导人和专业军事教育机构之间的交流——有助于确定和探索新的合作领域,讨论分歧,以及服务于

In May 2018, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) Working Group met in Honolulu to improve maritime safety through open communication between U.S. and Chinese naval and air forces. In December 2018, the MMCA Working Group and MMCA Plenary convened in Qingdao. Major General Joaquin Malavet, Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), and representatives from U.S. Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) met with a PLAN and PLAAF delegation led by Rear Admiral Wang Zhongcai, PLAN Deputy Chief of Staff. Both sides reviewed unsafe incidents over the last year and discussed implementation and assessment of the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters Memorandum of Understanding. In December 2018, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Brigadier General Roberta Shea hosted the Defense Policy Coordination Talks with Major General Huang Xueping, Deputy Director, Office for International Military Cooperation (OIMC). The U.S. delegation included representatives from the Joint Staff, INDOPACOM, and the Department of State. The dialogue covered issues ranging from military to military engagements, confidence-building measures, key bilateral defense issues, and practical areas of cooperation. In September 2018, China postponed a planned Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism meeting after the United States announced sanctions against the EDD. Functional and Academic Exchanges. Functional engagements focus on advancing risk reduction, understanding, and communication channels to promote deconfliction and coordination. Functional exchanges such as port calls are also used to enhance operational safety and exercise communications and navigation protocols. In May 2018, the United States disinvited the PLAN from the 2018 RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC) exercise as a result of China’s continued militarization of disputed features in the South China Sea, violating a pledge by Chinese President Xi Jinping not to militarize the Spratly Islands. In November 2018, PLA and U.S. Army soldiers participated in a Disaster Management Exchange (DME) in Nanjing. U.S. Army Pacific Commander, General Robert Brown, met with Lieutenant General Qin Weijiang, Deputy Commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command. The exchange focused on HA/DR in an earthquake scenario in a third country in which both armies would interact as part of a Multinational Coordination Center. Reciprocal academic exchanges – including between functional officers, rising leaders, and institutions of professional military education – help to identify and explore new areas of cooperation, discuss differences, and serve to

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展

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培养一代双方的领导人,他们知识渊博,善于处理这种日益复杂和重要的关系。增加中层军官之间的接触是两军的一个重要目标,因为他们寻求在未来领导人之间建立熟悉和相互理解。2018年1月,美国陆军战争学院代表团访问中国,随后是2018年3月空军战争学院代表团访问中国。2018年4月,解放军空军指挥学院代表团访问美国。2018年5月,美国国防大学 CAPSTONE 和美国海军陆战队战争学院的代表团分别访问了中国。同样在2018年5月,中国人民解放军将领作为参加中国人民解放军国防大学战略级别"龙"课程的学生代表团的一员访问了美国。2018年12月,中国人民解放军军事科学院的一个代表团访问了美国。这些访问和其他学术交流提供了一个机会,通过与解放军各阶层的接触,增加对中国的了解。2019年军事交战规划2019年计划交战清单见附录二。

develop a generation of leaders on both sides who are knowledgeable and adept at handling this increasingly complex and vital relationship. Increasing contacts between mid-level officers is an important objective for both militaries as they seek to build familiarity and mutual understanding between future leaders. In January 2018, a U.S. Army War College delegation visited China, followed by a March 2018 Air War College delegation to China. In April 2018, a PLA Air Force Command College Delegation visited the United States. In May 2018, separate delegations from U.S. National Defense University CAPSTONE and the U.S. Marine Corps War College visited China. Also in May 2018, PLA general officers visited the United States as part of a delegation of students in the strategic-level “Dragons” course from the PLA National Defense University. In December 2018, a PLA Academy of Military Science delegation visited the United States. These visits and other academic exchanges during the year offered an opportunity to increase understanding of China through engagements with various echelons of the PLA. PLANNING FOR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS IN 2019 A list of planned engagements for 2019 is provided in Appendix II.

国防部长办公室向大会作年度报告:中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展112特别主题:影响力作战至少从2003年起,中国人民解放军在其作战计划中就强调了其"三战"战略的发展。三战包括心理战、舆论战和法律战。心理战使用宣传、欺骗、威胁和胁迫来影响对手的决策能力。舆论战传播信息供公众消费,以引导和影响公众舆论,赢得国内和国际受众的支持。法律战利用国际和国内法律来获得国际支持,控制政治影响,影响目标受众。中国将网络空间视为一个提供影响力作战机会的平台,解放军可能寻求利用网络影响力活动来支持其整体的"三战"战略,并破坏敌方在突发事件或冲突中的解决。根据这一战略,中国对美国、其他国家和国际机构的文化机构、媒体组织、商业、学术和政策团体施加影响,以实现有利于其安全和军事战略目标的成果。中共寻求调整国内、国外和多边政治机构和公众舆论,以接受中国围绕其优先事项的叙述,如 OBOR 和南中国海的领土和海洋主张。中国的影响力行动是高层协调的,由一系列行为者执行,如统战部、宣传部和国家安全部。中国战略的一个基石包括呼吁海外中国公民或其他国家的华裔公民通过软实力来推进党的目标。中国有时也会利用胁迫或敲诈手段操纵海外中国公民代表中国进行影响行动,比如威胁居住在美国的维吾尔族人,监禁他们的家庭成员。中国的情报部门经常为这些行动提供便利。此外,中国还以其他国家的华裔公民为目标,支持其对外技术引进战略;其"千人计划"优先招募华裔或新近移民,中国政府认为招募他们是中国科学技术现代化的必要条件,特别是在国防技术方面。此外,中国利用学术界、教育机构、智囊团和官方媒体推进其软实力运动,以支持中国的安全利益。例如,中国留学生和学术组织被用来传播党对西藏和达赖喇嘛的叙述。中国学生学者协会和孔子学院组织活动,支持中国的主权主张,提出申诉,组织抗议学术机构开展与中国政策不同的活动。截至2018年,作为中国最大的官方媒体和党的官方喉舌,新华社没有按照美国司法部的要求,将该机构的美国工作人员登记为外籍员工

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   112 SPECIAL TOPIC: INFLUENCE OPERATIONS The PLA has emphasized the development of its Three Warfares strategy in its operational planning since at least 2003. Three Warfares is comprised of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. Psychological warfare uses propaganda, deception, threats, and coercion to affect the adversary’s decision-making capability. Public opinion warfare disseminates information for public consumption to guide and influence public opinion and gain support from domestic and international audiences. Legal warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support, manage political repercussions, and sway target audiences. China views the cyberspace domain as a platform providing opportunities for influence operations, and the PLA likely seeks to use online influence activities to support its overall Three Warfares strategy and to undermine an adversary’s resolve in a contingency or conflict. Consistent with this strategy, China conducts influence operations against cultural institutions, media organizations, and the business, academic, and policy communities of the United States, other countries, and international institutions to achieve outcomes favorable to its security and military strategy objectives. The CCP seeks to condition domestic, foreign, and multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept China’s narrative surrounding its priorities like OBOR and South China Sea territorial and maritime claims. Chinese influence operations are coordinated at a high level and executed by a range of actors, such as the United Front Work Department, the Propaganda Ministry, and the Ministry of State Security. A cornerstone of China’s strategy includes appealing to overseas Chinese citizens or ethnic Chinese citizens of other countries to advance Party objectives through soft power. China also sometimes uses coercion or blackmail to manipulate overseas Chinese citizens to conduct influence operations on behalf of China, such as threatening ethnic Uighurs living in the United States with imprisonment of their family members. Chinese intelligence services often facilitate these operations. Additionally, China targets ethnic Chinese citizens of other countries to support its foreign technology acquisition strategy; its “Thousand Talents Program” prioritizes recruiting people of Chinese descent or recent Chinese emigrants whose recruitment the Chinese government views as necessary to China’s scientific and technical modernization, especially with regard to defense technology. Furthermore, China harnesses academia and educational institutions, think tanks, and state-run media to advance its soft power campaign in support of China’s security interests. For example, Chinese students abroad and academic organizations are used to spread the Party’s narrative on Tibet and the Dalai Lama. Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) and Confucius Institutes organize events to support China’s sovereignty claims and lodge complaints and organize protests against academic institutions that conduct activities which differ from China’s polices. As of 2018, Xinhua News Agency, China's largest state-run media outlet and the Party’s official mouthpiece, has not complied with the U.S. Department of Justice’s request to register the agency’s U.S. staff as foreign

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展113名代理人根据外国代理人登记法(FARA)。中国领导人可能认为开放的民主国家容易受到包括美国在内的行动的影响。中国的外国影响力活动主要集中在建立和维持一个外国政府的权力掮客,以促进政策,中国认为将促进中国的崛起,尽管中国声明的立场,不干涉外国的内政。中国的外交外联强调与有影响力的人建立私人关系,提供援助,并通过贸易和外交强调"双赢合作"。通过这种方式,中国可以为其海外合作伙伴提供快速、小规模的成就,通常以支持中国长期战略目标的看似象征性姿态作为交换。一些国家已经开始对中国的影响活动采取政策应对措施,包括在欧盟以及澳大利亚和新西兰。

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   113 agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). China’s leaders probably consider open democracies as susceptible to influence operations, including the United States. China’s foreign influence activities are predominately focused on establishing and maintaining power brokers within a foreign government to promote policies that China believes will facilitate China’s rise, despite China’s stated position of not interfering in foreign countries’ internal affairs. China’s diplomatic outreach stresses building personal rapport with influential people, providing assistance, and emphasizing “win-win cooperation” through trade and diplomacy. This approach allows China to offer expedited, small-scale accomplishments for partners abroad, often in exchange for seemingly symbolic gestures that support China’s long-term strategic goals. Some countries have begun to implement policy responses to Chinese influence activities, including within the European Union as well as Australia and New Zealand.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展114特别主题:自2013年获得北极理事会观察员地位以来,中国在北极地区的活动和参与有所增加。2018年1月,中国公布了第一个北极战略,宣传"极地丝绸之路",并自称中国是"近北极国家" 该战略将中国的利益确定为获取自然资源、保护北极特殊发展中国家,以及在北极事务中树立"负责任的大国"形象。该战略强调,中国的破冰船和研究站是实施该战略不可或缺的组成部分。中国在冰岛和挪威设有研究站,并运营着一艘乌克兰制造的破冰研究船—— Xuelong 号。2017年,该船完成了第8次北极探险,成为第一艘穿越加拿大西北水道的中国官方船只。2016年,中国委托制造了一系列新的"可携冰"巡逻艇。2018年9月下旬,Xuelong 完成了第9次北极探险。今年9月,中国还启动了第二艘破冰研究船—— 国产雪龙2号。雪龙2号将能够破冰1.5米厚,相比之下,原雪龙的最大破冰深度为1.2米。此外,雪龙2号是第一艘可以在移动前后时破冰的极地考察船。北极边境国家对中国在该地区不断扩大的能力和兴趣表示担忧。丹麦政府公开表达了对中国对格陵兰岛兴趣的担忧,其中包括在格陵兰岛建立一个研究站、建立一个卫星地面站、翻新机场和扩大采矿的提议。民用研究可以支持加强中国在北冰洋的军事存在,其中可能包括在该地区部署潜艇,作为对核攻击的威慑。2018年9月,俄罗斯国际事务委员会的一位俄罗斯专家表示,俄罗斯俄罗斯强烈反对外国破冰船在北海航线上作业,包括美国和中国的破冰船。除了北海航线的潜在摩擦,北极地区是中俄商业合作的一个机遇区,此外还有能源开发和基础设施项目,如亚马尔液化天然气项目。

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   114 SPECIAL TOPIC: CHINA IN THE ARCTIC China has increased activities and engagement in the Arctic region since gaining observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013. In January 2018, China published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a “Polar Silk Road” and self-declared China to be a “Near-Arctic State.” The strategy identifies China’s interests as access to natural resources, securing Arctic SLOCs, and promoting an image of a “responsible major country” in Arctic affairs. The strategy highlights China’s icebreaker vessels and research stations as integral to its implementation. China maintains research stations in Iceland and Norway and operates one Ukrainian-built icebreaking research vessel, the Xuelong, which in 2017 completed its 8th Arctic expedition and became the first Chinese official vessel to traverse Canada’s Northwest Passage. In 2016, China commissioned the first of a new series of “ice-capable” patrol boats. In late September 2018, the Xuelong completed its 9th Arctic expedition. In September, China also launched its second icebreaking research vessel, the domestically built Xuelong 2. The Xuelong 2 will be able to break ice 1.5 meters thick, compared to the original Xuelong’s maximum of 1.2 meters. Furthermore, the Xuelong 2 is the first polar research vessel that can break ice while moving forwards or backwards. Arctic border countries have raised concerns about China’s expanding capabilities and interest in the region. The government of Denmark has publicly expressed concern about China’s interest in Greenland, which has included proposals to establish a research station in Greenland, establish a satellite ground station, renovate airports, and expand mining. Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks. In September 2018, a Russian expert at the Russian International Affairs Council stated the Russian Federation was strongly opposed to foreign icebreakers operating on the Northern Sea Route, including U.S. and Chinese icebreakers. Outside potential friction over the Northern Sea Route, the Arctic region is an area of opportunity for Sino-Russian commercial cooperation, in addition to energy development and infrastructure projects such as the Yamal liquefied natural gas project.

国防部长办公室向国会的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展,附录一:中国和台湾的军队数据由于作为解放军改革的一部分,正在进行的作战单位重组,作为单位正在建立、缩编、重组或解散的过程中,角色塑造和单位及系统的数量是大致的。因此,今年报告中的数据也采用了一种新的方法,这种方法可能导致与以往报告中显示的数字大不相同,但不一定反映能力的突然变化。台海军事平衡,地面力量

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   115 APPENDIX I: CHINA AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA Due to ongoing restructuring of combat units as part of PLA reforms, the characterization and numbers of units and systems are approximate as units are in the process of establishing, downsizing, reorganizing, or disbanding. The data in this year’s report also consequently applies a new methodology that may result in significantly different numbers than shown in previous reports, but does not necessarily reflect a sudden change in capability. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces

中国

China

台湾

Taiwan

合计

Total

东区及南区

Eastern and Southern

剧院

Theaters

合计

Total

地面部队人员总数:1,020,000408,000140,000

Total Ground Force Personnel 1 1,020,000 408,000 140,000

集团军1353

Group Armies 13 5 3

联合武装旅78(包括5个两栖任务)30(包括5个两栖任务) NA

Combined Arms Brigades 78 (includes 5 with amphibious role) 30 (includes 5 with amphibious role) NA

机械化步兵向联合武装旅过渡(见上文)3

Mechanized Infantry Brigades Transitioning to Combined Arms Brigades (see above) 3

摩托化步兵旅6

Motorized Infantry Brigades 6

装甲旅4

Armor Brigades 4

空中突击 / 陆军航空旅1554

Air Assault/Army Aviation Brigades 15 5 4

炮兵旅1553

Artillery Brigades 15 5 3

空降旅660

Airborne Brigades 6 6 0

海军陆战旅642

Marine Brigades 6 4 2

坦克5,800 UNKNOWN 800

Tanks 5,800 UNKNOWN 800

炮兵8000件 UNKNOWN 1000件

Artillery Pieces 8,000 UNKNOWN 1,000

注:本表以 PLA 作战单位为重点,并将观察到的新集团军的广泛变化应用于所有集团军单位。在中国人民解放军向各旅过渡的过程中,新集团军的建设采用的方法是每个特种旅(陆军航空 / 空中突击和炮兵)和六个联合武器旅之一。一些单位可能处于开发的早期阶段,不能充分运作。"台湾海峡地区"包括中国人民解放军东部和南部战区的部分国家级资产和单位。我们无法估计目前在这两个战区的坦克和野战炮的数量。

Note: This chart focuses on PLA combat units and applies observed widespread changes in the new group armies to all group army units. Methodology applied for the new group army construct as the PLA Army transitions to brigades is one of each specialty brigade (army aviation/air assault and artillery) and six combined arms brigades. Some units are likely in the early stages of development and not fully operational. The “Taiwan Strait Area” includes select national-level assets and units in the PLA’s Eastern and Southern Theater Commands. We are unable to estimate the number of tanks and field artillery located in these two theaters at this time.

1中国人民解放军地面部队一百零二万人中,估计作战部队有九十一万五千人,其中三十六万人在台湾海峡地区。

1 Of the 1,020,000 personnel in the PLA ground forces, it is estimated that 915,000 are in combat units, with 360,000 in the Taiwan Strait Area.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   116 Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces

中国

China

台湾

Taiwan

合计

Total

东区及南区

Eastern and Southern

剧院

Theater

合计

Total

航空母舰100

Aircraft Carriers 1 0 0

驱逐舰33234

Destroyers 33 23 4

护卫舰544322

Frigates 54 43 22

轻型护卫舰42330

Corvettes 42 33 0

坦克登陆艇 /

Tank Landing Ships/

船坞登陆舰373514

Amphibious Transport Dock 37 35 14

中型登陆舰22160

Medium Landing Ships 22 16 0

柴油攻击潜艇50342

Diesel Attack Submarines 50 34 2

核攻击潜艇620

Nuclear Attack Submarines 6 2 0

美国弹道导弹440潜艇

Ballistic Missile Submarines 4 4 0

海岸巡逻(导弹)866844

Coastal Patrol (Missile) 86 68 44

海岸警卫队船只

Coast Guard Ships 248 N / A 23

注意:解放军海军拥有亚洲最大的主要战斗人员、潜艇和两栖作战。如果台湾发生重大冲突,东南战区海军将直接参与对台湾海军的行动。北方战区海军(未上映)将主要负责保护通往中国的海上通道,但可以提供关键任务资产,以支持其他舰队。在冲突中,中国也可能使用 CCG 和 PAFMM 船只来支持军事行动。本表反映了作业单位,不包括正在建造、装备或进行海上试验的单位。

Note: The PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the Eastern and Southern Theater Navies would participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The Northern Theater Navy (not shown) would be responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to China, but could provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets. In conflict, China may also employ CCG and PAFMM ships to support military operations. This table reflects operational units and does not include units under construction, outfitting, or conducting sea trials.

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   117 Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces

中国

China

台湾

Taiwan

合计

Total

东区及

Eastern and

南方剧院

Southern Theater

合计

Total

歼击机1500架(2600 *)600架(750 *)350架(450 *)

Fighters 1,500 (2,600*) 600 (750*) 350 (450*)

轰炸机 / 攻击4502500

Bombers/Attack 450 250 0

运输4503030

Transport 450 30 30

特派团飞机1509030

Special Mission Aircraft 150 90 30

注:这个图表显示了来自解放军空军和解放军空军的作战军用飞机的估计总数。然而,人民解放军空军可以在作战情况下用民用飞机补充其军事运输。* 括号中的总数包括战斗机训练员。

Note: This chart displays estimated totals of operational military aircraft from both PLAAF and PLAN Aviation. However, the PLAAF may supplement its military transports with civilian aircraft in a combat scenario. *The totals in parentheses include fighter trainers.

中国的火箭力量

China’s Rocket Force

系统

System

发射器

Launchers

导弹

Missiles

估计范围

Estimated Range

90905,500公里

ICBM 90 90 >5,500km

Irbm 8080-1603000-5500公里

IRBM 80 80-160 3,000-5,500km

150-4501000-3000公里

MRBM 150 150-450 1,000-3,000km

Srbm 250750-1500300-1000公里

SRBM 250 750-1500 300-1,000km

全球土地管理90270-5401500公里

GLCM 90 270-540 >1,500km

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   118 APPENDIX II: MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES

2018年美中军事对话

U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS FOR 2018

高层访问中国

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO CHINA

月份(2018年)

Month (2018)

国防部长六月

Secretary of Defense June

对美国人民解放军总司令的高级别访问

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO UNITED STATES PLA Army Commander May Minister of Defense November

经常交流外交和安全对话11月美国军事海事协商协定工作组和中国工作组和全体会议5月 / 12月美国国防政策协调会谈12月

RECURRENT EXCHANGES Diplomatic and Security Dialogue November Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group in the United States and the Working Group and Plenary in China May/ December Defense Policy Coordination Talks in the United States December

学术交流美国陆军战争学院代表团访问中国一月份美国空军战争学院代表团访问中国三月份解放军空军指挥学院代表团访问美国四月份美国国防大学压顶石代表团访问中国五月份美国海军陆战队战争学院代表团访问中国五月份美国五月份中国人民解放军国防大学

ACADEMIC EXCHANGES U.S. Army War College Delegation to China January U.S. Air War College Delegation to China March PLA Air Force Command College Delegation to United States April U.S. National Defense University CAPSTONE Delegation to China May U.S. Marine Corps War College Delegation to China May PLA National Defense University Delegation to United States May PLA Academy of Military Science Delegation to United States December

中国功能交流灾害管理交流中心

FUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES Disaster Management Exchange in China November

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展119

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   119

2019年美中军事交流计划

U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES PLANNED FOR 2019

美国高级国防或军事领导人对中国的高层访问

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO CHINA U.S. Senior Defense or Military Leader to China (TBD)

中华人民共和国高级国防或军事领导人对美国的高级别访问(待定)

HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO UNITED STATES PRC Senior Defense or Military Leader to the United States (TBD)

制度化交流防务政策协调会谈(TBD)联合参谋对话机制 MMCA 全体会议和工作组防务协商会谈(TBD)亚太安全对话(TBD)

INSTITUTIONALIZED EXCHANGES Defense Policy Coordination Talks (TBD) Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism (TBD) MMCA Plenary and Working Groups (TBD) Defense Consultative Talks (TBD) Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (TBD)

学术交流中国科学院美国代表团(TBD)或中国科学院代表团

ACADEMIC EXCHANGES PRC Academy delegation to the United States (TBD) U.S. NDU or Academy delegation to China (TBD)

功能交流灾难管理交流(TBD) PLA 海军舰艇访问美国(TBD)美国海军舰艇访华(TBD)

FUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES Disaster Management Exchange (TBD) PLA Navy Ship Visit to the United States (TBD) U.S. Navy Ship Visit to China (TBD)

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   120 APPENDIX III: CHINA’S TOP CRUDE SUPPLIERS IN 2018

2018年中国最大原油供应国产量(每天1000桶)

China’s Top Crude Suppliers 2018 Country Volume (1,000 barrels/day)

百分比

Percentage of

进口原油俄罗斯1,43415沙特阿拉伯1,13612安哥拉94910伊拉克90210阿曼6597巴西6337伊朗5866科威特4655委内瑞拉3334刚果(布拉柴维尔)2523其他1,90321

Imported Crude Oil Russia 1,434 15 Saudi Arabia 1,136 12 Angola 949 10 Iraq 902 10 Oman 659 7 Brazil 633 7 Iran 586 6 Kuwait 465 5 Venezuela 333 4 Congo (Brazzaville) 252 3 Others 1,903 21

合计

Total

9,252

9,252

100

100

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展附录 IV:首字母缩写 a2 / ad 反进入 / 区域拒绝 aew & c 空中预警机非洲司令部美国非洲司令部情报收集船 AI Artificial Intelligence 亚洲基础设施投资银行 APT10亚洲基础设施投资银行 APT10反进阶持续性渗透攻击反舰弹道导弹反舰巡航导弹东盟东南亚国家联盟反舰巡航导弹东南亚反潜作战蝙蝠蝠百度弹道导弹防务指挥部阿里巴巴指挥控制部 C4I 指挥部, 中国科学院中国科学院中国航天科学工业公司中国海岸警卫队中国共产党巡洋舰中央军事委员会军民一体化 DDG 导弹驱逐舰工业基地国防部美国国防部民进民主进步党设备开发部专属经济区电子战电子导弹导弹护卫舰导弹护卫舰国内生产总值地面发射巡航导弹人道主义援助 / 救灾全球定位系统综合防空洲际弹道导弹

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   121 APPENDIX IV: ACRONYMS A2/AD Anti-access/area denial AEW&C Airborne early warning and control AFRICOM AGI United States Africa Command Intelligence collection ship AI Artificial intelligence AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank APT10 Advanced Persistent Threat 10 ASBM Anti-ship ballistic missile ASCM Anti-ship cruise missile ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASW Anti-submarine warfare BAT BMD Baidu Alibaba Tencent Ballistic missile defense C2 Command and control C4I Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence C4ISR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance CAS China Academy of Sciences CASIC China Aerospace and Science Industry Corporation CCG China Coast Guard CCP Chinese Communist Party CG Cruiser CMC Central Military Commission CMI Civil-Military Integration DDG Guided missile destroyer DIB Defense industrial base DoD U.S. Department of Defense DPP Democratic Progressive Party EDD Equipment Development Department EEZ Exclusive economic zone EW Electronic warfare FFG Guided-missile frigate FFL Corvette GDP Gross domestic product GLCM Ground-launched cruise missile GPS Global Positioning System HA/DR Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief IADS Integrated air defense system ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展国际能源机构国际信息和通信技术国际能源机构 IO 信息行动 INDOPACOM 国际刑警组织美国印度太平洋司令部国际警察 IRBM 远程弹道导弹情报、监视、侦察 JLSF 联合后勤支援部 JOCC 联合行动指挥中心联合参谋部陆上攻击巡航导弹海洋公约法 LPD 船坞登陆舰登陆舰 MIRV 可重返载具 v 多重独立目标再入载具 MOOTW 军事行动公共安全部以外的其他军事行动中程弹道导弹 国家安全委员会国家安全委员会国家科学基金委员会国家科学基金委员会国家科学基金委员会"一带一路"计划超视距行动武警部队人民武装警察维持和平行动武装部队人民解放军海上民兵解放军解放军解放军解放军解放军解放军解放军解放军解放军空军解放军海军陆战队解放军解放军海军陆战队解放军火箭部队中华人民共和国研究开发环太平洋科技面对空导弹

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   122 ICT Information and communications technology IEA International Energy Agency IO Information operations INDOPACOM INTERPOL United States Indo-Pacific Command International police IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile ISR Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance JLSF Joint Logistics Support Force JOCC Joint Operations Command Center JSD Joint Staff Department LACM Land-attack cruise missile LOSC Law of the Sea Convention LPD Amphibious transport dock LST Tank landing ship MaRV Maneuverable reentry vehicle MIRV Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles MOOTW Military operations other than war MPS Ministry of Public Security MR Military region MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile MSS Ministry of State Security NFU “No first use” NSC National Security Commission NSFC National Science Foundation of China OBOR “One Belt, One Road” Initiative OTH Over-the-horizon PAP People’s Armed Police PKO Peacekeeping operations PAFMM People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia PLA People’s Liberation Army PLAA PLA Army PLAAF PLA Air Force PLAN PLA Navy PLANMC PLA Navy Marine Corps PLARF PLA Rocket Force PRC People’s Republic of China R&D Research and development RIMPAC RIM OF THE PACIFIC S&T Science and technology SAM Surface-to-air missile

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展123枚潜射弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 短程弹道导弹特种作战部队 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 短程弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 潜射弹道导弹 / 核动

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   123 SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile SLOC Sea lines of communication SLV Space Launch Vehicles SOF Special operations forces SRBM Short-range ballistic missile SS Diesel-powered attack submarine SSBN Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine SSF Strategic Support Force SSN Nuclear-powered attack submarine SSP Air-independent attack submarine

国防部长办公室向国会提交的年度报告:涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全事态发展

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China   124

关于中国军事和安全发展的年度报告:机译:机译中文  2019-05-11 04:35   线路1   线路2   线路3 

(2019年5月2日,美国国防部)描述了一年来中国在提升和施展军力中的发展变化,包括:最可能用飞弹炸台湾;在「水下作战」投入大量资源;不只开拓「冰上丝路」,还可能在北极部署潜舰;第一艘国产航舰可能开始服役;研发先进高端武器;窃取美国科技;在世界各地增加军事基地。

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf

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